Skip to main content
×
×
Home

Subsidization, price suppression, and expertise: causation and precision in Upland Cotton

  • ANDRE SAPIR (a1) and JOEL P. TRACHTMAN (a2)
    • Send article to Kindle

      To send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

      Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

      Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

      Subsidization, price suppression, and expertise: causation and precision in Upland Cotton
      Available formats
      ×
      Send article to Dropbox

      To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

      Subsidization, price suppression, and expertise: causation and precision in Upland Cotton
      Available formats
      ×
      Send article to Google Drive

      To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

      Subsidization, price suppression, and expertise: causation and precision in Upland Cotton
      Available formats
      ×
Abstract
Copyright
References
Hide All
Brewer, Scott (1998), ‘Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process’, Yale Law Journal, 107: 15351681.
Cass, Ronald A. and Michael, S. Knoll (1997), ‘The Economics of “Injury” in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases: A Reply to Professor Sykes’, in Jagdeep, S. Bhandari and Alan, O. Sykes (eds) Economic Dimensions in International Law: Comparative and Empirical Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 126165.
Heckman, James J. (2000), ‘Causal Parameters and Policy Analysis in Economics: A Twentieth Century Retrospective’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(1): 4597.
Hudec, Robert E. (1998), ‘Does the Agreement on Agriculture Work? Agricultural Disputes After the Uruguay Round’, International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium, Working Paper No. 98-2.
Pauwelyn, Joost (2002), ‘The Use of Experts in WTO Dispute Settlement’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 51: 325364.
Schnepf, Randy (2005), ‘Background on the US-Brazil WTO Cotton Subsidy Dispute’, Congressional Research Service Report, 11 July 2005.
Steinberg, Richard H. and Timothy, E. Josling (2003), ‘When the Peace Ends: The Vulnerability of EC and US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenge’, Journal of International Economic Law, 6(2): 369417.
Sumner, Daniel A. (2003), ‘The Impacts of US Cotton Subsidies on Cotton Prices and Quantities: Simulation Analysis for the WTO Dispute’, Mimeo, Condensed and edited version of Annex I presented to the WTO cotton-dispute panel in September 2003.
Sykes, Alan O. (2003), ‘The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures’, University of Chicago John M. Olin Law and Economics Working Paper No. 186.
Sykes, Alan O. (1996), ‘The Economics of Injury in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases’, International Review of Law and Economics, 16(1): 526.
WTO Secretariat (2005), ‘Quantitative Economics in WTO Dispute Settlement’, World Trade Report 2005, Geneva: WTO.
Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

World Trade Review
  • ISSN: 1474-7456
  • EISSN: 1475-3138
  • URL: /core/journals/world-trade-review
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *
×

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 1
Total number of PDF views: 36 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 430 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 27th April 2018. This data will be updated every 24 hours.