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Regional Military Bases in Western Zhou Geopolitical Strategy: The Case of the Qi Garrison

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 April 2026

Christopher F. Kim Open the ORCID record for Christopher F. Kim [Opens in a new window]
Christopher F. Kim*
Affiliation:
Institute for the Study of the Ancient World, New York University , United States
*
Email: chriskim@nyu.edu
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Abstract

This article examines the relationship between military organization and regional governance in the Western Zhou 西周 state (ca. 1045–771 BCE), focusing on the role that regional military bases directly administered by the Zhou royal court played in reinforcing the geopolitical cohesion of the Zhou realm. By analyzing inscriptional and archaeological evidence, it argues that Qi shi 齊師 was one such regional Zhou garrison in northern Shandong. In the decentralized political structure of the Western Zhou state, political and military power were shared between the Zhou king and the regional nobility, rendering the participation of regional auxiliaries essential for Zhou military operations. Within this framework, regional Zhou military bases served as enclaves of royal power that extended the range of central reach in regional governance and facilitated the coordination of the dispersed military resources in the Zhou realm for common defense, thereby fostering the geopolitical integration of the Western Zhou state.

Keywords

Western Zhoumilitary powerregional governanceQi shiChenzhuang 陳莊

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Research Article
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Journal of Chinese History 中國歷史學刊 , First View , pp. 1 - 24
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This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
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© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press

Introduction

The Zhou 周 dynasty was built on conquest, and military power was a cornerstone of its political organization. However, Zhou martial dominance was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it enabled the Zhou’s sweeping expansion across China. On the other hand, the Zhou royal court’s lack of commensurate infrastructural reach and administrative capability to implement direct rule in conquered lands distant from the Zhou royal centers in the Wei 渭 River valley necessitated a decentralized political structure in which a great measure of local control was delegated to the regional nobility. In current scholarship, the balance of central and regional political power within this framework has often been examined through such lenses as the Zhou kinship and ritual order, whereas the role of military institutions as a prime integrative factor for the geopolitical cohesion of the Western Zhou state (ca. 1045–771 BCE) has arguably been presumed more than it has been comprehensively explored.Footnote 1 To address this gap, this study unpacks certain underlying organizational aspects of Western Zhou military power, particularly those relating to the dynamics between central authority and regional governance.

This pattern was common to many other regimes besides the Zhou across both Chinese and world history: an initial burst of wide-ranging military conquest followed by dispersed modes of local rule and governance heavily reliant on the cooperation of local elites to alleviate natural logistical obstacles posed by geographic distance.Footnote 2 The fundamental problem, as articulated by Owen Lattimore decades ago, was essentially that “the radius of military action was greater than that of civil administration.”Footnote 3 In other words, the principles behind expending military force (warfare) and sustaining it to enforce long-term rule (governance) were closely interrelated but differed meaningfully in their operation. Throughout history, rulers and states attempted to surmount this problem by employing different forms and applications of military coercion in combination with various other social, ideological, and diplomatic strategies.

For early China, the strategic organization of military power in relation more broadly to the logistics of government and the political structure of the state has received somewhat less attention than it has for later periods of Chinese history.Footnote 4 Partly, this is due to the relative scarcity of evidence for the pre-imperial period; the Qin 秦 and Han 漢 periods are better documented.Footnote 5 Accordingly, previous scholarship has investigated this issue through examining such topics as the discourses surrounding the classic dichotomy of the civil and the martial (wen 文 and wu 武).Footnote 6 However, while this conceptual pair is related to the present study’s concern with the relationship between government and warfare, political and military power, it was largely anachronistic, at least as it is formulated in our late first millennium BCE sources, in the context of the Western Zhou.

This article investigates the relationship between the central and regional military organization of the Western Zhou state, focusing especially on the inscriptional and archaeological evidence relating to a military unit called Qi shi 齊師. This “Qi army” or “Qi garrison” has conventionally been understood to refer to the military forces of the Zhou regional domain of Qi 齊 in northern Shandong.Footnote 7 Here, I consider an alternative interpretation: Qi shi was a regional garrison directly administered by the Zhou royal court, one of potentially several such centrally maintained military bases that served to extend the royal court’s political reach by facilitating the coordination of central and regional military resources. These regional garrisons may thus have functioned as an important integrative mechanism that counterbalanced some of the centrifugal pressures inherent in the decentralized geopolitical structure of the Western Zhou state.

Western Zhou geopolitical strategy

The Zhou victory over Shang 商 at the Battle of Muye 牧野 marked only the beginning of a century of prolonged Zhou political and military expansion through which the ascendant Zhou dynasts cemented their position as the new masters of the Central Plain 中原.Footnote 8 This initial phase of territorial expansion in the early Western Zhou period tapered off after the catastrophic southern campaign of King Zhao’s 昭 (r. 977/75–957 BCE) final regnal year, in which the king himself perished together with a core contingent of the Zhou military.Footnote 9 Thereafter in the mid- and late Western Zhou periods, Zhou geopolitical strategy pivoted to defense and consolidation, especially in the face of increasingly threatening conflicts with foreign enemies such as the Southern Yi 南夷 of the Huai 淮 River Basin to the southeast and the Xianyun 玁狁 to the northwest.Footnote 10

The Zhou realm stretched across a sizeable geographic expanse as far as the Jiaodong 膠東 Peninsula in the east and the Jianghan 江漢 Plain in the south—approximately 1,100 km and 600 km as the crow flies, respectively, from the Zhou royal centers in the Guanzhong 關中 Basin (see Figure 1).Footnote 11 But across much of this landscape, Zhou rule was extensive rather than intensive. While the Zhou king was able to wield a higher degree of control over the lands and aristocratic lineages in the Zhou royal domain, spatial constraints limited the direct administrative reach of the royal court beyond this zone.Footnote 12 As reckoned by Li Feng 李峰, deploying troops from the Wei River valley to the Central Plain and relaying communications across these regions may have required as long as two months.Footnote 13

Figure 1

Locations mentioned in this article. Digital elevation model source: A. Jarvis, H.I. Reuter, A. Nelson, E. Guevara, Hole-filled seamless SRTM data V4, International Centre for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT), 2008, available from http://srtm.csi.cgiar.org/.

Two main geopolitical strategies were implemented to mitigate these logistical challenges. First, the Zhou king installed subordinate elite lineages at key strategic locations across the realm, constructing a wide network of Zhou regional domains (also called regional states) to reinforce Zhou authority and safeguard the royal court’s political and economic interests in outlying regions.Footnote 14 Second, the eastern royal enclave of Chengzhou 成周 was founded in present-day Luoyang 洛陽, Henan, to bridge the royal and regional domains and provide the royal court more immediate access to its holdings in the east.Footnote 15 These strategies further facilitated the incorporation of local polities of non-Zhou origin into the wider Zhou sphere of influence.Footnote 16

As conduits of Zhou political and martial power across China, the regional domains thus constituted a critical component of Western Zhou geopolitical organization. However, reliance on the regional domains simultaneously necessitated a level of organizational decentralization in the Western Zhou state. The regional lords delegated to rule the regional domains on behalf of the Zhou king typically retained their own military forces and were invested with local decision-making powers that authorized them to conduct affairs within their own jurisdictions with considerable autonomy.Footnote 17 Given these conditions, incidents of disloyalty or rebellion against Zhou suzerainty could greatly undermine central authority, as seen, for instance, in the rebellion of E 鄂 in the mid-ninth century BCE.Footnote 18 Eliciting the loyalty and cooperation of the regional lords was therefore vital for sustaining Zhou central control in the long term. We know of several different mechanisms that were utilized to prevent the regional domains and their rulers from drifting too far from the orbit of the Zhou royal court. For example, regional rulers may have been expected to pay court from time to time, and there is some evidence for officials called royal inspectors (jian 監) dispatched to surveil the regional domains.Footnote 19

However, in current scholarship, the brunt of the explanatory weight concerning the question of the Western Zhou state’s political unity and integration has been borne by the socio-ritual underpinnings of the Zhou political system. In the kin-ordered Zhou world, lineage rank and affiliation as well as genealogical seniority (i.e., proximity to the primary line of the Zhou royal lineage) were of paramount importance in determining one’s status, ritual privileges, and, ultimately, access to different forms of power. Thus, many of the major regional domains were ruled by collateral lines of the Zhou royal house to begin with, and essentially every important non-kin elite lineage in the Zhou realm had affinal ties to the Zhou royal family. Thus regional rulers were subordinate to the Zhou king not merely in a political sense but also according to multifaceted Zhou social and ritual hierarchies.Footnote 20 These kinship networks bound the elite lineages of Zhou China to both the Zhou royal house and to one another, acting as a potent integrative force that even outlasted the Western Zhou royal court itself and continued to provide a degree of solidarity for the fragmented Zhou ecumene of the subsequent Eastern Zhou period.Footnote 21

In contrast, the role of military power and infrastructure in buttressing Zhou rule has received comparatively less attention, despite the importance of Zhou military might in establishing Zhou dominion over China in the first place. In what follows, I examine Western Zhou military organization in more detail to suggest that the Zhou king maintained centralized military command and directly managed regional military bases in certain frontier regions as strategies to sustain central control beyond the immediate confines of the royal domain.

The organization of the shi 師

The overall dominance of Zhou armies on the battlefields of the era was not an automatic deterrent against either internal rebellion or foreign invasion, especially in more remote regions of the Western Zhou state. As Owen Lattimore and Michael Mann emphasize, the routine projection of military force over great distances was inhibited by logistical obstacles and difficult to achieve even for powerful states.Footnote 22 In other words, armies of conquest operated differently from armies of governance.

At the core of the Western Zhou military establishment was the shi 師 (usually written dui in contemporary bronze inscriptions), which when referring to a kind of military organization has the dual meaning of both “army” (a body of troops) and “encampment” (a physical location).Footnote 23 The most prominent shi in Western Zhou history were the Six Armies 六師 and the Eight Armies 八師, two central military divisions that scholars have long viewed as comprising the mainstays of the Zhou military throughout the Western Zhou period.Footnote 24 The former, sometimes called the Six Armies of the West 西六師, were based in the Zhou royal domain. The latter were also called the Eight Armies of Yin 殷八師 (i.e., the late Shang capital at Anyang 安陽, Henan) or the Eight Armies of Chengzhou 成周八師 and thus based in the eastern part of the Zhou realm.Footnote 25

It is possible that the Six and Eight Armies were, at least initially, exactly as their names imply: two broad military divisions, each comprising six and eight individual shi encampments.Footnote 26 The early Western Zhou Xiaochen Lai gui 小臣簋 (JC 4238–39) inscription hints at this possibility, as it lays out a specific campaign route taken by the Eight Armies of Yin, which departed from X shi 師, reached the sea (likely the Bohai Sea 渤海), and returned to Mu shi 牧師.Footnote 27 Contextually, X shi and Mu shi may thus have represented two discrete military encampments in the purview of the Eight Armies.Footnote 28 Of course, this remains conjecture, as the monikers Six Armies and Eight Armies may simply have stuck even as the composition and organization of these two central divisions of the Western Zhou military must have changed over time. Notably, the Eight Armies were initially concentrated in the region of Anyang but later repositioned around the region of Chengzhou.Footnote 29

In total, more than twenty named shi are mentioned in Western Zhou bronze inscriptions.Footnote 30 It is potentially significant that some shi are seen on inscribed military equipment such as horse fittings or weapons that simply state the name of the shi, perhaps akin to marks of ownership or affiliation, rather than on ritual bronze vessels. For example, the Feng Shi danglu 豐師當盧 (NA 648–49) was unearthed at the site of the Feng-Hao 豐鎬 royal center in present-day Xi’an 西安.Footnote 31 The Lü Shi ge 呂師戈 (JC 10955) hints at the possible existence of a Lü shi 呂師, likely in the Jing 涇 River valley just north of the Guanzhong Basin.Footnote 32 And Wei shi 衛師 appears on several bronze implements from early Western Zhou tombs in Hebi 鶴壁, Henan, where the regional domain of Wei 衛 was established after the Zhou conquest of Shang.Footnote 33

The exact temporal span of each known shi is difficult to establish, though they are mentioned especially frequently in early Western Zhou inscriptions. Most probably, not all known shi existed concurrently. Some may have been transient, ad hoc military units while others were more persistent garrisons. In terms of spatial distribution, the known shi appear to have been concentrated in three main regions: in and around the Zhou royal domain, on the eastern flank of the Taihang 太行 Mountains in the former Shang core region around Anyang, and at the southern frontiers of the Zhou realm. Some shi were thus located at the peripheries of the Zhou realm and clearly unrelated to the Six and Eight Armies. Given the limited evidence and the polysemy of the term shi itself, it is important to keep in mind the possibility that different varieties of shi existed, depending on time period, geographic location, and other such parameters.

More is known about the organizational structure of the Six and Eight Armies, which by the mid-Western Zhou period were large-scale military organizations with their own internal administration and matériel infrastructure. The administration of the Six Armies, for instance, included its own Supervisor of Lands (situ 司土), Supervisor of Horses (sima 司馬), and Supervisor of Works (sigong 司工), paralleling the three main supervisory offices of the Western Zhou central government. The Hu hu 曶壺 (JC 9728) inscription implies that these military-administrative hierarchies were multi-tiered and fairly elaborate, as it refers to a Chief Supervisor of Lands (zhong situ 冢司土) of the Eight Armies of Chengzhou who may potentially have been in charge of a number of junior supervisors.Footnote 34 Several royal appointment inscriptions indicate that officers were also tasked with specific duties in relation to the management and operation of the Six and Eight Armies:

Lü Fuyu pan 呂服余盤 (JC 10169)

assist Bei Zhong and supervise the servants of the Six Armies

疋(胥)備中(仲)(司)六(師)服Footnote 35

Li fangyi 盠方彝 (JC 9899–900), Li zun 盠尊 (NA 744, JC 6013)

supervise the Six Armies and Eight Armies’ camps

(司)六(師)眔八(師)埶Footnote 36

Nangong Liu ding 南宮柳鼎 (JC 2805)

supervise the Six Armies’ pastures, hunting grounds, and the Grand [Right?]; supervise the Yi Yi’s work in the hunting grounds and fields

(司)六(師)牧、陽(場)、大□(友?), (司)羲夷陽(場)、佃史(事)Footnote 37

These inscriptions show that the Zhou king headed the command structure of the Six and Eight Armies and directly appointed senior officers whose responsibilities included logistics and provisioning.Footnote 38 On this point, the Nangong Liu ding is most informative, revealing that the Six Armies had their own attached assets such as agricultural fields, pastures for grazing horses and livestock, hunting grounds for conducting military drills and exercises, and the labor required to support these activities.Footnote 39 The Yi Yi 羲夷 mentioned in the Nangong Liu ding were possibly a non-Zhou community under the administration of the Six Armies. Analogous cases in other inscriptions suggest that such non-Zhou populations were an important source of labor and manpower for the Western Zhou military establishment.Footnote 40

Interestingly, despite the considerable military capital evidently amassed in the Six and Eight Armies, they seem not to have been dispatched afield too frequently as a unitary force. Only three of the sixty war-related Western Zhou bronze inscriptions collated by Shim Jae-hoon 沈載勳 explicitly mention their full deployment.Footnote 41 This suggests that the Six and Eight Armies were perhaps more effective at forestalling the enemy through their imposing presence rather than by going on the march routinely. Mobility was critical in Western Zhou warfare; the substantial scale of the Six and Eight Armies possibly rendered their mobilization en masse relatively cumbersome and costly for longer durations.Footnote 42

Instead, the prevailing military doctrine adopted by the Zhou royal court to attain its military objectives in the mid- and late Western Zhou periods, consonant with the aforementioned shift to the defensive in Zhou geopolitical strategy after the mid-tenth century BCE, was to deploy smaller but more mobile central military units in coordination with regional troops and allied local auxiliaries.Footnote 43 This use of mixed central-regional army coalitions was likely a more flexible and cost-effective approach that enabled the Zhou king to best harness the dispersed military capabilities of the regional domains. The inscriptional evidence shows that such coalitions were in all cases led by the king or by royally appointed commanders.Footnote 44 The operational difficulty of exercising such centralized military command must have been considerable in the long term, especially on fronts far removed from the Zhou royal domain. I shall now turn to examine the evidence for Qi shi to consider how some shi may have served as regional military bases providing crucial logistical infrastructure for the coordination of central and regional military assets in the Western Zhou state.

The Qi garrison

Qi shi is attested in four mid- and late Western Zhou bronze inscriptions: the Shi Mi gui 史密簋 (NA 636), Yin gui 引簋 (NB 2287), Shi Yuan gui 師㝨簋 (JC 4313–14), and Ren Xiao gui 妊小簋 (JC 4123). Collectively, these inscriptions illuminate two important points concerning the nature of Western Zhou geopolitical strategy and military organization. First, they illustrate how the Zhou royal court conducted warfare in outlying regions by using mixed coalitions of central, regional, and local military units led by centrally appointed commanders. Second, they evince the existence of a Zhou regional military garrison called Qi shi in northern Shandong. Prior to the discovery of the Yin gui at the site of Chenzhuang 陳莊 in Gaoqing 高青 County, Shandong, in 2008–2010, Qi shi was commonly thought to refer to the army of the regional domain of Qi; this new evidence raises the possibility that it may have been a separate entity directly controlled by the Zhou king.

Let us first examine the earliest of the four Qi shi inscriptions, the Shi Mi gui, discovered in Ankang 安康, Shaanxi, in 1986.Footnote 45 This inscription describes a Zhou campaign against several Yi 夷 groups that culminated in a battle fought at a place called Changbi 長必 sometime during the reign of King Gong 共 (r. 917/15–900 BCE) or King Yih 懿 (r. 899/97–873 BCE).Footnote 46 The precise location of Changbi is unknown, but commentators propose that it was possibly in southeastern Shandong, perhaps south of present-day Weifang 濰坊 or in the upper Yi 沂 River valley.Footnote 47 The Shi Mi gui inscription reads:

隹(唯)十又一月。王令(命)師俗、史密曰:「東征敆南尸(夷)。」膚(盧)、虎會杞尸(夷)、舟尸(夷), 雚(觀)不, 廣伐東或(國)。齊(師)、族土(徒)、述(遂)人乃執啚(鄙)寛亞。師俗䢦(率)齊(師)、述(遂)人, 左□(周)伐長必。史密右(率)族人、釐(萊)白(伯)、僰、(夷?), 周伐長必, 隻(獲)百人。對(揚)天子休, 用乍(作)(朕)文考乙白(伯)(尊)(簋)。子=孫=(子子孫孫)其永寶用。

It was the eleventh month. The king commanded Marshal Su and Scribe Mi, saying: “Campaign to the east and jointly attack the Southern Yi.” The Lu and Hu joined with the Qi Yi and Zhou Yi and, displaying recalcitrance(?), broadly attacked the eastern domains. The Qi shi, lineage footmen, and men of the suburbs then captured the captain(s) of the border region of Kuan. Marshal Su led Qi shi and the men of the suburbs, [encircling] and attacking Changbi from the left. From the right, Scribe Mi led the lineage men, the Elder of Lai, and (the men of) Bo and Yi(?) to encircle and attack Changbi, capturing one hundred men. Extolling in response to the Son of Heaven’s beneficence, I (=Scribe Mi) herewith make (for) my brilliant deceased-father Elder Yi (this) sacrificial gui tureen. Sons’ sons and grandsons’ grandsons, may they forever treasure and use (it).Footnote 48

To summarize, the Changbi campaign was provoked by the aggression (from the Zhou point of view) of several hostile Yi groups: the Lu 盧, Hu 虎, Qǐ Yi 杞夷, and Zhou Yi 舟夷.Footnote 49 To quell this threat, the Zhou king dispatched two central court officials, Marshal Su 師俗 and Scribe Mi 史密, to counterattack with a force consisting of various military units, including Qi shi. Marshal Su was a prominent high-ranking royal court official mentioned in several other extant bronze inscriptions; Scribe Mi is an otherwise obscure figure in our sources.Footnote 50 These two Zhou commanders defeated the enemy at Changbi, and Scribe Mi later had the Shi Mi gui cast to commemorate the victory.

The Zhou coalition was composed of both central and regional troops. Aside from Qi shi, the other principal detachments in this coalition were the lineage troops (zu tu 族徒 or zu ren 族人) and men of the suburbs (sui ren 遂人). Following the traditional view that Qi shi was the Qi regional domain’s army, many scholars have understood zu and sui here as referring to the lineages and suburbs of Qi.Footnote 51 Another viable reading links these military units to the Zhou royal domain, since zu as a military unit organized on the basis of kinship is well-attested in the context of the aristocratic lineages of the royal domain, and the only other contemporary evidence for the term sui refers presumably to the outlying precincts of urban centers in the royal domain.Footnote 52 Accordingly, these may have been troops drawn from the Zhou royal domain that accompanied Marshal Su and Scribe Mi in their expedition to the east.Footnote 53

Additional military support was provided by men from the local polities of Lai 萊, Bo 僰, and Yi(?) , whose locations lend further strength to the hypothesis that the main theater of the Changbi campaign must have been near southeastern Shandong. Lai was a well-attested polity based at Longkou 龍口 in the Jiaodong Peninsula.Footnote 54 Bo has been variously identified either as Jí 棘, a settlement located north of the Wen 汶 River; Biyang 偪陽, a polity in southern Shandong; or Li 鬲 in Dezhou 德州, northwest Shandong.Footnote 55 As for the third polity, scholars have proposed to read the character as either dian /殿, ni 尼, or shi 尸.Footnote 56 For the time being, I follow the last of these readings, given that this same polity is also mentioned in the Shi Yuan gui inscription written as (see below). Thus, the shi element appears to be the signifier in this word, and as shi is interchangeable with yi 夷, this polity might then be that of Yi (not to be confused with the ethnonym Yi) located in Gaomi 高密, not far south of Lai.Footnote 57

Interestingly, the Shi Yuan gui inscription lists a nearly identical group of military units involved in a Zhou campaign a century later against the Huai Yi 淮夷 during the reign of King Xuan 宣 (r. 827/25–782 BCE). This coalition was also led by a royally appointed commander, Marshal Yuan 師㝨, and consisted of Qi shi; troops from the local polities of Ji 㠱, Lai, Bo, and Yi(?) ; and the elite royal guards, the Left and Right Tiger Servants (zuoyou huchen 左右虎臣).Footnote 58 Despite the temporal gap between the events recounted in the Shi Mi gui and Shi Yuan gui, this similarity in the composition of the central-regional coalitions involved is striking, and intimates a degree of continuity in Zhou military strategy and organization across the mid- and late Western Zhou periods in this region. One imagines that the presence of Qi shi, which appears as the leading military unit in both the Shi Mi gui and Shi Yuan gui, may have contributed to this organizational stability.

Having established the general pattern of how the Zhou royal court conducted warfare in distant regions, let us now examine the question of Qi shi’s identification. Given that both Zhou campaigns recounted in the above two inscriptions took place in and involved the local polities of the Shandong region, it seems logical to assume at first glance that Qi shi must refer to the army of Qi, one of the important Zhou regional domains in Shandong. However, as Shim Jae-hoon notes, Western Zhou bronze inscriptions do not seem to explicitly refer to the armies of regional domains with the formula “domain name + shi.” Instead, their presence is indirectly indicated through mentioning the military actions of regional rulers.Footnote 59 This issue is further complicated by new information in the Yin gui inscription.

The Yin gui was unearthed in tomb M35 at the site of Chenzhuang, approximately fifty-five kilometers northwest of Linzi 臨淄, the seat of the Qi regional domain. Current scholarly consensus agrees that the Yin gui dates most probably to the period between the reigns of King Yih 懿 and Yi 夷 (r. 865–858 BCE), based on its archaeological context, stylistic features, and the inscription’s reference to the Grand Chamber of (King) Gong 共大室, which suggests that it must necessarily postdate the reign of King Gong.Footnote 60 The Yin gui records the Zhou king’s charge to Yin 引 to oversee Qi shi:

隹(唯)正月壬申。王各(格)于龏(共)大室。王若曰:「引, 余既命女(汝)更乃(祖) (司)齊(師)。余唯(申)命女(汝), 易(賜)女(汝)(彤弓)一、(彤矢)百、馬四匹。敬乃御,母(毋)(敗)(績)。」引(拜)(稽)首, 對揚王休。同追(俘)兵, 用乍(作)幽公寶廏(簋)。子=孫=(子子孫孫)寶用。

It was the first month, renshen day. The king arrived at the Grand Chamber of (King) Gong. The king said to the effect: “Yin, I have already commanded you to succeed your grandfather and supervise Qi shi. I extend your charge and bestow on you one red bow, one hundred red arrows, and four horses. Respect your duty, do not abscond from service.” Yin bowed and touched his head to the ground, in response extolling the king’s beneficence. (He) gathered (his forces) at X, made pursuit, and captured weapons; and herewith makes (for) Lord You (this) treasured gui tureen. (May my) sons’ sons and grandsons’ grandsons treasure and use (it).Footnote 61

The Yin gui not only confirms that the Zhou king directly appointed the commander of Qi shi, but it also suggests that this was a position maintained over an extended period as opposed to an ad hoc one since Yin was ordered to succeed his grandfather in the same capacity.Footnote 62 This problematizes the conventional interpretation of the term Qi shi as the Qi regional domain’s army, in which case we might expect to see the Qi ruler rather than the Zhou king presiding over such matters. As Li Feng notes, insofar as we can discern from Western Zhou bronze inscriptions, “there is no evidence that the Zhou king ever interfered in the internal civil administration of the regional states.”Footnote 63 Thus, either Qi shi here does not refer to the Qi military, or if it does, the structure of Zhou military command and the relationship between the royal court and the regional domains therein must have been more complex than previously realized.

A reassessment of the nature of Qi shi and the Yin gui’s broader implications for Western Zhou military organization hinges on the critical issue of Yin’s identity. Three main theories have been proposed: (1) Yin was a Qi noble; (2) Yin was a Qi ruler; (3) Yin was a Zhou noble from the royal domain. Since none of these possibilities can be entirely ruled out at present, I will consider the merits of each in turn and present a provisional case for the third, namely that Yin was most likely a member of an aristocratic lineage of the Zhou royal domain who was charged with overseeing a Zhou regional military base located in northern Shandong called Qi shi—the Qi Garrison.

Yin was a Qi noble

This view is largely based on the burial evidence from Chenzhuang rather than information in the Yin gui inscription itself. Six bronze-bearing elite tombs were excavated at Chenzhuang in 2008–2010.Footnote 64 Aside from Yin’s tomb M35, the most notable of these burials was tomb M18, an early Western Zhou rectangular vertical pit tomb furnished with a single coffin and a container holding ritual bronzes dedicated by the tomb occupant Feng 豐 to the Duke of Qi 齊公 (i.e., Lü Shang 呂尚, the founder of Qi).Footnote 65 Feng thus appears to have been descended from the ruling house of Qi. If tombs M18 and M35 belonged to the same lineage cemetery, then Yin may have been related to Feng and by extension the ruling lineage of Qi as well, a member perhaps of one of its collateral lines.Footnote 66

However, it is not possible to conclusively establish that tombs M18 and M35 were part of the same lineage cemetery because the relationship between the elite tombs at Chenzhuang are not yet entirely clear. In fact, tomb M35 differed markedly from the comparatively simpler tomb M18 in size and structure, as it was a large jia 甲-shaped tomb with one entry ramp—the first such Western Zhou period tomb discovered in Shandong along with the adjacent tomb M36.Footnote 67 This discrepancy in class may be challenging to reconcile if Yin belonged to Feng’s lineage, as in that case his tomb would probably not so far eclipse that of his predecessor.Footnote 68 Furthermore, Kim Jung-ryol 金正烈 preliminarily observes that at least two distinct burial customs may be represented at Chenzhuang, which potentially indicates that different kin groups were interred at the site.Footnote 69

Recently renewed excavations at Chenzhuang since 2023 have yielded additional evidence that promise to lend further clarity to this issue in the near future, including four additional Western Zhou period jia-shaped tombs and a new but as-yet-unpublished bronze inscription from one of them that apparently substantiates their connection to Yin.Footnote 70 If all six jia-shaped elite tombs discovered at Chenzhuang can indeed be attributed to the same lineage, this might add more support to the view that Yin was a Qi noble, since it may be unlikely that Zhou nobles from the royal domain would maintain such a lineage cemetery in distant Shandong.

Yin was a Qi ruler

To start, it bears mentioning that no Qi ruler named Yin is mentioned in any known genealogies of the Qi ruling lineage.Footnote 71 Putting this point aside, two main lines of evidence can be marshalled in support of this theory, one based on the Yin gui inscription and the other on the nature of tomb M35. According to the Yin gui, the Zhou king bestowed on Yin a set of gifts that included a red bow and one hundred red arrows—items that also appear as royal gifts in three other extant Western Zhou bronze inscriptions. In each of these cases, their recipients were rulers of Zhou regional domains. For example, the Ying Hou Xiangong zhong 應侯見工鐘 (JC 107–8, NA 82–83), which also dates to the early ninth century BCE, records that the Zhou king bestowed on the ruler of Ying 應 the same set of items Yin received, down to their exact quantities: one red bow, one hundred red arrows, and four horses.Footnote 72 Some scholars have reasoned on this basis that Yin may have been a ruler of Qi.Footnote 73 The exceptionality of the jia-shaped tomb M35 has also been raised as a point in support of this identification, since entry ramps were generally reserved for the tombs of very high-status individuals.Footnote 74

While both the prestigious gifts bestowed on Yin and his jia-shaped tomb are certainly indicative of high rank and status, a few counterpoints can be advanced against this theory. It is indeed remarkable that the royal gifts Yin received seem mainly to have been granted to regional rulers, but another commonality between the four inscriptions mentioning these items was the military contexts in which they were granted. As such, the bestowal of this particular set of items may have been associated with military service or accomplishments, contributions both Zhou high officials and regional rulers would have made, and not necessarily with the position of regional ruler itself.Footnote 75 As for Yin’s tomb, the link between the presence (and number) of tomb entry ramps and the rank of tomb occupants was somewhat irregular in the Western Zhou period, as the tombs of high officials, lineage patriarchs, and regional rulers could all have entry ramps, and conversely, not all tombs of regional rulers had entry ramps.Footnote 76 Moreover, although no tombs of Western Zhou period Qi rulers against which to compare tomb M35 have been found, its modest burial assemblage certainly does not appear to reflect the rank of a regional ruler.Footnote 77

Yin was a Zhou noble from the royal domain

This is the position best supported by the actual content of the Yin gui inscription, which closely adheres to the standard formula of Western Zhou royal appointment inscriptions.Footnote 78 In fact, if we were to momentarily disassociate the toponym Qi from the regional domain of the same name in reading the Yin gui, we might default to assuming that Yin was a Zhou official, as there is nothing in the content of the inscription itself beyond the shared toponym Qi that links Yin and Qi shi to the regional domain of Qi.Footnote 79 Understanding Yin as a Zhou noble and Qi shi as a Zhou regional garrison furthermore clarifies the late Western Zhou Ren Xiao gui inscription, which states: “Elder Naifu tasked X to inspect the officials at Qi shi” 白(伯)(艿)父事 (省)尹人于齊(師).Footnote 80 While it would be unusual for Elder Naifu 伯艿父 and X , who were presumably royal court officials, to be so closely involved in the affairs of the Qi military, this issue is resolved if Qi shi was actually a Zhou regional garrison managed by the Zhou royal court.

At this juncture, the nature of the site of Chenzhuang is worth incorporating into the discussion as well.Footnote 81 Covering an area of nine hectares, four of which comprised the core fortification encircled by walls and ditches with only one point of egress, a south gate, Chenzhuang was too small to have been a major urban settlement. Preliminary findings suggest that the walls were built during the early Western Zhou period and fell into disuse after the mid-Western Zhou period, though the site itself was continuously occupied into the Eastern Zhou period. In addition, archaeobotanical analysis of the floral remains uncovered at Chenzhuang indicates that a significant proportion may have constituted horse fodder.Footnote 82 The archaeological evidence thus strongly underscores the military character of the site, suggesting that Chenzhuang may well have been a military encampment, potentially identifiable as Qi shi itself given the discovery of the Yin gui at the same location.Footnote 83

In summary, of the three possibilities for Yin’s identity, the third scenario appears to be the cleanest conceptually: the Zhou king appointed a Zhou noble to take charge of a Zhou regional garrison. The other two scenarios are not impossible but still push us to view Qi shi as a Zhou rather than a Qi organization, as it seems to me more likely that a Qi noble would be appointed by the Zhou king to supervise a Zhou garrison than the Qi army, which would fall within the purview of the Qi ruler. Likewise, it seems more likely that a Qi ruler might be charged by the Zhou king to supervise a Zhou garrison, since it would be redundant for the Qi ruler to be specifically appointed to supervise his own domain’s army. Thus, taken together, the four Qi shi inscriptions and the archaeological evidence from Chenzhuang offer support for the view that Qi shi was a regional Zhou military garrison stationed in the geographic region of Qi. The Yin gui and Ren Xiao gui reveal that Qi shi was closely associated with the Zhou king and royal court, who oversaw the appointment of its officers and its internal administration. Meanwhile, the Shi Mi gui and Shi Yuan gui speak to the important role Qi shi played as part of mixed central-regional coalition armies led by royally appointed commanders in maintaining the security of the far eastern regions of the Zhou realm.

The role of regional military bases

Several important questions concerning the nature of the relationship between regional military bases and the regional domains in or near which they were located are raised in reevaluating Qi shi as a Zhou regional garrison. In the case of Qi shi, the connection between Chenzhuang and Qi must be accounted for (recall that Feng, a kinsman of the Qi ruling lineage, was buried at Chenzhuang), as does the apparent absence of Qi military forces in the campaigns described in the Shi Mi gui and Shi Yuan gui. Since there is little direct evidence with which to investigate these questions fully, I offer a few conjectural thoughts before looking beyond Qi shi to examine a few other relevant inscriptions that might provide an improved picture of regional garrison-regional domain relations in the Western Zhou state.

One potential explanation for Feng’s burial at Chenzhuang is simply that the stewardship of Chenzhuang may have changed hands from Feng’s lineage to Yin’s lineage at some point between the early and mid-Western Zhou periods. As discussed above, Feng’s tomb M18 was among the earliest tombs at Chenzhuang, dating to the early Western Zhou period, at which time Chenzhuang was also fortified. This means that roughly a century or slightly longer separated Feng from Yin, whose tomb M35 dates to the early ninth century BCE. Incidentally, the earliest attestation of Qi shi in the Shi Mi gui dates to sometime within this intervening century; Yin’s grandfather, ostensibly a former commander of Qi shi, would also have been active at some point during that time.

The seeming nonparticipation of the Qi regional domain in the military campaigns described in the Shi Mi gui and Shi Yuan gui inscriptions is curious given that they took place in Shandong, presumably within Qi’s remit. There is, of course, the possibility that these two inscriptions simply do not mention the involvement of the Qi military, or that Qi armies happened to be unavailable for those two particular campaigns—which might actually have been the reason it was necessary to call in support from the Zhou royal court in the first place. Another line of thought relates to the scale of Qi shi, which cannot be ascertained, but given the size of Chenzhuang may have been relatively small. Perhaps the Qi military was sufficiently large enough to strike out on its own if necessary, whereas Qi shi was a smaller force that needed to operate in concert with other military units, including auxiliaries from such minor local polities as those enumerated in the Shi Mi gui and Shi Yuan gui.

The economic and logistical support necessary to maintain regional military bases far from the Zhou royal domain are also important to consider. In this regard, cooperation with neighboring regional domains was critical since regional garrisons must have obtained the bulk of their supplies from local sources. The case of Bin shi 豳師 in the Jing River valley potentially elucidates such a symbiotic relationship between regional garrisons and regional domains.Footnote 84 According to the mid-Western Zhou Qi gui 簋 (JC 4266) inscription, Bin shi was administered directly by the Zhou royal court. The relevant part of the inscription records the royal appointment of Qi as the garrison’s Chief Supervisor of Horses (zhong sima 冢司馬):

王若曰:「, 命女(汝)乍(作)(豳)(師)冢(司)馬, 啻官僕、射、士, 訊小大又(有)隣(憐), 取遄五寽(鋝)。」

The king said to the effect: “Qi, I command you to act as Chief Supervisor of Horses at Bin shi and specially manage the servants, archers, and soldiers. Arbitrate small and large (matters) with magnanimity, and take a stipend of five lüe units of metal.”Footnote 85

This appointment is strongly reminiscent of the previously mentioned Hu hu inscription, according to which the Zhou king appointed one Hu 曶 to be the Chief Supervisor of Land for the Eight Armies of Chengzhou. The administrative structure of Bin shi thus seems to have imitated that of the Six and Eight Armies except perhaps for a difference in scale. Additionally, given that Qi’s responsibilities included both managing troops and overseeing judicial matters, it is evident that much like the Six and Eight Armies, Bin shi was a more comprehensive military organization, probably linked to a supporting ecosystem of local lands, personnel, and resources.Footnote 86

More information about Bin shi, crucially its relationship to nearby regional domains, is provided by the mid-Western Zhou Shan ding 善鼎 (JC 2820) inscription, the relevant part of which states:

王曰:「善, 昔先王既令女(汝)左(佐)疋(胥)侯。今余唯肈(肇)(申)先王令=(令,令)女(汝)左(佐)疋(胥)侯, 監(豳)師戍。易(賜)女(汝)乃且(祖)旂。用事。」

The king said: “Shan, in the past, the former king already commanded you to aid and assist the ruler of Quan. Now I, for the first time, extend the former king’s charge and command you to aid and assist the ruler of Quan and oversee the garrison of Bin shi. (I) bestow on you your grandfather’s banner. Use (it) to serve!”Footnote 87

The most significant point to note here is the seemingly synergetic relationship between Bin shi and the local regional domain or polity of Quan . The Shan ding makes clear that Bin shi was under the direct control of the Zhou king, much like Qi shi, and that its commander was expected to aid and assist the ruler of Quan. The implication is that there must have been a vital aspect of mutual defense and military collaboration between Quan and Bin shi. Unfortunately, little else is known about Quan including its precise location, but Bin shi, at least, was situated in a region pivotal for the defense of the royal domain, particularly in the Zhou-Xianyun wars, which may possibly have been the historical backdrop of the Shan ding. Footnote 88

Recently in 2018–23, archaeologists excavated the site of Xitou 西頭 in Xunyi 旬邑 County, Shaanxi, which was part of the historical region of Bin according to historical records.Footnote 89 Xitou was a walled settlement dating from the eleventh to eighth centuries BCE with a core fortified zone that encompassed an area of roughly eighty hectares. Multiple features highlight the military associations of the site, including the remains of a smelter that produced bronze weapons and other implements, as well as a large cemetery situated outside the southeast wall with horse pits and several exceptional elite tombs in which large quantities of bronze weapons, horse and chariot-related equipment, and sacrificial human victims were interred.Footnote 90 While the precise nature and chronology of the different loci and features discovered at Xitou still remains to be worked out, at minimum these new discoveries seem to corroborate the view that the broader region associated with Bin shi may have been a focal point of much Western Zhou military activity.

The case of Bin shi thus illuminates a few aspects of the symbiotic relationship between Zhou regional garrisons and regional domains. Another promising candidate for further investigation might be Gu shi 古師, which seems to be have been closely associated with the domain or polity of Hu 胡 near the southeastern boundaries of the Zhou realm in the context of the Zhou wars against the Huai Yi.Footnote 91 Of course, the similarities and differences between these various shi must be determined with more empirical grounding in future research, but we may provisionally theorize that they shared the same overall function of increasing the centripetal pull of the Zhou royal court by providing it with military enclaves in critical regions to augment the infrastructural capacity for local governance and defense already installed there in the form of the regional domains.

Conclusion

In many regards, Western Zhou military organization can be viewed as a microcosm of the broader geopolitical constitution of the Western Zhou state. On the one hand, the Zhou royal court’s preference for the routine use of central and regional troops in tandem highlights the logistical limits of central force projection that necessitated the decentralized geopolitical structure of the Western Zhou state. In addition, the royal court’s increasing reliance on regional military resources to achieve its strategic objectives, especially in the ninth and eighth centuries BCE, reflects the gradual waning of royal authority over time. On the other hand, that mixed central-regional army coalitions were always led by centrally appointed officials and that the royal court was able to maintain direct control over military outposts in certain frontier regions underscores the high level of hierarchical order and political authority the Zhou king was nevertheless able to command. Tellingly, though this centralized military command structure persisted until the end of the Western Zhou period, it was the loss of royal military power following the catastrophe of 771 BCE that presaged the long decline of the Zhou royal house’s preeminence in China over the course of the ensuing Eastern Zhou period.

This study has examined the organization and application of Western Zhou military power especially in the context of long-term regional governance by investigating the operation and role of regional military bases administered by the Zhou royal court. As demonstrated through the analysis of the inscriptional and archaeological evidence for Qi shi in northern Shandong, such regional garrisons were instrumental for extending the range of Zhou political control and logistical reach across the vast landscapes under Zhou dominion. These military enclaves thus formed an important component of Western Zhou geopolitical strategy, effectively acting as a connective bridge between the Zhou royal court and the regional domains and facilitating the coordination of central and regional military resources for the defense of the Western Zhou state.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Li Feng for his feedback on earlier iterations of this research. I also thank the journal editors and anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions to improve the article. Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the author.

Competing interests

The author declares none.

Appendix: Named shi in Western Zhou bronze inscriptionsFootnote 92

References

1 For earlier treatments of Western Zhou military institutions, see, e.g., Chen Enlin 陳恩林, Xian Qin junshi zhidu yanjiu 先秦軍事制度研究 (Changchun: Jilin wenshi chubanshe, 1991), 55–105; Herrlee G. Creel, The Origins of Statecraft in China, Volume 1: The Western Chou Empire (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1970), 296–316; Huang Shengsong 黃聖松, “Liu Shi yu Ba Shi de ruogan wenti” 六與八的若干問題, Wen yu zhe 文與哲 2003.12, 17–64; Li Feng, Bureaucracy and the State in Early China: Governing the Western Zhou (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 78–83; Shim Jae-hoon 沈載勳, “Kŭmmun e nat’anan Sŏ Chu kunsaryŏk kusŏng gwa wanggwŏn” 金文에 나타난 西周 군사력 구성과 왕권, Chungguksa yŏn’gu 中國史研究 41 (2006), 1–77. For kinship, ritual, and diplomacy in the Western Zhou, see, e.g., Maria Khayutina, “Marital Alliances and Affinal Relatives (sheng 甥 and hungou 婚購) in the Society and Politics of Zhou China in the Light of Bronze Inscriptions,” Early China 37 (2014), 39–99; Maria Khayutina, “Royal Hospitality and Geopolitical Constitution of the Western Zhou Polity,” T’oung Pao 96.1/3 (2010), 1–73; Paul Nicholas Vogt, Kingship, Ritual, and Royal Ideology in Western Zhou China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023).

2 See David Graeber and Marshall Sahlins, On Kings (Chicago: Hau Books, 2017), 5–7; Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 130–78.

3 Owen Lattimore, Studies in Frontier History: Collected Papers, 1928–1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 480. For similar expressions of this idea, see also Creel, Origins of Statecraft, 242; Mann, Sources of Social Power, 26.

4 For military institutions in later periods of Chinese history and their relationship to adjacent developments in the social, political, economic, and cultural spheres, see, e.g., Nicola Di Cosmo, ed., Military Culture in Imperial China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); David Robinson, “Why Military Institutions Matter for Chinese History Circa 600–1800,” Journal of Chinese History 1 (2017), 235–42; and the articles in the same issue of this journal covering the Tang 唐 to Qing 清 periods. For a study of early Chinese military culture and institutions covering the Zhou period, see Mark Edward Lewis, Sanctioned Violence in Early China (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990).

5 For Qin and Han military institutions, see, e.g., Mark Edward Lewis, The Early Chinese Empires: Qin and Han (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 30–39; Michael Loewe, “The Western Han Army: Organization, Leadership, and Operation,” in Military Culture, ed. Di Cosmo, 65–89; Kiyoshi Miyake, “The Military History of Qin and the Composition of Its Expeditionary Forces,” Bamboo and Silk 1 (2018), 121–51.

6 See Kai Filipiak, ed., Civil-Military Relations in Chinese History: From Ancient China to the Communist Takeover (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), 1–17, 34–46; Robin McNeal, Conquer and Govern: Early Chinese Military Texts from the “Yi Zhoushu” (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2012), 13–39; Christopher C. Rand, Military Thought in Early China (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2017), 5–30.

7 Located in the area of Linzi 臨淄, Qi was ruled by the line of Lü Shang 呂尚, a close ally of the first Zhou kings. Records of early Qi history during the Western Zhou period are sparse, but for a collation see Chen Shuyi 陳書儀, Qi guo shiliao biannian kaobian 齊國史料編年考辨 (Ji’nan: Shandong renmin chubanshe, 2016), 33–96.

8 Li Feng, Bureaucracy and the State, 31–34.

9 See Lei Chinhau 雷晉豪, “Xi Zhou Zhao wang nanzheng de chongjian yu fenxi” 西周昭王南征的重建與分析, Wenshi 文史 2022.3, 5–34; Wang Qi 王祁, “Xi Zhou zaoqi nanzheng qingtongqi qun ji xiangguan shishi kaocha” 西周早期南征青銅器群及相關史實考察, Chutu wenxian 出土文獻 9 (2016), 41–53. Western Zhou chronology continues to be debated. For recent treatments, see Edward L. Shaughnessy, “The Xia Shang Zhou Duandai Gongcheng baogao 夏商周斷代工程報告 and Its Chronology of the Western Zhou Dynasty,” Early China 46 (2023), 351–71; Pengcheng Zhang, “The Chronology of Western Zhou,” Early China 46 (2023), 131–242. This study follows the conventional regnal dates for Western Zhou kings in Edward L. Shaughnessy, Sources of Western Zhou History: Inscribed Bronze Vessels (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), xix.

10 Li Feng, Landscape and Power in Early China: The Crisis and Fall of the Western Zhou, 1045–771 BC (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 3, 103–5, 142–92; Zhao Congcang 趙叢蒼 and Liang Shuo 梁碩, “Cong zhanchang dao bianjiang: Xi Zhou zhongqi zhanzheng de junshi kaoguxue guancha” 從戰場到邊疆:西周中期戰爭的軍事考古學觀察, Huaxia kaogu 華夏考古 2021.2, 66–70, 94. Major offensive campaigns continued to be waged periodically—for example, a southern expedition in the early years of King Gong’s 共 reign (r. 917/15–900 BCE) as recently discussed by Han Wei 韓巍—but did not result in lasting conquests; see Han Wei, “Dui pen yu Gong wang chunian nanzheng” 兑盆與恭王初年南征, Chutu wenxian yanjiu 出土文獻研究 23 (2024), 15–50.

11 For the geographic extent of the Western Zhou state, see Li Feng, Landscape and Power, 300–342.

12 For the organization of the Western Zhou central government, see Li Feng, Bureaucracy and the State, 42–234.

13 Li Feng, Landscape and Power, 65.

14 See Li Feng, Bureaucracy and the State, 43–49; Li Feng, Landscape and Power, 66–76. For the regional domains in Shandong, where both Qi shi and the domain of Qi were located, see also Min Hoo-ki 閔厚基, “Sŏ Chu shidae ŭi Sandong: Yumyŏng ch’ŏngdonggi ch’ult’oji punsŏk ŭl t’onghaebon Sandong chiyŏk ponggŏn” 西周시대의 山東: 有名 青銅器 출토지 분석을 통해본 山東 지역 封建, Yŏksa hakpo 歷史學報 230 (2016), 67–114.

15 For the establishment of Chengzhou, see Li Feng, Landscape and Power, 62–66; Victor Cunrui Xiong, Capital Cities and Urban Form in Pre-modern China: Luoyang, 1038 BCE to 938 CE (London: Routledge, 2017), 7–14.

16 For examples of such polities, which were sometimes quite similar to Zhou-sanctioned regional domains, see Maria Khayutina, “The Tombs of the Rulers of Peng and Relationships between Zhou and Northern Non-Zhou Lineages (Until the Early Ninth Century B.C.),” in Imprints of Kinship: Studies of Recently Discovered Bronze Inscriptions from Ancient China, ed. Edward L. Shaughnessy (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2017), 71–132; Kim Jung-ryol 金正烈, “Sŏ Chu ŭi isŏng jehu ponggŏn e taehayŏ: Sŏ Chu chibae ch’eje ŭi ilmyŏn” 西周의 異姓諸侯 封建에 대하여: 西周 지배체제의 一面, Tongyang sahak yŏn’gu 東洋史學研究 77 (2002), 1–45; Li Feng, “Literacy Crossing Cultural Borders: Evidence from the Bronze Inscriptions of the Western Zhou Period (1045–771 B.C.),” Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities 74 (2002), 210–42.

17 For the organizational structure of the regional domains or regional states, see Li Feng, Bureaucracy and the State, 235–70.

18 A ruler of E who held the title of Border Protector (yufang 馭方) as an erstwhile Zhou ally incited this major rebellion together with the Southern Yi and Eastern Yi 東夷; see Li Feng, Landscape and Power, 103–5, 330–31. It is important to note that since our information derives mostly from bronze inscriptions reflecting the Zhou point of view, it can sometimes be difficult to distinguish between different kinds of internal unrest or external troubles, all of which may potentially be cast in contemporary sources as “rebellions.” Two other regional domains known to have fallen out with the Zhou king are Qi in the mid-ninth century BCE and Lu 魯 in 796 BCE; see Shiji 史記 33.1527–28 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959); Li Feng, Landscape and Power, 97–99; Shaughnessy, Sources of Western Zhou History, 268–69.

19 For visits between regional rulers and the Zhou king, see Khayutina, “Royal Hospitality,” 18–25; Li Feng, Bureaucracy and the State, 260–64. For royal inspectors, see Huang Jinqian 黃錦前, “Yejiashan M107 suo chu Pu Jian gui ji xiangguan wenti” 葉家山 M107 所出濮監簋及相關問題, Sichuan wenwu 四川文物 2017.2, 72–73; Li Feng, Bureaucracy and the State, 251–52.

20 See Allen J. Chun, “Conceptions of Kinship and Kingship in Classical Chou China,” T’oung Pao 76 (1990), 16–48; Lothar von Falkenhausen, Chinese Society in the Age of Confucius (1000–250 BC): The Archaeological Evidence (Los Angeles: Cotsen Institute of Archaeology, University of California, Los Angeles, 2006), 64–70; Cho-yun Hsu and Katheryn M. Linduff, Western Chou Civilization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 163–71.

21 Khayutina, “Marital Alliances.”

22 Lattimore, Studies in Frontier History, 479–80; Mann, Sources of Social Power, 10, 25–27.

23 The English word “garrison” captures both senses and is thus a suitable translation; see Creel, Origins of Statecraft, 310–12. The term shi also appears as a common designation (meaning “captain, marshal”) in the names of Western Zhou nobles, in which context it likely reflects the bearer’s military background; see Li Feng, Bureaucracy and the State, 229–32.

24 Earlier scholarship on the Six and Eight Armies, beginning with the debate between Yu Xingwu 于省吾 and Yang Kuan 楊寬 published in the journal Kaogu 考古 in 1964–65, focused on the question of whether Western Zhou military organization revolved around the “district and suburb” (xiangsui 鄉遂) or “military-agricultural colony” (tuntian 屯田) system. Although both are institutions known from texts of later periods and are anachronistic in the context of the Western Zhou, the greater significance is that scholars recognized the importance of investigating the question of how Western Zhou armies were provisioned and administered. This remained a focal point of much subsequent research on the Six and Eight Armies, which are too numerous to list here; see, e.g., Creel, Origins of Statecraft, 305–10; Huang Shengsong, “Liu Shi yu Ba Shi”; Li Xueqin 李學勤, “Lun Xi Zhou jinwen de Liu Shi, Ba Shi” 論西周金文的六師、八師, Huaxia kaogu 華夏考古 1987.2, 206–10. For references to and summaries of Yu Xingwu and Yang Kuan’s discussions, see Chen Guangxin 陳光鑫, “‘Tuntian’ yu ‘xiangsui’: Shi shu Yu Xingwu, Yang Kuan de shixue lunbian” “屯田”與“鄉遂”——試述于省吾、楊寬的史學論辯, Shixue lilun yu shixueshi xuekan 史學理論與史學史學刊 2017.1: 260–73; Shim, “Kŭmmun,” 1–8.

25 Although its authenticity requires further verification, the Xian ding 賢鼎 inscription, which should date to the tenth century BCE, refers to the Eight Armies as the Eight Armies of the East 東八師 and abbreviates the Six and Eight Armies as the Western Armies 西師 and Eastern Armies 東師, respectively. This is thus far the only known attestation of these new appellations. For the Xian ding, see Wu Zhenfeng 吳鎮烽, Shang Zhou qingtongqi mingwen ji tuxiang jicheng xubian 商周青銅器銘文暨圖像集成續編 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2016), vol. 1, no. 228. For two studies of this inscription, see Huang Jinqian 黃錦前, “Xian ding suojian renwu, shishi ji zhidu” 賢鼎所見人物、史事暨制度, Chutu wenxian yanjiu 出土文獻研究 19 (2020), 7–16; Ye Xianchuang 葉先闖, “Xin jian Xian ding qiming yu Xi Zhou dashe li” 新見賢鼎器銘與西周大射禮, Baoji wenli xueyuan xuebao (shehuikexue ban) 寶雞文理學院學報(學會科學版) 39.1 (2019), 42–48.

26 See Huang Shengsong, “Liu Shi yu Ba Shi,” 51–53.

27 The numbering of bronze inscriptions in this study follows Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Shiyusuo Jinwen Gongzuoshi 中央研究院史語所金文工作室, Yin Zhou jinwen ji qingtongqi ziliaoku 殷周金文暨青銅器資料庫, https://w9.ihp.sinica.edu.tw/bronze/. The prefix “JC” has been added to inscriptions originally catalogued in Yin Zhou jinwen jicheng 殷周金文集成 for greater clarity.

28 Huang Shengsong, “Liu Shi yu Ba Shi,” 52.

29 Huang Shengsong, “Liu Shi yu Ba Shi,” 53–61; Tani Hideki 谷秀樹, “Sei Shū dai Sentō senryaku kō: ‘Tai’ to no kakawari o chūshin ni shite: Sei Shū chūki kaikaku kō (3)” 西周代陝東戦略考——「」との関わりを中心にして——〔西周中期改革考(3)〕, Ritsumeikan bungaku 立命館文学 626 (2012), 44–46.

30 See the Appendix.

31 Wang Changqi 王長啟, “Xi’an Feng-Hao yizhi faxian de chemakeng ji qingtongqi” 西安豐鎬遺址發現的車馬坑及青銅器, Wenwu 文物 2002.12, 4–14.

32 For the location of Lü, see Li Feng, Landscape and Power, 228–30.

33 Other objects in this category include the Shi ge 師戈 (NB 1926) found at Baoji 寶鷄, Shaanxi, and the X Shi ge 師戈 (JC 11012) of unknown provenance.

34 Li Feng, Bureaucracy and the State, 79–82.

35 The term fu 服 as a category of people is attested in the Jing gui 靜簋 (JC 4273). Wang Hui 王暉 suggests another reading of fu as garments, armor, or other such equipment, but to my knowledge this meaning is not attested in other Western Zhou bronze inscriptions; see Wang Hui, “Xi Zhou junfu wenti yanjiu” 西周軍賦問題研究, Baoji wenli xueyuan xuebao (shehuikexue ban) 寶雞文理學院學報(學會科學版) 35.4 (2015), 12–14.

36 For the meaning of yi 埶, see Li Feng, “‘Offices’ in Bronze Inscriptions and Western Zhou Government Administration,” Early China 26–27 (2001–2002), 35.

37 Wang Hui reads the partially effaced graph in this passage as you 右 and the resulting term da you 大右 to mean in context something like “the many herdsmen” (众多的放牧牧民); see Wang Hui, “Xi Zhou junfu,” 14. Provisionally accepting that the effaced graph is you, another possibility might be to understand da you as “Grand Right,” the counterpart of the “Grand Left” (da zuo 大左) mentioned in the First Year Shi Shi gui 元年師事簋 (JC 4279–82)—a military division stationed in the Zhou royal domain near the royal center of Feng 豐. Together, these may have comprised the Left and Right Camps (zuoyou xi 左右戲) mentioned in the Shi Hu gui 師虎簋 (JC 4316), for which see Li Feng, Bureaucracy and the State, 78–79, 192–93.

38 Chen Enlin 陳恩林, “Shilun Xi Zhou junshi lingdao tizhi de yiyuanhua” 試論西周軍事領導體制的一元化, Renwen zazhi 人文雜誌 1986.2, 71–76; Creel, Origins of Statecraft, 312; Huang Shengsong, “Liu Shi yu Ba Shi,” 34–45.

39 As was the case in subsequent periods in Chinese history, warhorses were paramount military assets in the Western Zhou period, during which time they were primarily used to operate war chariots. For the management of horses in the Western Zhou, see Vogt, Kingship, Ritual, and Royal Ideology, 98–107; Wang Hui, “Xi Zhou junfu,” 14–17. For the connection between hunting and warfare, see Lewis, Sanctioned Violence, 17–26.

40 See, e.g., the Xun gui 詢簋 (JC 4321) and Shi You pan 師酉簋 (JC 4288–91). For further discussion, see Li Feng, Bureaucracy and the State, 198; Li Kai 李凱, “Su you zhi ‘pu’ yu Xi Zhou junshi zhidu” 肅卣之“僕”與西周軍事制度, Hangzhou shifan daxue xuebao (shehuikexue ban) 杭州師範大學學報(社會科學版) 2018.1, 27–31.

41 Shim, “Kŭmmun,” 24. Since many inscriptions name only the commanders and do not detail which military units they led, it is still possible that the Six and Eight Armies, or at least elements thereof, were deployed in the various campaigns recounted in these inscriptions.

42 For instance, Li Feng demonstrates in the context of the Zhou-Xianyun wars that to defend the Zhou royal domain, “the Zhou must have always been prepared to bring a force into the battlefield within three or four days over a distance of 120 kilometers”; see Li Feng, Landscape and Power, 189. For related considerations of military logistics, see Mann, Sources of Social Power, 137–42; Ralph D. Sawyer, Ancient Chinese Warfare (New York: Basic Books, 2011), 390–401; Edward L. Shaughnessy, “Military Histories of Early China: A Review Article,” Early China 21 (1996), 163–64.

43 See Han, “Dui pen,” 43; Shim, “Kŭmmun”; Tani, “Sei Shū dai Sentō.”

44 See, e.g., the Jin Hou Su zhong 晉侯蘇鐘 (NA 870–89), Zha Bo ding 柞伯鼎 (NB 1059), and Ming Gong gui 明公簋 (JC 4029). Two additional illustrative examples, the Shi Mi gui 史密簋 (NA 636) and Shi Yuan gui 師㝨簋 (JC 4313–14), are discussed below in the next section. For further discussion, see also Shim Jae-hoon 沈載勳, “Chakpaekchŏng gwa Sŏ Chu hugi chŏnjaeng gŭmmun e nat’anan wang gwa chehu ŭi kunsajŏk yudae” 柞伯鼎과 西周 후기 전쟁금문에 나타난 왕과 제후의 군사적 유대, Chungguk kojungsesa yŏn’gu 中國古中世史研究 29 (2013), 221–63.

45 For the initial reports of the Shi Mi gui, see Li Qiliang 李啟良, “Shaanxi Ankang Shi chutu Xi Zhou Shi Mi gui” 陝西安康市出土西周史密簋, Kaogu yu wenwu 考古與文物 1989.3: 7–9; Zhang Maorong 張懋鎔, Zhao Rong 趙榮, and Zou Dongtao 鄒東涛, “Ankang chutu de Shi Mi gui jiqi yiyi” 安康出土的史密簋及其意義, Wenwu 文物 1989.7, 42, 64–71.

46 The date of the Shi Mi gui can be triangulated through five other inscriptions in which Marshal Su 師俗, the commander of the Changbi campaign, appears: the Shi You ding 師酉鼎 (NA 1600), Fifth Year Wei ding 五祀衛鼎 (JC 2832), Yong yu 永盂 (JC 10322), Nan Ji ding 南季鼎 (JC 2781), and Shi Chen ding 師晨鼎 (JC 2817). For the dating of these inscriptions, see Shaughnessy, Sources of Western Zhou History, 152–55, 258–59. Stylistically, the Shi Mi gui vessel dates approximately to the second half of the mid-Western Zhou period, supporting the view that it was a commemorative piece cast somewhat later after the conclusion of the Changbi campaign, which must have taken place earlier in the mid-Western Zhou period; see Li Xueqin 李學勤, “Shi Mi gui ming suo ji Xi Zhou zhongyao shishi kao” 史密簋銘所記西周重要史實考, Zhongguo shehuikexueyuan yanjiushengyuan xuebao 中國社會科學院研究生院學報 1991.2, 6; Zhang Maorong et al., “Ankang chutu de Shi Mi gui,” 68–69.

47 Kim Sŏng-gi 金聖基, Tongijok gwa Tongashia munmyŏng ŭi kiwŏn: Sŏ Chu p’yŏn 동이족과 동아시아 문명의 기원: 서주편 (Seoul: Sŏnggyun’gwan taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 2021), no. 74; Wang Hui 王輝, “Shi Mi gui shiwen kao di” 史密簋釋文考地, Renwen zazhi 人文雜誌 1991.4, 102–3; Zhao and Liang, “Cong zhanchang dao bianjiang,” 68. Though now split across the modern provinces of Shandong and Jiangsu, the Yi River is geographically linked to the Huai River Basin. For the possible etymological connection between Huai 淮 and Wei 濰, see Zhao Yanjiao 趙燕姣, “Xi Zhou shiqi de Huai Yi ji xiangguan zuqun” 西周時期的淮夷及相關族群, Dongyue luncong 東岳論叢 37.7 (2016), 166; cf. Lee You-pyo 李裕杓, “Xi Zhou shiqi Huai Yi mingcheng kaolun” 西周時期淮夷名稱考論, Zhongguo lishi dili luncong 中國歷史地理論叢 30.3 (2015), 141–47.

48 For an overview of the numerous studies of the Shi Mi gui published in the decades since its discovery, which are too numerous to list individually here, see Choi Nam-gyu 崔南圭, “Samilgwe ŭi tandae wa myŏngmun yŏn’gu” 《史密簋》의 斷代와 銘文 연구, Chunggugŏ munhak 中國語文學 61 (2012), 605–35. For additional references and an alternative translation by Constance Cook, see Constance A. Cook and Paul R. Goldin, eds., A Source Book of Ancient Chinese Bronze Inscriptions (Berkeley: Society for the Study of Early China, 2016), no. 38.

49 A detailed investigation of these Yi groups is beyond the scope of this article, but for further discussion see Chen Jie 陳絜 and Wang Xudong 王旭東, “Yinxu jiagu zhong de Wang Sheng yu Wang di: Jian tan buci ‘Hufang’ zhi youwu” 殷墟甲骨中的望乘與望地——兼談卜辭“虎方”之有無, Lanzhou daxue xuebao 蘭州大學學報 47.6 (2019), 1–6; Guo Jingyun 郭靜雲, “Shang Zhou Hufang he Lufang: Liang guo kongjian fanwei kao” 商周虎方和盧方:兩國空間範圍考, Nanfang wenwu 南方文物 2014.4, 104–10; Yang Kun 楊坤, “Cong Bo ding mingwen kan Xi Zhou zaoqi Lu guo de jinglüe” 從亳鼎銘文看西周早期魯國的經略, Qingtongqi yu jinwen 青銅器與金文 6 (2021.1), 85–89.

50 For the bronzes in which Marshal Su appears, see note 46 above.

51 Kim Sŏng-gi, Tongijok gwa Tongashia, no. 74; Li Xueqin, “Shi Mi gui,” 7–8; Zhang et al., “Ankang chutu de Shi Mi gui,” 67.

52 For zu, see Creel, Origins of Statecraft, 315–16; Paul Nicholas Vogt, “Between Kin and King: Social Aspects of Western Zhou Ritual” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2012), 48–50; Wang Qi 王祁, “Yinxu jiaguwen zhong de zu jun” 殷墟甲骨文中的族軍, Nanfang wenwu 南方文物 2017.4, 80–86; Zhang Yongshan 張永山, “Shi Mi gui ming yu Zhou shi yanjiu” 史密簋銘與周史研究, in Jinxinji: Zhang Zhenglang xiansheng bashi qingshou lunwenji 盡心集:張政烺先生八十慶壽論文集, ed. Wu Rongzeng 吳榮曾 (Beijing: Zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe, 1996), 196–97. For sui, see Li Feng, Bureaucracy and the State, 170–73. Some scholars opt to read sui as the polity of Sui 遂 located in the lower Wen 汶 River valley known from later texts, but the evidence for Sui in the Western Zhou period is thin; see Chen Quanfang 陳全方 and Shang Zhiru 尚志儒, “Shi Mi gui mingwen de jige wenti” 史密簋銘文的幾個問題, Kaogu yu wenwu 考古與文物 1993.3, 80–81; Wu Zhenfeng 吳鎮烽, “Shi Mi gui mingwen kaoshi” 史密簋銘文考釋, Kaogu yu wenwu 考古與文物 1989.3, 57; Zhang Yongshan, “Shi Mi gui,” 190–91.

53 See Chao Yuepei 晁嶽佩, “Cong Shi Mi gui mingwen kan Xi Zhou zhongqi de Qi guo shehui” 從史密簋銘文看西周中期的齊國社會, Qi Lu wenhua yanjiu 齊魯文化研究 2002.1, 162–65; Lin Nanchun 林楠春, “Shi Mi gui mingwen hui shi” 史密簋銘文彙釋, Qingnian wenxuejia 青年文學家 2011.11, 165–66.

54 See Cao Bin 曹斌, “Jiaodong tongqi yu Xi Zhou Ji Lai” 膠東銅器與西周紀萊, Kaogu 考古 2021.1, 88–99; Li Feng 李峰 and Liang Zhonghe 梁中合, eds., Guicheng: An Archaeological Study of the Formation of States on the Jiaodong Peninsula in Late Bronze-Age China, 1000–500 BC (Beijing: Kexue chubanshe, 2018); Minna Wu, “On the Periphery of a Great ‘Empire’: Secondary Formation of States and Their Material Basis in the Shandong Peninsula during the Late Bronze Age, ca. 1000–500 B.C.E.” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2013), 148–76.

55 For these identifications, see Kim Sŏng-gi, Tongijok gwa Tongashia, no. 74; Li Xueqin, “Shi Mi gui,” 8; Wu, “Shi Mi gui,” 58; Zhang Yongshan, “Shi Mi gui,” 190.

56 For dian, see Feng Shi 馮時, “Xi Zhou mu ji kao” 西周木屐考, Kaogu 考古 2019.6, 89–93; Liu Zhao 劉釗, “Tan Shi Mi gui mingwen zhong de ‘X’ zi” 談史密簋銘文中的“X”字, Kaogu 考古 1995.5, 434–35. This reading is plausible, though its suggested meaning of “rearguard” seems a stretch. For ni, see Sun Jingming 孫敬明 and Xu Pengzhi 徐鵬志, “Liang Zhou jinwen yu Ju shi bu” 两周金文與莒史補, Qi Lu xuekan 齊魯學刊 1995.4, 45. According to Zuozhuan 左傳, Xiang 襄 6.7, Qi conquered Lai later in 567 BCE and relocated its people to Ni 郳 (not to be confused with another state in southern Shandong with the same name also called Lesser Zhu 小邾), which was probably not too far removed from Lai; see Stephen Durrant, Wai-yee Li, and David Schaberg, Zuo Tradition / Zuozhuan 左傳: Commentary on the “Spring and Autumn Annals” (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2016), 930–31.

57 Li Xueqin, “Shi Mi gui,” 8; Wang Hui, “Shi Mi gui,” 102; Zhang Yongshan, “Shi Mi gui,” 192.

58 For an English translation of the Shi Yuan gui, see Li Feng, Bureaucracy and the State, 266. For Ji, see Cao, “Jiaodong tongqi”; Wu, “On the Periphery,” 194–246; Shim Jae-hoon 沈載勳, “Sang Chu ch’ŏngdonggi rŭl t’onghae pon Ki jok ŭi isan gwa sŏngsoe” 商周 청동기를 통해 본 㠱族의 이산과 성쇠, Yŏksa hakpo 歷史學報 200 (2008), 371–418.

59 Shim Jae-hoon 沈載勳, “Sŏ Chu sa ŭi saeroun palgyŏn: Sandong-sŏng Koch’ŏng-hyŏn Chinjang Sŏ Chu sŏngji wa In’gwe myŏngmun” 西周史의 새로운 발견: 山東省 高青縣 陳莊 西周 城址와 引簋 명문, Sahakchi 史學志 43 (2011), 22.

60 Fang Hui 方輝, “Gaoqing Chenzhuang tongqi mingwen yu chengzhi xingzhi kao” 高青陳莊銅器銘文與城址性質考, Guanzi xuekan 管子學刊 2010.3, 103; Li Ling 李零, “Du Chenzhuang yizhi chutu de qingtongqi mingwen” 讀陳莊遺址出土的青銅器銘文, Haidai kaogu 海岱考古 4 (2011), 371–73; Li Xueqin 李學勤 et al., “Shandong Gaoqing Xian Chenzhuang Xi Zhou yizhi bitan” 山東高青縣陳莊西周遺址筆談, Kaogu 考古 2011.2, 24–25; Zhang Xuehai 張學海, “Chenzhuang Xi Zhou cheng guankui” 陳莊西周城管窺, Haidai kaogu 海岱考古 4 (2011), 381.

61 It is not possible to individually list here the numerous studies of the Yin gui published since its discovery, but for a brief summary of the literature, see Li Xiuliang 李秀亮, “Gaoqing Chenzhuang yizhi yanjiu zongshu” 高青陳莊遺址研究綜述, Guanzi xuekan 管子學刊 2019.2, 122–24. Other important studies of the Yin gui not referenced elsewhere in this article include Wang Qi 王祁, “Gaoqing Chenzhuang chutu Yin gui zhong ‘fu lü bing’ wei ‘fu Ju bing’ shuo” 高青陳莊出土引簋中“俘呂兵”為“俘莒兵”說, Guanzi xuekan 管子學刊 2017.1, 116–19; Yan Zhibin 嚴志斌, “Yin gui ming ‘fu’ zi xiao yi” 引簋銘“俘”字小議,” in Jiaguxue ji Gaoqing Chenzhuang Xi Zhou chengzhi zhongda faxian guoji xueshu yantaohui lunwenji 甲骨學暨高青陳莊西周城址重大發現國際學術研討會論文集, ed. Zhang Guangming 張光明 and Xu Yihua 徐義華 (Ji’nan: Qi Lu shushe, 2014), 102–6.

62 See Li Ling, “Du Chenzhuang yizhi,” 374.

63 Li Feng, Bureaucracy and the State, 98.

64 Shandong Sheng Wenwu Kaogu Yanjiusuo 山東省文物考古研究所, “Shandong Gaoqing Chenzhuang Xi Zhou yizhi” 山東高青陳莊遺址西周遺址, Kaogu 考古 2010.8, 31.

65 Shandong Sheng Wenwu Kaogu Yanjiusuo 山東省文物考古研究所, “Shandong Gaoqing Xian Chenzhuang Xi Zhou yicun fajue jianbao” 山東高青縣陳莊西周遺存發掘簡報, Kaogu 考古 2011.2, 7. For the bronze inscriptions from Chenzhuang M18, see Fang, “Gaoqing Chenzhuang tongqi”; Li Ling, “Du Chenzhuang yizhi”; Li Xueqin 李學勤, “Lun Gaoqing Chenzhuang qi ming ‘Wen Zu Jia Qi Gong’” 論高青陳莊器銘“文祖甲齊公,” Dongyue luncong 東岳論叢 31.10 (2010), 40–41; Ren Xianghong 任相宏 and Zhang Guangming 張光明, “Gaoqing Chenzhuang yizhi M18 chutu Feng gui mingwen kaoshi ji xiangguan wenti tantao” 高青陳莊遺址 M18 出土豐簋銘文考釋及相關問題探討, Guanzi xuekan 管子學刊 2010.2, 97–102; Zhang Juncheng 張俊成, “Gaoqing Chenzhuang ‘Qi Gong’ zhu qi mingwen ji xiangguan wenti” 高青陳莊“齊公”諸器銘文及相關問題, Chutu wenxian 出土文獻 11 (2017), 19–29.

66 See Li Ling, “Du Chenzhuang yizhi,” 374; Li Xiuliang 李秀亮, “Shandong Gaoqing Chenzhuang yizhi suo chu jinwen yu Qi shi xin zheng” 山東高青陳莊遺址所出金文與齊史新證, Qingtongqi yu jinwen 青銅器與金文 7 (2021.2), 65–74; Sun Jingming 孫敬明 and Zhao Kezeng 趙克增, “Xi Zhou jinwen ‘Qi shi’ yu dianji ‘Shi Shangfu’ lei zheng” 西周金文“齊師”與典籍“師尚父”類證, in Zhang and Xu, Jiaguxue ji Gaoqing Chenzhuang, 73; Wang Shaolin 王少林, “Gaoqing Chenzhuang X gui mingwen kaoshi ji xiangguan wenti yanjiu” 高青陳莊X簋銘文考釋及相關問題研究, Luoyang shifan xueyuan xuebao 洛陽師範大學學報 32.7 (2013), 43–44; Zhao Qingmiao 趙慶淼, “Gaoqing Chenzhuang Yin gui mingwen yu Zhou dai mingqing zhidu” 高青陳莊引簋銘文與周代命卿制度, Guanzi xuekan 管子學刊 2015.3, 105–6.

67 Tomb M35 was furnished with an inner and outer coffin, and its burial assemblage comprised a total of thirteen bronze objects including eight ritual vessels and five weapons, two chariots on the entry ramp, and a dog with a bronze bell around its neck; see Shandong Sheng Wenwu Kaogu Yanjiusuo, “Shandong Gaoqing Chenzhuang,” 32; Liu Haiyu 劉海宇 and Wu Jian 武健, “‘Yin gui’ shiwen ji xiangguan wenti chutan” “引簋”釋文及相關問題初探, Haidai kaogu 海岱考古 4 (2011), 426. For comparison, the burial assemblage of M18 comprised eleven bronze objects including nine ritual bronzes and two weapons, as well as seven pottery vessels; see Shandong Sheng Wenwu Kaogu Yanjiusuo, “Shandong Gaoqing Xian Chenzhuang,” 7.

68 As noted by Lothar von Falkenhausen, Zhou sumptuary burial privileges were typically more consistent “within lineages rather than among lineages”; see Falkenhausen, Chinese Society, 100.

69 Kim Jung-ryol 金正烈, “Sŏ Chu shidae ŭi Dongi” 西周時代의 東夷, Sungshil sahak 崇實史學 32 (2014), 256–60.

70 See Geng Xue 耿雪, “Gaoqing Xian Chenzhuang yizhi ruxuan 2023 niandu Shandong Sheng wu da kaogu xin faxian” 高青縣陳莊遺址入選 2023 年度山東省五大考古新發現, Bolan xinwen 博覽新聞/Zibo ribao 淄博日報, March 4, 2024, accessed May 5, 2025, https://news.lznews.cn/luzhong/zibo/202403/t20240304_13761305.html; Sun Congcong 孫叢叢, “‘Haidai kaogu’ chu xin cai” “海岱考古”出新彩, Zhongguo wenhua bao 中國文化報, March 21, 2024.

71 Wang Entian 王恩田 attempts to reconcile this absence by reading the character for Yin as shen 申 and linking shen to shan 山 on phonetic grounds, ultimately identifying the sponsor of the Yin gui as Lord Xian 獻 of Qi (d. 851 BCE), whose personal name was Shan according to the Shiben 世本; see Wang Entian, “Shen gui kaoshi: Jian shuo Gaoqing Chenzhuang Qi guo gongshi mudi de niandai yu muzhu” 申簋考釋——兼說高青陳莊齊國公室墓地的年代與墓主, Haidai kaogu 海岱考古 4 (2011), 390–91, 393. However, as Li Ling 李零 points out, the graph shen occurs elsewhere in the same inscription (in the date notation renshen 任申) where it is clearly distinct from that for Yin; see Li Ling, “Du Chenzhuang yizhi,” 371–72.

72 In the remaining two inscriptions, the Bo Chen ding 伯晨鼎 (JC 2816) and Yi Hou Ze gui 宜侯夨簋 (JC 4320), the composition of gifted items varies (aside from the red bow and one hundred red arrows). In transmitted texts, the royal gift of one red bow and one hundred red arrows to rulers of Jin is mentioned in the Zuozhuan and Shangshu 尚書, for which see, respectively, Durrant et al., Zuo Tradition, 420–21, 484–85; James Legge, The Chinese Classics, Vol. III: The Shoo King, or the Book of Historical Documents (London: Trübner & Co., 1865), 618–19. For further discussion of additional variations of this gift set (different colors or quantities of bow and arrows), see Yang Yongsheng 楊永生, “Cong Yin gui kan Zhou dai de mingqing zhidu” 從引簋看周代的命卿制度, Shixue jikan 史學集刊 2015.5, 109–18.

73 Liu and Wu, “Yin gui,” 430.

74 See Wang Rong 王戎, “Chenzhuang Xi Zhou yizhi yu Qi guo Xi Zhou shi de jige wenti” 陳莊西周遺址與齊國西周史的幾個問題, Guanzi xuekan 管子學刊 2014.3, 32.

75 See Yang Yongsheng, “Cong Yin gui kan Zhou dai.”

76 See Zhang Yingqiao 張應橋, “Shang Zhou mudao zhidu bianlun” 商周墓道制度辯論, Zhongyuan wenwu 中原文物 2009.2, 47–48.

77 See Cao Bin 曹斌, “Shandong Gaoqing Xian Chenzhuang yizhi xingzhi tanxi” 山東高青縣陳莊遺址性質探析, Kaogu 考古 2018.3, 91. This is a small quantity when compared, for example, to the bronze burial assemblages found in the tombs of Western Zhou period Jin 晉 rulers at Beizhao 北趙, Shanxi, for which see Falkenhausen, Chinese Society, 88.

78 For Western Zhou royal appointment inscriptions, see Virginia C. Kane, “Aspects of Western Chou Appointment Inscriptions: The Charge, the Gifts, and the Response,” Early China 8 (1982–83), 14–28; Li Feng, Bureaucracy and the State, 103–11.

79 As evidenced by late Shang oracle bone inscriptions, the toponym Qi probably originally referred to the region encompassing the lower reaches of the ancient Ji 濟 River, where the regional domain of Qi was later established by the Zhou; see Wang Xiuliang 王秀亮 and Jiang Lei 姜磊, “Qi ming zhi yuan kaobian” 齊名之源考辨, Guanzi xuekan 管子學刊 2014.1, 32–36; Zhao Yun 趙縕, “Shuo ‘Qi’ yu ‘Ji’” 說 “齊” 與 “濟,” Guanzi xuekan 管子學刊 2001.4, 25–29.

80 For the X gui, see Chen Mengjia 陳夢家, Xi Zhou tongqi duandai 西周銅器斷代 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2004), no. 218; Li Xueqin 李學勤, “Gaoqing Chenzhuang Yin gui jiqi lishi beijing” 高青陳莊引簋及其歷史背景, Wenshizhe 文史哲 2011.3, 121.

81 For the Chenzhuang site reports, see Shandong Sheng Wenwu Kaogu Yanjiusuo 山東省文物考古研究所, “Gaoqing Xian Chenzhuang Xi Zhou yicun fajue jianbao” 高青縣陳莊西周遺存發掘簡報, Haidai kaogu 海岱考古 4 (2011), 72–104; Shandong Sheng Wenwu Kaogu Yanjiusuo, “Shandong Gaoqing Chenzhuang”; Shandong Sheng Wenwu Kaogu Yanjiusuo, “Shandong Gaoqing Xian Chenzhuang.”

82 Jin Guiyun 靳桂雲 et al., “Xi Zhou wangchao de dongfang junshi zhongzhen: Shandong Gaoqing Chenzhuang yizhi de gu zhiwu zhengju” 西周王朝的東方軍事重鎮: 山東高青陳莊遺址的古植物證據, Kexue tongbao 科學通報 56.35 (2011), 2996–3002; Jin Guiyun et al., “Shandong Gaoqing Chenzhuang yizhi tanhua zhongzi guoshi yanjiu” 山東高青陳莊遺址炭化種子果實研究, Nanfang wenwu 南方文物 2012.1, 147–55; Jin Guiyun et al., “An Important Military City of the Early Western Zhou Dynasty: Archaeobotanical Evidence from the Chenzhuang Site, Gaoqing, Shandong Province,” Chinese Science Bulletin 57.2–3 (2012), 253–60.

83 One additional discovery whose precise nature has puzzled scholars is the rammed earth platform TJ2 situated roughly twenty meters north of Chenzhuang’s south gate. This feature is most commonly seen as a ritual altar of some kind; see Gao Mingkui 高明奎, “Gaoqing Chenzhuang Xi Zhou jitan yanjiu: Jian lun Xi Zhou jitian, sishe de youguan wenti” 高青陳莊西周祭壇研究——兼論西周祭天、祀社的有關問題, Haidai kaogu 海岱考古 2023.1, 108–15; Li Xiuliang, “Gaoqing Chenzhuang yizhi,” 120–21. Given Chenzhuang’s military character, TJ2 may have been a site where war-related rituals were conducted, as military campaigns typically started and ended with sacrifices. For discussion of such rituals, see Lewis, Sanctioned Violence, 23–26; Shang Yantao 商豔濤 and Li Xiaohua 李小華, “Xi Zhou jinwen suojian yu zhengfa xiangguan de ji zhong huodong” 西周金文所見與征伐相關的幾種活動, Dongfang wenhua 東方文化 43.1–2 (2010), 67–75.

84 For the location of Bin 豳, see Li Feng, Landscape and Power, 160–64.

85 For the key phrases “xun xiao da you lian” 訊小大有憐 and “qu chuan wu lüe” 取遄五鋝, see Chao Fulin 晁福林, “Beijing Shifan Daxue cang Gou yan shi shi: Jian lun yiming ‘you lin’ ‘qu chuan’ he ‘yong shi’” 北京師範大學藏㝅甗試釋——兼論彝銘“有粦”“取遄”“用事,” Qingtongqi yu jinwen 青銅器與金文 6 (2021.1), 1–10; cf. Cook and Goldin, Source Book, no. 23.

86 See Li Feng, Bureaucracy and the State, 81–82.

87 For the Shan ding, see Li Feng, Bureaucracy and the State, 199–200n18, 208; Ma Chengyuan 馬承源, ed., Shang Zhou qingtongqi mingwen xuan 商周青銅器銘文選, vol. 3 (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 1988), no. 321.

88 For the geography of the Zhou-Xianyun wars, see Li Feng, Landscape and Power, 158–65. For the archaeological landscape of the Jing River valley, which demonstrates that the region had close cultural ties to the Zhou royal domain in the Wei River valley, see Li Feng, Landscape and Power, 49–54; Yan Sun, Many Worlds Under One Heaven: Material Culture, Identity, and Power in the Northern Frontiers of the Western Zhou, 1045–771 BCE (New York: Columbia University Press, 2021), 17–62.

89 See Li Ling 李零, “Bin di kao: Cong dili wenxian he mingke ziliao zai sikao” 豳地考——從地理文獻和銘刻資料再思考, Zhongguo guojia bowuguan guankan 中國國家博物館館刊 247 (2024.11), 87–102.

90 For the Xitou site reports, see Xibei Daxue Wenhua Yichan Xueyuan 西北大學文化遺產學院 et al., “Shaanxi Xunyi Xian Xitou yizhi Shang Zhou shiqi yicun” 陝西旬邑縣西頭遺址商周時期遺存, Kaogu 考古 2024.12, 17–39; Xibei Daxue Wenhua Yichan Xueyuan 西北大學文化遺產學院 et al., “Shaanxi Xunyi Xitou yizhi Shangmiao didian 2022 nian fajue jianbao” 陝西旬邑西頭遺址上廟地點 2022 年發掘簡報, Kaogu yu wenwu 考古與文物 2024.8, 15–26; Xibei Daxue Wenhua Yichan Xueyuan 西北大學文化遺產學院 et al., “Shaanxi Xunyi Xian Xitou yizhi Yuzuipo didian Shang Zhou shiqi yicun fajue jianbao” 陝西旬邑縣西頭遺址魚嘴坡地點商周時期遺存發覺簡報, Kaogu 考古 2021.12, 22–39.

91 For Hu, see Kim Jung-ryol 金正烈, “Sŏ Chu shidae ŭi Ho wa Ho hu” 西周時代의 胡와 胡侯, Sungshil sahak 崇實史學 37 (2016), 357–89.

92 Excepting the Six and Eight Armies. For an earlier collation of shi that appear in Western Zhou bronze inscriptions, see Huang Shengsong, “Liu Shi yu Ba Shi,” 47–48.

93 Li Feng, Landscape and Power, 228–30.

94 Li Ling, “Bin di kao”; cf. Wang Shoukuan 汪受寬, “Bin guo diwang kao” 豳國地望考, Zhonghua wenshi luncong 中華文史論叢 92 (2008.4), 9–24.

95 Li Feng, Landscape and Power, 160–64.

96 Li Xueqin 李學勤, “Mu gong guigai zai qingtongqi fenqi shang de yiyi” 穆公簋蓋在青銅器分期上的意義, Wenbo 文博 1984.2: 6; cf. Guo Yongbing 郭永秉, “Mu gong guigai suo ji Zhou Mu wang da sou shi kao” 穆公簋蓋所記周穆王大蒐事考, Fudan xuebao (shehuikexue ban) 復旦學報(社會科學版) 2012.5, 138.

97 Lei Chinhau 雷晉豪, “Jinwen zhong de ‘X’ di jiqi junshi dili xin tan” 金文中的“X”地及其軍事地理新探, Lishi dili 歷史地理 26 (2012), 211–41; Yu Kai 于凱, “Xi Zhou jinwen zhong de ‘shi’ he Xi Zhou de junshi gongnengqu” 西周金文中的“”和西周的軍事功能區, Shixue jikan 史學集刊 2004.3, 24.

98 Yu, “Xi Zhou jinwen,” 25.

99 Yu, “Xi Zhou jinwen,” 25.

100 Yu, “Xi Zhou jinwen,” 25.

101 The toponym Yan 炎 appears in the Zuoce Ze Ling gui 作冊夨令簋 (JC 4300–4301) as a place the Zhou king visited while on campaign to attack the southern polity of Chu 楚; see Yu, “Xi Zhou jinwen,” 25; cf. Huang Shengsong, “Liu Shi yu Ba shi,” 52–53.

102 Xiao Wei 肖威, “You Shi Wei zhu qi kan Shao Gong nanzheng” 由師衛諸器看召公南征, Qingtongqi yu jinwen 青銅器與金文 8 (2022.1), 70–73.

103 Xiao, “You Shi Wei zhu qi”; cf. Yan Guosheng 鄢國盛, “Shi Wei qi Feng Gong, Kuai Shi xiao kao” 師衛器豐公、鄶師小考, Nanfang wenwu 南方文物 2019.3, 161–66.

104 Wu Zhenfeng 吳鎮烽, Shang Zhou qingtongqi mingwen ji tuxiang jicheng 商周青銅器銘文暨圖像集成 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2012), vol. 4, no. 2185, vol. 10, no. 4937.

105 Han, “Dui pen,” 25–26.

106 Wu Zhenfeng 吳鎮烽, Shang Zhou qingtongqi mingwen ji tuxiang jicheng san bian 商周青銅器銘文暨圖像集成三編 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2020), vol. 2, no. 507.

Figure 0

Figure 1 Locations mentioned in this article. Digital elevation model source: A. Jarvis, H.I. Reuter, A. Nelson, E. Guevara, Hole-filled seamless SRTM data V4, International Centre for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT), 2008, available from http://srtm.csi.cgiar.org/.