The tragic events of September 11, 2001, came as a terrible surprise, except of course to those who perpetrated them. The four aircraft hijackings, the use of the seized and fully fueled large aircraft as incendiary bombs directed against the perceived centers of American financial, military, and legislative life (on the assumption that the fourth jet was to have been targeted at the U.S. Capitol), and the massive loss of life shattered all assumptions. The terror immediately produced a flood of analysis, instant commentary, articles, books, and gradually also a smaller tide of semiacademic and academic analysis.

Are predominantly Muslim societies distinctly disadvantaged in democratization? If so, why? The article presents a straightforward cross-national examination of the link between Islam and political regime. The evidence strongly suggests that Muslim countries are in fact democratic underachievers. The nature of the causal connection between Islam and political regime is investigated. Many conventional assumptions about Islam and politics do not withstand scrutiny. But one factor does help explain the dearth of democracy in the Muslim world: the treatment of women and girls. The rudiments of a provisional theory linking the treatment of females and regime type are offered and the implications of the findings for democracy, both in Muslim societies and elsewhere, are discussed.

In the ongoing war on terrorism that highlights the “new era” in world politics, East Asia constitutes a crucial swing vote. Its importance derives from its growing economic heft in the world, as well as its central role in three key trends that have characterized international politics since the end of the cold war: globalization, regionalism, and a reequilibration of the national balance of power. This article examines the impact of September 11 on the region, focusing on these three trends as indicators. It finds that while the impact of the war has been in significant respects different in Southeast Asia and in Northeast Asia, in both subregions the dominant preference has been to pursue this new campaign more as a police effort than as a “war” against selected alleged terrorist-harboring nation-states. In this respect, antiterrorist efforts have been modest but thus far fairly effective. Yet the antiterrorist effort has not eclipsed other realms of international diplomacy (such as economic cooperation and regional development) to the extent that it has in American foreign policy. Thus there is some risk that the divergent priorities of Washington and the East Asian nations may unwittingly contribute to a form of regional consolidation in which the U.S. plays a diminished role.

The attacks of September 11, 2001, highlight the general absence of attention to religion in international scholarship. The absence is understandable, for it arises from the secularized nature of the authority structure of the international system, described here as the “Westphalian synthesis.” Over the past generation, though, the global rise of public religion has challenged several planks of the synthesis. The sharpest challenge is “radical Islamic revivalism,” a political theology that has its roots in the early twentieth century and that gave rise to al-Qaeda. If international relations scholars are to understand the events of September 11, they ought to devote more attention to the way in which radical Islamic revivalism and public religion shape international relations, sometimes in dramatic ways.

This article examines the importance of the internal structural dynamics of the military in the analysis of transitions from nondemocratic rule and in democratic consolidation. The authors argues that factors endogenous to the military—including variations in the size of the officer corps, solidarity among graduating classes from the military academy, and promotional prospects—are important determinants of the political behavior of militaries. As a case study, military structure and politics during Indonesia's recent transition from nondemocratic rule and current consolidation of democracy are explored in detail. While the ongoing interaction between civilians and the military is acknowledged, systematic structural features are identified as being important for understanding the behavior of the Indonesian military between 1998 and 2001. The authors compare and contrast the study of Indonesia with other cases in the literature on transitions—including Ghana, Nigeria, Portugal, and Thailand—and discuss resulting implications for the study of transitions and consolidations.

John Mearsheimer's Tragedy of Great Power Politics errs in claiming that all national security decisions are rational ones. In contrast, sometimes state ambitions and actions go beyond what “rationality” typically would permit; sometimes states do not assert capabilities which they clearly possess. The explanations for such outcomes reside in realms that Mearsheimer either does not consider or dismisses too readily, such as alignments, democracy, ideology, and economic relationships. He also charts a role for the United States (a state confronting “the stopping power of water” that is too limited given the objectives (a balance of power) which he believes it should seek to create. His theory of war is too restricted and so therefore is his theory of peace. But he has fashioned one of the first new empirical essays in general realist theory in recent years and deserves to be commended. His approach will be the focus of debate and analysis for some time to come.