Haunting memorials: the hauntological cycle of de- and re-commemoration

The term hauntology first appeared in Jacques Derrida’s Specters of Marx (Reference Derrida1994). He coined this neologism as a combination of “haunting” and “ontology,” signifying the critical exploration of ghostly traces of past ideologies, suppressed memories, and unfulfilled futures that linger and disrupt the present (Derrida Reference Derrida1994: 10). Hauntology has influenced many academic disciplines, leading to what Luckhurst (Reference Luckhurst2002) describes as “an explosion of academic work … [on] ghosts,” resulting in the “spectral turn” (p. 527; see also Gunn Reference Gunn2006; Good Reference Good2020). By challenging presentism and the linear view of history on the basis of the idea that “the past is past” and the present is its natural conclusion, hauntology reveals how suppressed memories and unresolved traumas from the past continue to seep into the present shaping its reality. In the context of this article, hauntology helps illuminate how the Statue of Peace and its replications are haunting presences that resist the state’s attempts at de-commemoration. As Derrida (Reference Derrida1994) explains, a haunting is “both a dead man who comes back and a ghost whose expected return repeats itself, again and again” (p. 10). Likewise, the Statue of Peace has been repeatedly replicated and reinstalled, making a haunting return that resists efforts at its forced closure.

Among the growing body of literature on haunting post-conflict memorials, this article is especially informed by the work of Jessica Auchter (Reference Auchter2014) and Christine Sylvester (Reference Sylvester2019). Both scholars suggest that memorials are haunting because they represent the dead who continue to influence the living in the present and even in the future, rather than being confined to the past. However, they focus on different sources of what makes memorials haunting. Auchter (Reference Auchter2014) focuses on how memorials become haunting through statecraft’s narrative manipulation aimed at reordering society. She observes that “memorial sites offer an interesting way to explore questions of life and death through the politics of haunting” (p. 2) because memorials are products of political decisions about who should be remembered and who should be forgotten. By contrast, Sylvester (Reference Sylvester2019) emphasizes how ordinary people make memorials haunting by re-curating them in defiance of the state’s control over their design, meaning, and political use. The photographs, belongings, and keepsakes placed next to memorials by the families and loved ones of the deceased deepen their haunting effect by evoking a powerful sense of unresolved presence and personal loss.

Building on both studies’ insights, this article focuses on the hauntological cycle produced by processes of de-commemoration and re-commemoration to analyze the replications of the Statue of Peace. In response to the global trend of toppling statues and destroying monuments representing past eras when different social norms or practices existed, scholars have turned their attention to the never-ending cycle of commemoration, de-commemoration, and re-commemoration (Adams and Guttel-Klein Reference Adams and Yinon2022; Gensburger and Wüstenberg Reference Gensburger and Wüstenberg2023; Adams Reference Adams2024). Gensburger and Wüstenberg (Reference Gensburger and Wüstenberg2023) define de-commemoration as the removal, destruction, or fundamental alteration of material and public representations of the past, framing it as an act of commemoration and a generative moment that makes re-commemoration possible. Adams and Guttel-Klein (Reference Adams and Yinon2022) also argue that de-commemoration is not simply an act of erasure, but rather a commemorative practice that broadens the ways in which a society can symbolize and negotiate its collective identity.

Re-commemoration involves the installation of new memory sites, both highlighting the ongoing social processes of negotiating memory and constructing meaning (Adams Reference Adams2024). Beiner (Reference Beiner2018) notes that when previously hidden memories rise into public view for celebration, they often confront “a violent response of decommemorating, which drives them back into the private sphere, but in turn may trigger initiatives for re-commemorating” (p. 41). Indeed, Yun (Reference Yun2024) argues that the processes of removal, re-erection, and modification of the Statue of Peace have become subjects of public debate, suggesting that the removal of the statue, as has occurred in certain locales, is not its end but a new beginning in the public discourse on how “comfort women” should be remembered (p. 2). Shim (Reference Shim2023) also points out that the controversy surrounding the Statue of Peace only renews public attention to the cause of the “comfort women.” He further notes that many activists and survivors interpret the removal of the statue as “silencing the victims and erasing their memories,” which in turn helps explain the proliferation of replicas (Shim Reference Shim2023, p. 668). Yun (Reference Yun2024) and Shim (Reference Shim2023) do not explicitly refer to the hauntological cycle of the statue, but they suggest that attempts to remove it often generate further debate and lead to its continued replication and re-commemoration in resistance to efforts to erase the memory of “comfort women.” Building on these studies, this article links the cycle of commemoration, de-commemoration, and re-commemoration to a hauntological cycle of the Statue of Peace, suggesting that this framework may also apply to other contentious memorials.

Commemorating and de-commemorating the statue of peace

This section examines how the Statue of Peace was erected by a South Korean civic group, the Korean Council, and how the Japanese government and right-wing civic groups in both Japan and South Korea have sought to de-commemorate it. On December 14, 2011, the Korean Council installed the first Statue of Peace to commemorate the 1,000th weekly “Wednesday Demonstration” (Korean Council 2025). The statue was placed across the street from the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, the site of the weekly demonstrations, and serves as a symbol of the demand for the Japanese government to take legal responsibility for the “comfort women” system (Kim and Kim Reference Kim and Kim2016). It is a life-size bronze sculpture of a girl aged 13–17 years, dressed in Korean traditional clothing, hanbok, barefoot, and seated on a chair. Her demeanor is calm and determined. But her shadow on the base of the monument is of an old woman with a bent back, which symbolizes that she spent her entire life seeking to achieve justice. Adjacent to the statue is an empty chair, inviting visitors to sit in empathy and solidarity with “her” and serving as a symbolic space for deceased victims (Kwon Reference Kwon2019; Chapman Reference Chapman2021; Shim Reference Shim2023).

The Japanese government began formally requesting the removal of the original Statue of Peace soon after its erection, claiming that it jeopardized the safety and dignity of Japanese embassy premises and violated Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 (Kim Reference Kim2017d). The South Korean government initially showed little response to Japan’s requests, as the Statue of Peace had been erected by a civic group. However, it ultimately acknowledged Japan’s demands in the 2015 bilateral agreement between South Korea and Japan on the “comfort women” issue. The agreement explicitly referenced the Statue of Peace, stating:

(2) The Government of the Republic of Korea acknowledges the fact that the Government of Japan is concerned about the statue built in front of the Embassy of Japan in Seoul from the viewpoint of preventing any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity, and will strive to solve this issue in an appropriate manner through taking measures such as consulting with related organizations about possible ways of addressing this issue (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2015).

This clause reveals the deep-seated tensions between commemoration and de-commemoration, symbolizing civic remembrance on one side and state-level discomfort on the other.

This abrupt settlement between the two governments, which sought a “final and irreversible” resolution, sparked significant backlash from survivors and activists, as it absolved Japan of legal responsibility while implying that South Korea would consider removing the statue (Chun Reference Chun2021; Ramaj Reference Ramaj2022). On December 28, 2016, the first anniversary of the 2015 “comfort women” agreement, civic groups attempted to install a replica of the Statue of Peace in front of the Japanese Consulate in Busan, which led to a fierce confrontation with the Busan police (Kim Reference Kim2016a). When media outlets broadcast live footage of the police clashing with civic groups in an effort to remove the statue, public opinion turned sharply against the Busan local government (Cha Reference Cha2016). The backlash was so intense that the local government allowed the civic organizations to install the statue 2 days later, on December 30, 2016 (Kim Reference Kim2016b). After the approval, Japan responded with “extremely strong” diplomatic measures, including withdrawing its ambassador and suspending economic negotiations between Seoul and Tokyo in 2017 (Gil and Cho Reference Gil and Cho2019). This conflict surrounding the statue in Busan caused grave diplomatic tensions between Japan and South Korea and aggravated public sentiments toward each other (Rich Reference Rich2017).

Right-wing politicians and civic groups in Japan also participated in efforts to remove the Statue of Peace. In 2019, one of the replicas of the Statue of Peace was installed at the Aichi Triennale in Nagoya, Japan, as part of an exhibition with the theme “No freedom of speech and after.” During the display, four right-wing individuals disrespected the statue by placing a paper bag over its face,Footnote ³ hitting it while taking photos, and posting the images on social media (Kim Reference Kim2019b). The committee of the Aichi Triennale announced the removal of the replica within 1 day of installation due to multiple threats of terrorist attacks (Kim Reference Kim2019a). On the same day, but prior to the committee announcement, the mayor of Nagoya, Kawamura Takashi, stated that he would request its removal, saying “The Statue of Peace will trample on Japanese people’s hearts. Any exhibit subsidized by public funds cannot display it,” while the governor of Aichi later held a press conference to announce its removal from the exhibition (Kim Reference Kim2019b). This incident illustrates the internal divisions within Japan between those who wish to commemorate the “comfort women” through the Statue of Peace and those who seek to de-commemorate it.

Beyond South Korea and Japan, the Japanese government has also formally opposed the installation of replicas of the Statue of Peace, exerting pressure for their removal. For instance, in June 2024, the latest permanent replica of the Statue of Peace outside South Korea was installed in Stintino, Italy. The statue was accompanied by an inscription stating that “it is regrettable that the Japanese government continues to deny the presence of ‘comfort women’ and attempts to take down the Statue of Peace in Germany, the Philippines, and other countries” (Jang and Kim Reference Jang and Kim2024). The Japanese government officially submitted a formal objection to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and raised concerns about the inscription through its embassy in Italy, claiming that it reflects a narrative biased toward the victims’ perspective (Byun Reference Byun2024). The mayor of Stintino, Rita Limbania Vallebella, emphasized that “the statue serves as a reminder of the causes of sexual violence that women around the world still suffer from, and therefore, the inscription cannot be modified or removed” (Jang and Kim Reference Jang and Kim2024). Due to the Japanese government’s official opposition, the Statue of Peace in Italy attracted greater media attention, additional public statements from the mayor, and increased interest from civil society. This illustrates the haunting cycle surrounding the hunted statue: the more aggressively it is subjected to de-commemoration, the more intense and widespread the public reaction and acts of re-commemoration become.

As these cases show, while civic actors commemorate the Statue of Peace to honor victims and demand justice, the Japanese government and right-wing groups have actively pursued its de-commemoration both domestically and internationally. These cases demonstrate the tension between commemoration and de-commemoration, revealing the conflicting narratives over how the “comfort women” should be remembered. While civic actors seek to commemorate the victims through the Statue of Peace, the Japanese government often attempts to control such memory practices to align with its diplomatic interests and national image. These clashing narratives between civic groups and governments have paradoxically sparked even greater public discourse about the meaning of “comfort women” memory and the politics of who is remembered. The efforts to de-commemorate the statues have only served to further expose the depth of unresolved historical injustices and the persistence of civic resistance across national boundaries. This haunting resonance has, in turn, contributed to the global spread of re-commemorative efforts, which will be the focus of the following section.

Civic re-commemoration efforts through the replication of the statue of peace

In response to de-commemoration efforts, the replication of the Statue of Peace functions as civic resistance and re-commemoration, which this study terms a hauntological cycle of de-commemoration and re-commemoration. Kwon (Reference Kwon2019) defines this continuous replication of the Statue of Peace as the “SonyosangFootnote ⁴ Phenomenon,” driven by “voluntary citizen activism involving protecting the statue from being removed and installing replicas and variations of the statue in South Korea and abroad” (p. 6). Citizens continue to install replicas of the Statue of Peace as a protest against the Japanese government’s attempts to erase the history of “comfort women” (Chapman Reference Chapman2021, p. 4). The replication of the statue serves as re-enactment that symbolizes “comfort women” victim-survivors and promotes renewed recognition of this history (Shin Reference Shin2020).

One of the most emblematic cases of this hauntological cycle can be found in the United States, particularly in Glendale and San Francisco, California. The replica erected in Glendale on July 30, 2013, was the first Statue of Peace installed outside of South Korea. The replication on U.S. soil triggered strong reactions from Japanese officials and right-wing individuals. As Shin (Reference Shin2020) notes, the Glendale replica became the object of intense political and legal backlash from Japanese officials and right-wing actors, who viewed it as “sending a message demanding Japan’s apology and responsibility,” and responded with “discomfort and resentment” (p. 233). On July 31, 2013, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide publicly stated that the Japanese government had requested Glendale city officials to reconsider the installation, calling it “extremely regrettable” and “incompatible with Japan’s position” (Shin Reference Shin2020: 236). Although the Japanese government supported a lawsuit seeking the statue’s removal, both the U.S. federal and California state courts ultimately ruled in favor of Glendale in 2017, upholding the city’s right to free expression and concluding the case with a $300,000 legal cost imposed on the plaintiffs (Lee Reference Lee2019, p. 78).

Ironically, this backlash only fueled further public interest and support for the statue. As Shin (Reference Shin2020) observes, “the more sensitively Japanese right-wing groups reacted to the statue, the more enthusiasm for erecting it spread” (p. 233). Various civic groups rallied in support, including Glendale’s sizable Armenian community—many of whom are descendants of genocide survivors—and Japanese American civil rights organizations such as Nikkei for Civil Rights & Redress (NCRR) and the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) (Lee Reference Lee2019: 73–74). These groups saw commonalities between their own histories of trauma and the women’s experiences in solidarity.

The installation of the Statue of Peace replica and the subsequent lawsuits drew significant media attention to the “comfort women” issue in the United States, which in turn influenced other cities, including San Francisco. This growing awareness contributed to the establishment of a similar yet distinct “comfort women” memorial at St. Mary’s Square in San Francisco, unveiled in September 2017 (Roh Reference Roh2017). Initiated by Chinese American civic organizations, this statue differs from the original Statue of Peace in both form and symbolism: it features three young girls representing Korea, China, and the Philippines, standing back to back, holding hands in a circle, while an older figure modeled after Kim Hak-sun (the first Korean former “comfort woman” to speak publicly about her experience) gazes up at the three girls with clasped hands (McGrane Reference McGrane2017). This multilayered representation drew support from a broad range of Asian American communities, including Japanese Americans. The Japanese government once again expressed strong opposition.

In November 2017, Osaka Mayor Hirofumi Yoshimura warned that unless the statue was removed, Osaka would terminate its sister-city relationship with San Francisco, a relationship that had lasted since 1957. When San Francisco officials made it clear that they would not remove the statue, Osaka followed through with the cancellation in December 2017, citing the memorial as an act that “damaged mutual trust” (Kim Reference Kim2017a). Despite these tensions, the movement to replicate the Statue of Peace continued to gain momentum in the United States, with new replicas erected in Georgia, Michigan, New York, Virginia, Connecticut, and Texas. (Korean Council 2025). The Japanese government’s de-commemoration efforts have paradoxically fueled the statue’s re-commemoration, reinforcing a hauntological cycle in which suppressed memories return with greater intensity.

Civic actors have replicated the Statue of Peace in various forms. In addition to 173 replicas of the Statue of Peace erected around the world, mini-sized replicas of the Statue of Peace also have been displayed by civic organizations. On August 14, 2017, 500 mini-sized replicas were exhibited at Cheonggye Stream Square in Seoul, for 8 hours and 14 minutes, from 8 a.m. to 4:14 p.m., to commemorate the day on August 14, 1991, when one of the survivors, Kim Hak-sun, gave the first public testimony about her experience at “comfort” stations (Kim Reference Kim2017b). The number 500 signifies not only the number of survivors who registered themselves as former “comfort women” with the South and North Korean governments, but also the unknown victims who could not come forward (Lee Reference Lee2017).

Similar events have been held without installing physical statues. People participate in performing as the statues themselves, another form of replicating the Statue of Peace. On March 1, 2017, more than 1,000 citizens gathered near the Japanese consulate to protest Japan’s demand for the removal of the replica installed in Busan, Korea (Kim Reference Kim2017c). Civic organizations had prepared 1,000 chairs for the participants, who sat on them to symbolically embody and replicate the Statue of Peace with their bodies, and 1,000 citizens simultaneously removed their shoes and socks for a minute of silence, embodying the barefoot figure of the Statue of Peace to symbolize the victims’ suffering and their unwavering pursuit of justice (Kim Reference Kim2017c). These numerous material and performative replications of the Statue of Peace clearly illustrate the hauntological cycle of de-commemoration and re-commemoration—the more efforts made to de-commemorate, the more intensely acts of re-commemoration emerge.

Moving beyond the hauntological cycle of the statue: from erasure to embrace

Then, must this hauntological cycle simply continue in this way? Is there no way to bring it to an end? This section explores hauntological perspectives on potential ways to peacefully coexist with the statues, rather than treating them as objects that must be either removed or reproduced. If this cycle can be brought to an end and attempts made to move beyond it, it could benefit not only Japan, but also those involved in commemorative practices. For the Japanese government, exiting the hauntological cycle is both a strategic and moral gesture, as it may lessen the intensity of its spectral presence and global visibility. For memory activists concerned with “comfort women,” escaping the cycle does not mean forgetting the past. Rather, it entails moving away from a politics of the statue’s perpetual reappearance toward a form of recognition that no longer depends on re-enactment to affirm historical truth.

How might they move beyond the hauntological cycle surrounding the statues and find ways to coexist with one another? This section presents two possible approaches. From a hauntological perspective, the most desirable path would be for the Japanese government to embrace these haunting memorials, while civic groups move beyond continued replication and instead explore more diverse forms of commemoration. But as this first approach appears politically difficult to achieve under current conditions, this study proposes a second, more pragmatic approach. The Japanese government should refrain from responding to the Statue of Peace so as step out of this excessively intensified hauntological cycle. When a civic-led movement is suppressed through formal intervention at the state level, backlash from civil society inevitably intensifies, thereby further accelerating the hauntological cycle surrounding the issue. This dynamic is, in large part, a consequence of the government’s disproportionate response to civic-led commemoration. This study examines the first approach from a hauntological perspective and then addresses the second approach.

Derrida (Reference Derrida1994) argues that the de-commemorators and the re-commemorators must learn to coexist with one another by living with hauntings rather than seeking to banish them. He calls for the deconstruction of binaries between the visible and the invisible, the living and the dead, and the “we” and the “others,” because what we fail to recognize is that the invisible, the hauntings, and all those who are not “us” are in fact parts of ourselves. They are not external to us but have always already existed within us, even if we have refused to acknowledge them. His point is that we must come to the realization that these presences already live with us and within us. Kearney (Reference Kearney2003) refers to these hauntings or invisible presences as “strangers within,” emphasizing the importance of learning to live with them (p. 74). Good (Reference Good2020) defines this coexistence as “hauntological ethics,” recognizing that the self is shaped by numerous hauntological presences such as the unresolved past and memories (p. 423).

Therefore, the Japanese government’s efforts to eliminate the Statue of Peace can be understood as stemming from a lack of awareness of the very nature of hauntings. In fact, many scholars argue that the essence of such haunting presences lies in their “inexorcizability” (Derrida Reference Derrida1994; Kearney Reference Kearney2003; Gunn Reference Gunn2006; Levan Reference Levan2011; Auchter Reference Auchter2014; Sylvester Reference Sylvester2019). They haunt more forcefully the more one attempts to exorcise them. From a hauntological perspective, thus, the only way to engage with them is to learn to coexist through a practice of hospitable listening (Derrida Reference Derrida1994; Kearney Reference Kearney2003; Gordon Reference Gordon2008). Derrida (Reference Derrida1994) suggests practicing “how to talk with him, with her, how to let them speak or how to give them back speech” (Derrida Reference Derrida1994: 221). This approach encourages people to “remain open” to the past and the future by “grant[ing] them the right to appear as arrivants” (Derrida Reference Derrida1994: 220, emphasis in original). The hauntological approach calls for embracing hauntings, allowing their voices to be heard and their presence to be acknowledged.

Hauntological ethics may not appear useful to the current Japanese government, which is led by a prime minister who adheres to an ultra-right interpretation of history (Yeung and Montgomery Reference Yeung and Montgomery2025). However, as illustrated in the previous section, empirical research has already shown that the removal or vandalism of memorials only reinforces their haunting effects. In addition, the haunting effects do not occur solely through the physical replication of memorials or through their relocation and reinstallation in other places; there are also cases in which re-commemoration takes place in far more diverse forms that remain beyond the full control of governments. For instance, a “comfort women” statue distinct from the Statue of Peace was installed in 2018 in front of the Japanese embassy in Manila, but it was removed by the Philippine government 5 months later at the request of the Japanese government (Aquino and Martin Reference Aquino, Jocelyn, Gensburger and Wüstenberg2024). Although the statue was erased from public space, numerous artists, writers, and activists transformed their stories into what Aquino and Martin (Reference Aquino, Jocelyn, Gensburger and Wüstenberg2024) define as “portable monuments,” expressed through books, films, theatrical works, and exhibitions (p. 267). The authors suggest that the absence of the statue in Manila reveals a repressed and recurring memory that returns through various artistic expression and public discourse, “like a trauma, like a haunting” (Aquino and Martin Reference Aquino, Jocelyn, Gensburger and Wüstenberg2024: 267).

If governmental intervention cannot stop (re-)commemoration, the question arises as to why the Japanese government continues to invest its time and resources in trapping itself within this repetitive and futile hauntological circle. Recent research suggests that their entrapment in this hauntological cycle can be explained by internal dynamics, as right-wing populist leaders often weaponize history and external conflict to intensify nationalism, consolidate support, and project strength (Fang and Li Reference Fang and Li2020; Couperus et al. Reference Couperus, Rensmann and Tortola.2023; Joo et al. Reference Joo, Bolte, Huynh, Yadav and Mukherjee.2024). In this context, the Japanese government’s continued efforts to remove the Statue of Peace can be understood not simply as a diplomatic stance, but as part of a political strategy that instrumentalizes historical memory to reinforce national unity and deflect internal criticism. Recent scholarship, however, suggests that such narratives simultaneously provoke strong backlash from the media, civil society, political actors, and academic communities, which often reinforces more negative attitudes and supports a threat response rather than normalization (Selvanathan et al. Reference Selvanathan, Leidner, Syropoulos, Louis, Adelman, Baka, Bauer, Blikmans, Becker, Beran, Bilewicz, Chekroun, Greitemeyer, Hannover, Jasinskaja-Lahti, Kardos, Li, Lindholm, Loughnan, Mros, Paladino, Papadopoulou, Rovenpor, Sadus, Vaes, Van Hie and van Zomeren.2025; Saldivia Gonzatti and Völker Reference Saldivia Gonzatti and Völker2025). In cases such as the United Kingdom and the Nordic countries, these right-wing nationalist narratives have ultimately failed to secure broad public legitimacy due to their logical weaknesses and associations with division and violence, leading instead to renewed marginalization of the narratives (Saldivia Gonzatti and Völker Reference Saldivia Gonzatti and Völker2025).

If domestic political incentives prevent the Japanese government from abandoning its attempts to remove the Statue of Peace, this paper proposes that, at a minimum, the government should adopt a more pragmatic approach by distinguishing between official or state-led commemoration and vernacular or civic-led commemoration in its policy practices (Marschall Reference Marschall2013; Dellios Reference Dellios2015; Adams Reference Adams2024). It is at least necessary for the Japanese government to recognize that the Statue of Peace constitutes a form of civic-led commemoration, created and maintained by civic groups rather than the South Korean government. In addition, to avoid amplifying the issue, the government should refrain from either supporting or suppressing civic-led commemorative practices and instead maintain a stance of nonintervention. This is similar to the case in which the South Korean government has officially expressed regret when Japanese politicians have paid official visits to the Yasukuni shrine on Korea’s National Liberation Day (Smith and Kim Reference Smith and Kim2025), yet it does not intervene in Japanese citizens visiting it in a private capacity. Intervening in and suppressing these bottom-up, citizen-driven “comfort women” movements and memorials from an intergovernmental perspective only intensifies transnational civic resistance.

However, this study ultimately hopes that both sides will move beyond the hauntological cycle by embracing haunting memories and memorials, thereby opening the possibility of ethical coexistence and allowing the victims to be commemorated as they are, in all their unresolved presence. Rather than attempting to impose a singular historical narrative aligned with the image of a unified and sanitized “Cool Japan,” the Japanese government might consider recognizing the statues as representations of victims and viewing them as a step toward acknowledging past atrocities. At the same time, the replication of the statue appears to have reached a point of saturation. After more than a decade of erecting and defending these memorials, transnational civil society has already invested immense legal, social, and political effort in sustaining them. This moment calls for the imagination of more varied forms of vernacular and more inclusive transnational commemoration, not only for the “comfort women” victims, but also for all those who have been subjected to gendered violence. As the Philippine case illustrates, the development of what Aquino and Martin (Reference Aquino, Jocelyn, Gensburger and Wüstenberg2024) define as “portable monuments,” expressed through books, films, theatrical works, and exhibitions, can open new possibilities for remembrance and engagement with the past.