Policy design

In China, several policies, including the disability quota, have been introduced to enhance employment opportunities for registered or certified disabled people (Huang et al., Reference Huang, Guo and Bricout2009; Liao et al., Reference Liao, Wang, Du, Gao, Liu, Chen, Song and Zheng2016). Other popular schemes include social welfare enterprises, which are subsidised by both central and local governments and are required to recruit more than 25 per cent of their workforce as disabled workers and self-employment schemes that encourage disabled individuals to establish their own businesses (e.g. access to designated market space; cash incentives to help set up business) (Huang et al., Reference Huang, Guo and Bricout2009).

The CDPF, a state-sponsored disability advocacy organisation established in 1988, paved the way for the introduction of a quota system in 1991. The 2008 Protection of Disabled People lawFootnote ² mandates that all employers, both public and private, with over 20 employees must reserve at least 1.5 per cent of their workforce for disabled employees. Employers who fail to meet this quota are subject to a levy collected by the local treasury department, which is then allocated to the Employment Security Fund, which is designed to be used in promoting disability employment by offering financial support for companies employing disabled people, funding disabled self-employees and providing career training. The formula for calculating this levy is as follows:

\begin{align}{{Due}}\,\,{{levy}} = & {{[number \ of \ employees}} \times 1.5 \ {{ per cent }} \ \left( {{{variance \, between \, regions}}} \right) \\& - {{number \ of \ disabled \ employees]}} \times {{average \ wage \ of \ the \ company}}{\rm{.}}\end{align}

Notably, the basis for calculating the disability employment levy in China diverges from practices in most European countries. Whereas the European model typically uses the national minimum wage as the benchmark, Chinese employers are assessed according to their average staff salary. In the private sector, this creates market-style incentives: Companies, particularly those in high-wage industries, may seek to under-report average wages to reduce levy obligations (Liao, Reference Liao2021). By contrast, public-sector organisations are not primarily driven by financial penalties or market competition; their compliance with the quota scheme is instead shaped by bureaucratic accountability mechanisms that prioritise political performance, administrative conformity and procedural reporting.

While central-level policy broadly defined the employment quota as ‘at least 1.5%’, it authorised lower-level governments to determine the precise figure according to local conditions and administrative capacity. Most provinces adopted the 1.5 per cent benchmark, while a few set higher targets – Henan, Sichuan, Jilin and Fujian at 1.6 per cent; Liaoning at 1.7 per cent; and Xinjiang at 2 per cent. This flexible and decentralised approach, as noted by Liang (Reference Liang2016), allows local authorities to tailor policy to regional contexts through consultation with stakeholders. However, it also creates accountability gaps: Private firms are weakly monitored through fiscal mechanisms, while public bodies often meet compliance requirements on paper without substantive inclusion outcomes. This illustrates how incentive-based and bureaucratic forms of accountability operate differently across sectors, producing uneven implementation of the quota scheme across sectors.

Policy implementation in the public sector

Recent studies highlight the persistent marginalisation and discrimination faced by disabled individuals in China’s labour market. According to Statistical Bulletin on the Development of Undertakings for Disabled PeopleFootnote ³ , approximately one million disabled people find employment through the quota scheme each year. However, the actual employment figures for disabled people in the public sector have not been disclosed.

Liao (Reference Liao2021) reports an alarmingly low employment rate for disabled people – just 0.03 per cent – in public-sector organisations across four Yangtze delta regions (Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shanghai and Anhui), where the economy tends to be more active. This falls significantly short of the mandated 1.5 per cent quota, indicating fluctuations in the actual implementation rate of the quota within public employment across the country.

There is little regulatory system for monitoring the implementation of the quota-levy system in the public sector (Liao, Reference Liao2021). To address this, in 2021, the Chinese governmentFootnote ⁴ issued a policy requiring public institutions and state-owned companies to ‘play the leading role in employing disabled people’ and clarified the concept of ‘reserved employment positions’ for disabled candidates.

One of the main barriers to effective implementation is the lack of clear accountability mechanisms. While the local treasury department, which holds considerable political influence, is responsible for collecting the quota levy, this has not led to effective enforcement (Liang, Reference Liang2016). Drawing from European experiences, disability quota schemes often employ punitive sanctions rather than incentives to achieve compliance, leading to resistance from public-employment bodies focused on profitability and efficiency (Sargeant et al., Reference Sargeant, Radevich-Katsaroumpa and Innesti2018).

An institutional theoretical approach

The employment experiences of disabled people in the public sector are relatively underexplored in current studies. Exceptions include work by Ge et al. (Reference Ge, Chen, Tang and Cong2021), who have scrutinised government stakeholders’ perceptions of disability support policy formulation, and Liao (Reference Liao2021), who has analysed the status quo of the quota scheme and its lacklustre implementation rate in the public sector. Prior research has revealed a paradox: Despite its substantial political power, the Chinese government has been less effective in mitigating social discrimination against minority groups (Shi & Foster, Reference Shi and Foster2024). The impact of state policies, particularly the disability quota scheme, on the experiences of disabled workers in the public sector remains ambiguous.

To put the public-employment sector in context and better explain the institutional structure concerns the implementation of disability employment quota, Scott’s (Reference Scott1987) institutional theoretical framework might be useful. According to Scott (Reference Scott1995), the institutional theory delves into how an institution’s core structures – schemas, rules, norms and routines – guide the social behaviours of its members. An institution is defined as such:

Scott (Reference Scott2013) argues that institutional elements operate at three levels: regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive. Regulative elements encompass formal rules, incentives and monitoring mechanisms; however, they may remain superficial if not supported by broader institutional norms and beliefs. Normative elements reflect social expectations and professional roles, implying that individuals are motivated not solely by rational calculation but also by identities, values and relational obligations. Cultural-cognitive elements concern the shared beliefs and taken-for-granted assumptions through which individuals perceive and interpret their institutional environment, thereby sustaining rules and norms (Meyer & Rowan, Reference Meyer and Rowan1977). Together, these three pillars interact to reinforce or, at times, undermine institutional stability and compliance (Scott, Reference Scott2013).

In this paper, the term ‘institution’ refers to the overall structure of the Chinese public-employment sector, which encompasses the civil service, public service organisations and state-owned enterprises – essentially, the entire socio-organisational system, in which the state plays a dominant role in employment. This paper identifies and analyses three key institutional characteristics of the Chinese public-employment sector: the historical legacy of the bianzhi system, the medically centred physical examination process and the role of state agent in delivering policies.

The planned economy legacy – bianzhi system

One of the main features associated with the public-employment sector in China is its unique bianzhi system. Bianzhi refers to the authorised number of personnel in a work unit (danwei), which is a legacy element of the planned economic system used by the party-state to manage and control the national development and population flow (Bian, Reference Bian1994). The bianzhi system is instrumental in determining an employee’s pay rate, career path and benefits package (Brodsgaard, Reference Brodsgaard2002). According to Ang (Reference Ang2012), it serves as a budgetary guideline that helps the state treasury department allocate public funds to each public unit (danwei), based on an assessment of the ideal staff size. It is important to note that the actual number of recruited staff may exceed the planned number, resulting in public units being ‘over-staffed’. Further details on this aspect of public employment can be found in Zhou’s (Reference Zhou2013) treatise on the Chinese institutional structure and culture.

When the work unit (danwei) is over-employing, i.e., those workers not included in the bianzhi count, their wages are sourced from the unit’s operating budget rather than being state-guaranteed. These wages often derive from operational revenues such as traffic fines in the case of police departments or medical bills for hospitals. Positions under the bianzhi system were colloquially known as ‘iron rice bowls’, and individuals in these roles are said to be ‘eating the imperial grain’, as they enjoy job security funded by the state (Ding et al., Reference Ding, Goodall and Warner2000). As China undergoes labour market reforms, marketisation has been seen in the public sector, though it still remains a relatively secured employment sector for most of the Chinese people.

The exact number of individuals with bianzhi status remains a matter for debate, owing to categorisation difficulties. However, Wu & Zheng (Reference Wu and Zheng2018) estimate that approximately 3.68 per cent of the Chinese workforce falls into this category, a proportion lower than that of developed countries such as the UK (7.26 per cent) and the USA (7.47 per cent). This ratio also varies regionally: Less economically active regions tend to have a higher proportion of bianzhi employees than more economically dynamic areas (Wu & Zheng, Reference Wu and Zheng2018).

Current reforms in China indicate a shift towards new public management models inspired by Western practices, albeit adapted to fit within Chinese administrative traditions (Christensen & Fan, Reference Christensen and Fan2018). However, it sometimes contradicts the central Chinese state’s recent trend of reasserting control over the public sector, potentially impacting political agendas such as quota systems.

Another institutional aspect for disabled individuals seeking employment in China’s public sector is the mandatory physical examination, which is closely linked with the bianzhi system. This assessment is consistent across civil and public services, based on a strict medical checklist.Footnote ⁵ Candidates who pass the written exams and interviews must undergo these tests at designated hospitals. If a candidate falls under one of the twenty-one specified medical categories, the examining doctor has the right to recommend discontinuing the employment process. One rationale for these pre-employment screenings could be the stability associated with bianzhi positions. Once an individual secures such a role, redundancy or dismissal is unlikely (Ang, Reference Ang2012). Consequently, from an ableist perspective, hiring disabled individuals – who are often deemed ‘difficult and weak’ – might be considered imprudent.

The expected role of the CDPF

The China Disabled Persons’ Federation (CDPF) is a state-affiliated organisation that plays a formal role in the implementation of disability-related policies in China, including the employment quota system for disabled people. Founded to act as a mediator between the party-state and its constituency of disabled people (Chen & Xu, Reference Chen and Xu2011), the CDPF is officially positioned as both a policy-transmission agency and a state advocacy organisation. However, its dual role is contested: While it is tasked with carrying out state policies, it holds neither enforcement nor independent administrative power, raising questions about its capacity to represent disabled people’s interests effectively (Stone, Reference Stone1998; Kohrman, Reference Kohrman2005).

One of the CDPF’s key administrative functions is issuing disability certificates, which are required to access the quota route to employment. In China, these certificates classify disabilities into four degrees (or levels) based on the severity of impairment and its impact on daily life and work capacity, with level 4 being the ‘mildest’ and level 1 the most ‘severe’. This classification system is medically assessed and serves as the basis for eligibility for various forms of state support (including quota). Grounded in the medical model of disability, it links bodily functionality directly to benefit entitlement and can lead to procedural injustices (Oliver, Reference Oliver1996).

In terms of employment practice, the CDPF itself lacks a transparent record of employing disabled individuals. According to a study by the first author, only a small proportion of officers in CDPF branches identify as disabled, which undermines its credibility as a rights advocacy body. Lin et al. (Reference Lin, Zhang and Yang2018) further argue that the CDPF’s structural rigidity limits its ability to adapt to China’s rapidly changing social and economic context, thereby constraining its effectiveness in supporting disabled people’s employment rights.

Regulative pillar of the public employment institution

The bianzhi framework serves as a gatekeeping institution, regulating who is deemed eligible for formal public employment. While on paper it provides structure and fairness in selection, its rigid application of standards and procedures disproportionately excludes disabled applicants, particularly in the recruitment process.

One of the most significant regulatory barriers lies in the medical/physical examination, a mandatory step in the recruitment process for bianzhi positions. Ostensibly introduced to ensure occupational suitability, this requirement functions in practice as a mechanism of exclusion, systematically screening out individuals with visible or diagnosed impairments regardless of their actual job-related capabilities.

This requirement illustrates how formally codified medical standards act as institutionalised filters that restrict disabled candidates from entering and progressing through the system. The authority vested in local physicians to determine ‘fitness for duty’ is rarely questioned or contested due to the centrality of medical authority within both state and organisational culture. Moreover, the lack of appeal mechanisms or procedural transparency further entrenches exclusion. Interviewee 4’s account reveals the absence of institutional redress in cases of potentially discriminatory medical evaluation:

Such instances reflect not only regulative rigidity but also the limited accountability within the institutional arrangement, reinforcing exclusion through procedural inertia and professional collusion. With a nearly invisible impairment, Interviewee 1’s case offers an interesting lens into how the ‘severity’ and visibility of an impairment can influence the softer elements of recruitment and promotion processes. During the interview, she explained that, while her impairment affects her walking, it does not prevent her from ‘doing jobs in a normal manner’. As a result, it has never posed a problem for her and has, at times, even elicited sympathy from colleagues.

In contrast to the restrictive bianzhi framework, which itself has selection rules as part of the regulative element of the public-employment institutions, the disability employment quota system operates as a state-level regulative intervention/advocate aimed at promoting inclusive employment to bring in some ‘fresh air’. At first glance, this represents a progressive shift, creating legal grounds for disabled individuals to access the labour market. However, empirical data from the study reveal that the quota system is frequently implemented in parallel to, but not integrated with, the bianzhi framework, resulting in contradictions and administrative dilemmas. Interviewee 8, who was recruited through a specialist scheme (see earlier for sanzhi yifu), describes a bureaucratic deadlock that emerged when her medical results conflicted with the regulatory expectations of bianzhi employment:

This exemplifies how institutions may be trapped between two regulatory obligations: adherence to medical standards embedded in the bianzhi system and compliance with legal mandates under the quota system. In such contexts, organisational actors may experience regulative friction, where the enforcement of one rule (e.g. medical eligibility) undermines compliance with another (e.g. quota fulfilment). These internal contradictions produce ad hoc compromises, which may allow individual entry but do not challenge the underlying structure.

In practice, many public employers respond to these tensions by offering contract-based positions, in other words, non-permanent posts, to disabled applicants, thereby circumventing the formal requirements of the bianzhi system. This workaround enables organisations to meet their legal obligations under the quota scheme while preserving the sanctity of bianzhi appointments for those deemed medically and administratively ‘fit’.

This illustrates how regulative design can unintentionally produce secondary stratification, where disabled individuals are structurally relegated to a lower tier of employment status despite fulfilling policy objectives.

Normative pillar of the public-employment institution

At the heart of normative institutional practice in China’s civil service lies an ableist conception of meritocracy. This ideology maintains that employment and advancement should be based on individual effort, educational attainment and competitive performance – criteria which are implicitly tied to notions of physical and mental ‘normalcy’. Although formally inclusive policies such as the disability quota system exist, disabled employees are frequently seen as violating these entrenched meritocratic norms.

This perspective generates widespread scepticism towards disabled individuals, particularly those recruited via quota rather than open competition. Colleagues may perceive them as having secured their position through preferential treatment rather than professional competence. As Interviewee 6 expressed:

This comment exemplifies the normative dissonance that quota recruitment creates in a context that strongly prizes competitive achievement. Disabled employees are caught in a double bind: welcomed into employment under state policy but simultaneously undermined by workplace norms that valorise self-sufficiency and physical competence.

Normative pressures are further reinforced by organisational cultures lacking disability awareness and inclusion training, particularly in less cosmopolitan or lower-tier administrative departments. A pervasive stigma against disability shapes informal interactions and managerial attitudes, contributing to a sense of alienation among disabled employees.

Interviewee 7, who briefly worked in a CDPF branch in a smaller city, described the stereotyping and condescension she faced upon arrival:

Such experiences indicate that ableist attitudes are not limited to public perception but are embedded within institutional subcultures. Even agencies such as the CDPF tasked with promoting disability inclusion may internalise and reproduce societal prejudices, thereby undermining their own mission. In this sense, workplace culture operates as a normative force that resists policy-driven inclusion.

An additional normative dimension influencing public-sector careers is the emphasis on guanxi – a Chinese social concept grounded in reciprocal favour exchanges, where personal relationships can take precedence over formal rules or written agreements (see Harding, Reference Harding2014). Although recruitment processes may formally adhere to established regulations, career progression is often shaped by informal mechanisms, such as peer networks, social bonding and subjective assessments of an individual’s perceived ‘fit’ within the team.

This to some extent disadvantages disabled employees, who may lack the social capital and confidence to participate fully in workplace networks, particularly if they were previously excluded from mainstream educational or professional environments. Interviewee 8 described how her limited social background impeded her performance reviews:

These comments underscore how interpersonal norms and informal expectations can serve as hidden gatekeepers in the institutional environment. Even where formal equality exists, social inclusion remains conditional on meeting ‘able-bodied’ behavioural expectations – such as sociability, emotional conformity and self-reliance.

Furthermore, the normative emphasis on sameness and conformity pressures disabled employees to suppress their needs for accommodation or support to ‘fit in’. As Interviewee 8 recalled:

This illustrates the internalisation of ableist norms: Disabled workers may feel compelled to overperform or avoid asserting their rights to counteract anticipated stigma. Such dynamics highlight how normative structures regulate behaviour not through formal sanctions, but through moral expectations and peer surveillance.

On the positive side of social norms, having access to a guanxi network may sometimes provide opportunities for disabled people. In this study, Interviewees 2, 3, 6 and 9 all secured their current employment in the same city where they were raised. Their familiarity with the local context is likely to have given them access to their familial guanxi networks, though the extent to which these connections directly contributed to securing their employment was not disclosed.

Cultural-cognitive pillar of the public-employment institution

One of the most pervasive cultural-cognitive assumptions underpinning public-sector employment in China is the dominance of a medical model of disability.Footnote ⁷ This framework constructs the disabled body as inherently problematic, requiring formal diagnosis, evaluation and, in many cases, restriction or exclusion from certain roles. In practice, eligibility for the quota scheme is administered through the CDPF, which mandates that individuals obtain official disability certification. This certification is based on medically defined categories and standards, meaning that only those whose impairments are medically verified are officially recognised as ‘disabled’ and thus eligible for inclusion in the scheme. As a result, the scope of the quota policy is already limited by a medicalised definition of disability, reinforcing the notion that workplace inclusion depends on biomedical validation rather than on social or rights-based considerations. In the context of this study, all participants were considered to be ‘less disabled’ within this framework, as they all held relatively minor disability certificates – none possessed a level 1 certificate, which may suggest a certain preference for particular degree of disability in the sector.

This worldview is institutionalised through the mandatory medical/physical examination in the recruitment of public-sector workers and especially bianzhi-designated staff. As discussed previously, the physical exam functions not merely as a regulatory requirement but as a culturally legitimised assessment of a candidate’s ‘normality’. The assumption that disabled individuals are unfit for bianzhi employment is not always explicitly stated, but it is tacitly embedded in the logic of these procedures.

Here, the taken-for-granted association between physical integrity and employability becomes a powerful cultural filter – one that structures institutional practice and individual perception alike. This results in systemic exclusion without the need for overt discrimination, as exclusion is rationalised through culturally accepted norms of fitness, health and public service competence.

Another dimension of the cultural-cognitive pillar is the role of lookismFootnote ⁸ – beliefs about the ideal appearance, comportment and bodily presentation of public employees. In many settings, especially those involving external representation (e.g. public-facing roles or promotional materials), bodily difference is implicitly equated with unprofessionalism or discomfort. Interviewee 9 described being asked to step back during a group photo at a company event, ostensibly to avoid ‘discomfort’ for senior management:

This is a stark example of lookism intersecting with disability. The message communicated is that disabled bodies are inappropriate for public display, and that professional image requires aesthetic conformity. This belief system is not written in policy, nor necessarily voiced openly, but it is enacted through organisational practices, shaping who is visible, who is valued and who is hidden.