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Getting Your Ducks in a Row: The Case for More Inclusive Renegotiations in EU–Poultry Meat (China)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 April 2019

DAVID R. DEREMER  and
FEDERICO ORTINO
DAVID R. DEREMER*
Affiliation:
International School of Economics, Kazakh–British Technical University, Kazakhstan
FEDERICO ORTINO*
Affiliation:
Kings College London
*
*Email: drd2108@columbia.edu.
**Email: federico.ortino@kcl.ac.uk.
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Abstract

This paper critiques a Panel ruling that was permissive in allowing the EU to exclude China from the renegotiations of several tariff lines of poultry meat and the related allocation of new tariff-rate quotas (TRQs). The EU's basis for exclusion was that China lacked a principal or substantial supplying interest in the modified tariff lines. The Panel's ruling supported China for only two tariff lines in which China eventually served 50% of the EU market after certain SPS measures expired, on the narrow basis that this import increase should have been considered a special factor in the TRQ allocation. The paper argues that the Panel ruled too narrowly by disregarding China's broader claims for a principal or substantial supplying interest. An interpretation consistent with the object and purpose of the GATT supports utilizing a broader set of evidence in China's claim as a principal or substantial supplier for renegotiations of tariff schedules. Allowing nations to use TRQs to prevent emerging markets from achieving a substantial supplying interest is a significant obstacle to the WTO's purpose. The Panel's ruling will be important for future TRQ renegotiations, such as those that would be necessary under Brexit.

Type
Original Articles
Information
World Trade Review , Volume 18 , Issue 2 , April 2019 , pp. 309 - 326
Copyright
Copyright © David R. Deremer and Federico Ortino 2019 

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Footnotes

The authors thank the participants at the EUI workshop, ‘WTO Case Law of 2017’, including our discussant Niall Meagher, Kristy Buzard, Rob Howse, Tatiana Yanguas, Arie Reich, Petros Mavroidis, Bernard Hoekman, and Chad Bown. The authors additionally thank participants at the Applied Economics Workshop of ISE-KBTU.

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