The concepts of triangular structure and pattern of relations are useful in understanding conflict in U.S.-China relations, particularly over Taiwan, and in explaining the context in which Chinese domestic politics influences the P.R.C.'s policy toward the United States. Through their influence on relative bargaining strengths, shifting patterns of relations have determined Beijing's readiness either to push for change in U.S.-Taiwan relations or to accept the status quo until China's bargaining position improves. The pace of policy change within a particular pattern of relations has been influenced by the P.R.C.'s domestic politics, which has also compelled the leaders to protect their domestic position by issuing statements aimed at the domestic audience.

The hypothesis that generation has become a major source of political cleavage within the Soviet regional party apparatus is examined in the context of existing models of political generations. The attitudes of a sample of RSFSR provincial officials toward problems in the Soviet economy, as expressed in their newspaper writings, are analyzed according to several variables, including political generation. While it is difficult to speak of a significant difference in perspectives along strict generational lines, generational differences appear to be more significant within subgroups of the elite than within the elite as a whole. Several attitudinal subgroups within the younger generation are identified and their views of economic problems compared with those of their elders and with those of their generational peers. The findings suggest that the process of generational change in the Soviet Union is likely to be more complex than the traditional models of political generations lead one to expect.

Are the Indian nuclear and space programs driven primarily by defense or development motives? What are India's economic and technological capabilities in these fields?

Defense motives are strong, but are offset by the potential consequences of programs of nuclear weapons and delivery systems that could produce less rather than more security by provoking counter-reactions in Pakistan and China. The underlying development motives are equally strong, but the programs may not be cost-efficient in the short run. Ultimately, the justification for these programs is based on a dual argument: strategic circumstances justify the maintenance of the nuclear weapons option through development of civilian nuclear energy and space programs irrespective of cost or efficiency, while civilian needs in nuclear energy and space-based telecommunications and meteorological systems provide the defense sector with nuclear weapons and delivery systems options. Although at present neither may seem economically justifiable independently of the other, together they provide a reinforcing defense-development justification.

Explanations of the growth of the newly industrializing countries (NICs) by neoclassical economists and dependency theorists neglect the role of politics in shaping development strategies. Different social configurations, state structures, and ideas about development help explain the divergent policy choices made by the export-oriented East Asian NICs—Korea and Taiwan—and the more “inward-looking” countries of Latin America, particularly Mexico and Brazil. These different strategic choices, in turn, account for variations in the patterns of external “dependency” that characterize countries in the two regions.

Brazil experienced both economic prosperity and political repression in the 1970s. When the “miracle” faltered after the oil shocks, however, repression came to be viewed as neither politically effective nor conducive to further economic growth. Workers, whose incomes had risen during the “economic miracle,” began to seek political freedom as well. The church, a strong proponent of liberation theology, also played an important role by supporting the poor in their struggle. In addition, the elite pressured for liberalization when they perceived that their control over economic rewards was being eroded by increasing state domination of the economy.

The elite may now be more responsive to mass demands in order to preclude the return of military control. Their ability to respond will be largely determined by international factors over which Brazil has little influence.