¹ On deductive reasoning for the stability of bipolar systems, see Waltz, Kenneth, “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” Daedalus 93 (1964)Google Scholar; idem, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), chap. 8; and Snyder, Glenn and Diesing, Paul, Conflict among Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977)Google Scholar, chap. 6. For empirical evidence that bipolar systems are more stable, see Levy, Jack, “The Polarity of the System and International Stability: An Empirical Analysis,” in Sabrosky, Alan Ned, ed., Polarity and War (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), 54—58Google Scholar, 66. For a game-theoretical perspective, see Oye, Kenneth A., ed., Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).Google Scholar For an application to the 1930s, see Posen, Barry, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984)Google Scholar; for the postwar period, see Gaddis, John, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).Google Scholar For a similar rationale in different international contexts, see Gowa, Joanne, “Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images,” International Organization 40 (Winter 1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; idem, “Bipolarity, Multipolarity and Free Trade, “American Political Science Review 83 (December 1989); and Mandelbaum, Michael, The Fate of Nations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² See Mearsheimer, John, “Back to the Future,” International Security 15 (Summer 1990).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³ The most extreme representative is Fukuyama, Francis, “The End of History?” National Interest 16 (Summer 1989).Google Scholar On realist, or “Hobbesian,” pessimists versus liberal optimists in post-cold war Europe, see Snyder, Jack, “Averting Anarchy in the New Europe,” International Security 14 (Spring 1990).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ On democracies and war, see Doyle, Michael, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review 80 (December 1986).CrossRefGoogle Scholar On the trading state, see Rosecrance, Richard, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modem World (New York: Basic Books, 1986).Google Scholar For a brief recent review of the economic-liberal argument concerning the connection between a market economy and peace, see Levy, Jack, “Domestic Politics and War,” in Rotberg, Robert and Rabb, Theodore, eds., The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 89–90.Google Scholar

⁵ Such inside-out theories expect high correlation between internal attributes, states' foreign policies, and international outcomes. These theories include second-image theories (such as the Wilsonian, the liberal economic, and Marxist schools); see Waltz, Kenneth, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959)Google Scholar, chaps. 4, 5; Doyle (fn.4); Hoffmann, Stanley, “Liberalism and International Affairs,” in Hoffmann, , Janus and Minerva (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987)Google Scholar; and Grotian perspectives, which argue that common norms and beliefs facilitate cooperation, most recently in the regime literature, e.g., Ruggie, John, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” in Krasner, Stephen, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983).Google Scholar For criticism of inside-out theories, see Waltz, Man, State and War; and idem (fn. 1, 1979).

⁶ The most influential structural theory is Waltz (fn. 1, 1979). For criticism and Waltz's response, see Keohane, Robert, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).Google Scholar A recent development related to structural theory is the emergence of the literature on cooperation under anarchy. See Axelrod, Robert, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984)Google Scholar; Oye (fn. 1); and Jervis, Robert, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30 (January 1978).CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Keohane, , After Hegemony (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).Google Scholar Cooperation theory uses game theory, especially the Prisoners’ Dilemma.

⁷ The critical element that characterizes a crisis and that differentiates it from a normal period is the dangerously high probability of resort to military force; see Brecher, Michael, “Toward a Theory of International Crisis Behavior,” international Studies Quarterly 21 (March 1977)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 6–7. Conflict resolution refers to settlement of the fundamental issues in conflict.

⁸ More specifically, the recent systemic changes might lead to greater problems in crisis management than in the postwar era, but the unit-level changes, if they persist and spread further, should lead to greater successes at conflict resolution. Thus, they should lead to more effective crisis prevention and should lessen the likelihood that crises will occur in the first place, especially in regions that have seen the most far-reaching domestic changes—Europe and Latin America. In other regions (notably the Middle East, some parts of Asia and Africa, and the former Soviet empire and the Balkans) the combination of the decline of bipolarity and the severe limits to the unit-level changes suggests that there might be growing problems in crisis prevention and in crisis management and less stability than in the last forty-five years unless the great powers in cooperation with the local parties make a concerted attempt to resolve conflicts and maintain stable balances of forces.

⁹ See Holsti, Ole, Crisis, Escalation, War (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1972)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Janis, Irving, Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972)Google Scholar; Allison, Graham, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971)Google Scholar; Ole Holsti, and George, Alexander, “The Effects of Stress on the Performance of Foreign Policy-Makers,” Political Science Annual 6 (1975)Google Scholar; George, Alexander, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), 47–49Google Scholar; Lebow, Richard Ned, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981)Google Scholar; idem, Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987); and Jervis, Robert, Lebow, Richard Ned, and Stein, Janice, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985).Google Scholar

¹⁰ In the Prisoners' Dilemma the players have only two choices: defection or cooperation. By contrast, cooperation might more appropriately be conceived of as a continuum. On this point, see Jervis, Robert, “Realism, Game Theory and Cooperation,” World Politics 40 (April 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; George, Alexander et al., U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 5Google Scholar n. 4, 11 n. 31, 14; and Haggard, Stephan and Simmons, Beth, “Theories of International Regimes,” International Organization 41 (Summer 1987), 504.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Despite the importance that structural theory attaches to the international effects of the number of players on outcomes such as stability and order, it is not clear from that literature whether one should expect more cooperation in a bipolar or a multipolar system and what kind of cooperation, if any, is expected in each of the systems. Cf. Waltz (fn. 1, 1964), 882–83; idem (fn. 1, 1979), 171, 175; and Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 446; versus Waltz (fn. 1, 1979), chaps. 8, 9; Snyderand Diesing (fn. 1), 506–7; Oye (fn. 1), 4; and Gowa (fn. 1, 1986), 172. Moreover, in Waltz's work on bipolar stability (fn. 1, 1964 and 1979) it is not completely clear whether system stability means durability or peacefulness or both. See Ruggie, John, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis,” in Keohane (fn. 6, 1986), 153–54.Google Scholar

¹¹ See George et al. (fn. 10), 6; Jervis (fn. 10); Haggard and Simmons (fn. 10), 500–506.

¹² Obviously, there is not total correlation between the theoretical element of the puzzles and the historical cases that illustrate them. Yet there are critical elements in the historical cases that correspond to the essence of these puzzles, especially when considered in comparison with other periods. For example, the nineteenth-century powers were moderate and similar in comparison with the postwar U.S. and Soviet Union. Moreover, the focus here is on explaining not a specific historical case but rather certain types of international phenomena such as inadvertent wars, tacit rules, or concerts.

¹³ As the literature on these two wars is vast, it is noteworthy that a recent major volume on crisis management, which provides a comprehensive treatment of inadvertent wars, includes case studies of the Crimean War and World War I. See Richard Smoke, “The Crimean War,” and Levy, Jack, “The Role of Crisis Management in the Outbreak of World War I,” both in George, Alexander, ed., Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991).Google Scholar Although the precise dates of the Concert are disputed, most scholars agree that the Concert lasted until the Crimean War. This war was thus clearly a case of failed crisis management under the Concert. See the references in Kupchan, Charles and Kupchan, Clifford, “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe,” International Security 16 (Summer 1991), 122CrossRefGoogle Scholar n. 23. Even World War I can be seen, at least to some extent, as a failed crisis management under the Concert. Not only did the Concert endure in name until World War I, but as late as 1913 the great powers convened a conference in London to address the Balkan conflict. Moreover, Britain and Germany experienced a de tente in their relations in the three years preceding World War I. See Mandelbaum (fn. 1), 55; and Lynn-Jones, Sean, “Detente and Deterrence,” International Security 11 (Fall 1986).CrossRefGoogle Scholar On World War I as an inadvertent war, see also the fairly comprehensive list of references in Lynn-Jones, 121–23 nn. 1—5. It is true that this characterization of World War I contrasts with the argument of the Fischer school of historians concerning the German aggression that led to the war (cited in Lynn-Jones, 123 n. 6), but there is a widespread view that the cultural similarity of the nineteenth-century powers underlined the Concert of Europe (see Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society [New York: Columbia University Press, 1977], 226, 316–17)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, as did also the relative moderation of these powers' foreign policies, even including Germany's, on the eve of World War I. Robert Jervis writes: “If we were to add up each state's expansionism in this period, we would expect a moderate international system” see Jervis, , “Systems Theories and Diplomatic History,” in Lauren, Paul, ed., Diplomacy (New York: Free Press, 1979), 213.Google Scholar Indeed, even Fischer's supporters accept that Germany did not want a world war but stumbled into it as a result of misguided attempts to ensure German security. See Christensen, Thomas and Snyder, Jack, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization 44 (Spring 1990), 148CrossRefGoogle Scholar n. 25.

¹⁴ The postwar era will be defined here as the period from the late 1940s to the late 1980s. During that time the structure of the international system was bipolar: the U.S. and the Soviet Union were the most powerful states in overall capabilities and the leading actors in influencing patterns of conflict and cooperation in the global system.

¹⁵ On unintended consequences in international politics, see Waltz (fn. 1, 1979); Jervis (fn.13), 216–19; and Gaddis (fn. 1), 217–18. For more general discussions of unintended conse quences, see Summer, William, “War,” in War and Other Essays (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911)Google Scholar; and Deutsch, Morton, The Resolution of Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 358.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Classical realist writers include Carr, E. H., The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919–1939 (New York: Harper and Row, 1964)Google Scholar; Morgenthau, Hans, Politics among Nations, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978)Google Scholar; and Aron, Raymond, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (New York: Praeger, 1967).Google Scholar On the difficulties of security cooperation, see Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” in Krasner (fn. 5); and Lipson, Charles, “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,” World Politics 37 (October 1984).CrossRefGoogle Scholar For a recent presentation of the realists' views on the limits of cooperation, see Grieco, Joseph, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization 42 (Summer 1988).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁷ Although Waltz (fn. 1, 1979), 180–81, considers nuclear arms as a unit-level element, they are qualitatively different from such internal factors as ideology and domestic politics. Rather, nuclear weapons are an indispensable part of the overall distribution of capabilities. Moreover, MAD as an objective situational constraint (irrespective of whether it is also a strategy or even if the dominant doctrine is flexible response—war fighting) fits well with the structural idea of objective factors that exercise restraining pressures on the actors regardless of their intentions, that is, their planned policies and strategic doctrines. On such a conception of nuclear deterrence, see Jervis, Robert, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989).Google Scholar

¹⁸ As we know from the history of unintended wars, such as the Crimean War and World War I, willingness to avoid war has not always been sufficient to prevent a major war, let alone to foster the emergence of such rules.

¹⁹ In general, the more concentrated the power within a certain industry, the easier is cooperation between the leading firms to maintain their price above the equilibrium level. This is based on Mancur Olson's collective goods theory; see Olson, , The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965)Google Scholar, chaps. 1–2; and Hardin, Russell, Collective Action (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 4—42.Google Scholar More specifically, Frederic M. Scherer, an economist, has argued that when only two firms dominate an industry, they will spontaneously coordinate their conduct to secure a higher price (namely, the oligopoly price). The larger the number of oligopolists, the more explicit their cooperation must be. See Scherer, , Industrial Pricing: Theory and Evidence (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970), 7—8Google Scholar, cited in Mandelbaum (fn. 1), 35 n. 26. In several experimental studies in social psychology, Thibaut and his associates have shown that two parties are more likely to devise norms of behavior to regulate their behavior and avoid conflict when both have the power and will ingness to affect the welfare of the other. See, e.g., Thibaut and Faucheux 1965, Thibaut 1968, Thibaut and Gruder 1969, which are cited in Patchen, Martin, Disputes between Nations (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988), 40.Google Scholar This kind of interdependence is especially high between the superpowers in a bipolar world.

²⁰ Major examples of the destabilizing effects of unclarity in the balance of interests and of related commitments to intervene include the Russian miscalculation of the British commitment to Turkey in 1853–54 and the German misjudgment of the British commitment to the Triple Entente in summer 1914. The first misperception led to escalation of the Crimean War. See, e.g., Smoke (fn. 13), 44. He highlights the destabilizing effects of the multipolar structure on the management of the Crimean crisis (p. 56). The second miscalculation was a major factor in the escalation of World War I. See, e.g., Levy (fn. 13), 88; and Lynn-Jones (fn. 13), 144. On the security dilemma, see Jervis (fn. 6). The terms buck-passing and free ridership, derived from the collective goods problem in Olson (fn. 19), are applied to multipolar systems by Posen (fn. 1), 63–64. For a recent refinement of Waltz's argument concerning the instability of multipolar systems, see Christensen and Snyder (fn. 13), 137–68.

²¹ For recent conceptualizations of the Concert of Europe as a mechanism for conflict resolution and system management, see Mandelbaum (fn. 1), chap. 1; and Clark, Ian, The Hierarchy of States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, chap. 6. On the Concert as a security regime in contrast to the absence of such a regime in the postwar era, see Jervis “Security Regimes,” in Krasner (fn. 5). For a distinction between a concert and other mechanisms for conflict management and for the theoretical underpinnings of these mechanisms and their application to the postwar and the post-cold war eras, see Miller, Benjamin, “A ‘New World Order’: From Balancing to Hegemony, Concert or Collective Security,’ International Interactions 18 (Fall 1992).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²² See, e.g., Miller, Benjamin, “Perspectives on Superpower Crisis Management and Conflict Resolution in the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” in Breslauer, George, ed., Soviet Strategy in the Middle East (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990).Google Scholar

²³ On the structural expectation that great powers will balance each other because of the dominance of security considerations in an anarchic system, see Wolfers, Arnold, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 122–24Google Scholar; Waltz (fn. 1, 1979), 123–28; and Walt, Stephen, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).Google Scholar

²⁴ Waltz (fn. 1), chap. 9, suggests that it should be easier to manage the international system when there are only two superpowers. For related points, see Snyder and Diesing (fn.1), 506–7; Oye (fn. 1), 4; Gowa (fn. 1, 1986), 172; and Mandelbaum (fn. 1), 35 n. 26.

²⁵ Jervis, , “From Balance of Power to Concert,” in Oye (fn. 1)Google Scholar, offers an interesting structural explanation of the formation of concerts following general wars. But a real concert arose in only one of the three historical instances in which a concert should, according to the theory, have been created.

²⁶ Such a cognitive-domestic account of the most recent superpower concert differs from Steve Weber's structural explanation of superpower joint custodianship; see Weber, , “Realism, Detente, and Nuclear Weapons,” International Organization 44 (Winter 1990).CrossRefGoogle Scholar My model can explain why a concert could emerge only after Gorbachev's reforms and not earlier, although Weber's structural change of the emergence of nuclear deterrence took place much earlier. Moreover, the model presented here is much more skeptical than Weber's about the endurance and effectiveness of such a concert in the event of a conservative/nationalist back lash in Russia, which would again deepen the ideological gulf between the two powers regardless of the endurance of MAD (mutual assured destruction).

²⁷ I am following Waltz's conception of a model of a theory (fn. 1, 1979), 7.

²⁸ See, e.g., the sources cited in fn. 6 in relation to the literature on cooperation under anarchy.

²⁹ See, e.g., the sources (Jervis, George, and Haggard and Simmons) cited in fn. 10.

³⁰ According to Max Weber, an ideal type is an arrangement of selected attributes detached from their contingent circumstances. See Weber, , Methodology of the Social Sciences (Glencoe, III.: Free Press, 1949), 89–110Google Scholar; and idem, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 20–22, 57–58. According to this definition, we could expect that some elements in each ideal type might be missing or appear in a different form in the real world.

³¹ The distinction here draws primarily on Friedrich Hayek's distinction between two sources of order. See Hayek, , Law, Legislation, and Liberty, vol. 1, Rules and Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973).Google Scholar I also draw on the categorizations in Young, Oran, “Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes,” in Krasner (fn. 5), 98–101Google Scholar; George Downs, W., Rocke, David M., and Siverson, Randolph M., “Arms Races and Cooperation,” World Politics 38 (October 1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and George et al. (fn. 10), esp. chaps. 26, 27, 29.

³² I draw here on Thomas Schelling's theory of interdependent decisions. See Schelling, , The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), chaps. 1—3.Google Scholar

³³ Krasner (fn. 5) defines regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations' (p. 2). I rely here especially on the work of Ruggie (fn. 5), who suggests that norms and principles constitute a regime's normative framework (p. 200). Rules and procedures are, by contrast, the instruments of a regime and are strongly affected by the power relations between the participants.

³⁴ On the term “situationally determined,” see Spiro Lastis, cited in Keohane (fn. 6, 1984), 27–28. While discussing spontaneous cooperation, both Schelling (fn. 32), chaps. 3, 4 (esp. pp. 71, 75) and Axelrod (fn. 4) highlight the influence of situational factors.

³⁵ Lindblom, Charles, The Intelligence of Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1965), 28–29Google Scholar; Lindblom, defines a “partisan decisionmaker” on pp. 3, 9.Google Scholar

³⁶ On the distinction between collaboration out of common interests and coordination due to common aversion, see Arthur Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World,” in Krasner (fn. 5). He also provides references to scholars who distinguish between positive and negative kinds of cooperation (p. 130 n. 27).

³⁷ See Schelling (fn. 32), 53–81.

³⁸ On promises, see Schelling (fn. 32), 43–46, 131–37, 175–77.

³⁹ On the accommodative element in crisis bargaining, see Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 243–80.

⁴⁰ For an extended discussion, see Schelling (fn. 32), 35–125; Williams, Phil, Crisis Management (London: Martin Robertson, 1976)Google Scholar; and Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 211–51.

⁴¹ See Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 10, 18. See also Hampson, Fen and Mandell, Brian, “Managing Regional Conflict: Security Co-operation and Third Party Mediators,” International Journal 45 (Spring 1990), 192–93 n. 2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴² A somewhat related argument is advanced by Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 248. Their impression is that the pattern of many more backdowns than compromises is more characteristic of crisis interaction than of noncrisis bargaining.

⁴³ See Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 451. On the definition of crisis management, see also George (fn. 13, 1991), 3–27; and Williams (fn. 40), 27–32.

⁴⁴ See Bull (fn. 13), 211.

⁴⁵ See Evron, Yair, “Great Power Military Intervention in the Middle East,” in Leitenberg, Milton and Sheffer, Gabriel, eds., Great Power Intervention in the Middle East (New York: Pergamon, 1979), 22.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ See Keal, Paul, Unspoken Rules and Superpower Dominance (London: Macmillan, 1983), 2–3CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gaddis, John, “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System,” International Security 10 (Spring 1986), 132–33CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Williams (fn. 40), 200.

⁴⁷ On the distinction between crisis management and crisis prevention, see George, Alexander, ed., Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), 365—69Google Scholar; and George et al. (fn. 10), esp. chap. 23. In crisis management the cooperation starts after the parties have already been drawn into a war-threatening confrontation. The collaboration is reflected in an effort to prevent the outbreak of a major war. By contrast, in crisis prevention the collaboration should begin before the participants find themselves in a crisis situation, that is, they head off crises by controlling the escalation of their competition into dangerous confrontations.

⁴⁸ In presenting the ideal type conditions under which systemic or structural explanation will be most useful, I draw mainly on the works of Waltz (fn. 1, 1979); and Jervis, Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976)Google Scholar, chap. 1. They do not, however, make explicit some of these conditions in the same way as is done here.

⁴⁹ Structural theory does not expect, however, that states will necessarily be interested in power maximization. This is one of the key differences between old realists, e.g., Morgenthau (fn. 16), 215, and neorealists or structural theorists such as Waltz. On this point, see Waltz (fn. 1, 1979), 118, 126; idem (fn. 5), 334; Posen (fn. 1), 68.

⁵⁰ This is the expectation not only of realists and many deterrence theorists but also of some students of organizational behavior. See Holsti, Ole, “Crisis Decision Making,” in Tetlock, Philip et al., eds., Behavior, Society and Nuclear War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 15–18.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Time, October 15, 1979, p. 71.

⁵² Verba, , “Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System,” World Politics 14 (October 1961), 115.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵³ Morgan, , Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis, 2d ed. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1983), 180.Google Scholar For supportive evidence, see Paige, Glenn, “Comparative Case Analysis of Crisis Decisions: Korea and Cuba,” in Hermann, Charles, ed., International Crisis: Insights from Behavioral Research (New York: Free Press, 1972)Google Scholar; Williams (fn. 40), 68–69; and Adomeit, Hannes, Soviet Risk Taking and Crisis Behavior (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982), 48–49.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Waltz (fn. 1, 1979), 173. More specifically, while explicitly disavowing division into spheres of influence on ideological grounds, Moscow and Washington have recognized de facto the other's sphere of influence during periods of crisis. See Keal (fn. 46).

⁵⁵ see Blainey, Geoffrey, The Causes of War (New York: Free Press, 1973), 121.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵⁶ Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 280.

⁵⁷ See Waltz (fn. 1, 1979), 77. For an example of Soviet emulation of American roles as a superpower, see Jonsson, Christer, Superpower: Comparing American and Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 22–23.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ See Wolfers (fn. 23), 13.

⁵⁹ Snyder, and Ickes, , “Personality and Social Behavior,” in Lindzey, Gardner and Aronson, Elliot, eds., Handbook of Social Psychology, 3d ed. (New York: Random House, 1985), 2:904.Google Scholar For empirical support in military psychology for the proposition that as conditions become more threatening and stressful, situational variables will explain the observed behavior better than an analysis of personality dispositions, see especially the studies of Gal, Reuven, “Courage under Stress,” in Breznitz, Shlomo, ed., Stress in Israel (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1983)Google Scholar; and idem, “Combat Stress as an Opportunity: The Case of Heroism” (Paper presented at the Northeast Regional Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Albany, N.Y., 1985). Gal concludes that situational and circumstantial characteristics are more important than the individual's personal qualities in explaining acts of combat bravery, notably, in some of the battles of the Yom Kippur War.

⁶⁰ See Wolfers (fn. 23), 16.

⁶¹ On the maxims of a state-as-actor (or a unitary actor) model, see Wolfers (fn. 23), 3—24.

⁶² See Jervis (fn. 48), 23–24.

⁶³ See Verba (fn. 52), 115; Mesquita, Bruce Bueno de, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 16, 27–29Google Scholar; Huth, Paul and Russett, Bruce, “What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980,” World Politics 36 (July 1984), 498–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Patchen (fn. 19), 19–22.

⁶⁴ See Richardson, Lewis, Arms and Insecurity (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1960)Google Scholar; and Wright, Quincy, A Study of War, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 1272.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ See Waltz (fn. 1, 1964), 883–84; and Bell, Coral, The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 115–16.Google Scholar Indeed, in the post war era crises became a surrogate for war because of bipolarity and the nuclear revolution.

⁶⁶ See Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 10.

⁶⁷ See Verba (fn. 52), 115; Williams (fn. 40), 66; Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 511; Brecher, Michael, Decisions in Crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1973 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 377Google Scholar; and Adomeit (fn. 53), 48. More precisely, crisis decisions tend to be reached by adhoc decisional units, composed of the chief executive and a selected group of advisers rather than the formal organizational machinery normally used to conduct foreign policy. See Paige, Glenn, The Korean Decision (New York: Free Press, 1968), 281Google Scholar; and Williams (fn. 40), 66–67.

⁶⁸ See Waltz, Kenneth, Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 274–75.Google Scholar See also Russett, Bruce, Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, chaps. 2, 3.

⁶⁹ See Adomeit (fn. 53), 38.

⁷⁰ See Wilensky, Harold, Organizational Intelligence (New York: Basic Books, 1967)Google Scholar; Holsti, and George, (fn. 9), 297Google Scholar; Williams (fn. 40), 66–67; Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 512, conclude that the degree of lower-level involvement does vary across cases, in general, in inverse ratio to the brevity and severity of the crisis. Both Robert Art, “Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique,” Policy Science 4 (December 1973), 477–79, and Jervis (fn. 48),28, underline the centrality of the president in all major postwar U.S. foreign policy decisions. Evidence on the Soviet side is sketchy but on the whole indicates a similarly high degree of control by the highest-level decision makers. See especially Adomeit (fn. 53), 38. Recent revelations about the Cuban missile crisis underline the critical role of the two top decision makers, Kennedy and Khruschev, in the management of the crisis. See Blight, James et al., “The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited,” Foreign Affairs 66 (Fall 1987).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷¹ See Schilling (1962), 23, cited in Williams (fn. 40), 69. See also the literature surveys in Holsti and George (fn. 9), 285–93; and Stein, Arthur, “Conflict and Cohesion,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 20 (1976), 143–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar This conclusion is consistent with the insight of George Simmel and Lewis Coser about the cohesive effects of an external threat. See Simmel, , Conflict (Glencoe, III.: Free Press, 1955)Google Scholar; and Coser, , The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1956).Google Scholar

⁷² Adomeit (fn. 53), 49.

⁷³ Holsti, Ole, “Individual Differences in ‘Definition of the Situation,’” Journal of Confl Resolution 14 (September 1970), 303–10.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷⁴ On the concept of national interest and the problems in defining and operationalizii it, see the useful discussions in Brodie, Bernardy, War and Politics (New York: Macmill; 1973)Google Scholar, chap. 8; and George, Alexander and Keohane, Robert, “The Concept of National I terests: Uses and Limitations,” in George (fn. 9).Google Scholar

⁷⁵ A representation of comprehensive rationality is Allison's Model I (fn. 9), 10–38. For more recent definition of rationality, consult Bueno de Mesquita (fn. 63), 29–33, who seleaders as strong rational calculators of expected utility. See also Huth and Russett (fn. 6499).

⁷⁶ See Waltz (fn. 1, 1979), 118; Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 342–48, 507; and Feldma, ShaiIsraeli Nuclear Deterrence (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 145.Google Scholar The traditio of bounded rationality goes back to March, James and Simon's, Herbert “satisficing”; March, and Simon, , Organizations (New York: Wiley, 1958).Google Scholar For a recent discussion of rati nal-choice and bounded rationality, see Keohane (fn. 6). Recent studies that support the log of the “sensitivity to costs” thesis include Mearsheimer, John, Conventional Deterrence (Ithad N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983)Google Scholar; and Posen's study of military doctrine (fn. 1).

⁷⁷ See also Snyder and Diesing's definition of rationality in the sense of information processing (fn. 1), 332–39.

⁷⁸ The classic study of misperceptions in international politics is Jervis (fn. 48). See also idem, The Logic of Images in international Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 132; and Holsti, Ole, “Foreign Policy Formation Viewed Cognitively,” in Axelrod, Robert, ed., The Structure of Decision (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Such as Schelling (fn. 32).

⁸⁰ For a very useful overview of crisis decision making from the theoretical perspective of four levels of analysis, see Holsti (fn. 50). For the adverse effects of causes at the level of the decision makers and of the bureaucracy, see the citations in fn. 9. James Blight, a psychologist who specializes in nuclear crisis management, criticizes the overemphasis on psychological factors in the work of Lebow and his associates (fn. 9); see Blight, , “The New Psychology of War and Peace,” International Security 11 (Winter 1986–1987).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸¹ Compare the findings of the studies cited in fn. 9 with the evidence of, among others, Russett, Bruce, “Pearl Harbor: Deterrence Theory and Decision Theory,” Journal of Peace Research 4 (1967), 89–105CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Paige (fn. 67), 81–93, 292; Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 492; Brecher (fn. 67); Stein, Janice and Tanter, Raymond, Rational Decision-Making: Israel's Security Choices, 1967 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980)Google Scholar; Shlaim, Avi, The United States and the Berlin Blockade 1948–1949 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983)Google Scholar; Dowty, Alan, Middle East Crisis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984)Google Scholar; and also a number of crisis simulations (see Morgan [fn. 53] 181). Some major historical studies of the causes of war argue that even when the crisis escalates to war, it does not mean that decision makers behave irrationally. See Howard, Michael, The Causes of Wars (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 14Google Scholar, 15; Blainey (fn. 55), 127, chap. 9; and Luard, Evan, War in International Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986)Google Scholar, chap. 5.

⁸² While explaining the sources of military doctrine, Posen (fn. 1) suggests that “in times of relative international calm we should expect a high degree of organizational determinism. In times of threat we should see greater accommodation of doctrine to the international system—integration should be more pronounced, innovation more likely” (p. 80; see also pp.40, 59).

⁸³ Williams (fn. 40), 67—68. This view is shared by a number of organizational theorists such as Wilensky (fn. 70), 78, who argues that decision makers are more likely to search past the first “satisficing” alternative, and Verba (fn. 52), and to a lesser extent March and Simon (fn. 76), 116, who argue that the search for information under crisis conditions may be more extensive, if less productive.

⁸⁴ Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer point out that information overloading is more likely in a multipolar world than in one that is bipolar. See Deutsch, and Singer, , “Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability,” World Politics 16 (April 1964).CrossRefGoogle Scholar The case of World War I contradicts their argument, however, showing that rather than prompting policymakers to withdraw from confrontation, overloading can generate greater hostility and result in escalation and war. See Holsti (fn. 9), 81. At the same time, when multiple interpretations are possible and plausible, according to Jervis, no criterion of rationality can dictate a single conclusion. See Jervis (fn. 78), 132; and idem (fn. 48), 119. In comparison, bipolarity reduces both the overloading of policymakers and the ambiguity of the situation. Hence, to the extent that the two leading powers in bipolarity have strong incentives to avoid a general war (and these incentives are reinforced by the presence of nuclear weapons), the international structure facilitates tacit cooperation in crisis settings.

⁸⁵ For somewhat similar reasoning in the context of conventional deterrence, see the theory and case studies of Mearsheimer (fn. 76). For an argument related to the thesis developed here in the context of the nuclear age, see Quester, George, “Some Thoughts on ‘Deterrence Failures,’” in Stern, Paul et al., eds., Perspectives on Deterrence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 52–65.Google Scholar See also Howard (fn. 81), 22.

⁸⁶ On the unclarity of balances before the two world wars, see Jervis, Robert, “War and Misperception,” in Rotberg and Rabb (fn. 4).Google Scholar Thus, many of the misperceptions of the rivals'intentions and capabilities before the two world wars, suggested by Jervis, or at least the prevalence of the misperceptions in these crises, can be attributed to the multipolar structure of the pre-1945 era.

⁸⁷ See Waltz (fn. 1, 1979), chaps. 5–6.

⁸⁸ More precisely, the implications of such crisis cooperation are unintended. These implications could include acceptance of the status quo and recognition of the rival's interests, equal status, and spheres of influence, even if all these elements are undesired and unacceptable in normal times because of ideology or domestic politics or both. On application of these elements to the postwar era, see the last section of this article.

⁸⁹ In the first three factors, the setting and timing of the cooperation is normal periods (as opposed to crisis situations). The last point addresses the level and nature of cooperation—explicit joint actions of a concert of all the great powers. In principle, these can occur either in periods of crisis or in periods of noncrisis. Yet in this case the cris is would not be between the great powers themselves (as is the case regarding the linkage between the structure and tacit management) but between all the powers and third actors (as was the case in the Concert and in the recent crisis in the Persian Gulf).

⁹⁰ See Waltz (fn. 1, 1979), 105; and Grieco (fn. 16), 498–500.

⁹¹ Waltz (fn. 1, 1964), 882–83; and idem (fn. 1, 1979), 171, 175.

⁹² Oye (fn. 1), esp. 18–20, in his survey of the literature on game theory, considers the effect of the number of players. Olson (fn. 19), chaps. 1–2, argues that the more concentrated the distribution of capabilities within a group, the more likely that public goods will be provided. See also Hardin (fn. 19), chap. 3.

⁹³ Waltz (fn. 1, 1979), 195.

⁹⁴ Waltz (fn. 1, 1964), 884; and idem (fn. 1, 1979), chap. 8; Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), chap. 6; Oye (fn. 1), 18–20. See also the examples of situation-related cooperation, introduced in Schelling (fn. 32); and Axelrod (fn. 6).

⁹⁵ See Waltz (fn. 1, 1979), chap. 9.

⁹⁶ For references on this point, see fn. 10 above.

⁹⁷ See Morgan (fn. 53), 180.

⁹⁸ There are, however, many obstacles to the effectiveness of such intelligence efforts, as Kurt Gottfried and Bruce Blair note. See Gottfried, and Blair, , Crisis Stability and Nuclear War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 270–73.Google Scholar

⁹⁹ Snyder and Diesing have found that decision makers behave in crises according to bounded rationality or even according to some combination of utility maximization and bounded rationality. See Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 405–8; and Patchen (fn. 19), 103–8. On “sensible decision making,” see Morgan (fn. 53), chap. 5.

¹⁰⁰ See Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 248–49; and Patchen (fn. 19), 298' resistance to perceptual change, see Jervis (fn. 48); Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), chap. 4; and Patchen (fn. 19), 90. On bureaucratic politics, see Halperin, Morton, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974).Google Scholar

¹⁰² See Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1); Brams, Steven, Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict (New Haven: Vale University Press, 1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Patchen (fn. 19), 46.

¹⁰³ On similarity in beliefs and values as facilitating cooperative resolution of conflicts, see Deutsch (fn. 15), 158—59, 374, 378. On the positive influence of common values on interna tional cooperation, see also Bull (fn. 13), 16, 33, 226–27, 316–17; Ruggie (fn. 5); and Jervis's (fn. 10) recent critique of the PD literature, including some of his own previous work. Yet Jervis does not attempt to distinguish between those types of cooperation better explained by the PD (that is, by structural factors) and those types of cooperation better accounted for by values and morality.

¹⁰⁴ For a recent discussion, see Kupchan and Kupchan (fn. 13).

¹⁰⁵ This section is largely based on my findings in Miller, Benjamin, “Can Opponents Cooperate: Explaining Great Power Cooperation in Managing Third Area Conflicts” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1988).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ See Miller, Benjamin, “International Relations Theory and U.S.-Soviet Conflict Management in the Middle East: Surprises, Accomplishments, Limitations,” in Spiegel, Steven, ed., Conflict Management in the Middle East (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ For a recent analysis of these attempts, see Miller (fn. 22).

¹⁰⁸ See Miller (fn. 105), chap. 7.

¹⁰⁹ On the evolution and phases of U.S.-Soviet relations, see Nye, Joseph Jr, ed., The Making of America's Soviet Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984)Google Scholar, chaps. 9–12; and Horelick, A., ed., U.S.-Soviet Rektions: The Next Phase (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), chaps. 1–3.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ On differences in the Soviet policies of various administrations, See Gaddis, John, Strategies of Containment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982)Google Scholar; and Brown, Seyom, The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Reagan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).Google Scholar The inconsistency and incoherence of U.S. Soviet strategy is especially underlined in Nye (fn. 109).

¹¹¹ On the effects of the image of the opponent on Soviet foreign policy, see, e.g., Spechler, Dina, Domestic Influences on Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1978)Google Scholar; and Griffiths, Franklyn, “The Sources of American Conduct: Soviet Perspectives and Their Policy Implications,” International Security 9 (Fall 1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; on its influence on U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, see George, Alexander, “Factors Influencing Security Cooperation,” in George et al. (fn. 10), 658–61.Google Scholar On the effects of the U.S. domestic system, see Destler, I. M., Gelb, Leslie H., and Lake, Anthony, Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984)Google Scholar; and Nye (fn. 109).

¹¹² See the citation of Adomeit (fn. 53), 49.

¹¹³ On Soviet Middle East crisis behavior, see, e.g., Miller (fn. 22); and Dismukes, B. and McConnell, J., eds., Soviet Naval Diplomacy (New York: Pergamon, 1979).Google Scholar On Soviet debates on Third World policy, see Hough, Jerry, The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1986)Google Scholar; and the review essay by Breslauer, George W., “Ideology and Learning in Soviet Third World Policy,” World Politics 39 (April 1987).CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Spechler (fn. 111).

¹¹⁴ On the U.S. in the War of Attrition and in the Jordanian crisis, see e.g., Spiegel, Steven, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 191–203.Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ On the disagreements inside the Nixon and Carter administrations and the discontinuity between each of them and the Reagan administration concerning cooperation with the Soviets on resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, see Miller (fn. 105), chap. 8. See also Harold Saunders, “Regulating Soviet-U.S. Competition and Cooperation in the Arab-Israeli Arena, 1967–86,” in George et al. (fn. 10).

¹¹⁶ For a recent discussion of the adverse effects of ideology on U.S.-Soviet security cooperation, see George, , “Factors Influencing Security Cooperation,” in George et al. (fn. 10), 658–61. See also Mandelbaum (fn. 1), 29.Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ See Nye, Joseph Jr, “Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes,” International Organization 41 (Summer 1987).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹⁸ See Betts, Richard, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987).Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ Karsh, Efraim, The Cautious Bear: Soviet Military Engagement in Middle East Wars in the Post-1967 Era (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1985), 38.Google Scholar

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Zacher, , International Conflicts and Collective Security, 1946–77 (New York: Praeger, 1979), 19–20Google Scholar, 73–79.

¹²² Dallin, Alexander, “Soviet Approaches to Superpower Security Relations,” in George et al. (fn. 10), 612–13.Google Scholar

¹²³ At the same time Reagan's thaw with Moscow as well as Nixon's rapprochement with China and initiation of détente with the Soviets indicate that domestic politics can make cooperation with an ideological adversary easier for a conservative who is willing and able to become more flexible than for a soft-liner.

¹²⁴ On the U.S., see Williams (fn. 40); and George, , “Political Crises,” in Nye (fn. 109), 153–54.Google Scholar On the Soviet Union, see Adomeit (fn. 53).

¹²⁵ Quandt refers here to the weakened authority of Nixon in the 1973 crisis because of Watergate. See Quandt, , Decade of Decisions: American Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967–1976 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 203.Google Scholar

¹²⁶ See George (fn. 116), 666; Blechman, Barry, “Efforts to Reduce the Risk of Accidental or Inadvertent War,” in George et al. (fn. 10), 466–81Google Scholar; Halperin (fn. 101); Dallin (fn. 122), 614.

¹²⁷ For a recent statement, see Lebow (fn. 9, 1987), chap. 3.

¹²⁸ See Mangold, Peter, Superpower Intervention in the Middle East (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), 165.Google Scholar

¹²⁹ Kissinger, , Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982).Google Scholar Cited in Frei, Daniel, Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983), 144.Google Scholar

¹³⁰ Kalb, and Kalb, , Kissinger (New York: Dell, 1975), 232.Google Scholar

¹³¹ See Adomeit (fn. 53), 344–45. See also Dallin (fn. 122), 614.

¹³² See Dowty (fn. 81), 348. Although recent revelations about the Cuban missile crisis show that there were debates among individual executive committee members, the recent evidence also underlines the critical role that the top decision maker, President Kennedy, played in the (cautious) management of the crisis. See James Blight et al. (fn. 70).

¹³³ For a recent debate on whether the caution shown by the superpowers in times of crisis was caused by nuclear arms or other factors, see Mueller, John E., “The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World,” International Security 13 (Fall 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Robert Jervis's response in the same issue, “The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons: A Comment.” The two authors agree nonetheless that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union behaved with great restraint during superpower crises.

¹³⁴ Freedman, , “I Exist; Therefore I Deter,” International Security 13 (Summer 1988), 184–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for an extended discussion, see Jervis (fn. 17).

¹³⁵ Cited in Zimmerman, William, Soviet Perspectives on International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 5, 255—59Google Scholar; see also , Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, trans, and ed. Talbott, Strobe (Boston: Little Brown, 1974), 530.Google Scholar

¹³⁶ See Gaddis (fn. 46), 235–37.

¹³⁷ See Stein, Janice, “Proxy Wars—How Superpowers End Them: The Diplomacy of War Termination in the Middle East,” International Journal 35 (Summer 1980), 513.Google Scholar

¹³⁸ Dowty (fn. 81), 339.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 340.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 343–44. See also Evron, Yair, War and Intervention in Lebanon: The Israeli-Syrian Deterrence Dialogue (London: Croom Helm, 1987).Google Scholar

¹⁴¹ Quandt (fn. 125), 130.

¹⁴² On the “blank check,” see, e.g., Orme, John, “Deterrence Failures: A Second Look,” International Security 11 (Spring 1987), 106.CrossRefGoogle Scholar On the Crimean case, see Smoke (fn. 13), 56. Both authors underline the destabilizing effects of these steps in a multilateral (Orme) or multipolar (Smoke) setting. Although both terms are applied to these two crises, they are not identical. Indeed, it is important to draw a distinction between the number of players and the distribution of capabilities (or polarity) and to underline the crucial effects of the latter factor during crises. Thus, the structure of those postwar Third World crises in which the superpowers intervened was not multipolar even if more than two players took part. Rather, once these crises escalated to the global level, their structure became bipolar in accordance with the overall distribution of capabilities in the post-1945 system. Although it was more difficult to manage such multiactor crises than to manage two-actor crises (see George [fn. 13], 562–63), bipolarity made it possible for the superpowers to exercise a restraining effect on regional crises.

¹⁴³ See, e.g., Shoemaker, Christopher C. and Spanier, John, Patron-Client State Relationships: Multilateral Crises in the Nuclear Age (New York: Praeger, 1984).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁴ Although Israel has been widely seen as a particularly good example of the difficulties encountered by a patron in trying to control a small state (because support for Israel in U.S. domestic politics also played a role), this might be applicable primarily to noncrisis settings. For a recent study that stresses U.S. control over Israel in times of Arab-Israeli wars, see Organski, A. F. K., The $36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 190–201.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁵ See Snyder and Diesing (fn. 1), 443–44, 505.

¹⁴⁶ See Dayan, Moshe, Story of My Life (London: Sphere Books, 1977), 551Google Scholar; and Heikal, Mohamed, The Road to Ramadan (New York: Quadrangle, 1975), 225.Google Scholar One might argue that the decline of bipolarity since the late 1980s, and especially the related perception of superpower disengagement from the Third World, created the background for Saddam Hussein's invasion of K u wait in August 1990. For an expression of his awareness of the global changes, see his speech of February 24, 1990, at the Fourth Summit of the Arab Cooperation Council, Amman, Jordan, as reported in FBIS-NES-90–039, February 27, 1990, pp. 1–5. See also Miller (fn.21).

¹⁴⁷ See Neuman, , “Arms, Aid and the Superpowers,” Foreign Affairs 66 (Summer 1988), esp. 1045–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁴⁸ On this point, see Gaddis (fn. 46).

¹⁴⁹ See Zacher (fn. 121), 218–19.

¹⁵⁰ Rosecrance, Richard, International Relations: Peace or War? (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), 116Google Scholar; cited in Zacher (fn. 121).

¹⁵¹ See the comprehensive overview in Patchen (fn. 19).

¹⁵² The stabilizing influence of bipolarity in times of crisis, in contrast to the proneness of multipolar systems to inadvertent war, can also be observed on the regional level in the Middle East, independent of the superpowers and of nuclear weapons. Whereas the multipolar structure of the 1967 crisis contributed to the undesired escalation that resulted in the June war, the essentially bipolar structure of the Syrian-Israeli rivalry over Lebanon facilitated the evolution of certain tacit rules for crisis management, despite the intense antagonism between these two neighbors and their strong suspicions of each other. On the 1967 war, see Stein, Janice, “The Arab-Israeli War of 1967: Inadvertent War through Miscalculated Escalation,” in George (fn. 13).Google Scholar On the tacit rules for regulating the Syrian and Israeli military intervention in Lebanon, see Evron (fn. 140).

¹⁵³ But the changes in Soviet policy under Gorbachev and the reciprocal U.S. restraint have made diplomatic cooperation much more likely. Consistent with the overall argument presented here, these changes in normal diplomacy and conflict resolution can be explained by changes in subsystemic factors such as decision makers' beliefs and images (especially in the Soviet elite, but also the change in the image of the Soviets in Washington) and domestic politics (a hawkish president legitimized cooperation with Moscow following the internal political and economic reforms in the Soviet Union). At the same time this model would predict that a major retreat from these reforms would lead to the disruption of the close U.S.Soviet (or Russian) diplomatic cooperation in conflict resolution.

¹⁵⁴ On the Concert as a crisis-prevention regime, see Lauren, Paul, “Crisis Prevention in Nineteenth-Century Diplomacy,” in George (fn. 47).Google Scholar Indeed, in accordance with the distinction drawn by George, the essence of the cooperation between the Concert members was in preventing great power crises rather than in managing them. When crises erupted during the peak period of the Concert, 1815–54, the rivals were usually third parties and not more than a single great power was directly involved. In order to prevent escalation to crisis among the great powers themselves, the Concert then acted multilaterally either through a joint intervention of the powers—as in the Ottoman crises of the 1830s and the 1840s (see Lauren, 47–48)—or through joint diplomacy in conflict resolution—as in the crisis resulting in the establishment of Belgium in the early 1830s. On the Concert's accomplishments in settling disputes and averting dangers by diplomacy, see, especially, Schroeder, Paul W., “The 19thcentury International System: Changes in the Structure,” World Politics 39 (October 1986).CrossRefGoogle Scholar In contrast, many local crises in the postwar era escalated to superpower crises and only then were successfully managed while the superpowers all along acted mainly through unilateral steps. See Miller, Benjamin, “From Balance of Power to Hegemonic Stability or to International Society: Competing Theoretical Models and Great Power Crisis Interaction” (Manuscript, Hebrew University, 1992).Google Scholar On superpower failure in crisis prevention during the cold war, see the other chapters in George (fn. 47); and also George et al. (fn. 10), chap. 23.