In the introduction to his study on Safavid and Italian sources concerning the reign of Shah Ismaʿil I (r. 1501–24), Jean Aubin observed that “les sources européennes occupant une place aussi importante que les chroniques persanes,” noting in particular that, among European materials, Italian sources “constituent l’essentiel des sources européennes.”Footnote 1 Although Aubin’s analysis focuses on the early Safavid period, his assessment of the centrality of Italian sources remains relevant for the subsequent decades and centuries of Safavid history, as Giorgio Rota underscores in the introduction to his monograph on Venetian knowledge of Persia.Footnote 2 The value of these sources becomes even more evident when considering the scarcity of surviving documentation from the Safavid administration—especially in contrast to the abundant records preserved by the Ottoman bureaucracy—as highlighted by Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont.Footnote 3
It is undeniable that Italian sources—alongside Portuguese ones—played a pivotal role in shaping European knowledge of the Safavid state during its formative years, whereas contributions from other European powers only began to emerge several decades later.Footnote 4 Typically, references to Italian documentation evoke the vast collections preserved in the Venetian and Vatican archives, which, for well-known historical and institutional reasons, remain the most substantial in both volume and richness of information on Persia.Footnote 5 However, other Italian archives also preserve a noteworthy corpus of materials related to Iran under the Safavids and have received comparatively less scholarly attention.
It is important to emphasize that neither Rome nor, above all, Venice were the only Italian states deeply invested in developments in the East. As the analysis of the selected documents in this study will demonstrate, other polities on the Italian peninsula also displayed a significant degree of interest in, and consequently a certain familiarity with, the “Orient,” including Persia.
However, for much of the sixteenth century, the vast majority of information on the latter was often intertwined with or mediated through Ottoman affairs. In fact, most Italian states lacked direct relations with the Safavids and tended to pay attention to Persia only insofar as its political or military developments impacted the Ottomans or, by extension, Europe.Footnote 6 Indeed, for instance, when the Ottomans were militarily engaged on the eastern front against the Safavids, this often presented an opportunity for Catholic powers to launch attacks from the West, hoping to exploit a temporary weakening of Ottoman defenses. Such opportunities were of interest not only to major powers like the King of Spain or the Holy Roman Emperor, but also to minor Italian rulers, whose troops frequently served in both Spanish and Austrian Habsburg campaigns against the Ottomans.
From a commercial standpoint, with the exception of Venice, none of these Italian states possessed the maritime infrastructure or mercantile capacity to establish direct trade with Persia—many were even landlocked. That said, it is not impossible that individual merchants from cities such as Mantua or Modena may have traded beyond the Levant. Moreover, the ruling dynasties of smaller Italian states—such as the Medici, Gonzaga, or Este—were often wealthy enough to acquire luxury goods and exotic objects from Persia, India, or even China, either for personal consumption or as part of their princely collections.
All of this—military interest or the desire for luxury goods—relied on the existence of extensive networks, particularly in the realms of information and diplomacy. These networks included a wide range of actors: informants, merchants, official diplomats, spies, Catholic missionaries, and even representatives of foreign powers.Footnote 7 It is important to emphasize that the limited size or political reach of these Italian states did not necessarily correspond to a weak diplomatic infrastructure. On the contrary, many of these states maintained remarkably broad and effective networks capable of channeling significant volumes of information back to their capitals. There, the respective secretariats of state systematically collected, organized, and archived the incoming reports for their ruling authorities.Footnote 8 The dispatches that arrived in Italy conveyed a wealth of often highly detailed intelligence and are generally referred to as avvisi—roughly translatable as “newsletters” or “notices.” The State Archives of Florence, to cite just one significant example, preserve thousands of such documents.Footnote 9
The level of detail found in the documents examined in this article is particularly striking—although they differ significantly in tone and purpose. The first (document 2 in the appendix) held at the State Archives of Florence, is an excerpt from a broader avviso sent from Constantinople, describing the complex situation in Persia following the death of Shah Ismaʿil II and the initial Ottoman troop movements toward Safavid borders—developments that would eventually lead to the outbreak of the 1578–90 war. Although not without inaccuracies, the document demonstrates the effectiveness of the Medici grand dukes’ intelligence network, which was capable of gathering nuanced information on both internal factional struggles within the Safavid state and the broader contours of Ottoman strategic planning. The second document (document 3 in the appendix), preserved in the State Archives of Mantua, is a report on the Battle of Sufiyan (November 6, 1605), in which Shah ʿAbbas I dealt a decisive blow to the Ottoman army led by former Grand Vizier Cığalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha. This report, although also containing minor inaccuracies and likely some rhetorical embellishment intended to magnify the scale of the Safavid victory, nonetheless offers a relatively detailed and credible account of the battle’s course. To these two texts, which form the core of the article, a third document (presented first in the article as well as the appendix as document 1) is added. Preserved in Florence, it concerns the list of gifts presented by the Safavid ambassador sent by Shah Tahmasb to Constantinople to congratulate Sultan Murad III on his accession to the throne.
The selected documents are examined within their historical context, and their content is compared with modern scholarly reconstructions of the events in question. This approach seeks to assess the accuracy of the information as it was recorded at the time. The texts have been translated into English with an effort to remain as literal as possible. In places in which a word-for-word rendering was hindered by the complexity of early modern Italian, the translation nonetheless remains faithful to both the original meaning and tone. The original texts are included in the appendix at the end of the article. As with the translations, the transcriptions have been produced with fidelity to the sources, with only minimal editorial intervention—limited to minor punctuation adjustments and the expansion of abbreviations to improve legibility.
Through the analysis of records concerning the Ottoman–Safavid wars, preserved in two lesser-known Italian archives, this article offers a renewed perspective on Italian knowledge of Safavid affairs beyond the well-established Venetian and Roman frameworks. As Giorgio Rota noted in 2009, there remains a pressing need for a comprehensive and systematic exploration of Italian sources on Persia.Footnote 10 This study aspires to serve as both a stimulus and a point of departure for further research into Italian archival materials that have to date attracted little attention within Iranian studies and the historiography of Safavid Iran.
Origin of the 1578–90 Ottoman–Safavid War (Florence)
In March 1601, a substantial Safavid embassy arrived at the Medici court, initiating what may be described as a diplomatic alliance that would endure until the eventual collapse of the Safavid state in 1722.Footnote 11 Dispatched by Shah ʿAbbas I, the embassy sought to establish a broad military coalition against the Ottoman Empire, the common adversary of both the Safavids and Christian Europe.Footnote 12
This encounter positioned Medici Tuscany as one of Persia’s key European partners and a significant hub for intelligence relating to the Levant and Persia.Footnote 13 However, news of Safavid Persia had reached Florence well before the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with Isfahan. The Safavid state was known in Tuscany from its foundation in 1501, although official contact was not established until the arrival of the aforementioned embassy. Nonetheless, it remained important for a Catholic power—even a relatively minor one like Medici Tuscany—to stay informed about major developments in Persia, given their potential implications for the broader European and Mediterranean theater of war. As noted, significant military engagements in the East against the Safavids could render the Ottoman Empire more vulnerable in the West, creating strategic openings for offensives with a reduced risk of Ottoman reaction and retaliation. This was largely due to the inherently demanding nature of campaigns in Persia, which—despite often resulting in Ottoman victories—tended to be prolonged, costly, and highly exhausting of both manpower and resources.
The 1578–90 Ottoman–Safavid War, in particular, marked a pivotal episode in the regional balance of power and imposed significant strain on Ottoman resources and military capacity. As a result, Catholic powers followed the conflict with great attention, and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany was no exception. The Medici maintained a far-reaching network of diplomatic and intelligence contacts across Europe and the Mediterranean, which ensured a steady flow of information to Florence. This extensive correspondence (now largely preserved in the State Archives of Florence) allowed the Tuscan government to closely monitor the progress of the war. Today, these archival sources offer historians valuable insights into the key developments of the Ottoman–Safavid conflict.
The war extended over a twelve-year period and, despite considerable challenges, culminated in a decisive Ottoman victory. The sultan succeeded in occupying all the western Safavid provinces, including the capital Tabriz and the territory of present-day Azerbaijan, thereby gaining strategic access to the Caspian Sea. The Safavid response—examined later in this study—would not emerge until more than a decade later. Although the overall course of the conflict is relatively well documented, albeit with the typical inaccuracies, distortions, and exaggerations that often characterize wartime reporting across eras, its initial phases and causes are more difficult to reconstruct in Italian archival sources. As Rudi Matthee explains, the war was triggered by “the Ottomans who, temporarily secure on the European front and tempted by the turmoil in Iran following the death of Shah Tahmasb I, hoped to bring a significant portion of the Caucasus under their control.”Footnote 14 Notably, the Tuscan report examined below recognized both the significance of the Caspian Sea in the Ottoman strategy and the internal instability in Persia, which the Ottomans effectively exploited.
In the period immediately preceding the outbreak of war, relations between the Ottomans and the Safavids appeared relatively stable. Following the conflict of 1532–55, won by the Ottomans, Shah Tahmasb I (r. 1524–76) adhered to the terms of the Treaty of Amasya and regularly dispatched embassies to Constantinople in an effort to preserve peaceful relations.Footnote 15 The final Safavid embassy arrived in the Ottoman capital to offer congratulations to Sultan Murad III (r. 1574–95) upon his accession to the throne, shortly before Tahmasb’s death on May 14, 1576. The ambassador was received with great ceremony, and a Tuscan report from Constantinople provides a detailed, day-by-day account of his arrival, including a comprehensive list of gifts presented to the sultan.Footnote 16 The authorship of such reports is often difficult to ascertain, as they were frequently composed by informants or spies who, due to the sensitive nature of their intelligence—particularly on military or diplomatic matters—remained anonymous. In fact, the report concerning the onset of the war itself takes the form of an unsigned message addressed to the Tuscan secretariat of state, which, despite the absence of a signature, likely knew the identity of the correspondent. Nonetheless, the level of detail provided concerning the Safavid embassy’s movements in Constantinople strongly suggests that the Tuscan informant was present on the ground and personally witnessed the events described. Below is the list of gifts sent by the shah to the sultan, as recorded by the Tuscan source.
[204r]
On the 13th [of May], the said ambassador greeted the Great Lord and presented him with gifts. First of all, 9 beautiful bejewelled books with magnificent covers that were books of the Qurʾan, another 9 books of the Qurʾan but smaller, another 63 books dealing with History, and then another 254 books concerning different subjects.Footnote 17 Twenty-seven bags of turquoise stones, three boxes of deer tears, 9 plumes of 300 heron feathers each, 3 boxes of very fine mumia, a very large field pavilion of 33 cords, very beautiful and richly decorated in the Persian style, with its dome admirably crafted, and the border bejewelled, beautiful and of great value, lined with crimson satin embroidered with gold and silver [threads], with its [central] column decorated with azure and gold and bejewelled.Footnote 18 The umbrella in front of the entrance is beautiful and all embroidered with precious stones of great value.
[204v]
The whole thing was of such a size that it required 8 carriages for transportation, and it is reported to have taken several years to complete the refinement process. Then, 9 beautiful long-pile silk carpets, as well as velvet of different colors, and decorations in the Persian style. Another 34 carpets of different types, they also in the Persian style, beautiful and fine, eight of length 20 [unit measure missing] and two others very large, two in the Persian style of length 30 each. Then 14 small fine carpets of silk and gold, five others of camel wool without gold, ten most excellent fine felts, 50 large rugs of musk camel with beautiful designs of decorations of various colours, which [the Persians] use as carpets. In addition, besides these gifts which he had presented [to the sultan] on behalf of the King, the same ambassador presented him with the following goods: a beautiful book of the Qurʾan, a 72-carat deer tear, four Persian-style silk carpets, three sea ox tails, 9 damask sword blades, 9 Persian bows, 9 pieces of a fine cloth of theirs, and 9 more of the finest and most beautiful cotton.Footnote 19
It is noteworthy that the majority of the gifts presented to the Ottoman sultan were arranged in groups of nine—a practice rooted in ancient Turkic tradition that was regarded as a tangible expression of the donor’s goodwill and amicable intentions.Footnote 20
As previously mentioned, Shah Tahmasb I died while his ambassador was still presenting gifts to Sultan Murad III, and his passing plunged Persia into turmoil. Although he had managed to maintain relative stability throughout his reign, his later years witnessed the growing influence of the Kizilbash tribal factions. Upon his death, a power struggle ensued, ultimately resulting in the accession of his son, Ismaʿil Mirza, who assumed the throne as Shah Ismaʿil II (r. 1576–77). Having spent nearly two decades imprisoned during his father’s rule, Ismaʿil II emerged deeply mistrustful and unstable. His brief reign was characterized by terror driven by paranoia and perhaps affected by long-term drug use during his captivity, he ordered the execution of numerous brothers and perceived rivals, including prominent figures from his father’s administration.Footnote 21 This brutal purge, effectively an internal civil conflict, was welcomed by the Ottomans, as it diminished the likelihood of any immediate threat from Persia. In addition, possibly as a reaction against the Shiʿi orthodoxy championed by his father and the Kizilbash, Ismaʿil II made attempts to reintroduce Sunni Islam.Footnote 22 Under these circumstances, his assassination in November 1577—almost certainly orchestrated by his powerful sister Pari Khan Khanum (ca. 1548–78)—appears to have been all but inevitable.Footnote 23 Following his death, a new succession crisis emerged among the leading Kizilbash factions, each supporting different claimants. The late shah’s own son was still an infant, and his nephew, Sultan Hamza Mirza, was only eleven years old. Through the political maneuvering of Pari Khan Khanum, a consensus was reached around Mohammad Khodabandeh (r. 1578–87), Ismaʿil II’s brother and one of the few male family members to have survived the purge. However, the new shah proved largely detached from the responsibilities of rule. As Hans Roemer noted, Hamza Mirza was “described more than once as a reigning monarch in the list of Safavid rulers—a position which in reality he never held.”Footnote 24
This tumultuous period paved the way for the Ottoman invasion of the western provinces of Safavid Persia, ultimately culminating in the war of 1578–90. As previously noted, the origins of the conflict lay in the Ottoman desire to exploit a moment of relative calm on the western front following the Treaty of Adrianople in 1568, in conjunction with the internal instability that gripped the Safavid state after the death of Shah Ismaʿil II. Within this context, the following document assumes particular importance. To the best of our knowledge, it is one of the very few Tuscan (and possibly even Italian) records that addresses the internal situation of Safavid Persia in the immediate lead-up to the war. It is especially noteworthy for providing a strikingly precise account of the interregnum between the death of Shah Ismaʿil II and the enthronement of Shah Mohammad Khodabandeh. Before presenting the English translation of the document, it is therefore useful to offer a brief analysis of its content, evaluating both its accurate elements and its discrepancies in light of current historiographical understanding.
The extract opens by announcing the outbreak of the Persian war and names the two principal Ottoman commanders appointed by the sultan to lead the invasion from different fronts: Cığalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha (c. 1545–1605), advancing from Baghdad, and Lala Mustafa Pasha (c. 1500–80), marching from Erzurum. The text features a notably accurate enumeration of the provincial armies that accompanied each commander—an account that broadly aligns with the list reported by Rudi Matthee.Footnote 25 According to the Florentine report, Lala Mustafa Pasha was to move toward Shirvan with the objective of occupying it, thereby securing direct access to the Caspian Sea. The author’s reflections are particularly compelling, revealing a sophisticated grasp of the geopolitical importance of Shirvan within the broader Ottoman strategy. The emphasis on gaining access to the Caspian Sea illustrates the informant’s understanding of the wider strategic aims and implications of the campaign. This not only highlights the informed and perceptive nature of the report but also provides valuable historical insights into the geopolitical calculations underpinning the Ottoman expansion. Indeed, hostilities formally commenced with the Battle of Çıldır on August 9, 1578, followed by Lala Mustafa Pasha’s advance into Shirvan from Erzurum.Footnote 26
The description of Persia’s internal unrest in the report is particularly revealing. It confirms the death of Shah Ismaʿil II—significant in itself, as earlier dispatches had cast doubt on this news, suggesting it might have been Ottoman misinformation aimed at facilitating truce negotiations with the Habsburgs in the Balkans. The report notes that Persia was being governed by a woman—clearly a reference to Pari Khan Khanum—and that a new monarch, identified as a sixteen-year-old nephew of the late shah, was expected to arrive in the capital for his coronation. This likely refers to Sultan Hamza Mirza, despite the inaccuracy regarding his age—he was, in fact, only eleven. Notably, Shah Mohammad Khodabandeh is absent from the account, indicating that at the time the report was compiled no consensus had yet been reached by Pari Khan Khanum and the Kizilbash on his selection as the new ruler. Furthermore, the report records the arrival in Constantinople of a member of Shah Ismaʿil II’s retinue, bearing important intelligence. The man claimed he had fled because he was Sunni—like the deceased shah—who had reportedly executed many nobles during his reign for adhering to Shiʿism, referred to in the report as “the Persian religion,” a term often used in Western sources of the time. This individual may well have been Mirza Makhdum Sharifi, a prominent Sunni statesman who defected to the Ottomans following Ismaʿil II’s death.Footnote 27
The report provides valuable insights into the internal unrest afflicting Safavid Persia, then caught in a power struggle between two leading Kizilbash Turkmen factions: the Ustajlus and the Takkelus. The information presented is generally reliable and corresponds closely to known historical facts, particularly as outlined by Hans Roemer.Footnote 28 According to the text, the Ustajlus (referred to as the Ostagalli) claimed descent from the renowned Uzun Hasan (1423–78), were based primarily in Shirvan, and are described as Sunni. The Takkelus (Tecali), by contrast, were Shiʿa, and their name is said to derive from the castle of Teke in the Anatolian region of Karaman. Although the attribution of Sunni affiliation to the Ustajlus is historically inaccurate, the overall depiction of the two factions is broadly correct.Footnote 29 The report also describes a battle between these rival groups, with the Ustajlu emerging as the victors. This internal factionalism, coupled with the de facto rule of Pari Khan Khanum, is reported to have triggered widespread unrest among Safavid border lords, particularly Kurdish chieftains, who subsequently defected to the Ottoman side. Believing the moment ripe for conquest, they are said to have invited the sultan to invade Persia.
English Translation of the Report about the Beginning of the 1578–90 War
The following text is an excerpt from a longer, anonymous report that compiles information on various topics. It appears to be a chronological arrangement of multiple dispatches prepared for the Tuscan secretariat of state. The report, entitled News from Constantinople (“Nuove di Gostantinopoli” [sic]), is dated 12 February. Although the year is not specified, its date can be reasonably inferred from its content. It mentions the start of Ottoman military preparations (in the second quarter of 1578), and the confirmed death of Shah Ismaʿil II (in November 1577). Considering the time needed to gather and verify news from the unstable situation in Persia, the report likely dates to early 1579. In the English translation that follows, personal and place names have been left in their original form unless they correspond directly to names still in use today (e.g., Aleppo, Damascus). The original Italian orthography has been preserved in the transcription provided in the appendix (document 2).
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The Persian war goes on. In these days, as written in another report, it was ordered to Sinan Pasha, who was at the Goletta, and to Mustafa Pasha, who was in Cyprus, that they should prepare themselves to go to those borders [of Persia], the one to Bagadet, that is, Babylonia, and together with its Beylerbey, the one of Maras, the one of Serisol, the one of Basra, and other Sanjaks, to make war on Persia on that side; and Mustafa Pasha to Erzurum, together with its Beylerbey, the one
[215r]
of Sivas, the one of Vora, the one of Caraemit, the one of Aleppo, and the one of Damascus, to make war on that side to conquer Serum, which is on the Caspian Sea, because then [from there] they could plan great projects.Footnote 30 After the last dispatch, which was on the 27th of [the] past [month], there came from Persia the confirmation of the death of King Ismail Sophy, and that a sister of his was ruling while waiting for his nephew of sixteen years of age, who was expected to arrive from CornazzanFootnote 31 very [page ruined, proposed reading:] far away. A scribe of the dead king’s chancellor came [to Constantinople], who fled Persia and says that when he left, the said nephew had not yet arrived. This scribe practices the religion of the Turks, as did the dead King Ismail, who had many Sipahi barons, and other lords of the court killed because they instead observed the Persian religion, [regarded] as a heresy by the Turks, just as was observed by Tahmasb, father of the aforementioned dead Ismail.Footnote 32 Now Persia finds itself divided into two factions: one which is supported by the Turks, and which descends from the famous Uzun Hasan, has its center in the Shirvan region bordering the Caspian Sea and [its members] name themselves Ostagalli.Footnote 33 The other [faction] derives from Tecalla, [and its members] call themselves Tecali from the name of a castle called Tecali located in Karaman, and they profess the true Persian religion. These two factions are said to have clashed in battle after the death of King Ismail, and Uzun Hasan’s faction, called Ostagalli, emerged victorious. Because there are this division and discord, and the kingdom is ruled by a woman, the border Beylerbey, the Sanjaks, and other Kurdish and Persian lords, who have passed over to the side of the Turks, have petitioned, here at the Porte, the Great Turk, that this opportunity to be able to easily conquer Persia should not be lost.Footnote 34
This report, with its detailed understanding of Persia’s internal affairs, clearly served as a reliable source of intelligence. It also underscores the existence of a well-developed information network available to the Medici grand dukes, already in place decades before the establishment of direct relations between the Medici and the Safavids.
The Battle of Sufiyan, 1605 (Mantua)
Rooted in the medieval Italian communal period, the Signoria of Mantua was elevated to a duchy by Emperor Charles V (r. 1519–56). The Gonzaga dynasty, which rose to power in the first half of the fourteenth century, ruled the city until the early eighteenth century. Under them, the Mantuan court became one of the most vibrant and culturally sophisticated among the Italian states of the Renaissance, rivaling in many respects the more famous—and historiographically more fortunate—Medici court of Florence. Thanks to the vitality of the Gonzaga, Mantua became one of the most important states in early modern Italy and, despite being small and landlocked, developed strong interests and connections with the East, particularly with the Ottoman world. Indeed, like many other small Italian states, Mantua maintained regular relations with the sultans of Constantinople, negotiating trade agreements, acquiring exotic goods, and exchanging precious gifts.Footnote 35
Although the Ottoman Empire was officially regarded as the greatest threat to Christian Europe, every Italian ruling dynasty aspired to be recognized by the sultan, obtain permission to trade within his empire, and maintain a diplomatic representative at his court.Footnote 36 However, this situation changed in the sixteenth century when Emperor Charles V formally granted them rule over their cities, elevating these states from republics, signories, or marquisates to duchies, thereby binding them to the Habsburg imperial crown. As feudatories of the Holy Roman Emperor—who was deeply engaged in the defense of Christendom and Europe against the infidel Ottomans—the Gonzaga, like other Italian dynasties, were obliged to participate in Habsburg anti-Ottoman campaigns in Hungary, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean, by providing military contingents to serve aboard allied ships. The peak of Mantuan military engagement was reached between the naval battle of Lepanto (October 7, 1571) and the early decades of the seventeenth century. During this period, Mantuan troops under Duke Vincenzo I (r. 1587–1612) took part in at least three military campaigns in Hungary, following the Holy Roman Emperor. At the same time, the duke even harbored ambitions of becoming king of certain regions in Greece that he hoped to liberate from Ottoman rule.Footnote 37
In this broader context, Persia may appear largely absent. However, as in Medici Tuscany, news of Persian affairs did reach Mantua—most often in relation to its conflicts with the Ottoman Empire. Established in the early 1530s, around the same time as the Duchy of Florence (which later became the Grand Duchy of Tuscany), the Duchy of Mantua also showed a consistent interest in developments in the East.Footnote 38 It relied on a far-reaching network across the Mediterranean and the Levant, primarily composed of merchants, who regularly kept the court informed about the Orient, including events in Persia. Moreover, in the early seventeenth century, Mantua became a regular stop for Safavid envoys on their way to Rome, making it an ideal place to gather information about Persia and the shahs. This was due not only to its geographical position but also to its inadvertent role in shaping Euro–Safavid relations at the dawn of the seventeenth century.
Indeed, in 1597, a friar named Giovanni Battista Ruffini, confessor to Duke Vincenzo I, returned to Mantua following an extended journey through the Levant.Footnote 39 During his travels, he undertook a pilgrimage to Jerusalem and visited several cities in the region, including Aleppo, where he met a Syrian dragoman named Fathullah Qurray—better known to historians as Michel Angelo Corai.Footnote 40 Corai had previously served as secretary to Cığalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha, the leading Ottoman commander during the Ottoman–Safavid war of 1578–90. After converting to Catholicism—possibly to marry a Christian woman—he faced persecution and eventually fled Syria. He followed Friar Ruffini back to Mantua, where he entered the service of Duke Vincenzo I, serving him as a dragoman during one of his military campaigns against the Ottomans in Hungary between 1597 and 1598.
After his service, in 1598 Corai traveled to Venice, where he encountered the English adventurer Anthony Sherley (ca. 1565–1635), the man who would be chosen as ambassador by Shah ʿAbbas I only one year later. The precise nature of their meeting remains somewhat obscure, but the two departed for Persia together, with a group of European veterans and the younger brother of Anthony, Robert (ca. 1581–1628), another key figure in the history of Euro–Safavid diplomacy.Footnote 41 Corai proved instrumental, serving as both guide and interpreter for the Englishmen, and may even have influenced Sherley’s decision to undertake the journey. Upon their arrival at the Safavid court, Shah ʿAbbas I received them favourably and entrusted both men with diplomatic missions to Europe. Following his appointment, Corai returned to Europe and visited Mantua multiple times—as the Sherley brothers did in the following years. He later entered the service of Grand Duke Ferdinando I of Tuscany (r. 1587–1609), becoming one of his key diplomats in the Levant and an unofficial Medici envoy at the court of Shah ʿAbbas I, where he resided between 1608 and 1612. In light of this, it is worth considering whether, without Mantua and Corai, the Sherleys ever would have undertaken their journey to Persia—or, if they had, whether it would have taken a different course. That journey went on to shape early seventeenth-century Euro–Persian relations and played a significant role in forming the European imagination of Persia during the early modern period.
Safavid diplomats traveling through Italy turned the city into a hub where information about Persia arrived and circulated—even in the absence of direct diplomatic relations with the Safavid court. The flow of news from Persia and the broader East also was driven by the curiosity of the Gonzaga dukes, who were eager to learn about events beyond Europe. Traces of this interest in collecting knowledge can still be found in the numerous documents preserved in the State Archives of Mantua.Footnote 42
In this context, it is unsurprising that news of major Ottoman–Persian events reached Mantua, as confirmed by several archival sources. Among them is a report on the Battle of Sufiyan, fought on November 6, 1605—one of Shah ʿAbbas I’s most significant victories over the Ottomans and a major triumph for the Safavid dynasty.Footnote 43 According to Colin Imber, “the battle of Sufiyan was a greater disaster [for the Ottomans] than anything they had experienced in Hungary.”Footnote 44 The outcome marked a turning point in Shah ʿAbbas’ campaign to reclaim the provinces lost during the 1578–90 war. An anonymous manuscript account of the battle, preserved in the Archivio Gonzaga within the Levant collection, testifies to the circulation of this news in Mantua.
In September 1603, taking advantage of a rebellion by a Kurdish border emir and a period of internal instability within the Ottoman Empire—then contending with unrest across several provinces—Shah ʿAbbas I launched an offensive on the Tabriz region. By June 1604, he had successfully recaptured Tabriz, Nakhichevan, Yerevan, and their surrounding territories. In response, Sultan Ahmed I (r. 1603–17) dispatched Cığalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha to confront the shah. The decisive engagement between the Ottoman and Safavid forces took place in late autumn 1605 near Sufiyan, not far from Tabriz.
It seems that neither commander initially intended to fight a pitched battle.Footnote 45 Shah ʿAbbas I, commanding around 60,000 troops against an estimated 100,000 Ottomans, had instructed his officers to proceed with caution. Nonetheless, anticipating the possibility of conflict, he prepared his army for battle. As the two forces neared one another at Sufiyan, the Safavid vanguard came into view, prompting the Ottomans to launch a large-scale assault. In accordance with the shah’s orders, the vanguard withdrew without engaging. The Ottomans, mistaking this retreat for weakness, pursued them.Footnote 46 Shah ʿAbbas I responded swiftly by dispatching reinforcements, and observing the poor defense of the Ottoman camp ordered a diversionary attack on it. This tactic caused significant disruption: many Ottoman soldiers abandoned the offensive to return to the camp, which threw their lines into confusion. Trapped between the newly reinforced Safavid vanguard and the diversionary force, the Ottoman troops suffered heavy losses. Only a few commanders managed to retreat; many were either killed or taken prisoner.Footnote 47 The battle on November 6 therefore concluded with a clear Safavid advantage. That night, numerous Kurdish lords and their contingents—about 12,000 men—deserted the Ottoman army. On the following day, Sinan Pasha remained in the camp, attempting to bolster his troops’ morale while awaiting reinforcements that were reportedly en route. However, according to the Ottoman historian İbrahim Peçevi (1572–1650), panic spread, fueled by rumors of the approaching Kizilbash cavalry and apparent attempts by Sinan Pasha and other senior commanders to flee in secret.Footnote 48 This resulted in a chaotic Ottoman retreat. Upon receiving reports of widespread flight within the enemy ranks, Shah ʿAbbas I dispatched his troops to the Ottoman camp, which they found almost entirely abandoned, enabling them to seize an exceptionally rich booty. The Safavid chronicler Iskandar Beg Munshi (c. 1561/2–1633/4) recounts broadly the same sequence of events, although he notes that rumors of the approaching Kizilbash began circulating around midnight between November 7 and 8. The following day, November 8, upon receiving confirmation of the Ottoman retreat, Shah ʿAbbas I dispatched his troops to the Ottoman camp.Footnote 49 The outcome was a resounding Safavid victory. Even İbrahim Peçevi acknowledged the magnitude of the defeat, remarking that the Ottomans had never experienced such a calamity. In Europe, the only event seen as comparable was the crushing Ottoman loss to Tamerlane at the Battle of Ankara in 1402. Cığalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha died shortly after during his retreat.
The far-reaching consequences of the Battle of Sufiyan are undeniable. Shah ʿAbbas I retained control over all the territories he had reconquered since September 1603. Meanwhile, the Ottoman commander, Cığalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha, withdrew to Van, where he met the governor of Aleppo, Canbuladoğlu Hüseyn Pasha (d. 1605), who had failed to join the army in time for the battle. Sinan Pasha blamed Hüseyn Pasha for the defeat at Sufiyan and ordered his execution. This act became the catalyst for a rebellion: Canbuladoğlu Hüseyn Pasha’s nephew, Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha (d. 1610), subsequently rose up against Ottoman authority.Footnote 50 Cığalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha himself died a few weeks later in Diyarbakir during his retreat.
Just as the Florentine document on the causes of the 1578–90 war illustrates, the analysis of the Mantuan report on the Battle of Sufiyan likewise highlights the level of detail in Italian knowledge of events concerning the Safavids. The geographical setting of the battlefield is clearly recognizable, even though no specific name is mentioned. Regarding the course of the combat, the report states that Shah ʿAbbas I set out with 40,000 men to confront Sinan Pasha, who reportedly commanded at least 80,000 troops. The shah ordered several attacks intended to confuse the enemy, and by the end of the day his forces had killed a large number of Ottoman soldiers and commanders. The following day marked the main battle, during which Shah ʿAbbas I is said to have declared that he would either lose his kingdom or conquer that of the sultan. By the day’s end, his troops had decimated the Ottoman forces and inflicted significant losses among their leadership. Sinan Pasha, realizing the scale of the defeat and learning that the shah was advancing with 12,000 men to launch a final assault on the Ottoman camp, fled with the remaining commanders and some 12,000 soldiers. Moreover, a servant of the shah who had been captured by the Ottomans reportedly exaggerated the strength of the Safavid army, further unsettling Sinan Pasha. Safavid spies informed Shah ʿAbbas that the Ottoman camp had been abandoned, prompting him to send his men in pursuit of the fleeing enemy, leading to a devastating rout. Overcome with shame, Sinan Pasha is said to have taken poison during the retreat and died.
When compared with modern reconstructions, the Mantuan report proves to be fairly accurate, despite a number of minor discrepancies that merit attention. The report likely overstates Shah ʿAbbas I’s eagerness to engage in battle. Although the text suggests that the shah was determined to risk everything in a single confrontation, it is more plausible that he sought to avoid such a high-stakes encounter unless necessary. The estimated size of the opposing armies is slightly lower in the Mantuan account, yet the reported numerical difference—approximately 40,000 men—corresponds to that found in other sources. The reference to Safavid attacks intended to confuse the Ottomans may allude to the feigned withdrawal of the Safavid vanguard, which the Ottomans misinterpreted as a sign of weakness. Similarly, the attacks on the Ottoman camp seem to reflect the shah’s strategy of surrounding and disorienting the enemy. It is not entirely clear whether the “true” battle refers to the clash of the first or the second day, although this ambiguity appears secondary to the report’s overall narrative. In any case, the chronology provided—spanning more than one day—aligns with the broader course of the conflict. The report also accurately conveys the sense of panic caused by rumors of the shah’s advance on the Ottoman camp. However, the episode involving a captured Safavid servant who allegedly exaggerated the shah’s strength to instill fear seems to be a literary embellishment rather than a factual account. The retreat of Sinan Pasha is indeed historically attested, although contrary to the report’s suggestion it was not carried out in secrecy. The figure of 12,000 men said to have fled with him may reflect the number of Kurdish troops who deserted the Ottoman side during the night. Finally, although Sinan Pasha did die during his retreat, there is no reliable evidence to confirm the claim that he took his own life by poison.
English Translation of a Report on Shah Abbas I’s Victory at Sufiyan, 1605
The text is an anonymous and undated one-page account of the Battle of Sufiyan, presented on both the recto and reverse sides. The pages are not numbered, so the front and back have simply been indicated. The original text is in the appendix (document 3).
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Report on how the King of Persia defeated the Cicala.
Near Tabriz is a very spacious plain in which the King had already defeated the Pasha of Tabriz. To this place Cigala arrived with his army of 80,000 soldiers. The Persian, who was in Tabriz at that time, came out with his [army] of 40,000 good soldiers and prepared [for the clash]. After summoning his council, he ordered four of his captains with their men to attack the Turkish army from different sides. They executed the order and fought very bravely that day, and on both sides there were many losses, and on their return these captains informed the King that the Turkish army was very strong. Immediately, the King ordered his general and other captains to get ready together with their soldiers to attack Cicala’s camp on the following day from different sides, because the Persian King intended to confuse and divide the said [Turkish] army, [an order] which [the Persian commanders] immediately obeyed and fought vigorously for most of the day, killing many Turks and losing few Persians. Hearing this, the King, with 12,000 of his good soldiers and all the rest of his camp, prepared to go into battle himself the next day to fight the final battle against the Cicala, saying that on that day he would either lose his kingdom or conquer the Turks, and that he hoped God would help him. As the day arrived and everything was ready, the last battle was fought, which lasted all day and in which many Turks died, including several Pashas and important dignitaries.
In the evening, when the battle was over, the Cicala, saw the great ruin of his camp and that the Persian did not retreat, and indeed, his spies said that the Persian wanted to return the next day to fight another
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battle. Moreover, the said Cicala had taken as a prisoner one of the favored servants of the King of Persia, from whom he learned through torture that it was not the King who fought in the field that day but only his general (which was a lie) and that the next day it would be the King who would fight with 18,000 fresh soldiers. And because the footman persisted with this story until his death, so great was the fear of the Cicala and his principal commanders of being taken prisoner by the Persian, to their and the Great Turk’s great shame, that they decided among themselves, pretending to prepare to attack the Persian, to flee with 12,000 of their best soldiers, with good horses, and to abandon the camp.
It was not long before the Persian was warned of this by his spies, as well as the Turks themselves, that the Cicala had fled together with the principal captains and best soldiers and that therefore the camp was left without a chief, and the King immediately ordered that, except for his personal guard, the general and all others pursue the Cicala. And they did so, reaching them and cutting everyone to pieces except the Cicala who managed to escape with five hundred [men] to a town that was nearby in which, thinking of his disgrace and the ruin of the Turkish camp, as well as fearing that the Great Turk would have his head cut off dishonoring him, he poisoned himself and died miserably. And the Persians, first thanking God for the victory as great as unexpected, gained courage to continue the war, seeing that both God and Fortune favored him.Footnote 51
Conclusions
Through the publication and analysis of this brief selection of documents, the article has sought to demonstrate the potential value—and, at the very least, the interest—of further research in Italian archives for the field of Safavid studies. Whereas the inventory of gifts was presented chiefly with reference to ongoing scholarship on material culture and diplomatic exchange—most notably Sinem Arcak Casale’s recent and excellent contribution —the accompanying documents also offer meaningful insights into early modern knowledge of Safavid Persia.Footnote 52
The first document, from Florence, reveals an impressive degree of familiarity with the internal dynamics of Safavid Persia during a pivotal interregnum. As discussed, it provides an almost immediate account of the political developments following the death of Shah Ismaʿil II in November 1577, culminating in the accession of Shah Mohammad Khodabandeh and the outbreak of the Ottoman–Safavid war in early 1578. Although it remains unclear how widely such intelligence circulated beyond the secretariat of state and the Tuscan court, there is evidence that this type of information was sometimes disseminated more broadly, including through print. It is therefore plausible that the audience for these reports—and the understanding of Persian affairs within Italian political circles—was more substantial than traditionally assumed. Even if Tuscan officials probably did not fully grasp the intricacies of Kizilbash factional politics or tribal affiliations such as the Ustajlus and Takkelus, the document suggests a working knowledge of the broader military and political structures underpinning Safavid rule. This, in turn, speaks to the effectiveness of the Medici intelligence network, which managed to gather relatively nuanced information about a region located well beyond the Ottoman frontiers—possibly with assistance from Venetian intermediaries. Regardless of the precise routes, the evidence points to a surprisingly robust Tuscan awareness of Safavid developments.
A similar conclusion may be drawn in the case of Mantua. Although this special issue is primarily concerned with the Ottoman–Safavid Wars, the Mantuan report examined here belongs to a larger archival series devoted to Levantine and Eastern affairs more broadly. Although the majority of this material focuses on the Ottoman world, references to Safavid Persia are frequent and often substantial. Despite being a landlocked and comparatively minor principality, lacking the maritime reach of Tuscany or Venice, the Gonzaga court demonstrated both a keen interest in the Eastern Mediterranean and an ability to obtain reliable information on Persian matters. The report on the Battle of Sufiyan—although referring to a major Ottoman defeat that may have circulated widely—nonetheless shows the depth of knowledge available at the Mantuan court.
In this regard, the archives of Mantua should be approached not as marginal but as meaningful repositories of knowledge on early modern Iran. If recent scholarship has begun to reposition Medici Tuscany as a kind of “second Venice” in the historiography of East–West exchanges, the same invitation must be extended to other archival centers across the Italian peninsula—such as Ferrara, Modena, Parma, and Lucca. The documents preserved in their archives and collections, even when indirect or mediated, contribute to a richer understanding of how Safavid Iran was perceived and conceptualized in Renaissance and early modern Europe.
Appendix
Document 1
Archivio di Stato di Firenze, Mediceo del Principato, vol. 4277, f. 204 r–v.
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Alli 13 detto il suddetto ambasciatore salutò il Gran Signore et gli fece il presente, che fu prima 9 libri bellissimi con magnifica coperta gioiellati cioè libri del Arcorano, 9 altri pur del Arcorano ma più piccoli; Altri 63 libri che trattano d’Historie. Poi 254 altri libri che trattano de diverse cose. 27 borse di rocca de turchese. 3 bussoli di lagrime curvi. 9 pennaggi di penne d’argirono de 300 penne l’uno, 3 scattole di mumia finissima, un grandissimo padiglione da campo di corde 33 molto eccellente, et riccamente lavorato alla giamesca, con il suo capello di sopra di mirabilissimo lavoro, et il turno gioiellato, bello, et di gran valuta fodrato di raso cremesile, et recamato d’oro & argento, con la sua collonna lavorata di azzuro, et d’oro gioiellata. Ha la sua ombrella che stà avanti la porta bellissima tutta recamata di pietre meravigliose
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et di gran valore, et di tal grandezza che vi erano 8 carri a condurlo, et dicono che sie statto molti anni à fornirlo. Poi 9 tapeti di seta bellissimi co’l pelo longo come veluto de diversi colori, lavori agiameschi. Altri 34 tapeti de diverse sorti pur giameschi bellissimi et fini di lunghezza otto in 20, et doi altri molto grandi, doi agiameschi di lunghezza 30 l’uno. Poi 14 tapeti piccoli di seta e oro finissimi, cinque altri senza oro di lana fina di camello, dieci eccellentissimi feltri finissimi, 50 tapelle di camelli muschiati con bellissimi dissegni de lavori de diversi colori grandi, quali adoprano come tapeti, et oltre questo presente che ha fatto à nome del Re, esso Ambasciatore presentò come lui le robbe infrascritte.
Un libro bellissimo dell’Arcorano, una lagrima cervi de caratti 72, quattro tapeti di seta giameschi, tre code di bove marino, 9 lame di spade damaschine, 9 archi persiani, 9 pezze di alcuna loro fina tela, et 9 altre di cottonina finissimi et bellissimi.
Document 2
Archivio di Stato di Firenze, Mediceo del Principato, vol. 4277, ff. 214v–215r.
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La guerra di Persia va avanti; A questi giorni, come per altra si è scritto, fu ordinato a Sinan Bascià, che fu alla Golettta, e a Mustafa Bascià, che fu in Cipro, che si mettessono in ordine per andare a quelli confini l’uno in Bagadet, cioè Babillonia, et con quel Bellerbei, et quel de Maras, e quel de Serisol, et quel di Bassara, et altri Sangiachi per fare la guerra alla Persia da quella parte; e Mustafa Bascià per Arzeron, e con quel Bellerbei, e quel
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di Sivas, e di Vora, e di Caraemit, e quel di Aleppo, e quel di Damasco far la guerra da quella banda per acquistare Serum, che è al Mare Caspio, perché poi farebbero gran disegni. Doppo l’ultim’avviso, che fu alli xxvii del passato venne nuova di Persia con la confermatione della morte del Re Ismael Sophi, e che una sua sorella governava aspettando che giungesse un suo nepote di sedici anni, che si aspettava da Cornazzan molto [page ruined, proposed reading:] discosto. È venuto uno scrivano del cancelliere del Re morto, quale è fuggito di Persia et dice che al suo partire non era ancora giunto il nipote suddetto, questo scrivano osserva la religione de’ Turchi, come osservava il morto Re Ismael il quale fece morire molti baroni Spai, et altri signori della corte, perché osservavano la religione persiana appresso de Turchi heretica, e così la osservava Tamas padre del prefato Ismael morto. Hora essendo la Persia divisa in due parti, l’una, la quale è approvata da’ Turchi, et è quella, che deriva dal famoso Ussum Cassam sta nella regione di Servam confine con il Mare Caspio, e si nominano Ostagalli. L’altra deriva da quel Tecalla, che si dicono Tecali dal nome di un castello nominato Tecali in Caramania, e questi sono della vera religione persiana. Queste due parti si dice che hanno fatto giornata insieme doppo la morte del Re Ismael, e che la banda de Ussum Cassam detta Ostagalli è restata con vittoria. Però essendo questa divisione, e discordia governando il Regno una donna, quelli Bellerbei de confini, e Sangiachi, et altri signorotti Curdi, e Persiani ritiratisi dalla parte de Turchi hanno fatto instantia qui alla Porta al Gran Turco, che non si perda questa occasione di potere acquistare facilmente la Persia.
Document 3
Archivio di Stato di Mantova, Archivio Gonzaga, 796, pages not numbered.
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Rellatione come il Re di Persia ha datto la rotta al Cicala.
Appresso Tauris stà una campagna molto spatiosa dove già il Re haveva dato la rotta al Bassià di Tauris. In questo luoco venne il Cigala col suo essercito de 80/m soldati. Il Persiano che all’hora stava in Tauris uscì fuora con il suo de quaranta mila buoni soldati et si mese in ordine. Et fatto il suo consiglio, ordinò a quatro suoi capitani che per diverse parte con le sue gente assaltassero a l’essercito turchesco, i quali essequendo il comandamento combaterono fortemente quel giorno, e dal una et altra parte morirono assai. Tornando questi capitani diedero raguaglio al Re come l’essercito turchesco era assai forte. Subito comandò il Re al suo generale et ad altri capitani, che si metessero in ordine con la sua soldatesca per il giorno seguente per assaltar per diverse parti il campo del Cicala, perché il Re persiano procurava disordinar detto essercito, i quali medesimamente ubedirno e combaterono galiardamente quasi tutto il giorno con grandissima occisione de turchi e di pochi persiani. Sentendo questo il Re, con dodici mila suoi buoni soldati, e tutto il resto del suo campo si messero in ordine per il seguente giorno lui stesso in persona dar l’ultima battaglia al Cicala, dicendo che in quel giorno o voleva perdere il suo regno, o voleva conquistar quel del Turcho, e che sperava in Dio che l’aggiutaria. Venendo il giorno et sendo ogni cosa in ordine dedero l’ultima battaglia che durò tutto il giorno con gran perditta delli Turchi fra quali erano alcuni Bassià e personaggi grandi.
La sera finita la battaglia vedendo il Cicala la gran ruina del suo campo e che il Persiano non se ritirava, ansi le sue spie dicevano, che il Persiano il giorno seguente voleva tornar a dar un’altra ba-
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-taglia, e di più detto Cicala pigliando priggionero un camariero favoritto del Re di Persia, dal qual seppe per via di tormenti che quel giorno il Re non gli haveva dato la battaglia, ma solamente il generale (il che era bugia) e che il giorno seguente la daria il Re in persona con dici otto mila freschi soldati, e perseverando detto camariero in questo sino alla morte, fu tanta la paura del Cicala e delli suoi grandi capitani di non essere pigliati priggionieri del Persiano con loro gran vergogna, e del Gran Turcho, si risolsero fra loro, fingendo di voler andar a dar un assalto al Persiano, fugirono con dodeci mila soldati suoi favoriti con buoni cavali, abbandonando il campo.
Non passò molto tempo che il Persiano fu avisato così dalle suoi spie, come de li stessi turchi come il Cicala con li suoi capitani principali e soldati favoriti erano scampati e il campo era restato senza capo. Ordinò subito il Re dalla sua guardia in poi che il generale con tutti li altri seguitassero il Cicala, i quali fecero così, e giungendo a loro gli tagliono tutt’appezzo eccetto che detto Cicala, quale scampò con cinquecento a una città che era appresso, il quale pensando alla sua disgratia e ruina del campo turchescho, e vergogna del Gran Turcho, e anco temendo che detto Gran Turcho non gli facesse tagliar la testa con suo dishonore si avelenò e morì miserabilmente. Et il Persiano ringraziando prima Dio di tanto grande e inaspettata vittoria pigliò grandissimo coraggio de continuare la guerra, vedendo che Dio e la Fortuna lo favoriva.
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