A Defamation

The purpose of non-economic loss damages in defamation claims is to provide redress to a person for imputations which tend to lower a person’s reputation in the estimation of his or her peers by making them think less of them, usually by bringing them into hatred, ridicule or contempt.^{Footnote 17} The most common form of damages in a defamation claim is compensatory damages for non-economic loss. In Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (‘Carson’),^{Footnote 18} Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ described the principal purposes of compensatory damages for defamation as follows:

As such, there are three purposes, or elements, to assessing damages for a finding of defamation: personal distress and hurt, reparation for reputational harm and vindication.

Consolation for personal distress and hurt is a considerable component of the damages awarded for defamation.^{Footnote 20} As McHugh J confirmed in Carson, the damages need to be high enough to compensate the plaintiff’s ‘hurt feelings’.^{Footnote 21} The rationale for this is articulated by Lord Diplock in Broome v Cassell & Co Ltd:

The evidence that a plaintiff is required to provide to illustrate their hurt feelings is generally taken to be their own words about their feelings in hearing or reading the false information about themselves. The court will also consider evidence of the plaintiff being shunned by their community,^{Footnote 23} primarily demonstrated through the loss of friends or associates or exclusion of the plaintiff in community or professional settings.^{Footnote 24}

With respect to repairing the aggrieved party’s reputation, this has historically been viewed as a compensatory measure for a right infringed upon. There are three different ways in which the idea of a right to a good reputation has been understood: as a property right, a public right and a dignitary right.^{Footnote 25}

Rolph argues that the reputation of a person might be viewed as a form of property — something that has value which can be enhanced or diminished by others actions, with the award of damages designed to ‘restore’ the plaintiff’s reputation to its previous value.^{Footnote 26} However, he notes that this fails to encompass the entirety of the purpose of repairing damages to reputation, as the damages awarded also seeks to ‘vindicate’ the aggrieved party. This is consistent with a conceptualisation of repairing one’s reputation as compensating for a loss of ‘dignity’.^{Footnote 27}

Finally, courts have taken the view that the awarding of the damages themselves is not enough; the size of the damages awarded also conveys a level of vindication.^{Footnote 28} As such, while an award of general damages in defamation is said to be compensatory, it is in fact more than that, with both the private goal of compensating harm caused, and the public goal of vindicating a person’s reputation.^{Footnote 29}

Historically, a common theme in the critique of the damages awarded in defamation cases is that the non-economic loss damages awarded in defamation claims often far exceeded that which was awarded in personal injury claims. This disparity was previously criticised.^{Footnote 30} Consequently, a statutory cap on non-economic loss damages in the uniform Defamation Acts was introduced in the states and territories around Australia.^{Footnote 31} At the time of writing, the statutory cap for non-economic damages was set at AUD478,500.^{Footnote 32} However, damages can be awarded above this amount where there are sufficient aggravating factors which warrant a higher amount to be awarded. Aggravated damages are also compensatory in nature but compensate actions of the defaming party which exacerbate the damage caused beyond the core hurt being litigated, by being improper, unjustifiable or lacking in bona fides.^{Footnote 33} Historically, this has been found to include the blatant falsity of the defamatory statements^{Footnote 34} or failure to enquire as to the truth of the matter,^{Footnote 35} refusal to make an apology or an adequate apology where reasonable in the circumstances to do so,^{Footnote 36} and the conduct of the party during the litigation itself.^{Footnote 37} That non-economic loss damages could be awarded over the statutory cap where there were factors of aggravation warranting such a determination was affirmed in Bauer Media Pty Ltd v Wilson (No 2) in 2018 and as will be outlined in Part III^{Footnote 38} was a key consideration in how the payment of AUD850,000 in damages in Rush could be justified.

B Sexual Harassment

Unlike defamation claims, the harm of sexual harassment that damages are designed to address is less well-articulated. Sexual harassment is unwanted or unwelcome sexual behaviour where a reasonable person would have anticipated the possibility that the person harassed would feel offended, humiliated or intimidated.^{Footnote 39} Damages in discrimination and sexual harassment claims at the federal level are governed by s 46PO(4)(d) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) which requires that where the court is satisfied that there has been unlawful discrimination (including sexual harassment), the court can require a respondent to pay an applicant compensatory damages for any loss or damage. However, what ‘loss and damage’ the compensation is intended to compensate is left unstated and it is open to the court to articulate the nature of the loss and damage caused by unlawful discrimination including the damage caused by sexual harassment.

Historically, one of the reasons for the low damages was in part due a reliance on British jurisprudence which suggested that the individual or personal harms of sexual harassment were minimal and short-lived and that high damages payments would fail to have a deterrence effect.^{Footnote 40} In part though, a reason for the low damages received by claimants is that the harms of sexual harassment and the purpose of anti-discrimination legislation in changing behaviour were not well-articulated. As a consequence, it is difficult to find an articulation of precisely what the purpose of damages in sexual harassment claims was. The damages awarded for sexual harassment were often low. For example, in the trial decision of Richardson v Oracle Corporation Pty Ltd, the judge noted that the appropriate ‘range’ for general damages in sexual harassment was often considered to be between AUD12,000 and AUD20,000.^{Footnote 41} In early sexual harassment claims, it was often difficult for the complainants to establish liability. Where liability could be established, the damages that flowed were awarded at low levels.^{Footnote 42} In part, this can be explained by sexual harassment being traditionally conceptualised as a form of sex discrimination, as reflected in the choice to make sexual harassment a form of discrimination under the various anti-discrimination acts in Australia.^{Footnote 43} The consequence then has been that sexual harassment was plagued by the same systemic concerns that underpin discrimination law more broadly.^{Footnote 44} The general approach to discrimination law as a matter of statutory construction has been cautious, with limited damages offered.^{Footnote 45} As Thornton argues, the nature of the individual enforcement mechanism, as well as the difficulties with conceptualising terms such as ‘reasonableness’ in a context of historically patriarchal spaces, has led to circumstances where compensation is often rejected or awarded at low levels — though sexual harassment cases have some further success due to their more overtly unacceptable nature.^{Footnote 46}

Although inconsistent, analogies to tort law have long been used in discrimination and sexual harassment case law. As far back as 1986, in Allders International Pty Ltd v Anstee (‘Allders’), Lee J concluded that the assessment of damages under the New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 should be analogous with an action in tort.^{Footnote 47} In particular, he held that general or compensatory damages in statutory discrimination law claims might take into account damages for ‘hurt feelings’, as the common law already did so as a matter of course in other damages assessments, for example, with respect to defamation, negligence and malicious prosecution.^{Footnote 48} Whether or not judges determining claims in discrimination should consider the remedies and damages awarded in other areas of law such as torts has generated a degree of debate in the case law. In Hall v A&A Sheiban,^{Footnote 49} the Federal Court appeared to tentatively agree with this approach, but nevertheless still maintained that, given Australian discrimination law was in its infancy, a flexible approach to damages should be adopted. The decision in Allders and McHugh JA’s obiter in Australian Postal Corporation v Dao appears to understand the damages in discrimination claims as akin to the general damages awarded in tort law.^{Footnote 50} However, in Commissioner of Police v Estate of Russell,^{Footnote 51} Spigelman CJ rejected the construction of discrimination law as a ‘tort’ and concluded that principles and approaches developed in tort law or statutes governing aspects of tort law (in that case related to vicarious liability) were inapplicable to discrimination law.^{Footnote 52}

It was not until Richardson ^{Footnote 53} more clearly re-conceptualised sexual harassment as akin to a tort that the damages that a claimant could receive rose. In its decision in Richardson,^{Footnote 54} the Full Court of the Federal Court began to better explain the underlying reasons that sexual harassment should be compensated and why sexual harassment is unlawful. In Richardson, at first instance, the plaintiff was successful in her claim for sexual harassment and was awarded AUD18,000 in general damages.^{Footnote 55} She appealed the decision and argued that the general damages should have been assessed at a higher rate.^{Footnote 56} Justice Kenny, with whom the Court agreed on the question of damages, accepted that general principles from tort could be used as analogies to assist enquiries into appropriate damages assessments, unless the circumstances warranted a different approach,^{Footnote 57} and accepted that the damages awarded were manifestly inadequate.^{Footnote 58} In coming to this conclusion, Kenny J explicitly relied upon a comparison to an area of tort law, namely personal injury, to argue that the damages in Richardson were manifestly inadequate, stating that:

In contrast to the comparison with personal injury, the plaintiff asked the court to draw an analogy to defamation law when considering the damages that should be awarded in a discrimination claim.^{Footnote 60} The analogy drawn to damages in a defamation claim was rejected and the court concluded that this was not the most apposite comparison to be made.^{Footnote 61} Justice Kenny acknowledged that one could generally consider defamation damages to consider whether the damages awarded in the present case were manifestly excessive. However, Kenny J also concluded that the underlying rationale for non-economic loss damages in defamation claims was different to the purpose of sexual harassment damages claims. The overarching purpose of sexual harassment damages was to recognise the pain and suffering caused to the victim and the loss of enjoyment in their life as a consequence, not reparation for harm or vindication.^{Footnote 62} In Richardson, Kenny J appears to implicitly indicate that damages are not awarded to compensate damage to the complainant’s personal or professional reputation or vindicate their rights.^{Footnote 63} As we will contend in this article, the decision to find that the damage of sexual harassment is akin to personal injury has a number of consequences which both makes it more challenging for a complainant to demonstrate their damage and fails to recognise the broader harms done to the complainant due to sexual harassment outside the scope of personal injury.

A Rush v Nationwide News Pty Ltd

The facts of Rush are relatively well-known. In 2017, at the height of the ‘#MeToo’ movement in Australia, the Daily Telegraph published allegations that Rush had behaved in an inappropriate manner against a much younger female co-star.^{Footnote 64} Mr Rush brought a cause of action against the Daily Telegraph’s parent company, Nationwide News Pty Limited (Nationwide) for defamation. He claimed that the series of news articles published about the allegations implied that he was a pervert, behaved as a sexual predator and engaged in inappropriate behaviour of a sexual nature and that he did so for a significant period of time.^{Footnote 65} At trial, Wigney J accepted that all of these defamatory imputations could be imputed from the Daily Telegraph articles.^{Footnote 66}

In their defence, Nationwide argued that the imputations were true and thus justified.^{Footnote 67} To make this argument, the respondent relied upon the woman at the centre of the allegations, Erin Jean Norvill as their key witness. Wigney J rejected the defendant’s defence of truth.^{Footnote 68} In doing so, he made some conclusions based upon his determination of the reliability and truthfulness of the witnesses.^{Footnote 69} Wigney J concluded that Mr Rush was an ‘impressive’ witness who gave honest and reliable evidence about the critical events of the case.^{Footnote 70} In contrast, he did not form the same conclusions about Ms Norvill.^{Footnote 71} He recognised the particularly vulnerable state that people who make allegations relating to sexual harassment are put in as well as the highly personal and sensitive nature of the evidence that they are required to give; this was likely of particular consideration as Ms Norvill had not wished to make any complaint about the allegation public.^{Footnote 72} Nevertheless, Wigney J rejected much of Ms Norvill’s evidence on critical issues.^{Footnote 73} It was, partly on these findings on credibility, that Wigney J rejected the defendant’s reliance on the defence of justification.^{Footnote 74}

On the question of damages, Wigney J accepted the circumstances warranted the award of aggravated damages and consequently, that the general damages awarded could exceed the statutory cap.^{Footnote 75} He then accepted that the plaintiff had suffered significantly as a consequence of the publications. Prior to the publication, he found the plaintiff had been held in ‘very high esteem’ in both his professional and private life.^{Footnote 76} Wigney J also accepted that the publication caused considerable hurt and distress to Mr Rush. In particular, he found that he was ‘devastated’ by the publication:

Wigney J also relied upon evidence from friends and family as to the devastating effect that the articles had on Mr Rush.^{Footnote 78} As a consequence of the destruction of reputation, the ‘devastating’ effect of the allegations on Mr Rush and the aggravating factors, Wigney J awarded the plaintiff AUD850,000 in general damages for non-economic loss.^{Footnote 79}

B Hughes v Hill

When compared to the Rush case, the facts of Hill are far less well-known. In Hill, the applicant sought compensation for sustained sexual harassment in the workplace.^{Footnote 80} The applicant was a paralegal in the respondent’s law firm.^{Footnote 81} The sexual harassment involved a series of emails in which the respondent proclaimed his love for the applicant and threatened the applicant with threats to terminate her employment and damage her career if she rejected him.^{Footnote 82} The trial judge accepted that the respondent had repeatedly coerced the applicant into giving him physical contact and had repeatedly entered the applicant’s room unannounced whilst on work trips.^{Footnote 83} The trial judge concluded that the respondent’s repeated conduct over a series of years was very serious sexual harassment. The trial judge’s determination in this respect was also accepted by the Full Court of the Federal Court.^{Footnote 84}

The trial judge concluded, and the Full Court accepted that the respondent’s sexual harassment caused significant distress to the applicant.^{Footnote 85} The applicant worried about losing her job, slept poorly and felt down all the time.^{Footnote 86} She found the conduct, the email and repeated requests for hugs extremely distressing.^{Footnote 87} The applicant provided medical evidence which demonstrated that the conduct had caused her to develop an adjustment disorder with an anxious and depressed mood.^{Footnote 88}

The trial judge and the Full Court accepted that the respondent’s conduct ruined the applicant’s quality of life. The question for the courts was: ‘what is the ruin of a person’s quality of life worth?’^{Footnote 89} The Full Court accepted that the trial judge was justified in finding that the ‘ruin of a person’s quality of life’ was worth AUD120,000.^{Footnote 90} In making this decision, the Full Court accepted that this fell within the ‘range of available awards for general damages in a case of this seriousness’.^{Footnote 91} The Full Court concluded that Richardson had fundamentally changed the approach to general damages in sexual harassment claims, and the approach taken by the trial judge was consistent and appropriate, given the recent decision by the Full Court in this area of law.^{Footnote 92}

C Place of the Cases Within Their Respective Doctrines

As highlighted in the introduction, both decisions represent some of the highest general damages awarded in their respective fields. Consequently, it is worth considering how representative each decision is of these two areas of law and whether they are useful in considering the broader trends in general damages in both fields. In this section, we consider the place of these two cases within the broader case law and argue that, though higher than other decisions, both are reflective of the general approach adopted by courts in defamatory accusations of sexual harassment or sexual misconduct, or sexual harassment claims, respectively.

While other claimants have brought defamation claims based on sexual harassment accusations in the past, few have been successful. For example, in Haddon v Forsyth,^{Footnote 93} the court concluded that the allegations were substantially true.^{Footnote 94} Consequently, questions of damages were not discussed. In other claims that were successful, for example, Hodge v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd,^{Footnote 95} the conduct complained of was more serious and involved allegations of child sexual abuse rather than the sexual harassment of another adult.^{Footnote 96} In Burston v Hanson,^{Footnote 97} the plaintiff complained of a number of imputations relating to his interactions with his staff. While some of the imputations were found not to be true,^{Footnote 98} two of the imputations — that the plaintiff had harassed a female staffer in his parliamentary office and that the plaintiff sexually harassed female staff — were found to be substantially true.^{Footnote 99}

However, the approach adopted is nevertheless reflective of another defamation case involving accusations of sexual harassment or sexual misconduct. In Gayle v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) (‘Gayle’),^{Footnote 100} the Supreme Court of New South Wales awarded the plaintiff AUD300,000 in general damages where the defendants had published stories accusing the plaintiff of intentionally and indecently exposing his genitals to a woman, and indecently propositioning a woman in the West Indies team’s dressing room during the 2015 Cricket World Cup.^{Footnote 101} The plaintiff was successful in demonstrating to a jury that the accusations were defamatory.^{Footnote 102} In determining the general damages to be awarded, the trial judge accepted that this was not a case where aggravated damages should be awarded and thus the statutory cap was applied.^{Footnote 103} Though the statutory cap was applied, it is worth noting that the damages awarded to the plaintiff were still almost three times as much as those awarded in the highest general damages payouts in sexual harassment claims.

The justification for the award of non-economic loss damages also uses similar language to that used in the Rush decision. In particular, there is a similar focus on two issues. The first is the hurt felt by the plaintiff as a consequence of the defamatory accusations, which the trial judge found to be ‘surprisingly compelling’.^{Footnote 104} The plaintiff’s evidence of his hurt was as follows:

Second, McCallum J also emphasised the seriousness of the allegation and in particular the fact that it was an imputation of indecent behaviour in the workplace with a work colleague.^{Footnote 106} This indicates the seriousness of being accused of sexual harassment in a workplace setting with similar reasoning underlying the decision on damages in the Rush decision.

With respect to Hill’s place within the sexual harassment case law and awards of damages, it is consistent with the significant increase in the damages awarded in Richardson, though at the highest end of what has been awarded in the Federal Court.^{Footnote 107} Since Richardson, there has been a noticeable increase in the damages awarded in sexual harassment claims and courts and tribunals have accepted that the new approach in Richardson appropriately recognises the seriousness of sexual harassment and is in line with societal expectations.^{Footnote 108} The general damages awarded, and the justification for the award of those damages is consistent with other sexual harassment claims in which the harassment was deemed to be particularly egregious. For example, in Lee v Smith,^{Footnote 109} GLS v PLP, ^{Footnote 110} Ewin v Vegara (No 3),^{Footnote 111} Collins v Smith ^{Footnote 112} and Poniatowska v Hickinbotham,^{Footnote 113} the complainants all received close to $100,000 in general damages where the complainants were subjected to sustained sexual harassment and could demonstrate significant mental distress and ill-health as a consequence of the conduct. It is notable in Lee v Smith and Ewin v Vegara (No 3) that the conduct complained of is also one of sexual assault and rape and thus is of a different nature to the conduct complained of in some of the other cases.^{Footnote 114} Work by MacDermott indicates that the amount of compensation received in most sexual harassment claims is still often lower and these cases are still outliers in the compensation and general damages which are being awarded in sexual harassment claims.^{Footnote 115} Conversely, Castles et al consider, drawing on the limited case law, that the general damages claims for the limited number of sexual harassment claims since Richardson have risen substantially.^{Footnote 116}

A Credibility and Gender

In Rush, the trial judge and the Full Court suggest that significant damages should be awarded because of the seriousness of sexual harassment in the workplace.^{Footnote 123} Such an understanding of sexual harassment does reflect the same reasoning as in Richardson which accepts the changing community standards and expectations surrounding sexual harassment. The seriousness of such an allegation was a factor in favour of awarding a large sum to recognise the significant reputational harm suffered by an alleged perpetrator where they are falsely accused of sexual harassment.^{Footnote 124}

However, while the general assessment of the serious nature of sexual harassment is consistent with the recent decisions in the sexual harassment sphere, the consideration of the evidence of the woman who alleged sexual harassment shows unfortunate similarities to the approach to evidence in the early sexual harassment case law. The similarities are in the way which women’s evidence was often minimised and the conduct complained of was described as insignificant.^{Footnote 125}

In the early sexual harassment case law, there was a tendency to downplay the harms caused by sexual harassment and tribunals and courts could be equivocal about its impacts. An instructive example is Aldridge v Booth,^{Footnote 126} where a 19-year-old woman who had been unemployed for 12 months took a job working for a cake business. The complainant was persistently sexually harassed and assaulted by the employer, and she ultimately agreed to have sex with him under the threat of being terminated. Despite the seriousness of the conduct, the Equal Opportunity Commission took pains to note the complainant’s sometimes ‘ambivalence’ to the conduct, noting that ‘it may seem surprising that any young woman would endure the conduct of which she complained without taking some steps to bring it to an end. But…I believe this young woman was unsophisticated…and apparently thought that this was the tariff she had to pay’.^{Footnote 127}

These comments highlight the subtle sexism and misunderstandings of sexual harassment which underpinned early judgments. There is little doubt that the ultimate amount awarded to the victim — $7,000.00 — is a consequence of the Tribunal viewing the employers conduct as one of them taking advantage of a woman who did not know better, rather than what it was: predatory sexual behaviour, sexual assault and coercive abuse. This minimisation of the harm of sexual harassment in early cases such as this has set the precedent for general damages across the jurisdiction.

Similarly, in Hall, Oliver and Reid v Sheiban ^{Footnote 128} an employer of three women engaged in harassing conduct such as regularly touching the women inappropriately, attempting to kiss the women against their will and making consistently inappropriate and sexualised comments to the women. In refusing to award the women any compensation, Einfield J characterised the sexual harassment as ‘mild’ and ‘occasional’ attempts at physical contact and statements that ‘may be seen as juvenile and thoughtless and quite disregarded the feelings of the complainants.’^{Footnote 129} He went on to explain that

These comments from Einfield J, despite having found that the allegations were substantiated, suggest a preoccupation with the judiciary protecting men against the consequences of sexual harassment, rather than ensuring that the actions are held to account. As Morgan noted at the time, it is this approach which constructs women as liars and exaggerators.^{Footnote 131} Mackay notes that cases such as Hall have constructed a ‘reasonable woman’ standard, where men on the bench have interpreted their version of what a ‘reasonable woman’ should be offended by or be able to tolerate without consequence.^{Footnote 132}

In the trial judge’s decision of Rush, the alleged sexual harassment victim is described in the judgment as, at times, ‘prone to embellishment or exaggeration’.^{Footnote 133} Wigney J questioned her evidence of sexual harassment on a number of bases, including the fact that she continued to spend time with the plaintiff outside of rehearsals despite her allegations, continued friendly communication with him and made public and positive statements about the performance and working with Mr Rush specifically.^{Footnote 134} While she was not explicitly called a liar, it is suggested that her evidence and her memory may be as ‘poor or defective’ and ‘distorted or polluted over time because of other intervening events or circumstances’.^{Footnote 135}

As such, compensation (such as that awarded in the Rush case) may be affected by gender-based discounting of the credibility of victims, and therefore the amount of compensation which is required.^{Footnote 136} There is a deeply ingrained cultural scepticism towards those who claim sexual harassment, and a belief that women who complain of sexual harassment are inherently less trustworthy.^{Footnote 137} Epstein notes that women are often discounted on account of their demeanour and motives, while male perpetrators are often given an inflated sense of credibility in their testimony, with their story often readily accepted.^{Footnote 138} Collectively then, the patriarchal and hetero-normative social context in which sexual harassment claims are brought provide a compelling explanation for the disparity between defamation and sexual harassment compensation payouts in these types of claims.

B Medicalisation of the Harm of Sexual Harassment

The other way in which the discrepancy can be understood is as a continuation of the difference which has historically existed between the damages awarded for defamation claims and personal injury claims.^{Footnote 139} The discrepancy was one reason that the cap on general damages was introduced in the uniform Defamation Acts so that the general damages awarded in defamation claims remained consistent with the damages which could be awarded for personal injury pursuant to the Civil Liability Acts which are in force in each of the states and territories.^{Footnote 140}

In Richardson and in subsequent cases, the courts have drawn a degree of equivalence with personal injury when assessing the harm caused by sexual harassment.^{Footnote 141} In contrast, in Richardson, Kenny J suggested that drawing analogy with the approach to general damages in defamation was a less useful way forward in understanding the harm caused by sexual harassment.^{Footnote 142} The focus on the ‘injury’ caused by sexual harassment can be seen in the relatively heavy reliance on psychological and psychiatric evidence in the case law. For example, in Richardson, it was accepted that the plaintiff had suffered significantly both physically and psychologically and both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal accepted the psychiatric evidence that the conduct had caused a chronic adjustment disorder with mixed features of anxiety and depression.^{Footnote 143} In Hill, the trial judge and the Court of Appeal accepted the unopposed medical evidence that the appellant’s conduct had caused the complainant to suffer a significant psychological injury.^{Footnote 144} As the Court of Appeal observed and accepted:

In Hill, it is clear that the Court accepted that the appellant caused the respondent a significant personal injury and that this was the underlying rationale for the significant general damages that she received.

The acknowledgment in Richardson and Hill that sexual harassment can cause significant personal injury and distress is welcome. Both cases recognise the serious harms associated with sexual harassment and in particular, the anxiety, depression and other mental and physical health problems that it can cause.^{Footnote 146} However, from the perspective of generating significant payouts for claimants, the focus on the personal injury that sexual harassment can cause can be problematic for the assessment of general damages. Firstly, as MacDermott has highlighted, the focus on personal injury necessarily means that claimants are required to provide significant medical evidence with respect to the pain, suffering and injury that they have suffered.^{Footnote 147} This evidence can be expensive to provide and this could be a reason for continuing low damages payments in the majority of sexual harassment claims — because claimants cannot afford to provide the necessary medical evidence to prove their injury.

Secondly, the damage caused by sexual harassment becomes focused on the individual harm rather than the broader harm caused by the behaviour and dismisses the harms caused by sexual harassment where that harm does not cause a personal injury. Where a complainant is found to not have a recognised psychiatric injury, this has been used to justify low damages payouts for sexual harassment claims.^{Footnote 148} As a consequence, unlike in defamation claims, the complainant is under significant pressure to show the severe personal toll that such behaviour has taken and that they have consequently become ill and incapacitated. As we will argue in the next part of this article, this both mischaracterises the true cost of sexual harassment on victims, bystanders and the community more generally and places a high burden on complainants to medicalise their harm rather than simply accepting the inherent wrongfulness of sexual harassment deserves significant compensation for complainants.

In contrast, in defamation claims, a complainant is not required to show that their distress about the defamatory imputations has caused a personal injury. This has two important ramifications. First, the best evidence of the ‘hurt and distress’ is from the person themselves as to how they felt when reading the material and evidence from friends and family as to their state after they comprehended the material about themselves. This evidence is difficult to challenge by a respondent. In both Rush and Gayle, the judges’ found the evidence of the plaintiffs’ hurt and distress compelling — in Gayle’s case ‘surprisingly compelling’ and it was accepted at face value. The second ramification is that it is far more cost effective and simple to bring evidence as to your own mental state instead of having to medicalise the harm caused by sexual harassment.

A Hurt and Distress

The personal damage to victims of sexual harassment is often unique. Victims of sexual harassment can be psychologically damaged as a consequence of the harassment, with both diagnosable and non-diagnosed psychological conditions.^{Footnote 150} For instance, sexual harassment may result in post-traumatic stress disorder, amongst other medically diagnosable conditions.^{Footnote 151} However, even victims who do not meet the threshold of a diagnosed psychological condition have their psyche invariably and permanently affected. As Koss notes, ‘…once victimised, at a minimum, one can never again feel quite as invulnerable’.^{Footnote 152} These outcomes tend to occur regardless of the victim’s dispositional influences.^{Footnote 153} It can also affect the victim’s personal relationship and social relationships.^{Footnote 154} In their most recent survey into the prevalence of sexual harassment in Australian workplaces, the Australian Human Rights Commission (‘AHRC’) found that being sexually harassed had negative impacts on self-esteem and self-confidence and caused ongoing negative consequences for mental and emotional health.^{Footnote 155}

In their Respect@Work Report, the AHRC identified several factors which contribute to the personal distress caused by sexual harassment.^{Footnote 156} Citing existing research,^{Footnote 157} the AHRC found that taking an ‘objective’ approach to the nature of harassment and assuming that complainants are unlikely to be seriously harmed by infrequent or single instances of sexual harassment is incorrect. Rather, the AHRC heard that sexually harassing behaviour which has traditionally been mild, such as sexually suggestive comments or jokes, may have damaging long-term impact on victims, making them feel unsafe, devalued, frightened and psychologically distressed.^{Footnote 158}

B Personal and Professional Reputation

As with defamation, there is the potential for professional and personal reputational harms from being subjected to sexual harassment or complaining about sexual harassment. Though our understanding of the prevalence and the harms of sexual harassment have improved over time, the most recent report into sexual harassment by the AHRC indicates that victims still have concerns about the professional and reputational costs of reporting sexual harassment.^{Footnote 159} In their most recent survey, the AHRC emphasised that less than one in five people who experience sexual harassment in the workplace made a formal complaint.^{Footnote 160} When asked why they did not make a complaint, a small number of people noted that they were concerned that it would affect their reputation or career opportunities (14 per cent), but a larger number of people did not complain because they thought that people would think that ‘they were overreacting’ (31 per cent).^{Footnote 161} This in itself is another type of reputational damage in the sense that being seen as a person that ‘overreacts’ is generally not considered a ‘good’ personal characteristic and will have detrimental impacts on their reputation. Of those who did make a complaint, 64 per cent of people said that they received some detrimental impact at work including impacts relating to professional reputation which included being ‘ostracised, victimised or ignored by colleagues’ (13 per cent), resigning due to feeling like they had no choice but to leave their job (13 per cent), they were labelled a troublemaker (12 per cent) or were disciplined, demoted or denied other workplace opportunities such as training or promotion.^{Footnote 162} Similarly, the National Community Attitudes Towards Violence Against Women Survey (NCAS) found that a significant number of Australians hold the view that women who report violence are malicious, vengeful and untrustworthy, that many reports are not genuine and that women who experience sexual harassment hold some responsibility for that behaviour.^{Footnote 163} These most recent results of the national survey indicate that those that make complaints about sexual harassment are still likely to suffer negative consequences as a result of those accusations and concerns about negative ramifications to a person’s professional and personal reputation still operates as a significant reason that people do not make complaints about sexual harassment.

C Vindication

At the heart of the damage to both a person who has been defamed and someone who has been sexually harassed is that their dignity has been impaired. While in defamation, the dignitary harm of the tort is often made explicit — it is frequently referred to as a ‘dignity tort’^{Footnote 164}; the link in sexual harassment is less explicit in the case law but still nevertheless is fundamental to the wrong or harm caused by sexual harassment.

This conceptualisation of dignity has elements of both private and public harms. Privately, sexual harassment has been described by Bernstein as an offence of ‘dignity’, as it dehumanises, degrades and offends the victim.^{Footnote 165} This dehumanisation often has elements of having one’s reputation and standing in the community lowered in the eyes of others, just as it is for defamation victims. This in turn requires vindication. Further, a natural flow on consequences of the personal and professional reputational harms of sexual harassment victims, as described above, must surely be that vindication of victims is required in the eyes of the community. These public harms to the victim — so well understood in defamation law — are not currently recognised in sexual harassment proceedings.

Similarly, Cornell describes sexuality as ‘unique and formative’ to each person and sexual harassment as diminishing the self-respect of the victim as a sexuate being by imposing sexual shame upon them.^{Footnote 166} In Cornell’s conceptualisation, the harm of sexual harassment is currently conceived of as one which interprets the victim — usually women — to be fragile and asexual, where instead it should centre the harms on those of effects of the victims self-respect as sexual beings and their future capacity to grow and perform their sexuality.^{Footnote 167} This reconsideration of the harm of sexual harassment may be explained as being essentially dignitary in nature. By Cornell’s account, sexual harassment is harmful because it de-dignifies and shames victims as sexual beings. It is an integral link between discrimination law and sexual harassment which emphasises the dignitary harm caused by sexual harassment.^{Footnote 168} While in Australia, the dignitary harm of sexual harassment is not made explicit in the case law, the same is not true in comparable jurisdictions. For example, the early decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, in Janzen v Platy Enterprises Ltd,^{Footnote 169} in which the Supreme Court confirmed that sexual harassment was a form of sex discrimination and thus illegal pursuant to the Human Rights Codes, the Court explained the harm and damage caused by sexual harassment in the following terms:

Understanding the dignitary harms caused by sexual harassment also allows for a broader conceptualisation of the harms caused by sexual harassment than only the individual who is subject to it. Sexual harassment implications and costs do not simply relate to the injuries that it may have caused but a more profound sense of self in both a professional and personal capacity.

Considered collectively, there are clear analogies between harms suffered by victims of sexual harassment and the broad, non-personal injury harms recognised in the awarding of damages in defamation cases. General feelings of hurt and distress, broad career and reputational harms suffered by persons bringing claims of sexual harassment and the need for vindication of a victim’s rights and dignity are expressly articulated in consideration of damages for defamation but are too often not considered in damages for sexual harassment. This in turn helps to explain the difference in payouts between the two civil torts and provides a mechanism for ensuring adequate compensation for sexual harassment victims. If judges were to explicitly turn their mind to these broader considerations in sexual harassment matters, it is likely that the depth of harm of sexual harassment to its victims would be expressed, and the ultimate payouts would be higher and more just.