Ricks, Jacob I. 2017. Sector-Specific Development and Policy Vulnerability in the Philippines. Development and Change, Vol. 48, Issue. 3, p. 567.
Akinyoade, Akinyinka and Uche, Chibuike 2017. Development built on crony capitalism? The case of Dangote Cement. Business History, p. 1.
Hutchison, Jane 2016. The state and employment relations in the Philippines. Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 58, Issue. 2, p. 183.
Tusalem, Rollin F 2016. Political and economic accountability in a delegative democracy. International Political Science Review, Vol. 37, Issue. 4, p. 517.
Ford, Michele Gillan, Michael and Thein, Htwe Htwe 2016. From Cronyism to Oligarchy? Privatisation and Business Elites in Myanmar. Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 46, Issue. 1, p. 18.
Lai, Lawrence W.C. Chau, K.W. and Lorne, Frank T. 2016. The rise and fall of the sand monopoly in colonial Hong Kong. Ecological Economics, Vol. 128, p. 106.
Verbrugge, Boris 2015. Decentralization, Institutional Ambiguity, and Mineral Resource Conflict in Mindanao, Philippines. World Development, Vol. 67, p. 449.
Drainville, A. C. 2015. The Moral Economy of Global Crowds: Egypt 1977, Brazil 2013. New Global Studies, Vol. 9, Issue. 2,
Roanne van Voorst, Dr Ben Wisner, D, Dr and Bankoff, Greg 2015. “Lahat para sa lahat” (everything to everybody). Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal, Vol. 24, Issue. 4, p. 430.
Verbrugge, Boris 2015. The Economic Logic of Persistent Informality: Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining in the Southern Philippines. Development and Change, Vol. 46, Issue. 5, p. 1023.
Fukuoka, Yuki 2015. Who brought down the dictator? A critical reassessment of so-called ‘People power’ revolutions in the Philippines and Indonesia. The Pacific Review, Vol. 28, Issue. 3, p. 411.
Claudio, Lisandro E. 2014. From Scandalous Politics to Public Scandal: Corruption, Media, and the Collapse of the Estrada Regime in the Philippines. Asian Politics & Policy, Vol. 6, Issue. 4, p. 539.
Rock, Michael T. 2013. East Asia's Democratic Developmental States and Economic Growth. Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 13, Issue. 01, p. 1.
Tusalem, Rollin F. and Pe-Aguirre, Jeffrey J. 2013. The Effect of Political Dynasties on Effective Democratic Governance: Evidence From the Philippines. Asian Politics & Policy, Vol. 5, Issue. 3, p. 359.
Maca, Mark and Morris, Paul 2012. The Philippines, the East Asian ‘developmental states’ and education: a comparative analysis of why the Philippines failed to develop. Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education, Vol. 42, Issue. 3, p. 461.
Calimbahin, Cleo 2011. Exceeding (Low) Expectations: Autonomy, Bureaucratic Integrity, and Capacity in the 2010 Elections. Philippine Political Science Journal, Vol. 32, Issue. 55, p. 103.
Egorov, Georgy and Sonin, Konstantin 2011. DICTATORS AND THEIR VIZIERS: ENDOGENIZING THE LOYALTY-COMPETENCE TRADE-OFF. Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 9, Issue. 5, p. 903.
Aidt, T. S. 2009. Corruption, institutions, and economic development. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 25, Issue. 2, p. 271.
Five years after the downfall of Ferdinand E. Marcos, scholars of Philippine politics have yet to achieve even minimal consensus on the proper characterization of his authoritarian regime. More importantly, scholarship has failed to account for fundamental continuity, across regimes, in the way in which dominant economic interests interact with the Philippine state. The author argues that a focus on patrimonial aspects of the Philippine state will not only bring a greater sense of coherence to many disparate aspects of Marcos's rule, but will also lead to clearer understanding of enduring characteristics of the Philippine political economy. Throughout the postwar years, political administration is often treated as a personal affair, and the assignment of privileges granted by the state is largely determined by the personal discretion of those oligarchs currently holding official position. The article explores factors that help to explain why there has been no effective pressure from either domestic or external forces to undermine the patrimonial features of the state, and suggests that future research should analyze why patrimonial features have persisted in the Philippines despite enormous change, yet elsewhere seem to have subsided in the face of change.
1 For a neoclassical perspective on competitive rent seeking, see Krueger Anne O., “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society,” American Economic Review 64 (June 1974), 291–303.
2 Koike Kenji, “Dismantling Crony Capitalism under the Aquino Government,” in All Ishii chiro et al., National Development Policies and the Business Sector in the Philippines (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1988), 255.
3 In “the genuinely patrimonial office,” Weber writes, “the political administration … is treated as a purely personal affair of the ruler, and political power is considered part of his personal property.” Weber , Economy and Society, ed. Roth Guenther and Wittich Claus (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), 3:1028–29. Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent references are to vol. 3.
4 Ibid., 1041; emphasis in original.
5 Dios De, “A Political Economy of Philippine Policy-Making,” in Langford John W. and Lorne Brownsey K., eds., Economic Policy-Mailing in the Asia-Pacific Region (Halifax, Nova Scotia: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1990), 114.
6 Weber (fn. 3), 1028.
7 My definition of the state derives from the incisive discussion of postcolonial African states found in Jackson Robert H. and Rosberg Carl G., “Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood,” World Politics 35 (October 1982), 1–24. They go beyond Weber's classic “empirical” definition of the state (“a corporate group that has compulsory jurisdiction, exercises continuous organization, and claims a monopoly of force over a territory and its population, including ‘all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction’ ”) (p. 2) and argue the need to incorporate also the “juridical” definition of statehood, that which is recognized by the “international society of states.” In Europe, they argue, “empirical statehood preceded juridical statehood or was concurrent with it.” In Black Africa and other parts of the Third World, however, there has been a very different sort of state-building process: “External factors are more likely than internal factors to provide an adequate explanation of the formation and persistence of states” (p. 23). “A political system may possess some or all of the empirical qualifications of statehood, but without the [internationally recognized] juridical attributes of territory and independence it is not a state” (p. 13).
8 This parallels Guenther Roth's discussion of a “detraditionalized” patrimonialism that “becomes the dominant form of government” in “some of the newer states.” Even in industrialized countries, he writes, this “personal rulership … is apparently enlarged by the extension of government functions”; Roth , “Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-Building in the New States,” World Politics 20 (January 1968), 194–206, at 196, 199.
Weber (fn. 3), 1002–3, discusses the historical “march of bureaucracy.”
9 Weber (fn. 3), 1088 and 1059.
10 The formation and persistence of a central state that is unable to exert authority effectively over “local lords” can only be understood in light of external factors: (1) an American colonial heritage that aborted what might have been a more “natural,” Latin American-style caudillo route to state formation and superimposed a weak central state over a polity of quite autonomous local centers of power; and (2) an “international society of states” that helps ensure the survival of central states that cannot, empirically, claim control over much of their territories. See Anderson Benedict, “Cacique Democracy and the Philippines: Origins and Dreams,” New Left Review 169 (May-June 1988), 3–33, at 9–13; and Jackson and Rosberg (fn. 7).
11 Weber (fn 3), of course, develops “pure” categories and then permits hybrid characterizations of his historical cases. In his analysis of bureaucratic systems, for example, he notes cases with “strong patrimonial elements” and “patrimonial admixtures” (p. 964). It is in this spirit that I use the terms “patrimonial features” and “patrimonial elements.”
My analysis has benefited from two works that provide excellent, historically based analyses of patrimonial dynamics in other postcolonial settings: Crouch Harold, “Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia,” World Politics 31 (July 1979), 571–87; and Callaghy Thomas M., The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984). Some scholars find patrimonial features in modern First World bureaucracies as well. See the very insightful “revisionist” approach to Weber's ideal-typical bureaucratic state in Rudolph Lloyd I. and Rudolph Susanne Hoeber, “Authority and Power in Bureaucratic and Patrimonial Administration: A Revisionist Interpretation of Weber on Bureaucracy,” World Politics 31 (January 1979), 195–227. Robin Theobald, by contrast, seeks to confine the patrimonial framework to underdeveloped economies; see Theobald , “Patri-monialism,” World Politics 34 (July 1982), 548–59.
12 “No relation to President Corazon C. Aquino,” it is noted in the foreword to her book.
13 Nemenzo , “The Left and the Traditional Opposition,” in May R. J. and Nemenzo Francisco, eds., The Philippines after Marcos (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 50.
14 Tiglao , “The Consolidation of the Dictatorship,” in Dios Aurora Javate-de et al., eds., Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of Peoples's Power (Metro Manila: Conspectus Foundation Incorporated, 1988), 27, 31 (quote from p. 27).
15 Stauffer , “The Political Economy ofRefeudalization,” in Rosenberg David A., ed., Marcos and Martial Law in the Philippines (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1979), 217.
16 Wolters , Politics, Patronage and Class Conflict in Central Luzon (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1984), 3.
17 Crouch Harold, Economic Change, Social Structure and the Political System in Southeast Asia: Philippine Development Compared with the Other ASEAN Countries (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), 10–18, quote at 10.
18 See Corpuz Onofre D., The Bureaucracy in the Philippines (Manila: University of the Philippines Institute of Public Administration, 1957), 249.
19 Anderson (fn. 10), 11–12. One of the best prewar illustrations of an oligarchic raid on the state machinery is the sugar bloc's unbridled assault on the loans department of the newly formed Philippine National Bank, between 1916 and 1920. See Stanley Peter W., A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and the United States, 1890–1921 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 233–48.
20 Doeppers Daniel F., Manila, 1900–1941: Social Change in a Late Colonial Metropolis, Monograph Series No. 27 (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1984), 72. See also Hutchcroft Paul D., “A State Besieged: Historical Patterns of State-Elite Relations in the Philippines,” Issues and Letters (Philippine Center for Policy Studies) 1, no. 4 (1990), 1–10.
21 Golay , The Philippines: Public Policy and National Economic Development (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1961), 71–72.
22 As Weber (fn. 3) writes, “The patrimonial office lacks above all the bureaucratic separation of the ‘private’ and the ‘Official’ sphere” (p. 1028).
23 There are two explanations commonly given for this postindependence change: (1) increased corruption in the bureaucracy during the Japanese occupation and the early postwar years; and (2) the birth of the two-party system, injecting more partisan considerations into the spoils system. See Corpuz (fn. 18), 224–25, 237–48. A third reason is perhaps most important: what Anderson calls the “American ringmaster for domestic political competition” played a less prominent role after 1946; Anderson (fn. 10), 14.
24 Scott James C., “Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia,” in Schmidt Steffen W. et al., eds., Friends, Followers and Factions (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1977), 137 and 143. Thomas C. Nowak and Kay A. Snyder explain that the “growing penetration of national bureaucratic institutions into local areas heightens the dependence of the local elite upon office-based resources”; Nowak and Snyder , “Clientelist Politics in the Philippines: Integration or Instability,” American Political Science Review 68 (September 1974), 1147–70, at 1151. See also Brian Fegan's discussion of how the closing of the land frontier made civil service positions a more important element of patron-client largesse in the postwar years-and led to a process of “bureaucratic involution” on the national level; Fegan , “The Social History of a Central Luzon Barrio,” in McCoy Alfred W. and Jesus Ed. C. de, eds., Philippine Social History: Global Trade and Local Transformations (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1982), 119–24. An influential early work on patron-client relations in the Philippines is Lande Carl H., Leaders, Factions, and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics, Monograph Series No. 6 (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1966).
25 As one scholar wrote in the 1950s, “Business is born, and flourishes or fails, not so much in the market place as in the halls of the legislature or in the administrative offices of the government”; McHale Thomas R., “An Econecological Approach to Economic Development” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1959), 217, quoted in Stifel Laurence Davis, The Textile Industry: A Case Study of Industrial Development in the Philippines, Data Paper Number 49 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1963), 50.
26 The “rent-seeking society” in the Philippines is further discussed in Montes, “The Business Sector and Development Policy,” in Ishii et al. (fn. 2), 23–77. As he points out, “rents” can include “protection from competition through quotas, tariffs, and measured capacities, subsidized credit, access to foreign reparations, loans, and grants. … [I]n a rent-seeking society, the operations of the state determine the assignment of and the continued enjoyment of economic advantages” (p. 65).
27 Stifel (fn. 25), 104.
28 Theda Skocpol writes that “states conceived as organizations claiming control over territories and people may formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society. This is what is usually meant by ‘state autonomy.’ Unless such independent goal formulation occurs, there is little need to talk about states as important actors”; Skocpol , “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” in Evans Peter B. et al., eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 9.
While it may be rare to speak of the Philippine state as an independent actor vis-à-vis dominant interests, the state nevertheless remains central to any comprehensive analysis of the country's political economy. As noted at the outset, access to the state apparatus is the primary means of private accumulation. It is indeed paradoxical that a “weak” state should be a central subject of analysis (and, as noted above, that analysis of the state must begin outside the state). The state's important role seems to derive primarily from responsibilities it has necessarily assumed in handling the country's external economic relations: it disburses aid and loans received from abroad and sets policies on foreign exchange, trade, and investment. In such a paradoxical situation, we must begin our analysis with an examination of the nature of dominant interests and proceed from there to develop a clearer picture of the state with which they interact.
29 Even Hawes seems to acknowledge this, despite the apparent inconsistency with his thesis about “the state” acting against “elite segments”: “Occasionally individual families were singled out and made an example so that others might see what fate awaited those deemed to be enemies of the president” (p. 127).
30 McCoy , “The Lopez Family: From Provincial Elite to National Oligarchy,” in Cullinane Michael, ed., Philippine Politicai Families (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Center for South and Southeast Asia, University of Michigan, forthcoming); emphasis added.
31 Stauffer (fn. 15), 193. Behind Hawes's “elite segments” seems to be the notion that production for the domestic market (or import-substitution industrialization) is generally nationalist, while production for external markets is not (see p. 45). The difficulty here is that foreign capital has played a central role in Philippine isi from the beginning (which Hawes actually acknowledges, p. 33). See Maxfield Sylvia and Nolt James H., “Protectionism and the Internationalization of Capital: U.S. Sponsorship of Import Substitution Industrialization in the Philippines, Turkey and Argentina,” International Studies Quarterly 34 (March 1990), 49–81.
Moreover, Montes points to the commonality of interest between Filipino firms and foreign firms that are protected by the same “tariff walls and protectionist measures”; Montes Manuel F., “Financing Development: The ‘Democratic’ Approach versus the ‘Corporatist’ Approach in the Philippines,” in Urrutia Miguel et al., eds., The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy (Tokyo: United Nations University, 1989), 98.
Interestingly, if one is looking for coherent segments of capital based on different economic interests, it can best be found in analyzing foreign capital. There, Montes points out, one can see a clear differentiation between foreign capital inside the tariff walls and foreign capital located outside the country (p. 98).
32 Montes (fn. 31), 90.
33 Interview, Wilhelm G. Ortaliz, former director, Bureau of Industrial Coordination, Ministry of Industry, April 26, 1989. Ortaliz explained that his job during the early 1980s was to “strengthen industrial associations within the private sector. … [B]ut it was hard for the government to know who to work with.” He described the largest business association, the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industries (formed in the late 1970s), as a mere “post office” of diverse concerns, very “personality-oriented” and unable to formulate common positions on major issues.
Economist Montes similarly explains that government-private sector “consultations are dominated by the need to protect individual interests. … The private sector does not have a well-defined interest as a private sector (or as larger groups within the private sector). This protecting of individual interests also involves the need to have advance information of the government's intentions. … Access to information tends to be individual, based on kinship and other ties”; see Montes (fn. 31), 108.
Indeed, one can say that quasi-patrimonial features (mirroring those found at the level of the state) are found within business associations, as personal interests usually win out over associational interests.
34 Nowak and Snyder (fn. 24) explain that “diversification of familial economic power decreases susceptibility to fluctuations in world prices, potential loss of privileges in the U.S. market, and local policy changes such a devaluation, which hurt some sectors more than others” (pp. 1148–49). They also note the important, but often neglected, role of urban real estate in diversification strategies.
There is one other reason for diversification that should be added to their list: in an economy in which wealth depends to such a large degree on access to the state machinery, diversification helps to guard against the uncertainties of change in political leadership. A family cannot depend exclusively on investments assisted by current friends in the Palace, for example, because in the next administration those investments may be jeopardized by a lack of necessary connections in key government offices.
35 De Dios (fn. 5), 112.
36 Abueva Jose Veloso, “The Philippines: Tradition and Change,” Asian Survey 10, no. 1 (1970), 56–64, at 62.
37 Scott (fn. 24), 143. The revenue problems are systemic:
A regime that is dependent on its particularistic distributive capacity … [will] have a most difficult time raising revenue from internal taxation. A rise in direct taxation would threaten their base of support, and in fact, they are notorious for the undercollection of revenues due them, since favors to their clients often take the form of either leaving them off local tax rolls or ignoring debts they owe the government, (p. 143)
38 Nowak and Snyder (fn. 24), 1151–54.
39 See Bautista Romeo M., Power John H., and Associates, Industrial Promotion Policies in the Philippines (Metro Manila: Philippine Institute for Development Studies, 1979), 5–9; and Montes (fn. 31), 88–89.
40 As Scott (fn. 24) explains:
Democratic regimes which must cater to the strong distributive pressures generated by their clientele are thus particularly vulnerable to the vagaries of world prices for primary products on which their budgets depend. … [A] stagnating economy or declining world prices threatened the entire structure they had pieced together, (p. 143)
41 Anderson (fn. 10), 18.
42 See Nowak and Snyder (fn. 24), 1170.
43 Tiglao (fn. 14), 38.
44 For enlightening scholarship on this process, see Paredes Ruby R., ed., Philippine Colonial Democracy, Monograph No. 32 (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1989).
45 For a particularly well documented account of this history, see Shalom Stephen Rosskamm, The United States and the Philippines: A Study of Neocolonialism (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1981).
46 Raymond Bonner gives a good account of how the Marcoses maneuvered in Washington circles; see Bonner , Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Mailing of American Policy (New York: Times Books, 1987).
47 Anderson (fn. 10), 21.
48 Haggard Stephan, “The Political Economy of the Philippine Debt Crisis,” in Nelson Joan, ed., Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 219.
49 Overholt William H., “Pressures and Policies: Prospects for Cory Aquino's Philippines,” in Lande Carl H., ed., Rebuilding a Nation: Philippine Challenges and American Policy (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute Press, 1987), 98.
50 Two years later, in fact, Marcos declared that the “KBL [New Society Movement, Mar-cos's political party] Central Committee, not the technocrats, make government policy” (Wurfel, 237 n. 8). The central committee included major cronies.
51 Broad explains at the outset that her primary theoretical reliance is upon the “new de-pendentistas,” especially Peter Evans's Dependent Development, but Evans's influence is not clearly evident in her analysis. The major weakness of earlier dependency analyses, she writes, “was the derivative position in which it placed the LDC state” (p. 16). But when all is said and done, Evans's “incontrovertible” assertion on “the centrality of the state to accumulation on the periphery” (p. 43) seems to have lost out to a focus more like that of Cheryl Payer, on how external institutions manage to overpower Third World states. See Evans , Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Payer , The Debt Trap: The International Monetary Fund and the Third World (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974); and idem, The World Ban?: A Critical Analysis (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982).
52 Fabella Raul V., “Trade and Industry Reforms in the Philippines: Process and Performance,” in Montes Manuel F. and Sakai Hideyoshi, Philippine Macroeconomic Perspective: Developments and Policies (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1989), 193.
53 Ibid., 205.
54 Weber (fn. 3), 1099; emphasis added.
55 Problems with Broad's nationalist/transnationalist categorization arise not only with the cronies, of course, but also with noncrony businesspeople. Except for this one acknowledgment that the categories are “not strictly demarcated,” she generally seems to suggest that mere involvement with foreign capital taints local capital and “tends to wed them ideologically to policies furthering free international flow of goods and capital” (p. 7). Interestingly, one of her key examples of a besieged economic nationalist is Hilarion Henares, who she says “professed to have kept his hands clean of involvement with foreign corporations and foreign markets” (p. 115). In fact, Henares has long had close linkages with U.S. capital, though that seems to have had little impact on the nationalist views he regularly expresses in his popular newspaper column. Henares's business interests are discussed in Pomerov William J., An American Made Tragedy: Neo-Colonialism and Dictatorship in the Philippines (New York: International Publishers, 1974), 58.
56 Some speculate that Silverio's fall from grace was related to displeasure over the course of a romance between Silverio's son and Imee Marcos, the daughter of the First Couple.
As Weber (fn. 3) writes: “Because of its very nature patrimonialism was the specific locus for the rise of favoritism—of men close to the ruler who had tremendous power, but always were in danger of sudden, dramatic downfall for purely personal reasons” (p. 1088).
57 Thompson Mark and Slayton Gregory, “An Essay on Credit Arrangements between the IMF and the Republic of the Philippines: 1970–1983,” Philippine Review of Economics and Business 22, nos. 1 and 2 (1985), 59–81, at 60 and 78.
58 Montes (fn. 31) 105, 110–11, 134.
59 Fabella (fn. 52), 197.
60 As de Dios writes: “There were many instances when the more ‘irrational,’ ‘inefficient,’ at times blatantly corrupt, aspects of the dictatorship were countenanced or accommodated by these institutions, particularly its net lending operations and crony bail-outs”; Dios de, “The Erosion of the Dictatorship,” in Javate-de Dios (fn. 14), 122.
61 See Lamberte Mario B., “Financial Liberalization: What Have We Learnt?” Journal of Philippine Development 12, no. 2 (1985), 274–89; and Alburo Florian and Shepherd Geoffrey, “Trade Liberalization Experience in the Philippines, 1960–84,” Working Paper No. 86–07 (Manila: Philippine Institute of Development Studies, 1986). While both studies cite important initiatives in the early 1980s, they also show that liberalization efforts ultimately had little success. Lamberte diagnoses the “failure of recent liberalization efforts,” while Alburo and Shepherd explain that the ”1983 economic crisis … effectively aborted these fundamental changes in tariff structure and commercial policy” (p. 37). See also Montes (fn. 31), noil.
62 De Dios (fn. 60), 119–20.
63 De Dios (fn. 5), 115.
64 Anderson (fn. io), 22.
65 Wurfel thus confuses matters when he writes of “oligarch and crony” as an “elite cleavage on economic issues” (p. 238). A clearer way to express this division is “favored” (crony) versus “nonfavored” or “less-favored” (businessperson).
66 McCoy explains that the Lopezes achieved national prominence after independence, building on prewar provincial wealth that was liquidated during the war. In both the pre and postwar phases of their accumulation, “the viability of all Lopez investments … has depended upon state regulation and licensing.…Don Eugenio [Lopez] used capital to secure political protection, investing in political campaigns and taking his profits in favors”; see McCoy (fn. 30), 21–23. In effecti they raided the state from a strong and independent societal base.
67 Weber (fn. 3), 1102.
68 Marcos had unprecedented tenure in office and managed to grab control of military, judicial, and legislative functions that had previously been dispersed among many rival centers of power. The measure of protection previously available to those oligarchs “on the outs” therefore disappeared in 1972. See Anderson (fn. 10), 12, 22, on how the declaration of martial law upset the “rule of law” that had long guided the system of oligarchic hegemony.
69 The First Lady had a special explanation for the success of cronies and relatives: “Some are smarter than others” (Wurfel, 237).
70 On the importance of “personal dependence” to a patrimonial ruler, see Weber (fn. 3), 1026–27.
71 For example, Cojuangco, Disini, Silverio, Rodolfo Cuenca (the construction magnate), and Antonio Floirendo (the “banana king”) did not hold important official posts. Benedicto headed the quasi-public Philippine Sugar Commission, the central agency of the sugar monopoly. Major exceptions to the rule include Geronimo Velasco (energy minister) and Juan Ponce Enrile (defense minister). By the early 1980s Benedicto, Cojuangco, and Floirendo were made regional party chairmen of Marcos's Kilusang Bagong Lipunan, or New Society Movement (Wurfel, 237). See also de Dios (fn. 5), 114.
72 According to a former Marcos adviser, Imelda would threaten Marcos with exposure (of intimate details of life in the Palace) or a “big public divorce, and Marcos never wanted to call her bluff.” Interview, Cristobal Adrian, former Special Assistant for Special Studies (to President Marcos), June 19, 1989. Wurfel describes it as a relationship of “mutual blackmail” (p. 241). An embroidered analysis of the relationship is found in Seagrave Sterling, The Marcos Dynasty (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), chap. 10.
73 Weber (fn. 3), 1029; emphasis in original. He writes that “this quasi-jurisdictional limitation of the powers of office results primarily from the competing economic interests of the various patrimonial officials.”
74 Montes (fn. 31), 108.
75 Cristobal (fn. 72). Similarly, an (anti-Marcos) professional technician for the state-owned Philippine National Oil Company, decries the return of unbridled patronage within his company since 1986 and looks back with an ironic sense of fondness for what one Marcos crony, Geronimo Velasco, did to professionalize their operations. Unlike the leadership under Aquino, where professional qualifications matter little and “the envelope with a recommendation from a senator is key,” he exclaimed, “at least Velasco built up something worth plundering!”; anonymous interview, April 2, 1989.
76 Indeed, when in 1981 external funds became harder to come by, it was useful for Marcos to promote chief technocrat Virata. Wurfel should not take this as an indication that the technocrats were temporarily edging out the cronies (p. 254). The same year a more ideological technocrat, Economic Planning Minister Gerardo Sicat, was “fired for raising objections to the costly projects of the First Lady”; see Fabella (fn. 52), 197.
77 Interview, Tatad Francisco S., former information minister (under President Marcos), August 22, 1989. In Weber's words, “The ruler's personal discretion delimits the jurisdiction of his officials”; Weber (fn. 3), 1029.
78 Weber (fn. 3), 1098; see also p. 1028.
79 Cardoso , “On the Characterization of Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America,” in Collier David, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 38.
80 Weber (fn. 3), 1042; emphasis in original.
81 While caudillos imposed personal orders by decree, Cardoso explains, most modern military regimes have a more bureaucratic, institutional basis of power; Cardoso (fn. 79), 35–36. The polity and economy from which the Marcos regime emerged is larger and seemingly more institutionalized and complex that that of most so-called “caudillos” of modern Latin America. Nevertheless, it is probably easier to draw comparisons with personalistic caudillo regimes (such as that of Somoza) than with the bureaucratic-authoritatian regimes of the Southern Cone (Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay), where the military ruled as an institution. It would be a valuable project to explore further the similarities and differences between Marcos and the modern caudillos.
82 If one were to try to determine precisely where the Philippine case is situated amid more extreme cases of personalistic and bureaucratic authoritarianism, one would need to conduct careful comparative analysis of specific arenas of state policy. Within each arena, it would be necessary to determine whether there was any significant change over time in the degree of separation of “official” and “private” spheres. Obviously, such an effort is beyond the scope of this article.
83 State autonomy is defined above (fn. 28). State capacity, Kathryn Sikkink writes, “involves the administrative and coercive abilities of the state apparatus to implement official goals”; Sikkink , “State Autonomy and Developmentalist Policy in Argentina and Brazil: Frondizi and Kubitschek Administrations Compared” (Paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association Congress, 1988), 3, quoted with author's permission. In a system with clear-cut patrimonial elements, this definition needs to include not only “official goals,” but also the personal goals of the political leadership.
84 A largely parallel line of analysis is found in Haggard's insightful discussion of the nature of “weak authoritarian regimes”; he states that “technocrats may gain autonomy from interest group and legislative pressures under authoritarian rule, but they do not necessarily gain independence from the executive.” This executive has a “personal stake … in the crony enterprise”; Haggard (fn. 48), 217–18.
Of the works discussed in this article, Hawes's book alone devotes significant attention to state theory. But Wurfel, too, in his occasional mention of the subject, asserts that in the early years of martial law the state had “autonomy from the dominant class” (p. 333) and had the “capability to make and implement policy” in a way that was unresponsive “to interests outside the state structure” (p. 334). Only later did the “state [serve] the interests of the superpatron and his closest clients-the essence of neopatrimonialism” (p. 333). This “essence of neopatrimonialism,” I am arguing, was present from the beginning.
85 Weber (fn. 3), 998; emphasis added.
86 Weber (fn. 3), 1:240, 3:1091 and 1092. If Weber is the guide, this effectively refutes Montes's (fn. 26) assertion that “a ‘rent-seeking’ economy cannot readily be classified as capitalist” (p. 65). In Montes's analysis (fn. 31) the Philippines suffers from a “feudal social basis of political power” (p. 135).
87 Anderson (fn. 10), 20.
88 Weber (fn. 3), 1040.
89 The idea of inducement comes from Charles Lindblom's discussion of “the privileged position of business.” Although he focuses on advanced capitalist countries, there are nonetheless parallels to be found in Marcos's situation after 1972. Especially in the beginning the ruler's household controlled but a portion of the national economy, and Marcos needed to ensure (domestic and foreign) investors' confidence in general business conditions. See Lind-blom , Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic System (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 170–88, quote from p. 174.
90 Weber (fn. 3), 1055; emphasis added.
91 Ibid., 1107.
92 Anderson (fn. 10), 22.
93 McCoy (fn. 30), Ms p. 45, quoting an affidavit of Oscar Lopez.
94 Ibid., 45–48.
95 Montes (fn. 31), 96, 114–15, 117, 120. Attempts at a more centralized patrimonial polity, then, did not resolve the revenue dilemmas faced in the pre-martial law period, when many oligarchic patrons competed in the electoral arena.
96 Doherty John F., “Who Controls the Philippine Economy: Some Need Not Try as Hard as Others,” in Aquino Belinda A., ed., Cronies and Enemies: The Current Philippine Scene, Philippine Studies Occasional Paper No. 5 (Honolulu: Philippine Studies Program, Center for Asian and Pacific Studies, University of Hawaii, 1982), 30.
97 See de Dios (fn. 60), 102–3. Broad attempts to link part of this elite opposition to the “national entrepreneurial class” (p. 105; see also p. 3). But a close examination of either the “bourgeois bombers,” to whom she is referring, or other major groups, especially the influential Makati Business Club, makes this implausible.
98 De Dios (fn. 5), 133.
99 Weber (fn. 5,), 1:239.
100 See the influential white paper of the University of the Philippines school of economics; Dios Emmanuel S. de, ed., An Analysis of the Philippine Economic Crisis: A Workshop Report (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1984).
101 Haggard Stephan, “The Philippines: Picking Up after Marcos,” in Vernon Raymond, ed., The Promise of Privatization (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), 93, 97. Within these enterprises, the public-private distinction was often blurred beyond recognition; as Haggard reports, prior to a 1985 Supreme Court ruling, “several managers of state-owned enterprises even denied that they were public officials!” (p. 95). See also Weber's discussion (fn. 3), 1097, of the extensive growth of state enterprises in patrimonial polities.
102 Weber (fn. 3), 1095.
103 Ibid.; emphasis in original.
104 ISI monopolists effectively control the policy-making agenda in the Aquino regime, and
international institutions seeking to push rationalizing or liberalizing strategies such as export-oriented industrialization are in the queer position of not having a clear constituency with political influence. … [T]he free-trade ideology … is being resisted by the traditional elite (now holding key positions in the government) who have been accustomed to privileged, rent-producing positions in the economy, (de Dios [fn. 5], 140–41)
As early as 1988 Haggard concluded that “barriers to rapid privatization emerged, and implementation has lagged behind state intentions.” In light of subsequent experience, this conclusion could now be stated even more forcefully. See Haggard (fn. 101), 92.
Economist Gustav Ranis, a longtime consultant on Philippine economic issues, wrote in 1989: “While the Philippines is certainly not alone in preferring [to avoid] … painful economic restructuring, it is undoubtedly one of the foremost practitioners of the art”; Ranis , Far Eastern Economic Review, September 28, 1989, pp. 153–54, at 154.
Even the prosecution of Marcos cronies has been plagued with failure, and only a tiny portion of the “ill-gotten wealth” has been recovered. See the Philippine Daily Globe, December 16, 1989. Quite early on, in fact, the major agency tasked with the effort (the Philippine Commission on Good Government) was already being called a “tainted watchdog” because of alleged misappropriation of seized assets. See the Far Eastern Economic Review, September 17, 1987, pp. 22–27.
105 Weber (fn. 3), 1095. This is not to say, of course, that corruption is incompatible with advanced capitalism: one can think of myriad examples where the two thrive simultaneously. In Weber's analysis bribery and corruption have the “least serious effect” when they are calculable and become most onerous when fees are “highly variable” and “settled from case to case with every individual official” (vol. 1, p. 240). If correct, a major obstacle to the development of more sophisticated forms of capitalist accumulation is not corruption per se, but highly arbitrary corruption.
106 Manila Chronicle, June 11, 1989.
107 De Dios (fn. 5), 124.
108 CIA, Philippines: General Survey, National Intelligence Survey, NIS 99, July 1965 (sanitized copy released November 1980), excerpted in Schirmer Daniel B. and Shalom Stephen Ross-kamm, eds., The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Dictatorship, and Resistance (Boston: South End Press, 1987), 126.
109 See Crouch (fn. II); and Callaghy (fn. n).
110 As Gustave Ranis wrote in 1989, discussing the country's strong standing with the U.S. and Japan,
There is likely to he overwhelmingly strong “need to lend” for geo-political reasons, on the one hand, and for the “need to borrow” to avoid domestic adjustment, on the other. As a consequence the system will probably find it possible to continue its non-optimal growth path for some time to come. … [T]he very economic opportunity that the Philippines’ geo-political importance provides threatens to be the undoing of its political economy. (Ranis [fn. 104], 154)
111 As attested by the current research of John Sidel of Cornell University; see Sidel , “Big Men with Bolos, Bosses, Bullets, Bank Loans, and Bus Companies: Local Power in Philippine Politics” (Unpublished manuscript, 1990).
112 When it comes to arrests of labor leaders or military harassment of peasant communities, of course, the state is very clearly an “independent actor” vis-à-vis societal forces.” 3 Joel Migdal, for example, writes that “a prime motivation for state leaders to attempt to stretch the state's rule-making domain within its formal boundaries, even with all the risks that has entailed, has been to build sufficient clout to survive the dangers posed by those outside its boundaries, from the world of states”; Migdal , Strong Societies and WeaK States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 21.
* The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of the University of the Philippines School of Economics, where he was based while conducting the dissertation research that inspired this article. He was supported by a grant from the U.S. Department of Education Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad Program, as well as by a grant from the Social Science Research Council and the American Council of Learned Societies, with funds provided by the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.
In addition, he would like to thank all those who offered suggestions and comments that contributed to the ideas in this review article: Ben Anderson, Gerry Burns, Nick Cullather, Edna Labra Hutchcroft, Alex Magno, Manuel Montes, Jim Rush, Jim Scott, and John Sidel, as well as those who commented on an earlier version, read at the Third International Philippine Studies Conference, Quezon City, July 13–17, 1989. The author, of course, accepts responsibility for any errors or omissions within the article.
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.
Full text views reflects the number of PDF downloads, PDFs sent to Google Drive, Dropbox and Kindle and HTML full text views.
* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 24th November 2017. This data will be updated every 24 hours.