Skip to main content
    • Aa
    • Aa
  • Get access
    Check if you have access via personal or institutional login
  • Cited by 151
  • Cited by
    This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Frieden, Jeffry 2016. The Governance of International Finance. Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 19, Issue. 1, p. 33.

    Ovodenko, Alexander 2016. Governing Oligopolies: Global Regimes and Market Structure. Global Environmental Politics, p. 106.

    Rezvani, David A. 2016. Partial Independence Beats Full Independence. Territory, Politics, Governance, Vol. 4, Issue. 3, p. 269.

    Tallberg, Jonas Sommerer, Thomas and Squatrito, Theresa 2016. Democratic memberships in international organizations: Sources of institutional design. The Review of International Organizations, Vol. 11, Issue. 1, p. 59.

    Young, Alasdair R. 2016. Not your parents' trade politics: the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations. Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 23, Issue. 3, p. 345.

    Zangl, Bernhard Heußner, Frederick Kruck, Andreas and Lanzendörfer, Xenia 2016. Imperfect adaptation: how the WTO and the IMF adjust to shifting power distributions among their members. The Review of International Organizations, Vol. 11, Issue. 2, p. 171.

    Zawahri, Neda A. Dinar, Ariel and Nigatu, Getachew 2016. Governing international freshwater resources: an analysis of treaty design. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Vol. 16, Issue. 2, p. 307.

    Bailer, Stefanie and Weiler, Florian 2015. A political economy of positions in climate change negotiations: Economic, structural, domestic, and strategic explanations. The Review of International Organizations, Vol. 10, Issue. 1, p. 43.

    Berger, Ron 2015. Technological Solutions for Sustainable Business Practice in Asia.

    Blauberger, Michael and Rittberger, Berthold 2015. Conceptualizing and theorizing EU regulatory networks. Regulation & Governance, Vol. 9, Issue. 4, p. 367.

    Drezner, Daniel W. 2015. America, China, and the Struggle for World Order.

    Febrica, Senia 2015. Why Cooperate? Indonesia and Anti-Maritime Terrorism Cooperation. Asian Politics & Policy, Vol. 7, Issue. 1, p. 105.

    Gilady, Lilach 2015. Triangle or ‘trilemma’: Rousseau and the ‘Kantian peace’. Journal of International Relations and Development,

    Hakelberg, Lukas 2015. The power politics of international tax co-operation: Luxembourg, Austria and the automatic exchange of information. Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 22, Issue. 3, p. 409.

    Hooghe, Liesbet and Marks, Gary 2015. Delegation and pooling in international organizations. The Review of International Organizations, Vol. 10, Issue. 3, p. 305.

    Koremenos, Barbara 2015. The Role of State Leadership in the Incidence of International Governance. Global Policy, Vol. 6, Issue. 3, p. 237.

    Lipscy, Phillip Y. 2015. Explaining Institutional Change: Policy Areas, Outside Options, and the Bretton Woods Institutions. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 59, Issue. 2, p. 341.

    Medina de Souza, Igor Abdalla 2015. An offer developing countries could not refuse: how powerful states created the World Trade Organisation. Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 18, Issue. 2, p. 155.

    Naurin, Daniel 2015. Generosity in intergovernmental negotiations: The impact of state power, pooling and socialisation in the Council of the European Union. European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 54, Issue. 4, p. 726.

    Pelc, Krzysztof J. and Urpelainen, Johannes 2015. When do international economic agreements allow countries to pay to breach?. The Review of International Organizations, Vol. 10, Issue. 2, p. 231.


Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier


Regime analysis has focused on issues of market failure, the resolution of which depends upon knowledge and institution building. Global communications regimes, however, have been concerned either with issues of pure coordination or with coordination problems with distributional consequences. Outcomes have been decided by the underlying distribution of national power. In those areas where power was asymmetrically distributed and there was no agreement on basic principles and norms—radio broadcasting and remote sensing—no regime was formed. In those areas where distributional issues could not be unilaterally resolved—allocation of the radio spectrum and telecommunications—regimes were created, although both principles and rules changed with alterations in national power capabilities.

Linked references
Hide All

This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

David Marks , “Broadcasting across the Wall: The Free Flow of Information between East and West Germany,” Journal of Communication 33 (Winter 1983), 4655, at 47

Douglas Boyd , “Pirate Radio in Britain: A Programming Alternative,” Journal of Communication 36 (Spring 1986), 8394, at 86–92.

Andrea Kavanaugh , “Star WARCs and the New System: An Analysis of U.S. International Satellite Policy Formation,” Telecommunications Policy (June 1986), 93106, at 105.

Richard R. Colino , “Global Politics and INTELSAT: The Conduct of Foreign Relations in an Electronically Wired World,” Telecommunications Policy 10 (September 1986), 199.

Ronald Coase , “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics 3 (1960), 144.

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

World Politics
  • ISSN: 0043-8871
  • EISSN: 1086-3338
  • URL: /core/journals/world-politics
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *