Reassessing Colonialism: British Protectorate Status and Power Dynamics in the Gulf Region

While some argue that nations in the Gulf region were either incompletely colonized or merely semi-colonized under British protectorates, prominent scholars in Gulf studies assert that the British protectorate status entailed more than mere political alliances with ruling shaykhs. Far from equal, these power dynamics favored the British, who wielded significant influence over internal affairs akin to their involvement in India. James Onley delves into the legal nuances, noting that the distinction in the terminology of British colonialism between protected state and protectorate is not straightforward. He emphasizes that the term “external affairs” could encompass internal matters of a protected state, blurring the lines of control.Footnote ²⁴ Moreover, Onley explains that in Arabia, the British Crown, though termed the “Protecting Power,” exercised powers akin to those of the “Paramount Power” in India.Footnote ²⁵

Omer AlShehabi’s analysis delves into British colonialism in the Gulf, with a particular focus on Bahrain. He elucidates the strategies employed by the British for direct involvement in Bahrain from the early 1900s, highlighting the utilization of “ethnosectarian cleavages” as a colonial governance practice, consistent with their approaches in other regions such as India and Southeast Asia.Footnote ²⁶ Drawing critical parallels, AlShehabi underscores the shared practices, strategies, and overarching trends of British imperialism during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, characterized as the “Age of Empire” by Eric Hobsbawm.Footnote ²⁷ Moreover, AlShehabi emphasizes the direct British intervention in local governance affairs in Bahrain by the early 1900s, underscoring the institutional framework under the Government of India’s oversight. Notably, the personnel staffing these institutions, often referred to as “Gulfites,” boasted prior experience in colonial administration in India.Footnote ²⁸

In addition to organizing society along ethno-sectarian lines, British rule in Bahrain promoted a narrative of “benevolent imperialism,” purportedly aimed at improving the conditions of its subjects.Footnote ²⁹ However, AlShehabi contends that this rhetoric masked deeper colonial penetration into Bahraini society, exemplified by the presence of Indian subjects who provided a pretext for British intervention in local affairs.Footnote ³⁰

A similar pattern of colonial strategies was observed in Qatar, initially considered a dependency of Bahrain before becoming a British protectorate in 1915.Footnote ³¹ Another example occurs in the attempt of Shaykh Jassim bin Mohammed of Qatar, the founder of Qatar, to expel Indians in 1882, only to be foiled by the British, who forced him to retain the Indian subjects and apologize. AlShehabi argues that these measures, under the guise of communal welfare, actually reinforced and bureaucratized colonial absolutist rule.Footnote ³²

However, the politics and complexity of indirect rule consist in the fact that colonial powers defined the “customary” institutions and laws that were supposedly based on “native traditions.” The line between such indirect rule and customary laws is blurry, and such matters were far from black and white. It was not just about foreign conspiracy by colonialists (as some may frame it) or about just working with the local practices but rather concerned power politics. Indirect rule was “a site of struggle between various forces.” In this context, it was the colonial powers whose interest came first and the native rulers that they put in place and chose to work with. “Power, and hence, the encounter, was not equal.”Footnote ³³

The concept of indirect rule has been extensively utilized to analyze colonial governance structures, yet it presents significant limitations when applied to the context of Gulf states. While the concept suggests a clear dichotomy between indirect and direct rule, the reality is far more nuanced. As this article will explore further, the distinction between the two can often be blurry, overlooking the agency of local rulers and the complex interplay of various international forces, as well as unequal power relations.

Scholars such as Omar AlShehabi, James Onley, Michael H. Fisher,Footnote ³⁴ and Mary Lewis have critically engaged with the concept of “indirect rule,”Footnote ³⁵ considering it to comprise more of a spectrum than a fixed set of terms. Lewis introduces the term “divided rule” to analyze colonial politics in the Gulf through the lens of sovereignty. AlShehabi extends this analysis by proposing the concept of “co-sovereignty,” elucidating how the British established dual centers of authority and jurisdiction in the Gulf, allowing local rulers to maintain their own systems of governance while introducing British courts and structures.Footnote ³⁶ However, the delineation between “foreign” and “local” subjects under this arrangement was not always clear, leading to disagreements between British authorities and local rulers.

In Qatar, British involvement extended beyond external affairs. In addition to the importance of recognizing that the theoretical framework of “protectorate” is a contested concept, British archives concerning the Gulf reveal a rich tapestry of documentation that unequivocally demonstrates British involvement in the internal affairs of the region, including in Qatar. In my research at the British archives in London and the Qatar National Library, several records contain reports from British agents detailing their involvement in Qatar’s internal affairs.

One such example is a confidential letter written by H. B. Walker, the British Political Agent in Qatar in 1961, which provides details of a dinner between Mr. Walker, his wife, and Dr. Hassan Kamil, an Egyptian legal advisor to the Qatari ruler at the time. The letter discusses Mr. Walker’s wife’s conversation with the Kamils about marriage, affairs, business, and local gossip among community notables.Footnote ³⁷ Other records highlight the British political agent’s specific concerns and involvement in the hiring of a financial advisor to Shaykh Ali during the 1960s. These documents detail the British agent’s assessment of the suitability of the present financial advisor for the position and his influence on the shaykh in selecting a more suitable substitute.Footnote ³⁸

Moreover, these documents reveal the British imperial strategy, which I term as “indirect-direct control,” in shaping Qatar’s internal affairs. The British were not only concerned with financial and administrative aspects but also with Qatar’s labor law, establishing the first labor court and influencing judicial practices and processes.Footnote ³⁹

The concept of “indirect-direct rule” suggests that although the British labeled their governance in the Gulf as a “Protectorate Status,” granting themselves varying degrees of involvement in the region depending on their interests and resources, they were extensively engaged in the socio-political dynamics of society. The abundance of British records labeled “confidential” serves as evidence of their direct involvement and behind-the-scenes manipulation of the socioeconomic landscape in Qatar.

British agents wielded power through strategic manipulation, ensuring that advisors to the ruler aligned with British interests, and by directly intervening in policy and lawmaking, often disguised as mere “suggestions” to the ruler. Given the unequal power dynamics and the leverage the British held over the local ruler in providing protection and resources, they clearly had the upper hand in implementing these “suggestions.” For instance, a confidential document from 1961 records a diary entry of the British political resident’s visit to Qatar, wherein the ruler expressed his willingness to consult with him and the British agent before taking any action on the recommendations of Egyptian financial advisors.Footnote ⁴⁰ Other key involvements included censorship of mail to help support the local shaykh,Footnote ⁴¹ and building the first Qatari hospital with key British staff.Footnote ⁴² The British were also a key factor in internal conflicts. They played a significant role in internal conflicts, acting to resolve, punish, and even shape these conflicts to protect their own interests in the territory. For instance, they intervened in the conflict between the ʿAmāmara and Āl bin ʿAlī tribes in the 1900s.Footnote ⁴³

Despite the significance of British involvement in shaping the Gulf’s socio-political landscape, existing scholarship on colonialism often overlooks this region, relegating it to mere footnotes or neglecting it altogether under the assumption of its being “incompletely colonized.” While various forms of colonialism, such as settler colonialismFootnote ⁴⁴ and exploitation colonialism,Footnote ⁴⁵ have been extensively studied,Footnote ⁴⁶ there remains a notable gap in understanding the unique colonial dynamics of the Gulf.

In light of these observations, I propose introducing a new category of colonialism: “Protectorate Colonialism.” This framework would elucidate the distinct nature of British colonialism in the Gulf, characterized by the strategic utilization of “Protectorate Status” to exert control, manipulate power dynamics, and exploit resources in the region. Despite its seemingly diluted presence compared to other colonial contexts, the British Empire maintained a firm grip on the Gulf’s socioeconomic and political landscape, effectively shaping its trajectory to serve imperial interests. Through a focused examination of the aftermath of “Protectorate Colonialism” in Qatar, this article endeavors to illuminate a neglected facet of colonial history. Furthermore, it seeks to underscore the interconnectedness between colonial legacies and the process of post-colonial nation-building in Qatar. By exploring how the remnants of colonialism continue to influence socio-political dynamics and shape the trajectory of nation-building efforts in Qatar, this study aims to provide valuable insights into the complexities of the post-colonial landscape in the region.

Various foreign powers, including the Portuguese, Dutch, and Ottomans, exerted influence on the Gulf region alongside the British during the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Toward the late-nineteenth century, the Ottomans vied with the British for dominance in the Gulf, leading to a complex geopolitical landscape. While some scholars liken Ottoman rule in Eastern Arabia to colonialism, debates persist regarding its theoretical and practical distinctions from British imperialism.Footnote ⁴⁷ Initially rooted in the caliphate and dynastic sovereignty, Ottoman governance evolved to incorporate imperial capitalist strategies in controlled territories. Despite the significance of Ottoman presence, the latter part of the nineteenth century witnessed European powers, particularly the British, dominating the period of colonial expansion in the region.Footnote ⁴⁸ This period also marked intense competition between the British and Ottomans, often manipulated by local shaykhs with conflicting interests.

In Qatar, the interplay between Ottoman and British politics significantly influenced pivotal events that shaped the country’s trajectory prior to independence. Among these events, the Ottoman recognition of Qatar as part of its province in 1871 stands out as particularly significant.Footnote ⁴⁹ Additionally, the Ottomans maintained a permanent garrison in Al Bidda until their expulsion following the Battle of Wajbah in 1893,Footnote ⁵⁰ eliciting British protests due to perceived threats to their regional interests. British archival records reveal their dominant role in the British–Ottoman rivalry, with documents from 1898 indicating British support for Shaykh Jassim bin Mohammed against the Ottomans. Despite tribal ties with the Ottomans, British intervention in internal disputes, such as the 1908 conflict between the Āl Bū ʿAynayn tribe and Shaykh Jassim bin Mohammed, showcased British efforts to assert control and maintain hegemony.Footnote ⁵¹ Ultimately, the Ottoman loss of control over the region stemmed from various factors, including communication irregularities, administrative neglect, and resource deficiencies.Footnote ⁵² With the Ottomans’ withdrawal, the British emerged as the sole imperial power, shaping Qatar’s state formation and early state-building efforts through colonial strategies and goals. This historical dynamic underscores the enduring influence of colonial power politics on Qatar’s trajectory.

Maneuvering Inter-Tribal Rivalries That Led to a Distinction between Bahrain and Qatar

As Qatar lies midway to the Arab Gulf shore, along with the Bahrain Islands it was historically part of the Hasa region, the eastern coast of present-day Saudi Arabia. This strategic location and the British presence shaped Qatari history and led to the rise of the Āl Thānī as the ruling family.

British colonization of India paved their way into the Gulf region and established one of their main interests in the region, to safeguard the route to India. The main purpose of British relationships with each Gulf Shaykhdom and empowerment of certain tribes was to protect multifaceted British interests, and a series of developments at the end of the eighteenth century shaped the fate of Qatar through the rise of the Āl Thānī family. The key developments were British dominance over India, the Wahhabi movement into the Arabian Peninsula, and rise of Mehmed Ali in Egypt. These events contributed to the intersection of Islamic, Arab, and tribal identities, which would later be reflected in the multi-layered national identity in the postmodern state.

The tribal shaykhdoms, despite their own tribal rules and laws, had to abide by British laws and regulations through treaties and agreements that favored British forces at the hand of powerful tribes and, consequently, further privileged their position in the power structures.Footnote ⁵⁵

The politics of agreements and treaties, such as the 1820 treaty, was that they reflected unequal power relations between the British and local elite tribal leaders. The main motive of the former was to protect their land and sea interests in the region.Footnote ⁵⁶ As a result, the British imposed laws and “order” on the residents of the Gulf, sometimes through force and violence,Footnote ⁵⁷ even though the terms of their treaties were not always made in consultation with the people and tribes of that region.

Due to various reasons including the lack of unified power, Qatar was unable to separate itself from Bahrain until the nineteenth century. These circumstances gave rise to key historical figures who would emerge as political elites and plant the seeds of independence to create a new state from a sparsely populated desert. The first of these historical figures was Raḥma Ibn Jābir, a sworn enemy of Āl Khalīfa determined to claim power back from Āl Khalīfa.Footnote ⁵⁸ To do this, he united with the tribes of Āl Bū Kuwārah, Āl Sulaytī, and Āl Musallam. Raḥma set the forces in motions that would shape Qatar’s relationship with Āl Khalīfa and define the path for other historical figures to contest Āl Khalīfa’s authority in Qatar. This process eventually led to the rise of Āl Thānī and the independence of Qatar,Footnote ⁵⁹ with the British playing a key role in recognizing Qatar as a state separate from Bahrain.

Agreements with the Āl Thānī Family

The 1867 attack on Doha and Wakrah by Bahrain was disastrous,Footnote ⁶⁰ leading to British involvement in providing dispute resolution. During the process, a British political resident met with Mohammed bin Thani, who represented the people of Qatar. This meeting led to the signing of the 1868 agreement and gave Mohammed bin Thani the recognition of a special leadership in Qatar through British’s direct involvement.Footnote ⁶¹ At this point, Al Thani’s leadership and, subsequently, the concept of modern nation state was institutionalized through the influence of the British. The agreement confirmed Britain’s control over Qatar’s affairs and solidified Qatar’s independent status linked directly with Al Thani’s exclusive leadership of the land.

The Āl Thānī family dynasty was the starting point of transforming Qatar from a group of villages and towns that lacked a collective identity to a nation state. The role of local tribal leaders’ engagement with various foreign powers in the region, by playing them off each other, made this possible. The most prominent of these political leaders, Qassim bin Mohammed Al Thani, also referred to as Jassim, was also regarded as the founder of Qatar.Footnote ⁶² Notably, very little is known about Qassim in the official narratives on Qatar’s history of the time, there is no record of his real photos from that time. As a result, historical narratives are constructed orally (as was the tradition in Bedouin culture) and through the records of British archival history of communication with tribal leaders. The absence of a documented history made it easier for the creation of a new one.

The Creation of Titles and Roles for Tribal Leaders – Further Institutionalization of Their Rule

Qassim bin Mohammed was unpleased with the British presence and their treatment of Qatar. The lack of Britain’s regard for Qatar was reflected in their treaties that were designed to impose British will on the ruler, with almost no protection.Footnote ⁶³

In Qatar’s modern history and official state narrative, Qassim bin Mohammed is regarded as the founder of Qatar due to his success in uniting tribal loyalties under Āl Thānī rule, which would later act as a foundation for the modern state.Footnote ⁶⁴ He played a major role in setting off the colonial powers, the Ottomans and the British, against each other. Through the Ottoman presence in Qatar in 1876, Qassim was given the title Qāʾim Maqām Footnote ⁶⁵ and Governor of Qatar (a title given to the governor of the Ottoman district). Prior to this, his father Mohammed bin Thani had signed a treaty with the British in 1868, which recognized Qatar’s sovereignty under his leadership. Both the titles ḥākim (ruler) bestowed on Mohammed bin Thani and Qāʾim Maqām for Qassim bin Mohammed were foreign and colonial constructions as a means to place their allies in the ruling positions. This could be considered the beginning of a new national awakening tied to a piece of land. Through these new official titles and given Qassim’s dealing with numerous crises including Zubarah, he was able to mobilize tribal loyalties in his favor.

This tribal unity was displayed in the Battle of Wajbah, led by Qassim bin Mohammed against the Ottoman wālī who wanted to punish Qassim for not abiding by the Ottoman rules, not paying taxes, and refusing to follow the reforms. Qassim united thousands of Qatari men from different tribes, including Manāṣīr, Banū Hājir, Āl Thānī, to fight against the Ottomans on March 26, 1893, and defeated the Ottoman forces in just two days.Footnote ⁶⁶ This marked the unification of Qatari tribes and made Qassim a national hero. As a key memory in nation-building, the Wajbah battle signifies the unification against a common enemy. Qassim had achieved recognition from the British, which conferred a status on him that would become crucial in his future leadership of the independent state.

The Wajbah battle serves as compelling evidence that a distinct local identity tied to the territory of Qatar indeed existed, showcasing the presence of local agency in shaping national unification. However, this nascent national consciousness underwent significant transformation under the influence of British imperialism. British involvement played a pivotal role in shaping the trajectory of Qatar toward modern statehood, contributing to the establishment of a framework for national identity anchored in state institutions.

Helping Establish a Formal Territorial Identity of Qatar

The defeat of the Ottomans and the rise of Āl Thānī as the leading family was a turning point in the history of Qatar. As a result, new relationships were formed, and a series of agreements were signed with the British that eventually led to Qatar’s recognition as a nation-state. Abdullah bin Qassim replaced his father after his death. During Abdullah bin Qassim’s time, two crucial agreements were signed between Britain and Qatar, including the 1916 treatyFootnote ⁶⁷ – the first official Anglo-Qatar agreement – and the 1935 oil concession agreement with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), which gave the British company exclusive rights to the production and marketing of petroleum and natural gases in exchange for the protection of Abdullah bin Qassim.Footnote ⁶⁸

These agreements and treaties highlighted the unequal and multi-layered power relations between political elites. The 1916 treaty was the first official treaty to be signed between Qatar and Britain and placed Qatar under British control. According to the treaty, Qatar had to establish post and telegraph offices, allow for the stationing of British agents in Doha, admit British subjects to Qatar, and guarantee their protection. The 1916 treaty like many other agreements between the British and tribal leaders was inconsistent and subject to interpretation. The articles of the treaty were far from being equal. The clause pertaining to abolishing the slave trade and piracy was more about favoring British interests in maritime trade rather than upholding moral values.Footnote ⁶⁹

Establishment of National Identity Institutions and Sovereignty Recognition in the Territory

After oil was first discovered in Qatar during the 1920s, Qatar was bound by the 1916 treaty that prevented the ruler from granting concession rights without British approval. On May 17, 1935, a document was signed that gave APOC exclusive rights to produce, refine, and market petroleum and other natural gases.Footnote ⁷⁰ In this document, a map defining Qatar’s territory was attached. It is, therefore, crucial to recognize the centrality of oil discovery with the formation of the modern state in Qatar. The British recognized Abdullah bin Qassim as the leader/ruler of Qatar. This document framed the British relationship with Qatar within an imagination of relations between nation-states, paving the way for the Āl Thānī to build their own political legitimacy and rulership on that political construction

Abdullah bin Qassim deemed the British presence necessary due to the absence of robust military capabilities and local laws, leaving Qatar vulnerable to political pressures from neighboring powers in the Gulf Peninsula. During this period, the involvement of the British facilitated the resolution of border disputes between Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. The Gulf region, characterized by diverse tribal populations, small towns, and villages, had not previously experienced strict border delineations and scaled lines.Footnote ⁷¹ These concepts were introduced through the influence of a foreign political elite, shaping the foundation of trans-border identities among tribes and families within modern states. Consequently, tribal institutions evolved in response to government-planned policies.

Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa’s Rule and Official Ratification of the Constitution

Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa’s rule in 1995 was marked by a transition to a new era of nation-building projects and state “modernization” in the outer domain in terms of architecture, state structures, and national policies.

During Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa’s rule a permanent constitution was ratified in April 2003 with a majority referendum. This constitution was built on the tenets of the preliminary constitution, with new articles highlighting Qatar’s sovereignty and defining its political structure and citizen relationships.Footnote ¹⁰⁸

The constitution specifies a primogeniture law: article 8 designated hereditary rule for the Āl Thānī family.Footnote ¹⁰⁹ The constitution also established Qatar as a democratic state; one of the most important articles, article 78, was about the establishment of the Shura (advisory) council. The Shura council, along with the municipal council, was meant to increase citizens’ power in decision-making. Although this was celebrated as a reform, the Shura council’s power was limited and the emir could dissolve it at any time.

One of the most important differences between the preliminary constitution and the permanent constitution lay in the way state and society relations were clearly defined through a framework for a new national identity. Part two of the constitution is titled “Guiding principles of the society,” in which article 18 states: “Justice, benevolence, freedom, equality and high moral standards are the core values of Qatari society.”Footnote ¹¹⁰

These core principles provided a basis for new modes of national solidarity as a form of another top-down project. However, it was unclear what these moral standards would look like in practice. Article 20 confirmed the role of the state in creating national unity and identity: “The State shall strive to reinforce the spirit of national unity, solidarity, and fraternity among all citizens.” Similarly, article 21 underlines the centrality of “family” in the national project: “The family is the basis of society. A Qatari family is founded on religion, ethics and patriotism.”Footnote ¹¹¹ A Qatari family is, therefore, considered a political unit and a tool for national imagination.

Additionally, it also mentions freedom of the press, and articles 47 and 48 guarantee free speech. Again, the concept of media freedom in civil society is Western based; but what that would look like in Qatar is not clear. Freedom of media was associated with the development of the Al Jazeera satellite channel in 1996. Al Jazeera has been effectively used as a diplomacy tool “by influencing a pan-Arab feeling amongst all populations of the region.”Footnote ¹¹²

Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa also changed the orientation of Qatar’s foreign policy toward greater decisiveness, influenced by the personal character of the emir. During Shaykh Hamad’s rule, the U.S.-based Al Udaid facility was built in Qatar as the headquarters of the U.S. central command.Footnote ¹¹³ The long-term, hard-security arrangement guarded Qatar against security threats from its neighbors. These bold changes in foreign policy and emphasis on independence also led to a stronger focus on building an exclusive and cohesive national identity to strengthen Qatar’s local and international legitimacy. The new approach to national identity was institutionalized through an ambitious national vision of 2030, introduced a decade after the constitution’s finalization.

The Permanent Constitution, Nationality, Citizenship, and National Identity

The constitution institutionalized Qatari national identity and provided a new framework for national belonging. Article 38 established a nationality law that was later produced in a separate legislative act published in September 2005. This document presents the details of nationality law and establishes citizenship criteria and levels, crystallizing the differences between citizens through comparison between descent and naturalized citizenship.

According to article 12, citizenship may be withdrawn from a naturalized Qatari if they commit a crime against “honor and integrity” or are out of the country for a long period without “lawful justification” or others. Article 13 solidifies the second-class status of naturalized citizens with the following:

The political participation mentioned in earlier articles relating to the Shura council excludes naturalized Qataris as they are exempted from candidacy and voting for the Shura council. These differences between levels of citizenships also contributed to the narratives on belonging and “othering” of certain groups in Qatari society and the development of weaker national solidarity and a possibly confusing discourse on national identity.

In Qatar, national identity is strongly linked with citizenship status. Thus, if one is not a citizen of the country, they are excluded from possessing a national identity in the literal sense. In this sense, citizenship and related national identity discourse is built on the “norms of exclusion” rather than “norms of inclusion.”Footnote ¹¹⁵ Similarly, Babar explained, “The continuous presence of a large number of foreigners has reinforced citizens’ sense of their distinct Qatari-ness and shaped a sense of nationality along clear lines of cultural belonging.”Footnote ¹¹⁶

Qatar’s case is also unique in the sense that its small population with high access to external rents enables it to engage in more distributive politics than some of its neighbors. In the past, the state has spent much money on its citizens to ensure strong legitimacy, popularity, and the regime’s stability. Qatar’s long-term developmental goals include the creation of a knowledge-based economy, which has further increased the need to bring high-skilled foreign workers for employment. This large number of skilled expatriates, have further impacted how the Qatari state and society view and guard their citizenship.Footnote ¹¹⁷ Due to the perceived threat to local identity and culture, the length of time that migrants can spend in Qatar is limited to a certain period, and the “sponsorship system” is structured to “bind foreign workers to their employers for a predetermined contractual period,”Footnote ¹¹⁸ though it was also influenced by border control policies introduced by British administrators.Footnote ¹¹⁹ AlShehabi explains in detail how the British colonial era in the Gulf introduced a system of sponsorship and surety that was meant to be compatible with Islamic principle and customs of Kafala. Footnote ¹²⁰ He calls it a “cheap” system for controlling foreigners. Jurdeini and Hassan explain that despite its link at least linguistically and conceptually to Islamic tradition, the practice of the Kafala system evolved as a hybrid between colonial structures with local concepts.Footnote ¹²¹

The politics of migration, exclusive identities, and the diversity of expatriate community cannot be solely explained through the Kafala system. Currently, the majority-migrant communities in Qatar are diverse on various levels (ethnic, cultural, religious, socio-economic). Many of the migrants are long-time residents and fall into the category of “residents” though they remain “migrants” legally. However, despite the long term presence and interaction with the citizen population, their impact on local culture is understudied.Footnote ¹²² There are long-term communities of Iranians, Pakistanis, Palestinians, Yemenis, and other Arabs in Qatar who have “inhabited the country for decades and have served as the backbone in certain sectors of public and private employment.”Footnote ¹²³

The combination of this demographic imbalance and ethno-national nationality law and institutionalization are also reflected in a new state development vision in QNV 2030.Footnote ¹²⁴ It provided a pathway and guidelines for the country’s new policy orientations. To accommodate the long-standing communities with ethnic and linguistic similarities to the native population, Qatar’s citizenship laws evolved to include naturalization laws. In Qatar, citizenship is conferred based on descent and having Qatari parents (Jus Sanguinis). This project of national-identity creation is built on multi-layered identities and rooted in ethnicity. The different citizenship levels in Qatar could explain the weaknesses of its national identity and confusing sense of solidarity in the past. One of the main layers of the Qatari national identity is Arab identity, as clearly mentioned in the constitution. However, the definition of “Arab” is far from clear, particularly as many Qataris trace their origins to predominantly non-Arab regions such as Iran, Africa, and India, as well as previously enslaved populations with diverse backgrounds. Therefore, the process of “Arabization” among non-Arab populations represents a classic nationalist project, characterized by the selective forgetting of historical elements and the collective remembrance of a new desired national narrative.Footnote ¹²⁵ A prime site for such collective remembering is the Msheireb museums,Footnote ¹²⁶ which are designed to replicate houses belonging to different Qatari families and exhibit artifacts from the recent past, serving as representations of national symbols. Notably, the slavery museumFootnote ¹²⁷ within Msheireb stands out as a unique institution in the Gulf region, shedding light on Qatar’s slave history and its evolution in the post-abolition era. The museum named Bin Jelmood House “tells of a time when there was a flourishing trade in enslaved people throughout the Indian Ocean World, a vast region of which the countries of the Arabian Gulf are a part of. The story in Qatar begins in enslavement but ends in shared freedom and shared prosperity.”Footnote ¹²⁸ This deliberate curation of national narrative, despite its selective nature, showcases the diversity of the past while fostering a new sense of national solidarity.

In Qatari national discourse, similar to that of many other Gulf countries, the formation of an exclusive identity necessitates the identification of an “other.” In this context, the “other” predominantly comprises the expatriate community, depicted as a threat to the local culture.Footnote ¹²⁹ Additionally, the naturalized Qataris can also be seen subjected to othering, viewed as newcomers or less native Qataris. This discourse serves to construct a particular notion of national identity that aligns with the distribution of socio-political power.

Throughout history, the Qatari Peninsula has been home to tribes and families migrating from Najd or Hasa, seamlessly integrating into the social fabric. However, contemporary discourse portrays recent migrants as foreigners, contrasting them with earlier migrants who are deemed indigenous. This narrative plays a pivotal role in creating exclusivity within the framework of Qatari national identity, despite representing a minority of the population. Moreover, the “other” is not a static category, as evidenced by the recent introduction of permanent residency lawFootnote ¹³⁰ in Qatar during the Gulf blockade, which selectively include certain segments of the expatriate community.

This project of exclusive national identity is further solidified through QNV 2030, which aims to “preserve Qatar’s national heritage.”Footnote ¹³¹ QNV can be considered as the single most crucial document in the last decade, reflecting the state’s ideology and codifying its vision for a new societal order, state-society relations, and direction for top-down national identity creation.Footnote ¹³²

Through the institution of the family, multiple layers of identity are legitimized and institutionalized and systematically reproduced through an idealized plan for the upbringing of national citizens. The status of “culture” as an institution is further highlighted through the strategies that construct culture as a separate entity for producing national identity and national consciousness. The outcomes of this vision would be achieved through specific state-initiated projects. National identity was characterized, specified, and quantified through this approach. The major achievements of the cultural sector include the development of various infrastructures and buildings that would materialize the vision of national culture as a top-down philosophy.

Arab, Islamic, and Tribal Identity

In Qatar, Islamic and Arab identities are intertwined, but neither was equally used in an attempt to create a homogeneous Qatari identity through national culture. For example, the Wijdan Cultural Centre,Footnote ¹³³ established in 2017, is, according to QNV 2030, a “cultural conscience” center. The center defines its purpose as to further the advancement of Arab societies in response to modern and contemporary challenges. As an advisory to the Ministry of Culture and Sports in Qatar, it is “responsible for the preservation of culture, arts and heritage, [and] highlighting [Qatar’s] national and Islamic characteristics.”Footnote ¹³⁴

Arab identity is highlighted through the institutionalization of the Arabic language. In January 2019, a new law was introduced to make Arabic the official language for all government and private institutions,Footnote ¹³⁵ in recognition of the threats of a diversity of languages in the country. Previously, mostly English was used as the preferred language of communication in most institutions due to the high number of non-Arab expatriates in the country and their lack of integration. This new law attempted to reinstate the importance of Arab identity in Qatar through the institutionalization of its major characteristic – the Arabic language. However, there is a lack of clarity regarding what constitutes Islamic values. For example, for women, Islamic values are highlighted through modest clothing such as abaya (long black/colored robe to cover the body), but what religious modesty means for men is more unclear. The mechanisms involved in shaping this national identity are usually carried out by state institutions and are also projected as participatory in character. Citizens are mobilized to participate in national identity creation and dialogue to make it seem a part of the process, instilling a stronger sense of belonging. This is done through lectures, symposiums, and lecture-discussion groups conducted by Qatar University, such as a symposium titled “Qatari Society and the Question of National Identity.”Footnote ¹³⁶

Tribalism in Qatari National Identity

Neha Vora asserted that what makes the nation-building agendas of the Gulf states so powerful is the fact that “they have relied heavily upon purifying the imagined citizen ‘self’ from the non-citizen ‘other.’”Footnote ¹³⁷ Related to this exclusive citizenship is the concept of tribalism. Tribal identities exist simultaneously and distinctly from the others. Each tribe defines itself differently both from the other and more broadly in the distinction between banū/ḥadar (Nomad/Sedentary).

Each of the Gulf states has created its own “brand” to trademark their own unique identity rooted in a tribal past but connected to modern reality. Although Qatar takes pride in its tribal past and history of unification, there exists an “imagined” tribal past, which falls into the category of “invented traditions.” The invented traditions and emphasis on tribal past are important for providing the regime with a symbolic “nationally legible cultural capital” based on claims of tribal purity.Footnote ¹³⁸ Although what tribalism is and how it has evolved are topics that lie beyond the scope of this article, the symbols of tribal differences are worth mentioning.

An example of this merging of invention and history exists in two of the largest Bedouin tribes in Qatar – al-Hajrī and al-Marrī. They have a distinctively different accent from some of the ḥaḍar tribes and families such as al-Kuwārī, al-Malkī, and al-Emadī.Footnote ¹³⁹ Both tribes embrace this distinction with pride and pass it on to their children as crucial tribe-specific cultural values. Thus, a clear distinction between local accents exists in Qatar, and language is used as a marker of diverse tribal identities.

The state in Qatar uses tribalism as a tool to create a specific form of national identity that is both inclusive and exclusive. It is a new form of tribalism that does not fit into the previous categorization or conceptualization of the tribe by anthropologists. For example, many Qatari National Day songs are written in Bedouin-style poetryFootnote ¹⁴⁰ and sung in Bedouin accents, which some of the other tribes may not fully comprehend. Similarly, the ḥaḍar accent, which is advertised as the main Qatari accent, is mostly heard in local news channels, such as Qatar TV and Al Rayyan, and official interviews. Through these differences within the tribal cultures an obvious paradox emerges: the constructed Qatari national identity is built on claims of a shared tribal heritage, but the reality is that significant differences exist between tribes. The politics of national identity have in fact further perpetuated these differences rather than unify the national culture.

Another event where tribalism’s impact can be clearly seen is the National Day celebrations. Qatar’s National Day was officially moved from September 3rd to December 18th, which commemorates Qatar’s unification in 1878 under Shaykh Jassim, the state’s founder. “Qatar’s National Day is about honoring the heroes, leaders and people who built this country.”Footnote ¹⁴¹ The shift denotes a focus on the past, historical leaders, and tribal unity, celebrated through several events in December. The National Day celebrations are centered on “Darb Al-Saai,” which means “routes of the messenger.” This symbolizes the men with whom Shaykh Jassim entrusted messages and directions. Darb Al-Saai exhibit these traits and characteristics by conducting activities such as camel riding, horseback riding, shooting, poetry reading, and others that reflect “the Qatari and local culture and national identity.”Footnote ¹⁴² All these are typical of the desert-nomadic lifestyle historically led by the Bedouin tribes. Additionally, another activity called Al Maqtar Footnote ¹⁴³ exemplified the desert life, an activity through which a participant could learn more about their ancestry. These activities highlighted a connection with the past, i.e., tribal symbolism. At this juncture, the tribe had become a nation-building tool, a new form of tribalism that is fully compatible with national modernity as the new imagined tribalism builds on certain symbols of the past while letting go of the political strength of the tribe. In this sense, tribal history is being used as a state-building tool.

Al Shawi, a member of the Āl Murra tribe, one of the largest and most indigenous Bedouin tribes in Qatar, characterized contemporary Qatari history as an “assemblage of tribes and tribal belonging in flux.”Footnote ¹⁴⁴ Although most classic definitions of tribe focus mostly on Bedouin tribes, the rest of the Qatari population is seen as non-tribal. However, the non-tribal population is increasingly adopting the idea of the tribe by following certain patterns of created traditions and showcasing them on various occasions. This is usually done through “elections, National Day celebrations, and the social prerequisites by which access to the state and its resources is achieved, individuals are increasingly called upon to express and utilize the consanguineal linkages of tribe.”Footnote ¹⁴⁵ For example, families who do not have a particular tribal history or are not related to a long-established tribe use their family names to perform the same tribal traditions as the Bedouin or Hadhar tribes do. Al-Emadī and Āl Mulla are examples of traditionally non-tribal families that are increasingly following the performance of tribal traditions such as the tribal dance Ardah, which is performed mostly among Arab tribes of central Arabia. In this case, the state uses tribe as a conceptual tool to create and promote a certain version of national identity that follows a shared set of values and created traditions, some of which are borrowed from the past and some re-invented as tribal-modern culture. In this sense, the state is “tribalizing” the nation. The state remains the most important factor in these changes. In the early stages of statehood the regime drew support from the tribes, but as it was able to use oil money to construct a new national identity, it then began reconfiguring what it meant to be a tribe.

National Identity Projects – From Regional to Local

In the last decade, the Gulf states have taken substantial steps to promote national identity and deepen the sense of nationalism in its citizens. Several factors have given rise to the need to carefully promote and design this new nationalism. These factors include economic, political, and regional unrest. Considerable political competition within the Gulf Cooperation Council, the threat of Iran as a regional power, and the emergence of various transnational movements, such as Islamist movements, to name a few.Footnote ¹⁴⁶

Like its neighboring states, Qatar has taken significant steps to promote a strong sense of belonging, patriotism, and unique national identity among its citizens through various projects such as Qatar Museums Authority (QMA), heritage projects including Al-Zubarah, Cultural Village Foundation (Katara), Msheireb Museums (Msheireb Properties), Qatar National Library (QNL), Souq Waqif Art Centre, and Al Fanar Centre. These heritage projects highlight the importance of preserving local culture to respond to global influences in the country and promote various aspects of Qatar’s national identity. QMA was established in 2005 by Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa to engage with the West through soft power.Footnote ¹⁴⁷ Qatar invested in Western-style cultural projects through QMA. Qatar Museum Authority established the Museum of Islamic Art as the first Islamic museum in the Gulf region and also the Mathaf – Arab Museum of Modern Art, with a focus on art production in the Arab world. By establishing museums with distinct characteristics corresponding to the multi-layered Qatari national identity, i.e., Muslim and Arab identity, political elites have been strategically promoting Qatar’s cultural power.

The National Museum of Qatar, designed by a French architect, Jean Nouvel, reflects “the vanishing Bedouin cultures of Qatar in an effort to embrace the realities of a rapidly urbanizing society and maintain a connection to this fading world in which the country sprang.”Footnote ¹⁴⁸ The National Museum of Qatar was designed such that it represents both traditional and modern aspects; it is a prime example of the “Qatari brand.” The whole notion of “brand” is a cultural and discursive legacy of imperialism. Although the museum’s spectacular architecture gives it strong cultural capital, locally, it seems to create a new narrative of belonging through a single history, culture, and heritage, overlooking diversity. At the time of its official opening in March 2019, the museum’s main slogan was “Our ancient identity.” In her remarks on the museum’s opening, chairperson H. H. Shaykha Mayassa bint Hamad stated the following:

The exhibitions and events in the museum provide an imagination of Qatar’s ancestry. A prime example is the “Making of Doha” exhibition in March 2019, where selective versions of Qatari history, starting from independence to the present, were exhibited to showcase the nation’s progress into modernity.

Another national identity project organized under QMA was Mal Lawal (“from the old days”). This exhibition is a prime example of mobilizing citizens to participate in building a new national identity with a combined focus on past and future. The exhibition “invited everyone in Qatar to share objects that have made an impression and resonated with them throughout their lives.”Footnote ¹⁵⁰ The project’s rhetoric called for the representation of collective heritage.

To highlight Qatar’s distinct history during the pre-oil era, the national identity projects have focused a great deal on heritage sites, as reflected in the huge emphasis on Al-Zubarah Fort in the north of Qatar Madinat Al-Shamal. Although Al-Zubarah was always present in Qatar, it was not until 2009 that it was declared a protected area, becoming a research subject for archaeologists under QMA, and a UNESCO heritage site.Footnote ¹⁵¹

Additionally, in 2009, the Qatar Heritage and Identity Centre (QHIC) was established to promote research and awareness in society of Qatari heritage and protect national identity. The executive director Dr. Khalid Al Mulla highlighted this during a seminar organized by the center:

Following Qatar’s national strategy, in 2016, the Ministry of EducationFootnote ¹⁵³ introduced three new compulsory subjects in private schools, including Arabic for both Arab and non-Arab students, national history, and Islamic studies. All schools under the Qatar foundation adopted a national heritage program for their students.Footnote ¹⁵⁴ The use of education in reshaping and reforming national identity was also highlighted by higher educational institutions such as Qatar University, which in 2019 held a national conference titled “The determinants of national identity and the role of education in its promotion.”Footnote ¹⁵⁵

At the conference, Dr. Ibrahim Al-Nuaimi, the undersecretary of the Ministry of Education and Higher Education, addressed the ministry’s role in

Such examples demonstrate Qatar’s concerted efforts, led by the state and its leadership, to construct and promote a distinct Qatari national identity by carefully intertwining it with a selective interpretation of the past. However, the effectiveness of these projects among the local population remains uncertain, given the inherently complex and evolving nature of national identity as a concept and lived reality. The perpetual reimagining of the past underscores this complexity, highlighting the paradoxes between the traditional and the modern and the simultaneous pursuit of a unified identity alongside the emphasis on tribal identities. These dynamics accentuate the multiple layers within Qatar’s national identity, posing obstacles to the establishment of a cohesive national identity and civic belonging. The “inner domain" serves as both a canvas for the imagination of indigenous identity and a platform for the emergence of diverse and sometimes competing versions of national identity. Nevertheless, this intricate landscape of multi-layered identities offers the potential to cultivate a more adaptable and multifaceted sense of national belonging, a potential area for further research and exploration.