¹ Hierich, Max, “The Use of Time in the Study of Social Change,” American Sociological Review, xxix (June 1964), 386CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² Francesca Cancian, “Functional Analysis of Change,” Ibid., xxv (December 1960), 818–27; and Boskoff, Alvin, “Functional Analysis as a Source of Theoretical Repertory and Research Tasks in the Study of Social Change,” in Zollschan, George K. and Hirsch, Walter, eds., Explorations in Social Change (Boston 1964)Google Scholar.

³ While the following variables are susceptible to more precise definitions than those offered here, to define them further would be both useless and pretentious. The kinds of hypotheses and illustrative evidence offered below are not refined enough to link up with a set of more closely defined variables, just as certain studies relying upon survey or aggregate data only artificially confirm the hypotheses when the statistical manipulations are unwarranted by the weak reliability of the data.

⁴ This distinction is related to the typology of regimes put forward by LaPalombara and Weiner; authoritarian government as defined here includes their “one-party authoritarian” and “one-party totalitarian” systems, whereas nonauthoritarian dictatorship includes, among others, their “one-party pluralistic” regimes (pp. 37–41).

⁵ Some students of political development would contend that democracy as defined here—in terms of the electoral form that it has taken in Western areas—is inapplicable to the non-Western areas and that governmental responsiveness to the population, if it is achieved, will be achieved through indigenous forms of representation. Perhaps—but at this point in history it is a highly dubious proposition since such indigenous forms of representation have not yet been institutionalized in any national political system. Moreover, a handful of modernizing systems—such as the Philippines, India, Chile, and Costa Rica—have successfully adopted the Western democratic model, and all but a few of the new states of Asia have set out to build a political order of the Western type. See Brecher, Michael, The New States of Asia (New York 1966), 61–62Google Scholar. Moreover, electoral democracy requires a heightened political consciousness, which in turn depends upon mass mobilization. And the latter is commonly incompatible with electoral competition. See Gellner, Ernest, “Democracy and Industrialisation,” Archives européennes de sociologie, viii, No. 1 (1967), 63–64Google Scholar.

⁸ Pennock, J. Roland, “Political Development, Political Systems, and Political Goods,” World Politics, xvm (April 1966), 415–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷ Dankwart Rustow arrives at a broadly similar conclusion (that the most effective sequence for “political modernization” is the one of identity-authority-equality) by a different route than that taken here. See his A World of Nations (Washington 1967), 120–32Google Scholar. LaPalombara and Weiner would presumably also agree with this formulation, but their supporting arguments are limited to the single point that a different sequence would inflict too heavy a “load” upon the government (pp. 428–29).

⁸ “Comparative Political Culture,” in Pye, Lucian and Verba, Sidney, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton 1965), 533CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸ In a related vein, Carl J. Friedrich has written that “only a firmly established government is capable of being constitutionalized. … In the evolution of our Western world diis meant that national unification had to precede constitutionalism” (Constitutional Government and Democracy [Boston 1941], 8Google Scholar).

¹⁰ Geertz, Clifford, “Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States,” in , Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States (Glencoe 1963), 127–28Google Scholar.

¹¹ Eckstein, Harry, Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway (Princeton 1966), esp. 119–20Google Scholar, 181–82.

¹² Moreover, these particular attachments to the nation allowed for the gradual inclusion of protoparties and limited popular participation into the decision-making process characterized by a bargaining style. See Robert E. Ward, “Japan: The Continuity of Modernization,” in Pye and Verba, 55–56. The pre-1868 peasantry and urban lower classes did not manifest a sense of national identity, but their quiescence and acquiescence made them insignificant as political actors.

¹³ Rustow, 125. Frederick W. Frey sets out “four crucial factors leading a group to an early sense of national identity,” in his The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), 409Google Scholar. Also see Weber's essay on bureaucracy in Gerth, H. H. and Mills, C. Wright, eds., From Max Weber (New York 1958), 209–10Google Scholar.

¹⁴ There is a third possibility—that the government simply legislate minority languages and educational patterns out of existence. This procedure is manifestly unsuited to the creation of a common identity. The failures of the post-World War I democracies in Eastern Europe in just this kind of heavy-handed attempt certainly underscore the point.

¹⁵ Emphasis upon “symbol-wielding” and what Shils has termed “demonstrative” and “remonstrative” politics may also lower a government's administrative and economic effectiveness. For an analysis of Indonesia along such lines, see Feith, Herbert, “Indonesia's Political Symbols and Their Wielders,” World Politics, xvi (October 1963), esp. 86Google Scholar, 92–96. For the general argument that charismatic leadership in the non-Western countries inhibits economic development, see Shils, Edward, “The Concentration and Dispersion of Charisma: Their Bearing on Economic Policy in Underdeveloped Countries,” World Politics, xi (October 1958), 1–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁶ Moreover, Weber's arguments that charisma may become routinized contain a number of pitfalls. See Runciman, W. G., “Charismatic Legitimacy and One-Party Rule in Ghana,” Archives europeennes de sociologie, iv, No. 1 (1963), 149–51Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Lipset, Seymour Martin, The First New Nation (New York 1963), 22–23Google Scholar. See also Rustow's penetrating discussion of charismatic leaders in the new states, 148–69.

¹⁸ See also Apter, David E., “Ghana,” in Coleman, James S. and Rosberg, Carl G. Jr., eds., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley 1964), 295–300Google Scholar.

¹⁹ See also Andrain, Charles F., “Democracy and Socialism: Ideologies of African Leaders,” in Apter, David E., ed., Ideology and Discontent (Glencoe 1964), 157–64Google Scholar.

²⁰ This argument finds additional support when it is noted that in other single-party African states whose governments and territorial integrity are also endangered by parochial demands—such as the Ivory Coast and Tanzania—the goal of creating a national identity is being implemented in a relatively gradual fashion, which is related to the maintenance of dieir intermediary groups.

²¹ Apter, David E., The Political Kingdom in Uganda (Princeton 1961), 476–77Google Scholar. Robert E. Ward also places a good deal of emphasis upon tradition as a stabilizing influence that may help to usher in democratic stability, in Pye and Verba, 77–82, and “Political Modernization and Political Culture in Japan,” World Politics, xv (July 1963), 578–81Google Scholar. For a discussion of Atatiirk's successful manipulation of the traditional Sultanate and Caliphate in altering Turkish identity, see Robinson, Richard D., The First Turkish Republic (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), 34–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²² Rustow, 119–20; and Weiner, Myron, Party Politics in India (Princeton 1957), 170–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²³ McKim Marriott, “Cultural Policy in the New States,” in Geertz, Old Societies and New States, 42.

²⁴ Geertz, Ibid., 123. Also see Wriggins, W. Howard, “Impediments to Unity in New Nations: The Case of Ceylon,” American Political Science Review, LV (June 1961), 316Google Scholar, 319.

²⁵ Cf. Daalder's argument (pp. 60–61) that it is less likely that authentic democratic government will emerge where the establishment of a strong bureaucracy precedes party competition. However, it would seem that the crucial point in his argument refers to overcentralization rather than bureaucratization.

With respect to rates of change, Alexis de Tocqueville suggested that political centralization is positively related to the rate at which democratic government emerges (Democracy in America, Vol. II [New York 1960], 298Google Scholar).

²⁶ For an analysis of European political parties that supports this proposition and demonstrates how the time factor “merges into and coincides with the load factor,” see Otto Kirchheimer's chapter “The Transformation of the Western European Party System,” in LaPalombara and Weiner (pp. 177–82). The same type of analysis on a somewhat broader theoretical plane is found in LaPalombara and Weiner's own concluding chapter (pp. 427–33).

²⁷ Parsons, Talcott, “Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process,” in Eckstein, Harry, ed., Internal War (New York 1964), 64Google Scholar. Also see Geertz, 131.

²⁸ Aristide R. Zolberg, “The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa” (forthcoming).

²⁹ Huntington, Samuel P., “Political Development and Political Decay,” World Politics, XVII (April 1965), 394–95Google Scholar. Also see Eisenstadt, S. N., Modernization: Protest and Change (New York 1966), 58–61Google Scholar; and Downs, Anthony, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston 1967), 18–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar. It is noteworthy that the two oldest single-party systems, those of Russia and Mexico, are the only ones to have been successfully institutionalized to the extent of regularizing the succession problem.

³⁰ Referring to Europe in the decades following the French Revolution, Tocqueville could write that once the “spell of royalty is broken … [the monarch] is full of animosity and alarm; he finds that he is a stranger in his own country, and he treats his subjects like conquered enemies” (I, 327).

³¹ Pye, Lucian W., Politics, Personality and Nation Building (New Haven 1962), 19–20Google Scholar.

³² Zolberg, Aristide R., Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa (Chicago 1966), 75Google Scholar.

³³ This would be true unless socioeconomic change is overrapid, in which case the government would probably have to contend with the rise of mass movements. See Kornhauser, William, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe 1959), esp. 142–76Google Scholar; and Olson, Mancur Jr., “Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force,” Journal of Economic History, xxiii (December 1963), 529–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁴ See the discussion of this point in Huntington, Samuel P., “The Political Modernization of Traditional Monarchies,” Daedalus, xcv (Summer 1966), 766–68Google Scholar. Huntington's reasoning is largely based on Wilson, James Q., “Innovation in Organization: Notes Toward a Theory,” in Thompson, James D., ed., Approaches to Organizational Design (Pittsburgh 1966), 193–218Google Scholar.

³⁵ Two exceptions come readily to mind from the Latin American experience: in both Mexico and Bolivia, prior to governmental institutionalization, land was distributed to the peasants who worked it. However, it is significant that the landholding elites were practically destroyed in the revolutions that preceded the land reforms.

³⁶ Foltz, William J., “Building the Newest Nations: Short-Run Strategies and Long-Run Problems,” in Deutsch, Karl W. and Foltz, William J., eds., Nation-Building (New York 1963), 123–24Google Scholar.

³⁷ The recent tendency of African states to merge their governmental and party hierarchies is partly necessitated by just this shortage of trained personnel, and it also accounts for the weakening of the parties. See Immanuel Wallerstein's chapter “The Decline of the Party in Single-Party African States,” in the volume under review (pp. 201–15).

³⁸ Shils, Edward A., “Demagogues and Cadres in the Political Development of the New States,” in Pye, Lucian W., ed., Communications and Political Development (Princeton 1963), 68Google Scholar.

³⁹ In analyzing the processes by which national units become integrated into political systems having a larger territorial scope and a greater number of functional responsibilities—an analysis that is also said to be in large part applicable to the processes of domestic political integration—Amitai Etzioni arrives at a proposition supporting the point made here: “Unions that have few elite-units will tend to be more successful [in integration] than unions that have a greater number” (Political Unification [New York 1965], 68–69Google Scholar). Also see Deutsch, Karl W. and others, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton 1957), 38Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ Huntington, “Political Development and Political Decay,” 403. Downs has hypothesized that in rapidly expanding bureaucratic organizations “a higher proportion of [the incumbents’] efforts is devoted to internal politics and rivalry rather than performance of their [organization's] functions” (p. 263). For example, in England between 1689 and 1715, an exceptionally rapid expansion of government personnel detracted from the unity, coherence, and autonomy of the executive (Plumb, J. H., The Origins of Political Stability: England 1675–1725 [Boston 1967], esp. 110–12, 126–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

⁴¹ Zolberg, “The Structure of Political Conflict”

⁴² See the related remarks of Deutsch, Karl W., in The Nerves of Government (Glencoe 1963), 224Google Scholar, 227. Edward A. Shils contends that in the new states there are some half-dozen factors that militate against an effective feedback flow, in “The Intellectuals, Public Opinion, and Economic Development,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, vi (October 1957), 55–62Google Scholar.

⁴³ Apter, David E., The Politics of Modernization (Chicago 1965), 238–40Google Scholar. What is in effect a corollary to Apter's hypothesis is put forward by LaPalombara and Weiner: “While a mobilist party (particularly in a one-party state) may be more compatible with the establishment of the minimum central authority necessary for economic development, the adaptive party is often more effective in providing government with information essential for carrying out economic development programs” (p. 426).

⁴⁴ Zolberg, Creating Political Order, 92. And for a repeated stress on the importance of a coherent and unified elite if political stability and democracy are to be attained and maintained, see Shils, Edward, “Political Development in the New States,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 11 (April and July 1960), 389–91Google Scholar, and Huntington, “Political Development and Political Decay,” 420–21.

⁴⁵ Cross-national aggregate data that support this generalization are found in Ted Gurr, with Ruttenberg, Charles, The Conditions of Civil Violence: First Tests of a Causal Model, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Research Monograph No. 28 (Princeton 1967), esp. 12Google Scholar, 86–87.

⁴⁶ Wallerstein discusses this point in the LaPalombara-Weiner book (p. 211).

⁴⁷ For an application of this hypothesis to West Africa, see Zolberg, “The Structure of Political Conflict.”

⁴⁸ The overnight introduction of universal male suffrage in Colombia in 1853, which was followed by two tumultuous civil wars, may serve as a telling Latin American case in which the suffrage was expanded “too far and too fast.” For the Latin American situation since 1940, see Johnson, John J., The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford 1964), 98–101Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ Pp. 120–23. Also see Deutsch and others, 61–63, for some European examples that support this generalization; and MacKenzie's conclusion based on close study of five African elections: “If tribalism is the enemy, elections are partly responsible for encouraging it” (MacKenzie, W. J. M. and Robinson, Kenneth E., Five Elections in Africa [Oxford 1960], 484Google Scholar). For a detailed account of the way in which the politicians sharpened communal tensions in Ceylon by playing upon communal issues in gaining electoral support, see Wriggins, C. Howard, Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation (Princeton 1960), 169–270Google Scholar. Pakistan may be viewed as a case in which the politicians played upon parochial interests and thereby provided the rationale for preserving national unity and governmental effectiveness by doing away with elections. See Callard, K., Pakistan: A Political Study (London 1957).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Deutsch and others, 62; Tocqueville, I, 201.

⁵¹ Italy illustrates this point most clearly. With the sudden expansion of the suffrage in 1918, shifting electoral power to an illiterate working class, Mussolini's antidemocratic appeals were embraced by a middle class whose main political objective now became protection from socialism and communism.

⁵² To which may be added two other arguments: a period of restricted suffrage may produce a “nationalized” politics, and to the extent that this influence extends into the next stage of universal suffrage, it mitigates cultural and regional cleavages—a point that is illustrated in Belgium. More important, gradual enfranchisement is apparently related to the nonelites' maintenance of respectful and partially acquiescent attitudes toward political authority—a cultural variable that figures prominently in a handful of theories of stable democracy.