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Teenage childbearing and the welfare state

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 September 2024

Alessandro Di Nola
Affiliation:
University of Barcelona, BEAT and CREB, Barcelona, Spain University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
Georgi Kocharkov
Affiliation:
Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt, Germany
Jan Mellert
Affiliation:
Effectual Capital, Munich, Germany
Haomin Wang*
Affiliation:
University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK
*
Corresponding author: Haomin Wang; Email: wangh142@cardiff.ac.uk
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Abstract

Teenage childbearing is a common incident in developed countries. However, teenage births are much more likely in the USA than in any other industrialized country. Most of these births are delivered by female teenagers from low-income families. The hypothesis put forward here is that the welfare state (a set of redistributive institutions) has a significant influence on teenage childbearing behavior. We develop an economic theory of parental investments and the risky sexual behavior of teenagers. The model is estimated to fit stylized facts about income inequality, intergenerational mobility, and the sexual behavior of teenagers in the USA. The welfare state institutions are introduced via tax and public education expenditure functions derived from US data. In a quantitative experiment, we impose Norwegian taxes and education spending in the economic environment. The Norwegian welfare state institutions go a long way in explaining the differences in teenage birth rates between the USA and Norway.

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Articles
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press
Figure 0

Figure 1. Teenage birth rates across countries (2006–2010). Note: (a) The teenage birth rate is defined as the number of births per 1000 women aged 15–19 years, and the data are from the Worldbank’s World Development Indicators (series SP.ADO.TFRT). (b) The probability of teen birth is defined as the share of teenage births out of total births. It is computed by adjusting the teenage birth rate by the total fertility rate (series SP.DYN.TFRT.IN).

Figure 1

Figure 2. Teenage births and sex initiation across income groups, USA (2006–2010). Note: (a) The income groups are defined using total income of the respondent’s family (variable totincr) from the 2006–2010 NSFG. The probability of teen birth is defined as in Fig. 1. It is computed from the variable hasbabes and indicates if a respondent ever had a live birth. (b) The probability of sex initiation is the share of teenagers that become sexually active before they turn 20. It is computed based on the variable rhadsex. Details for the definition of the income groups and the computation of the probability of teen birth and the probability of sex initiation can be found in Appendix C.

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Figure 3. Teenage births and sex initiation across income groups conditional on parent childbearing status, USA (2006–2010).Note: The probability of teen birth and the probability of sex initiation are defined and computed as in Fig. 2. The division of data by parent childbearing status is based on variable agemomb1 from the NSFG 2006–2010.

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Figure 4. Teenage births and the welfare state (2006–2010).Note: (a) Redistribution is measured by the Reynolds–Smolensky index, that is, net income Gini coefficient minus the gross income Gini coefficient. (b) Public education expenditures per student are normalized to the annual average wage. We employ data from OECD.Stat.

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Figure 5. Teenage births, child poverty, income inequality, and intergenerational mobility (2006–2010).Note: (a) We measure inequality using the net income Gini coefficient from OECD.Stat. (b) The child poverty rate represents the percentage of children living in households with incomes below 50% of national median income and refers to time points around the year 2000. We employ the data from UNICEF (2007). (c) The generational earnings elasticity measures the percentage of parental earnings advantage passed on to the children. We present father–son earnings elasticities computed by Corak (2013). They refer roughly to the 1990s.

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Figure 6. Taxes and transfers, USA and Norway.Note: Net income schedules are obtained from OECD wage benefits data. One unit corresponds to the average annual wage. Appendix C.6 provides further information on computational details.

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Figure 7. Public education expenditures by counties/municipalities.Note: (a) We employ public expenditure data for the USA from the National Center for Education Statistics Common Core of Data through the Elementary/Secondary Information System (ELSi) application. We use the variable total current expenditures on instruction per student at county level and plot it against the median household income as reported by the 2006–2010 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates. (b) For Norway we use data from the Statistics Norway website through the StatBank application. We plot the net operating expenditure on teaching at primary and lower- and upper-secondary level (Tables 04684 and 06939) at a municipality level against the median gross income for residents 17 years and older (Table 05854).

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Figure 8. Estimated public education distributions.Note: We estimate the distribution of public education expenditures by centile of the income distribution using the data from Fig. 7.

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Figure 9. Income and investments—the role of a teen birth.

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Table 1. Estimated parameters

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Table 2. Model fit—aggregate statistics

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Figure 10. Model fit—distributions.

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Figure 11. Household policy function.Note: The policy functions are plotted for families with parents who were not a teenage mother. Panel (c): Effort decision is for the case when the maximum birth control constraint is not binding.

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Table 3. Quantitative results

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Figure 12. Distributional changes—taxation experiments.Note: The graphs show the effects of counterfactual taxation experiments by parental income groups, measured in percentage deviation from the baseline experiment. “Progressivity”: changing only the progressivity to the Norwegian level while keeping average taxes fixed at the US level. “Level”: changing only the average taxes to the Norwegian level while keeping progressivity at the US level. “Total”: changing both progressivity and level of the policy.

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Figure 13. Distributional changes—public education expenditure experiments.Note: The graphs show the effects of counterfactual public education expenditure experiments by parental income groups, measured in percentage deviation from the baseline experiment. “Progressivity”: changing only the progressivity to the Norwegian level while keeping the average public education expenditure fixed at the US level. “Level”: changing only the average public education expenditure to the Norwegian level while keeping progressivity at the US level. “Total”: changing both progressivity and level of the policy.

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Figure A.1. Teenage births and public education across US states.Note: Public expenditure data come from the National Center for Education Statistics Common Core of Data through the Elementary/Secondary Information System (ELSi) application. Teenage birth rate is defined as the number of births per 1000 women aged 15–19 years, and the data are from the World bank WDI.

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Figure A.2. Teenage birth rate over time.Note: Teenage birth rate is defined as the number of births per 1000 women aged 15–19 years, and the data are from the World bank WDI.

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Table B.1. Robustness—parameters and summary statistics

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Table B.2. Robustness—quantitative results under alternative elasticity values

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Table B.3. Robustness—quantitative results in fertility policy experiments