We face a series of issues in the Middle East, some of them new and quite unprecedented. The first is how to bring to a conclusion the negotiating process that has been started. With respect to the negotiations between Egypt and Israel I do not think much needs to be said. They will be concluded within the very near future. They will create their own reality. They will mark both a political and a spiritual change, in the sense that two peoples who have thought of each other only in terms of hostility will now at least have an opportunity to address together some tasks of construction.

I would, however, say two things. It is perhaps not totally unfair to state that many Israelis, and Jews, operate on the principle that anything worth doing is worth overdoing. But I see no overwhelming political necessity that, for example, every Israeli busline establish a terminal in Cairo. I think, of course, it is important that contact starts with Egypt and Israel. I think it is important also that these contacts be developed in a manner that is compatible with Egypt's perception of itself, still a Moslem country and still related to other Arab countries. And I would strongly urge that within Israel aitd within the Jewish communities around the world some mechanism be established that vets the many brilliant approaches that are being generated by every original Jewish thinker, a number that exceeds the total Jewish population.

The Hill is as important as Foggy Bottom in the conduct of our international affairs. The impending battles in Congress over such important foreign relations questions as the new multilateral trade agreements, a strategic arms limitation treaty, the human rights covenants, and military and economic aid for Egypt and Israel demonstrate this.

Another presidential election looms—and American Middle East policy is again subordinated for about a year to the political circus mandated by American-style democracy.

For Israel this American election is more crucial than ever. Economically desperate, Israel relies on an American umbilical cord, now weakening. The Jewish state's political isolation could become psychologically unbearable if U.S. Government attitudes begin shifting even as far as have those of Western Europe—which, for the first time, is a real possibility. Israel's strategic/military position, with or without the West Bank, is largely a function of American arms and perceived American determination. And most crucially, in the longer run, basic American public attitudes toward Israel will bp heavily influenced by the tone and content of the incoming administration.