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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2011
Until recently it has been taken more or less for granted by many students of the subject that totalitarian polities will not in the long run tolerate any form of pluralism in their power structure. Lucid and convincing arguments have been constructed to support this contention, in studies of the several historical manifestations of totalitarianism. Implicit in these speculations was the more general view that it is in the very nature of power, and especially political power, that it will not gladly suffer any rivals. In the West the very virtues of democracy have been defended precisely on the grounds that democracy tends through its procedural commitments to diffuse power, to counteract, as it were, the inherent tendency of power toward infinite selfaggrandizement.
1 See, for instance, Arendt, Hannah, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York 1951)Google Scholar.
2 For a pioneering criticism of the use of the totalitarian model as an ideal type, see Skilling, H. Gordon, “Interest Groups and Communist Politics,” World Politics, XVIII (April 1966), 435–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3 The methodological framework of this paper owes much to Almond, G. A. and Powell, G. B., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston 1966). See especially 271–80Google Scholar.
4 Rocznik statystyczny 1968. [Polish Statistical Almanac 1968] (Warszawa 1968), 18Google Scholar. The recent changes in size and composition of the Party were as follows:
By June 30, 1968, the Party membership stood at 2,030,000. For the social composition of the C.P. of the Soviet Union see Rigby, T. H., Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R., 1917–1957 (Princeton 1968), 323Google Scholar.
5 Ibid., compiled data from pp. 28, 421, 422, 490.
6 More recently, for instance, in Anholcer, A., “Uwagi o polityczno-propagandowej dzialalnosci organizacji i instancji partyjnych” [Some Remarks on Political Education in Party Units], Nowe Drogi (March 1967), 23–40Google Scholar. It might also be of interest to note that in a November, 1966, study of the social attitudes of county apparatus activists (including members of the United Peasants and Democratic Parties) the question as to whose interests activists should serve was answered as follows: national interest 57%, party interest 33% , and local interest 10%. Nowe Drogi (January 1967), 62. What may be significant here is not only the results of the poll, but also the reasons for posing the questions in this manner.
7 In January, 1968, the Union of Socialist Youth had 1,056,000 members divided as follows: school youth—490,500, working youth—441,500, university students—62,000 (out of the total of 289,000 students). Polityka (January 13, 1968).
8 Nowe Drogi (March 1967), 16; Nowe Drogi (April 1967), 14 and 92.
9 Rocznik statystyczny 1968 [Polish Statistical Almanac 1968] (Warszawa 1968), 12Google Scholar. The remaining 49 seats are held by nonparty deputies.
10 Bromke, Adam, Poland's Politics: Idealism vs. Realism (Cambridge, Mass. 1967)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
11 See, for instance, Skrzydlo, W., “System partyjny Polskiej Republiki Ludowej i jego wyraz w ustroju politycznym panstwa” [The Party System in the Polish People's Republic and Its Significance in the Political System], Panstwo i Prawo (July 1959)Google Scholar.
12 This backing, however, is not in the form of a direct subsidy. Under a special arrangement these organizations derive their own revenues through operation of economic (mainly publishing) enterprises allocated to them by the state. Such revenues are subject to taxation and other limitations. The Pax Society's budget, for instance, was restricted in 1964 to 50 million zlotys (or 2 million dollars) annually, Freres du Monde, No. 39 (1965)Google Scholar.
13 In the present (1965–1968) Diet, the Pax Society and the Znak Group have five deputies each.
14 Stehle, Hansjakob, The Independent Satellite: Society and Politics in Poland Since 1945 (New York 1965), 108Google Scholar.
15 Piasecki, Boleslaw, Zagadnienia istotne [The Essential Issues] (Warsaw 1945)Google Scholar, Patriotyzm polskj [Polish Patriotism] (Warsaw 1958)Google Scholar. Both these books are collections of articles previously published in Pax periodicals. For a more recent statement of Pax's ideological position see: “Wytyczne ideowo-polityczne stowarzyszenia Pax,” Dokumenty: Schizmy [The Ideological Guidelines of Pax Society] (Paris 1966), 13–41Google Scholar.
16 This position has subsequently received the official blessings of Pope John XXIII in Pacem in Terris in 1963, and of the Second Vatican Council in 1965. To wit, “While rejecting atheism, root and branch, the Church sincerely professes that all men, believers and unbelievers alike, ought to work for the rightful betterment of this world in which all alike live.” Abbott, Walter M., S.J., , ed., The Documents of Vatican II (New York 1966), 219Google Scholar.
17 It must be noted, however, that on rare occasions, when governmental policy was prima facie in contradiction to the teaching of the Church and the issue only marginally political, the Pax Society registered its disapproval. Thus, for instance, when a bill to legalize abortion was introduced in 1956, the three Pax deputies voted against it “in the name of Catholic moral doctrine.” Stehle, no.
18 There have even been circulating in Poland persistent rumors that the Pax Society collaborates with the Polish and/or Russian security organs. The author failed to find any substantiation of these claims.
19 In 1956 and again in 1961.
20 Bromke, 215.
21 Stehle, 102.
22 Ibid., 105. Perhaps the most dramatic act of opposition occurred recently when the five Znak deputies submitted an interpellation concerning the March, 1968, student demonstrations. Couched in less than cautious language, the interpellation requested die government to establish the responsibility for police brutality in suppressing the demonstrations and to clarify its policy on civil liberties. On April 10th, in the Diet, the interpellation was sharply criticized and its signers castigated as reactionaries, first by the premier and then by no fewer than 27 prominent deputies. In the face of this mighty and concerted onslaught three Znak deputies rose to speak in defense of their position. One of them, Jerzy Zawieyski, subsequently submitted his resignation as a member of the State Council. Zycie Uterackie, No. 847 (1968)Google Scholar and Tygodnik Powszechny (April 28, 1968).
23 Bromke, 247–48.
24 Apart from these three politically oriented organizations of lay Catholics, there exists in Poland a charitable Catholic organization, Th e Caritas Society. Since 1950 it has been under direct governmental control. While the Caritas Society serves as a home base for some “progressivist” pro-government members of the clergy, its activities have not been ostensibly political.
25 Rocznik statystyczny 1968 [Polish Statistical Almanac 1968] (Warszawa 1968), 17Google Scholar.
26 Their combined circulation is 42,000, far below the circulation of the combined Catholic press of about 500,000. Kozakiewics, Mikolaj, O tolerancji i swobodzie sumienia [On Toleration and Freedom of Conscience] (Warszawa 1963), 83Google Scholar.
27 Argumenty, No . 19 (1961)Google Scholar, quoted in Stehle, 75. Kolakowski's own Rozmowy z diablem [Conversations with the Devil] (Warszawa 1965)Google Scholar is a good case in point of more subtle atheistic propaganda. This literate satirical tract, addressed to sophisticates, offers a powerful challenge to the Christian explanation of the problem of evil.
28 The typical categories of “believers” used by the sociologists in Poland are: (1) deeply religious and practicing regularly; (2) religious and practicing regularly; (3) religious and practicing irregularly; (4) religious and non-practicing. Th e responses tend to cluster around the first and second categories for the peasants and around the second and third categories for the intelligentsia and second-generation or more workers.
29 See Jaroszewski, Tadeusz, “Dynamika praktyk religijnych i postaw swiatopogladowych w Polsce w swietle badan socjologicznych” [The Dynamics of Religious Practices and Attitudes in Poland in the Light of Sociological Studies], Kultura i Spoleczenstwo (March 1966), 133–49Google Scholar.
30 Ibid., 138.
31 For a discussion of the methodological aspects of the sociological study of religion see Jacher, Wladyslaw, “Przemiany religijne i refleksje socjologiczne” [Religious Transformations and Sociological Reflections], Znak (December 1967), 1591–1601Google Scholar.
32 Clifford Barnett and others, Poland: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture (New York 1958), 64–65Google Scholar.
33 See, for instance, Grygiel, S. and Tischner, J., “Szkic o religijnosci wsi wspolczesnej” [An Essay on Religiousness of the Rural Dwellers], Znak (December 1966), 1455–73Google Scholar.
34 Adapted from Rocznik statystyczny 1968, 21, and Siemek, Jozef, Czy to sa sprawy religii [Are These Matters of Religion?] (Warszawa 1962), 6–7Google Scholar.
35 A table below illustrates these changes further:
* Maly rocznik statystyczny 1939 [Polish Statistical Almanac 1939] (Warszawa 1968), 354Google Scholar.
** Rocznik statystyczny 1968 [Polish Statistical Almanac 1968] (Warszawa 1968), 21Google Scholar. (Prior to 1967 the Polish People's Republic official statistical yearbooks did not include any data on religion.)
36 Compare, for instance, the following discrepancies:
Yet another semi-official source states that, between 1937 and 1962, the number of churches and chapels increased (only) by 2,937 (Siemiak, 7). Since, by all accounts, very few churches have been erected since 1962, the contrast with even the lower 1965 figure is striking.
37 Markiewicz, Stanislaw, Panstwo i Kosciol w okresie dwudziestolecia Polshj Ludowej [State and Church in the Twenty Years of the Polish People's Republic] (Warszawa 1965), 48Google Scholar. It is interesting and paradoxical that until 1950 the Church enjoyed a privileged position in land-ownership. It alone was allowed to own larger tracts than the maximum of 125 acres permitted under the general land nationalization law. One writer justifies the 1950 change as follows: “The exclusion of Church estates from land reform has not been properly appreciated by the Polish episcopate. The majority of Church estates became bases of antigovernment operations, center of exploitation of the workers and examples of the worst kind of economic management. The intentions of the government were utterly thwarted. The episcopate not only failed to make the slightest effort to cooperate with the government, but used the generous gift to finance its antigovernment activities.” Sikora, Jan, Watykan czy Polska [Vatican or Poland] (Warszawa 1950), 94–95Google Scholar.
38 Zycie Literackie, No. 31 (1961)Google Scholar. Quoted in Stehle, 72. By comparison, in 1967 Poland's gross national product was 593.8 billion zlotys, total expenditures on education and culture 32 billion zlotys, and defense expenditures 26 billion zlotys. Rocznik statystyczny 1968, 82, 558.
39 Trybuna Ludu (November 31, 1967).
40 In a rare published statement the Pax-associated priests pleaded thus: “In taxation the financial burden ought to be levied in relation to the actual situation and with the complete elimination of die painful cases of applying tax regulations as a form of administrative pressure.” Kierunki (August 11, 1968).
41 Stehle's unsubstantiated assertion that “the income of the average priest is more than that of a minister of state” (72), contrasts sharply with the present writer's own observations.
42 Stehle, 90–91.
43 Markiewicz, 51.
44 Trybuna Ludu (Oct. 31, 1967). These regulations also limited religious instruction in the centers to two hours a week and required the priests in charge to furnish an annual report. In addition, there were some inducements in the form of a small salary (1,000 zlotys) and the (not inconsiderable) benefits under the social security system for the priests in charge.
45 Renter (Warsaw, Oct. 29, 1967)Google Scholar. “A letter from the Episcopate read in Polish churches on Oct. 29, 1967, complained that some clergymen have been arrested and others have suffered other penalties for disobeying ‘unjust’ regulations issued by Polish civilian authorities regarding religious instruction and inventories of church property. The letter asked the faithful to respect and if necessary to support the priests.”
46 The Constitution of the Polish People's Republic, Article 70.
47 The extent of this concern is illustrated by the legal exemption from government inspection of those catechism centers that are located in churches and chapels. Trybuna Ludu (Oct. 31, 1967).
48 As in the case of the press campaign against the “Polish Bishops' Letter to the German Episcopate” in late 1965 and early 1966. For a representative sample of the official pronouncements and press articles in this connection see: Grzybowski, K. and others, Poprawka z historii [Rewriting History] (Warszawa 1966)Google Scholar, and anon., Materialy dokumenty: Oredzie biskupow polskich do biskupow niemieckich [Documents: The Letter of the Polish Bishops to the German Episcopate] (Warszawa 1966)Google Scholar.
49 The reactions from the pulpit were presumably reported to the policy-makers, but they could hardly be considered representative of the mass audience to which the campaign in question was addressed.
50 This letter, sent on November 18, 1965, from Rome, by the 36 Polish bishops attending the last session of the Vatican Council II, to the German bishops, invited them to attend the forthcoming Church celebrations of the millennium of Christianity in Poland. The rather lengthy document devoted much space to the review of past Polish-German relations and ended—invoking the spirit of the Gospels—by offering forgiveness and asking to be forgiven for the wrongs mutually inflicted. The Polish government utilized this occasion to accuse the episcopate of meddling in political affairs as well as of distorting history to promote its anti-Socialist policies. Within a week or so a massive campaign against the letter was mounted in the Polish mass media. For several days vehement and detailed attacks appeared in newspapers throughout the land without the text of the letter ever having been published. Once the mistake was noticed, the letter was published but with several distortions, one of them crucial to the argument. These discrepancies were in turn corrected in the new printings when they were pointed out by the foreign press and radio; the official explanation attributed the errors to faulty translation. In January, 1966, the govern-ment refused Cardinal Wyszynski permission to travel abroad, citing the bishops' letter and the attitudes it expressed as a basis for the decision. The “anti-letter” campaign continued for a few months afterwards. Czerski, M. and Walicki, A., eds., Dialog episkopatow Polslfi i Niemiec [The Dialogue Between the Polish and German Episcopates], (London 1966), 5–7Google Scholar. The ban on Cardinal Wyszynski's foreign travel was lifted in October, 1968. New York Times (October 31, 1968). Throughout 1966 and 1967 members of the episcopate generally refrained from applying for passports out of solidarity with the Cardinal. Several bishops travelled abroad in the first half of 1968. Hejnal Mariacki (July 1968).
51 Slowo Powszeckne (January 11, 1968).
52 In A.D. 966 the Polish King Mieszko I was baptized. The same date is also considered to mark the historical beginning of the Polish state. Thus in 1966, both the Church and the state had solemn reasons to prepare large-scale millennial celebrations. Not unnaturally this was done in the spirit of competition, both organizers doing their utmost to attract mass participation in their respective festivities. It was in 1966 that state-church relations reached their lowest ebb since the Stalinist period. It is in connection with these millennial celebrations that the state resorted to all kinds of disruptive tactics to hinder the success of the Church observances. These tactics varied from petty administrative interference with religious processions to provision of diversionary attractions scheduled at the time of the Church celebrations (such as popular sports events, popular television programs, and the like). See Bregman, Alexander, “Gomulka's Long Hot Spring,” East Europe, 15 (August 1966), 2–14Google Scholar.
53 On the other hand, it appears that there have been firm indications of the down-ward trend in the number of the followers of religious vocations. Concern about future scarcity of Church “cadres” has been expressed by the hierarchy on frequent occasions. See, for instance, ks. Bozowski, B., and others, “Dyskusja o ksiezach w Polsce” [A Discussion About Polish Priests], Wiez, XI (July-August 1968), 3–36Google Scholar.
54 It might also be important to note that the radical and progressive reform program initiated by Pope John XXIII and the Second Vatican Council does not seem to suit the temper of the majority of the Polish clergy and lay believers. While much space has been devoted to the discussion of “Aggiornamento” in the lay Catholic press the effect of these efforts on the Church at large has not been very significant. The rural believers and their clergy seem hardly to have been affected at all.
Another issue bearing upon our discussion is that of the possibility of the agreement between the Polish Government and the Holy See to regulate state-church relations. Such an agreement was concluded by the Vatican with Hungary in 1964 and with Yugoslavia in 1966. While both of these agreements, and especially the latter, were hailed by all parties involved as models for improving state-church relations in Communist countries, this solution is of doubtful value to Poland. As one observer stated it: “(In Poland) for a long time the episcopate under its militant primate Cardinal Wyszynski has been a self-confident negotiating party with the state. . . . No mean proportion of Polish bishops believe that the position of the Polish Church is so strong, despite or because of recurrent friction with the government, that any new agreement, any compromise, could only lead to a deterioration of the status quo” Stehle, Hansjakob, “Vatican Policy Towards Eastern Europe,” Survey, No. 66 (January 1968), 115.Google Scholar
