Skip to main content
×
Home
    • Aa
    • Aa

Paying for War and Building States: The Coalitional Politics of Debt Servicing and Tax Institutions

Abstract

Many scholars believe that intense warfare propelled state formation in early modern Europe because rulers built tax institutions to pay for wars. Scholars likewise cite milder geopolitical pressures to explain the lackluster state building in the developing world. The authors analyze episodes of ferocious warfare in and beyond Europe and find that despite similar fiscal strains, not all governments built strong tax institutions to service wartime debt. When net creditors in a country's credit market were part of the ruling political coalition, they pressed governments to diversify taxes and strengthen fiscal institutions to ensure debt service. But when net debtors held political sway, governments were indifferent to debt servicing and fiscal invigoration. Coalitional politics can help to explain why mounting debt-service obligations led to fiscal institution building in some cases, but not others. The analysis highlights how the private economic interests of ruling coalition members can affect state building.

  • View HTML
    • Send article to Kindle

      To send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

      Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

      Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

      Paying for War and Building States
      Available formats
      ×
      Send article to Dropbox

      To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Dropbox account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

      Paying for War and Building States
      Available formats
      ×
      Send article to Google Drive

      To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Google Drive account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

      Paying for War and Building States
      Available formats
      ×
Copyright
Linked references
Hide All

This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

Jeremy Adelman . 1995. “The Politics of Money in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Argentina.” In John Harriss , Janet Hunter , and Colin M. Lewis , eds., The New Institutional Economics and Third World Experience. London, UK: Routledge.

Elinor Barber . 1955. The Bourgeoisie in 18th Century France. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Nathaniel Beck . 2001. “Time-Series–Cross-Section Data: What Have We Learned in the Past Few Years?Annual Review of Political Science 4: 271–93. doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.4.1.271.

Nathaniel Beck , and Jonathan Katz . 1995. “What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data.” American Political Science Review 89, no. 3: 634–47. doi: 10.2307/2082979.

Timothy Besley , and Torsten Persson . 2011. Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Richard Bonney . 1993a. “ ‘Le Secret de leurs Familles’: The Fiscal and Social Limits of Louis XIV's Dixième .” French History 7, no. 4: 383416. doi: 10.1093/fh/7.4.383.

Richard Bonney . 1999. “France, 1494–1815.” In Richard Bonney , ed., The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c. 1200–1815 . Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

David Cannadine . 1977. “Aristocratic Indebtedness in the Nineteenth Century: The Case Re-opened.” Economic History Review 30, no. 4: 624–50. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0289.1977.tb00286.x.

Miguel Centeno . 1997. “Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America.” American Journal of Sociology 102, no. 6: 1565–605. doi: 10.1086/231127.

Gary Cox . 2011. “War, Moral Hazard, and Ministerial Responsibility: England after the Glorious Revolution.” Journal of Economic History 71, no. 1: 133–61. doi: 10.1017/S0022050711000052.

Gerardo della Paolera , and Alan Taylor . 2001. Straining at the Anchor: The Argentine Currency Board and the Search for Macroeconomic Stability, 1880–1935. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press.

Mark Dincecco . 2011. Political Transformations and Public Finances: Europe, 1650–1913. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Thomas Ertman . 1997. Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Anna Filipczak-Kocur . 1999. “Poland-Lithuania before Partition.” In Richard Bonney , ed., The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c. 1200–1815. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Gustavo Flores-Macías , and Sarah Kreps . 2013. “Political Parties at War: A Study of American War Finance, 1798–2010.” American Political Science Review 107, no. 4: 833–48. doi: 10.1017/S0003055413000476.

Michael Herron , and Kevin Quinn . 2016. “A Careful Look at Modern Case Selection Methods.” Sociological Methods & Research 45, no. 3: 458–92. doi: 10.1177/0049124114547053.

K. Kivanç Karaman , and S˛evket Pamuk . 2013. “Different Paths to the Modern State in Europe: The Interaction between Warfare, Economic Structure, and Political Regime.” American Political Science Review 107, no. 3: 603–26. doi: 10.1017/S0003055413000312.

Edgar Kiser . 1994. “Markets and Hierarchies in Early Modern Tax Systems: A Principal-Agent Analysis.” Politics & Society 22, no. 3: 284315. doi: 10.1177/0032329294022003003.

Edgar Kiser , and Joshua Kane . 2001. “Revolution and State Structure: The Bureaucratization of Tax Administration in Early Modern England and France.” American Journal of Sociology 107, no. 1: 183223. doi: 10.1086/323656.

Evan Lieberman . 2002. “Taxation Data as Indicators of State-Society Relations: Possibilities and Pitfalls in Cross-National Research.” Studies in Comparative International Development 36, no. 4: 89115. doi: 10.1007/BF02686334.

F. J. McLynn 1984. “Consequences for Argentina of the War of Triple Alliance 1865–1870.” Americas 41, no. 1: 8198. doi: 10.2307/1006949.

Douglass North , and Barry Weingast . 1989. “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England.” Journal of Economic History 49, no. 4: 803–32. doi: 10.1017/S0022050700009451.

Patrick O’Brien . 1988. “The Political Economy of British Taxation, 1660–1815.” Economic History Review 41, no. 1: 132. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0289.1988.tb00453.x.

Patrick O’Brien . 2011. “The Nature and Historical Evolution of an Exceptional Fiscal State and Its Possible Significance for the Precocious Commercialization and Industrialization of the British Economy from Cromwell to Nelson.” Economic History Review 64, no. 2: 408–46. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0289.2010.00538.x.

Patrick O’Brien , and Philip Hunt . 1999. “England, 1485–1815.” In Richard Bonney , ed., The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, c. 1200–1815. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

José Panettieri . 1980. “La Ley de Conversión monetaria de 1864 y la Oficina de Cambio de 1867. Causas y consecuencias económico-sociales.” Desarrollo Económico 20, no. 79: 383412. doi: 10.2307/3466436.

David Parker . 1996. Class and State in Ancien Régime France: The Road to Modernity? London, UK: Routledge.

D. C. M. Platt 1983. “Foreign Finance in Argentina for the First Half-Century of Independence.” Journal of Latin American Studies 15, no. 1: 2347. doi: 10.1017/S0022216X0000955X.

John Plumb . 1967. The Origins of Political Stability, England 1675–1725. Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin.

Guy Rowlands . 2012. The Financial Decline of a Great Power: War, Influence, and Money in Louis XIV's France. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Ryan Saylor . 2013. “Concepts, Measures, and Measuring Well: An Alternative Outlook.” Sociological Methods & Research 42, no. 3: 354–91. doi: 10.1177/0049124113500476.

Ryan Saylor . 2014. State Building in Boom Times: Commodities and Coalitions in Latin America and Africa. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press.

Theda Skocpol , and Margaret Somers . 1980. “The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 22, no. 2: 174–97. doi: 10.1017/S0010417500009282.

David Stasavage . 2003. Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State: France and Great Britain, 1688–1789. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

David Stasavage . 2007. “Partisan Politics and Public Debt: The Importance of the ‘Whig Supremacy’ for Britain's Financial Revolution.” European Review of Economic History 11, no. 1: 123–53. doi: 10.1017/S1361491606001900.

Richard Stubbs . 1999. “War and Economic Development: Export-Oriented Industrialization in East and Southeast Asia.” Comparative Politics 31, no. 3: 337–55. doi: 10.2307/422343.

Cameron Thies . 2005. “War, Rivalry, and State Building in Latin America.” American Journal of Political Science 49, no. 3: 451–65. doi: 10.2307/3647725.

David Weir . 1989. “Tontines, Public Finance, and Revolution in France and England, 1688–1789.” Journal of Economic History 49, no. 1: 95124. doi: 10.1017/S002205070000735X.

Nicholas Wheeler . 2011. “The Noble Enterprise of State-Building: Reconsidering the Rise and Fall of the Modern State in Prussia and Poland.” Comparative Politics 44, no. 1: 2138. doi: 10.5129/001041510X13815229366480.

Eugene White . 2004. “From Privatized to Government-Administered Tax Collection: Tax Farming in Eighteenth-Century France.” Economic History Review 57, no. 4: 636–63. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0289.2004.00291.x.

Andrzej Wyrobisz . 1989. “Power and Towns in the Polish Gentry Commonwealth: The Polish-Lithuanian State in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries.” Theory and Society 18, no. 5: 611–30. doi: 10.1007/BF00149494.

Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla . 2012. “Introduction.” In Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla and Patrick O’Brien , eds., The Rise of Fiscal States: A Global History 1500–1914. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla , and Patrick O’Brien , eds. 2012. The Rise of Fiscal States: A Global History 1500–1914. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

World Politics
  • ISSN: 0043-8871
  • EISSN: 1086-3338
  • URL: /core/journals/world-politics
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *
×

Metrics

Altmetric attention score

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 1
Total number of PDF views: 329 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 851 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between 6th March 2017 - 24th September 2017. This data will be updated every 24 hours.