3. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1–02,12 04 2001 at p. 203Google Scholar. For US forces, Information Operation policy is set forth in, inter alia. Information Operations, Department of Defense Directive (DODD) S-3600.1, 9 December 1996; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Joint Publication 3-13, 9 October 1998; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare, Joint Publication 3-13.1, 7 February 1996; Implementing Instruction for Information Warfare/Command and Control, Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3430.26, 18 January 1995; Information Operations, Air Force Doctrine Document 2–5, 5 August 5 1998. Many US military publications are available online through the Joint Electronic Library at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/.

4. At the strategic level, information operations can be employed to ‘achieve national objectives by influencing or affecting all elements (political, military, economic, or informational) of an adversary's or potential adversary's national power while protecting similar friendly elements'. At the operational level, the focus of information operations is ‘on affecting adversary lines of communication (LOCs), logistics, command and control (C2), and related capabilities and activities while protecting similar friendly capabilities and activities’. Finally, at the tactical level the objective is to affect adversary ‘information and information systems relating to C2, intelligence, and other information-based processes directly relating to the conduct of military operations….’ Joint Publication 3–13, ibid. at I-2 – I-3.

5. Idem at I-9. Or an operation may represent a combination. See e.g., Lungu, A., War.Com: ‘The Internet and Psychological Operations’, No. 28 Joint Force Quarterly (Spring/Summer 2001) at p. 13Google Scholar.

6. Joint Publication 1-02, supra n. 3, at p. 203.

7. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, book 8, para. 8.8.

8. OODA: Observe, orient, decide, act. ‘Getting inside an opponent's OODA loop’, i.e., being able to asses the situation and act thereon more quickly than an opponent (and then do the same for the new situation that has been created), is the purpose of information warfare.

9. Joint Publication 1–02, supra n. 3, at p. 88. The USAF Intelligence Targeting Guide, AF Pamphlet 14–210, 1 February 1998, para. 11.4.3, sets out seven employment concepts: Corruption — The alteration of information content; the manipulation of data to make it either nonsensical or inaccurate. Destroying existing knowledge.

Deception — A specific type of corruption; the alteration of, or adding to, information to portray a situation different from reality. Creating false knowledge to include masquerading. Delay — The reversible slowing of the flow of information through the system, and the slowing of the acquisition and dissemination of new knowledge.

Denial — The reversible stopping of the flow of information for a period of time; although the information may be transmitted and used within friendly territory, the adversary is denied access to it. The prevention of the acquisition and dissemination of new knowledge.

Disruption — The reduction of the capacity to provide and/or process information (reversible). This is a combination of delay and corruption. The delay of the acquisition and dissemination of new knowledge and the destruction of existing knowledge.

Degradation — The permanent reduction in the capacity to provide and/or process information.

Destruction — The destruction of information before it can be transmitted; the permanent elimination of the capacity to provide and/or process information.

10. Thus, e.g., electronic attack (EA) would not fall within this category. For instance, using an electromagnetic pulse to destroy a computer's electronics would be EA, whereas transmitting a code or instruction to a system's central processing unit to cause the power supply to short out would be CNA.

11. As an illustration of possible targets, consider a proposed ‘Top 10’ list of information warfare targets in the United States, all of which are targetable via CNA:

1. Culpeper, Viginia, electronic switch which handles all federal funds and transactions;

2. Alaska pipeline which currently carries ten percent of all US domestic oil;

3. Electronic switching system which manages all telephones;

4. Internet;

5. Time distribution system;

6. Panama Canal;

7. Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WMCSS);

8. Air Force satellite control network;

9.Strait of Malacca, the major maritime link between Europe-Arabian peninsula and the Western Pacific and East Asia; and

10. National Photographic Interpretation Center (Washington).

Gumahad, A.T., ‘The Profession of Arms in the Information Age’, No. 15 Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 1997) at pp. 14, 18Google Scholar.

12. On electrical grid attacks, see Crawford, J.W., ‘The Law of Noncombatant Immunity and the Targeting of National Electrical Power Systems’, 21 Fletcher Forum of World Affairs (Summer/Fall 1997) at p. 101Google Scholar. Legal issues regarding the two campaigns are discussed in US Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, app. O (1992), and Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report, ch. 6 (2000).

13. Testimony of Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet before the Senate Committee on Government Affairs, June 24, 1998, available online at http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/archives/1998/dci_testimony_062498.html.

14. CIA Director Tenet made just this point when testifying before the Senate. ‘Many of the countries whose information warfare efforts we follow realize that in a conventional military confrontation against the US, they cannot prevail. These countries recognize that cyber attacks — possibly launched from outside the US — against civilian computer systems in the US — represent the kind of asymmetric option they will need to ‘level the playing field’ during an armed crisis against the United States’. Idem.

15. Statement of Jack L. Brock, Director, Defense Information and Financial Management Systems Accounting and Information, General Accounting Office, Testimony Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Governmental Affairs, US Senate, Information Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose Increasing Risks, 22 May 1996 (GAO/T-AIMD-96–92), attached report, pp. 1–11.

16. For useful surveys of the subject, see Schmitt, M.N. and O'Donnell, B.T., eds., Computer Network Attack and International Law, (Newport RI, Naval War College International Law Studies 2002)Google Scholar; Wingfield, T.C., The Law of Information Conflict: national security law in cyberspace (Falls Church VA, Aegis Corp. 2000) pp. 124–125Google Scholar; Joyner, Ch. and Lotrionte, C., ‘Information Warfare as International Coercion: Elements of a Legal Framework’, 12 EJIL (2001) p. 825CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

17. The Start II treaty, for example, explicitly relies on national technical means of verification to verify the nature of heavy bombers. See various provisions in Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, 3 January 1993, US-USSR, Senate Treaty Document No. 1, 103d Cong. (1993) available online at http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/start2text.htm. The agreement was ratified by the US Senate in 1996 and the Russian Duma in 2000.

18. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Art. 27, 18 April 1961,23 CST3227,500 UNTS 95.

19. See e.g., Convention on International Civil Aviation, 7 December 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, TIAS 1591, 15 UNTS 295, esp. annex 10.

20. State practice suggests that telecommunications treaties are generally deemed suspended during armed conflict. See Department of Defense, Office of General Counsel, An Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information Operations, section V, 2nd edn. (1999)Google Scholar reprinted in Schmitt, op. cit. n. 16, at appendix.

21. Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union, 22 December 1992, Art. 34, Senate Treaty Document No. 104-134 (1996).

22. Agreement on Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, Art. II, 12 June 1989, USSR-US, 28 ILM (1989) p. 879. The United States treats the Russian Federation as the successor to the rights and duties found in the agreement.

23. Innocent passage is continuous and expeditious travel through another state's territorial sea. It may be exercised in the absence of consent by the coastal state regardless of the type of vessel, its cargo, or how it is propelled. Of course, activities consented to by the coastal state, such as military exercises, are always permissible. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Arts. 17–18, 10 December 1982, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122), 21 ILM (1983) p. 1261Google Scholar (entered into force on 16 November 1994)

24. On the military uses of space, see Cheng, B., ‘Properly Speaking, Only Celestial Bodies Have Been Reserved for Use Exclusively for Peaceful (Non-Military) Purposes, but not Outer Void Space’, in Schmitt, M.N., ed, International Law Across the Spectrum of Conflict (Newport RI, Naval War College 2001) p. 81Google Scholar. See also, D.S. Anderson and C.R. Dooley, ‘Information Operations in the Space Law Arena: Science Fiction Becomes Reality’, in Schmitt, op. cit. n. 16, pp. 265–310.

25. Regarding the exceptions, note that Art. 41 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter explicitly mentions ‘complete or partial interruption of…means of communications’ as enforcement mechanisms available to the Security Council.

26. The model Status of Forces Agreement is that for NATO. Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of Their Forces, 19 June 1951, 4 UST 1792, 199 UNTS 67. On the topic generally, see Fleck, D., ed., The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2001)Google Scholar.

27. On espionage, see Crane, D.M., Fourth Dimensional Intelligence: Thoughts on Espionage, Law, and Cyberspace, in Schmitt, , op. cit. n. 16, pp. 311–321Google Scholar.

28. See Walker, G.K., ‘Information Warfare and Neutrality’, 33 Vanderbilt J Transnational L (2000) p. 1079Google Scholar for a discussion of neutrality.

29. Assessment, supra n. 20.

30. Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, Arts. 8 and 9, 18 October 1907,36 Stat. 2310, TS No. 540, available online at the ICRC treaty site, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.

31. See e.g., Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, 20 August 1971,23 UST 3813, TIAS No. 7532(1973). Art. III (d), (e) prohibit the use of certain ‘specialized telecommunications services’ for military purposes.

32. UN Charter, Art. 1(1). Similar prohibitions are found elsewhere. For instance, the General Assembly, in its resolution regarding the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, has provided that ‘Every State has a duty to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Such a threat or use of force constitutes a violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations and shall never be employed as a means of settling international issues.’ GA Res. 2625 (XXV), UNGAOR, 25th Sess., annex, art. 1, UN Doc. A/Res/2625 (1970), reprinted in 65 AJIL (1971) p. 243CrossRefGoogle Scholar and in Rauschning, D., Wiesbrock, K. and Lailach, M., eds., Key Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, 1946–1997 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1997) at p. 3Google Scholar.

33. This was the British position in the Corfu Channel case before the International Court of Justice. See discussion in Brownlie, I., International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1963) pp. 265–266CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an interesting analysis of the issue, see D'Amato, A., International Law: Process and Prospect (Irvington NY, Transnational Publishers 1995) pp. 57–73Google Scholar.

34. See Doc. 1123,I/8,6 UNCIO Docs. 68 (1945); Doc. 784,I/1/27,6 UNCIO Docs. 335 (1945); and Doc. 885,I/1/34, 6 UNCIO. Docs. 400 (1945). See also Brownlie, ibid., at pp. 265–269.

35. See e.g., Dinstein, Y., War, Aggression and Self-Defense, 3rd edn. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2001) pp. 81–83CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mrazek, J., ‘Prohibition of the Use and Threat of Force: Self-Defense and Self-Help in International Law’, 27 Canadian YIL (1989) at pp. 81, 90Google Scholar; Randelzhofer, A., ‘Article 2(4)’, in Simma, B., ed., The Charter of the United Nations A Commentary (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1995) pp. 106, 117–118Google Scholar.

36. On the applicability of Art. 2(4), see D. Silver, ‘Computer Network Attack as a Use of Force under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter’, in Schmitt, op. cit. n. 16, pp. 73–97.

37. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, Art. 31 (1), 1155 UNTS 331, 8 ILM (1969) p. 679Google Scholar. This point was reiterated by the International Court of Justice in Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations case. There, the Court noted ‘the first duty of a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty is to endeavour to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur’. ICJ Rep. (1950) pp. 4, 8.

38. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. US), ICJ Rep. (1986) pp. 4, 119, para 228 [hereinafter Nicaragua]Google Scholar. It must be noted that for jurisdictional reasons the Court was not actually applying Art. 2(4) qua 2(4), but instead the customary international law prohibition on the resort to force.

39. 6 UNCIO Docs. 334, 609 (1945); Doc. 2, 617 (e)(4), 3 UNCIO Docs. 251, 253–54 (1945).

40. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Art. 1, 7 September 1947 TIAS 1838, 21 UNTS 77: ‘…undertake in their international relations not to resort to the threat or the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations or of this Treaty’. See also Pact of the League of Arab States, Art. 5, 22 March 1945, 70 UNTS 238, which only speaks of force: ‘Any resort to force in order to resolve disputes arising between two or more member States of the League is prohibited.’

41. UN Doc. A/AC. 125/SR. 114 (1970). See also Special Committee on Friendly Relations, Report, 24 UN GAOR Supp. No. 19, UN Doc. A/7619, at 12 (1969); Bowett, D.W., ‘Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States’, 13 Virginia JIL (1972) p. 1Google Scholar.

42. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra n. 32, annex: ‘States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Such a threat or use of force constitutes a violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations and shall never be employed as a means of settling international issues.’ The resolution was adopted by acclamation.

43. Rather, the explanation contains references to ‘war of aggression’, ‘violate existing international boundaries’, ‘organizing…irregular forces or armed bands…for incursion’, etc. Idem.

44. ‘No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind.’ Idem.

45. The situation led the UN to set up the ‘Oil for Food Programme’, under the UN's Office of the Iraq Programme. Details on the programme, as well as all relevant UN Secretary General reports on the situation, are available online at http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/.

46. Wingfield, op. cit. n. 16, at pp. 124–125, commenting on the criteria as explicated in Schmitt, M.N., ‘Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework’, 37 Columbia JTL (1999) p. 885Google Scholar.

47. Definition of Aggression, Art. 1, GA Res. 3314 (XXIX); UN GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142; UN Doc. A/9631 (1975), 13 ILM (1974) p. 710Google Scholar.

48. On this point, see J. Frowein, ‘Chapter VII’, in Simma, op. cit. n. 35, at pp. 605, 612.

49. Prosecutor v. Tadić, ICTY Case No. IT-94–1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Appeals Chamber, 35 ILM (1995) p. 43 (1996)Google Scholar.

50. SC Res. 713 (1991).

51. Sc Res. 841 (1993);SC Res. 940 (1994)

52. Sc Res. 748 (1992)

53. Sc Res. 827 (1993)

54. Sc Res. 955 (1994)

55. See e.g., SC Res. 1267(1999), SC Res. 1333 (2000), and SC Res. 1363 (2001).

56. Weckel, Ph., ‘Le Chapitre VII de la Charte et son Application par le Conseil de Sécurité’, 37 Annuaire François de Droit International (1991) pp. 165, 202CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

57. On this topic, see Bialke, J., ‘United Nations Peace Operations: Applicable Norms and the Application of the Law of Armed Conflict’, 50 Air Force Law Review (2001) p. 1Google Scholar; Greenwood, Ch., ‘International Humanitarian Law and United Nations Military Operations’, 1 YIHL (1998) p. 3CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In 1999 the UN Secretary-General issued a bulletin entitled ‘Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law’, ST/SGB/1999/13 (1999), reprinted in Roberts, A. and Guelff, R., Documents on the Laws of War, 3rd edn. (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2000) p. 721Google Scholar, and available at http://www.un.org/peace/st_sgb_1999_13.pdf. In it, the Secretary-General sets forth those IHL standards applicable to UN operations.

58. II International Law Commission Yearbook (1996) p. 247, cited with approval by the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua, supra n. 38 at p. 99.

59. Nicaragua, supra n. 38, at pp. 96–97.

60. See e.g., SC Res. 1368 (12 September 2001), which recognized ‘the inherent right of self-defence in accordance with the Charter’. See also SC Res. 1373 (28 September 2001).

61. Following a briefing by the US to the North Atlantic Council on 2 October 2001, NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson stated that ‘individuals who carried out these attacks were part of the world-wide terrorist network of Al-Qaeda… [and that] …the attack…was directed from abroad and shall therefore be regarded as an action covered by Article V’. NATO Update, 3 October 2001, available online at http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/1001/e1002a.htm.

62. Nicaragua, supra n. 38, at pp. 102–104.

63. See Dinstein, op. cit. n. 35, at pp. 207–213 for a discussion of these requirements.

64. On CNA and self-defence, see Y. Dinstein, ‘Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense’, in Schmitt, op. cit. n. 16.

65. Nicaragua, supra n. 38 at p. 102. The Court noted that the provision of weapons or logistical or other support is not an ‘armed attack’, but might constitute a use of force. The distinction makes sense in the context of the Charter's general disapproval of the resort to violence.

66. For instance, the standard was cited with approval by the Nuremberg Tribunal. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgement and Sentences, 41 AJIL (1947) pp. 172, 205Google Scholar.

67. Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (6 Augustus 1842), 29 British and Foreign State Papers (1840–1841) pp. 1129, 1138Google Scholar.

68. Dinstein, op. cit. n. 35, at p. 172.

69. Ibid.

70. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Rep. (1996) p. 226, 35 ILM (1999) p. 809, para. 85Google Scholar.

71. Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Art. 36, 12 December 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, 16 ILM (1977) p. 1391Google Scholar, reprinted in Roberts and Guelff, op. cit. n. 57, at p. 419. For the United States, the weapon review is required by Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 23 October 2000, para. 4.7.3.1.4.

72. For example, although not a Party to Protocol I, the United States considers many of its provisions to be declaratory of customary international law. For a non-official, but generally considered authoritative, delineation of those viewed as declaratory, see Matheson, M.J., ‘Session One: The United States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions’, 2 Amer. Univ. JIL & Pol. (1987) p. 419Google Scholar. See also International & Operational Law Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Department of the Air Force, Operations Law Deployment Deskbook, tab 12, no date, and comments by the then-State Department Legal Advisor Abraham Sofaer, D. in ‘Agora: The US Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions on the Protection of War Victims’, 82 AJIL (1988) p. 784CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

73. United States doctrine for the conduct of psychological operations is set forth in Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations, Joint Pub 3–53, 10 July 1996.

74. Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, para. 1875, Y. Sandoz, Ch. Swinarski and B. Zimmerman, eds. (1987).

75. E.g., the term is defined in the Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 10th edn., as ‘exertion of physical force so as to injure or abuse’. Mish, F., ed. (Springfield MA, Merriam-Webster Inc. 1998)Google Scholar.

76. Protocol I, supra n. 71, Arts. 35.3 and 55.1.

77. Ibid., Art. 56.1.

78. Protocol I, supra n. 71, Arts. 51.5(b) and 57.2(a)(iii).

79. But see Haslam, E., ‘Information Warfare: Technological Changes and International Law’, 5 Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2000) p. 173CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

80. Protocol I, supra n. 71, Art. 52.2. On military objectives, see Robertson, H., ‘The Principle of Military Objective in the Law of Armed Conflict’, in The Law of Military Operations, Schmitt, Michael, ed. (Newport RI, Naval War College Press 1998) p. 197Google Scholar.

81. Commentary, supra n. 74, paras. 2020–2024.

82. US Navy/Marine Corps/Coast Guard, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (NWP 1–14M, MCWP 5–2.1, COMDTPUB P5800.7), para. 8.1.1 (1995) reprinted in its annotated version as Vol. 73 of the US Naval War College's International Law Studies series. This assertion is labelled a ‘statement of customary international law’. The Handbook cites General Counsel, Department of Defense, Letter of 22 September 1972, reprinted in 67 AJIL (1973) p. 123Google Scholar, as the basis for this characterization.

83. Bankovic & Others v. Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights Application No. 52207/99.

84. Protection of civilians and civilian objects is provided for in Protocol I, Arts. 51.2 and 52. The Statute of the International Criminal Court also prohibits the direct targeting of civilians or civilian objects. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8.2(b)(i) & (ii), UN Doc. A/Conf. 183/9, 17 July 1998, at Annex II, reprinted in 37 ILM (1998) p. 999Google Scholar, and Bassiouni, M.C., The Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Documentary History (Ardsley NY, Transnational Publishers 1998) p. 39Google Scholar and available online at http://www.un.org/law/icc/texts/romefra.htm.

85. Commentary, op. cit. n. 74, para. 1944. It has even been asserted that mission-essential civilians working at a base during hostilities, though not engaged directly in acts of war, are legitimate targets. Letter from DAJA-IA to Counselor for Defense Research and Engineering (Economics), Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany (22 January 1988), cited in Parks, W.H., ‘Air War and the Law of War’, 32 Air Force LR (1992) pp. 1, 34Google Scholar.

86. Art. 56. The United States opposes this provision and believes it does not reflect customary international law.

87. Protocol I, supra n. 71, Arts. 35.3 and 55. See also ICC Statute, supra n. 84, Art. 8.2(b)(iv). The US opposes this provision. On the issue of environmental damage during armed conflict, see Austin, J.E. and Bruch, C.E, eds., The Environmental Consequences of War: Legal, Economic, and Scientific Perspectives (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schmitt, M.N., ‘Green War: An Assessment of the Environmental Law of International Armed Conflict’, 22 Yale JIL (1997) pp. 1–109Google Scholar; Grunawalt, R.J., King, J.E. and McClain, R.S., eds., ‘Protection of the Environment During Armed Conflict and Other Military Operations’, 69 US Naval War College International Law Studies (1996)Google Scholar.

88. Protocol I, supra n. 71, Art. 51.4 (b) and (c).

89. Ibid., Art. 51.4(a).

90. Protocol I, supra n. 71, Arts. 51.5(a) and 57.2(a)(iii) and (b). On proportionality, see Fenrick, W.J., ‘The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol Additional I in Conventional Warfare’, 98 Military LR (1982) p. 91Google Scholar; Gardam, J.G., ‘Proportionality and Force in International Law’, 87 AJIL (1993) p. 391CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

91. Commentary, supra n. 74, para. 2209.

92. This position has been formally adopted by a number of states upon becoming Party to the Protocol, through the mechanism of understandings/declarations/reservations. All are available on the ICRC's IHL site at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.

93. ‘NATO Denies Targeting Water Supplies’, BBC World Online Network, 24 May 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_351000/351780.stm.

94. A typical Information Operations Cell is illustrated in JP 3–13, supra n. 3, at figure IV–4 and accompanying text. It includes an IO officer from J-3; representatives from J-2, 4, 5, 6, 7, supporting combatant commands, and service and functional components; a judge advocate; and public affairs, counterintelligence, civil affairs, targeting, special operations, special technical operations, electronic warfare, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security experts.

95. ‘Ruses of war’ are not prohibited. Such ruses are acts which are intended to mislead an adversary or to induce him to act recklessly but which infringe no rule of international law applicable in armed conflict and which are not perfidious because they do not invite the confidence of an adversary with respect to protection under that law.’ Protocol I, supra n. 71, Art. 37.2

96. ‘Acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence’ are perfidy. Ibid., Art. 37.1.

97. Protocol I, supra n. 71, annex, Art. 11.

98. Ibid., Art. 37.1(c).

99. See Report of the Secretary-General on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, UN Doc. A/54/213 (1999). Russia has repeatedly called for a multilateral treaty to limit ‘information weapons’. For a discussion of a possible treaty, see P. Johnson, ‘Is it Time for a Treaty on Information Warfare?’, in Schmitt, op. cit. n. 16, at pp. 439–455. See for a discussion of CNA in the context of both law and ethics that concludes that a new convention is required, Bayles, W.J., ‘The Ethics of Computer Network Attack’, 31 Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College (Spring 2001) No. 1, at p. 44Google Scholar.