Triggers

It is widely recognized that the common triggers for outsourcing in government are cost efficiency (Farneti and Young Reference Farneti and Young2008, Marques and Berg Reference Marques and Berg2011) and lack of expertise or ability to recruit competent staff (Taponen Reference Taponen2017). A significant push toward outsourcing came with the introduction of “New Public Management” concepts into the government’s functioning over 30 years ago, which has translated into broader adoption of market solutions in the government (Kuziemski and Misuraca Reference Kuziemski and Misuraca2020).

Additionally, a neo-liberal agenda, driven by political goals like vote banking, opposition to unions, corruption, or career enhancement, is also seen as a trigger by many researchers for outsourcing in the government (Lacity and Hirschheim Reference Lacity and Hirschheim1993, Peled Reference Peled2000, Lakin and Ravishankar Reference Lakin and Ravishankar2006, Heeks and Arun Reference Heeks and Arun2010). Finally, the bandwagon effect and longer-term ideological agenda to change the government’s structure towards a “contract state” are identified as significant motivations for increased outsourcing (Lacity and Willcocks Reference Lacity and Willcocks2008, Willcocks, et al. Reference Willcocks, Cullen and Craig2011, Cordella and Willcocks Reference Cordella and Willcocks2012).

Initially, public services, where the outputs were relatively easy to measure, were the primary candidates for outsourcing (Milne and McGee Reference Milne and McGee1992, Reeves and Barrow Reference Reeves and Barrow2000, Dijkgraaf and Gradus Reference Dijkgraaf and Gradus2014). However, two opposite trends are emerging in recent times. On the one hand, governments increasingly outsource more complex services like tax administration, for which traditional explanations like competition and ownership are inadequate (Jensen and Stonecash Reference Jensen and Stonecash2004, Warner and Hefetz Reference Warner and Hefetz2012). On the other hand, some studies have also pointed out the trend of reverting to insourcing among some public authorities (Wollmann Reference Wollmann2018, Eckersley and Ferry Reference Eckersley and Ferry2020) (Figure 1).

Figure 1.

Government Outsourcing Performance Matrix.

Theoretical underpinning

Outsourcing has been seen through several theoretical lenses despite a lack of conceptual clarity on precisely what it is (Stark et al. Reference Stark, Arlt and Walker Derek2006). The idea of “the contract state” (Mintzberg Reference Mintzberg1996, Dunleavy, et al. Reference Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow and Tinkler2006, Lacity, et al. Reference Lacity, Khan and Willcocks2009, Le Grand Reference Le Grand2009, Cordella and Willcocks Reference Cordella and Willcocks2010) is a boundary-setting concept to understand the limits of outsourcing in the government. Cordella and Willcocks Reference Cordella and Willcocks2012 refer to the contract state as:

From economics and public administration literature, the most popular explanations for outsourcing in the government are based on transaction cost theory (Holcomb and Hitt Reference Holcomb and Hitt2007), new public management (Savas Reference Savas2005, Warner and Hefetz Reference Warner and Hefetz2008), agency theory (Eisenhardt Reference Eisenhardt1989) and the public value concept (Moore Reference Moore2000, Benington and Moore Reference Benington and Moore2010).

Transaction cost economics rationalizes outsourcing non-core services to improve cost efficiencies (Nordigården, et al. Reference Nordigården, Rehme, Brege, Chicksand and Walker2014). However, many researchers question the relevance of this differentiation between core and non-core in contemporary times (Harland, et al. Reference Harland, Knight, Lamming and Walker2005). Overall, the transaction cost explanation of outsourcing focuses on competitive tendering procedures, mitigation of increased risks, management of the transition phase, and establishing contract management practices to maximize cost advantage. (Girth, et al. Reference Girth, Hefetz, Johnston and Warner2012, Hefetz and Warner Reference Hefetz and Warner2012).

Agency theory puts “contract” between “principal” and “agent” at the heart of the outsourcing relationship (Simonsen and Hill Reference Simonsen and Hill1998). Significantly, principals’ ability to hold agents accountable depends on access to real-time information and contract management skills (Eckersley and Ferry Reference Eckersley and Ferry2020). Invariably, this information is not always available, and public servants often do not have the skills to process this information (O’Neill Reference O’Neill2009, Eckersley and Ferry Reference Eckersley and Ferry2020) or are willing to game the performance targets.

New Public Management (Hood Reference Hood1991) focuses on running governments on private business principles like “core competence” (Hood Reference Hood1991, Cordella and Willcocks Reference Cordella and Willcocks2012, Kuziemski and Misuraca Reference Kuziemski and Misuraca2020). In government, this core competence would mean the different strategic skills embedded in the institutional structure of public organizations to deliver public value. (Benington Reference Benington2009).

In a nutshell, proponents of outsourcing claim that benefits from outsourcing in the government include reduced costs, access to new technologies, and more attention to the core activities (Bel, et al. Reference Bel, Fageda and Warner2010, Boardman, et al. Reference Boardman, Vining and Weimer2016, Alonso, et al. Reference Alonso, Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes2017) and can potentially enhance government fiscal conditions, with contextual factors significantly moderating this impact (Wei and Chen Reference Wei and Chen2024).

Outsourcing organizations may also be able to circumvent human resources and labor problems and improve efficiency, as political actions are less prevalent in private firms (Jensen and Stonecash Reference Jensen and Stonecash2004, Doellgast and Gospel Reference Doellgast and Gospel2013). Here, the argument of Benson Reference Benson1990) that outsourcing can create new interest groups and lead to a more equitable distribution of benefits provides a contrarian perspective.

Clearly, everybody does not agree with the beneficial thesis of outsourcing. (Florio Reference Florio2014, Alonso, et al. Reference Alonso, Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes2017). Many see any benefits only as transitory and negatively impacting workers’ interests (Megginson and Netter Reference Megginson and Netter2001, Jensen and Stonecash Reference Jensen and Stonecash2004, Brown and Potoski Reference Brown and Potoski2005, Hefetz and Warner Reference Hefetz and Warner2012, Florio Reference Florio2014) and scant evidence of the consistent form of “good outsourcing” (Goodair and Reeves Reference Goodair and Reeves2024).

Therefore, Farneti and Young Reference Farneti and Young2008 have concluded that public officials must be selective about outsourcing and vigilant to inherent unknowable risks. Hence, governments must retain and augment their preparedness to revert to insourcing if private service providers fail to meet expectations. (Bradbury and Waechter Reference Bradbury and David Waechter2009).

Strategic challenges

An important guiding principle for effective outsourcing is contextual astuteness and adaptation to provide public value, as a one-size-fits-all approach is often ineffective (Aulich and Hein Reference Aulich and Hein2005, Cordella and Willcocks Reference Cordella and Willcocks2010, Reference Cordella and Willcocks2012). Simply focusing on imperfect short-term cost-benefit analysis without strategic thinking about enhancing public value can lead to unwanted consequences. For example, before deciding on outsourcing, the question of whether certain functions are distinctly public and must remain in-house for the public interest to be genuinely served has to be answered first. (Peters Reference Peters1996).

Another important factor is that the long-term dependence on outsourcing for complex and wide-ranging contracts leads to situations where replacing the existing contractor becomes very difficult (Sclar Reference Sclar2001, Aulich and Hein Reference Aulich and Hein2005). Solutions like breaking a large contract into smaller parts and encouraging sub-contracting create another set of problems, like the demarcation of different service providers’ roles, accountability, and control (Goodsell Reference Goodsell2007).

Operational challenges

At the operational level, a lack of real-time flow of information has significant implications for accountability, risk management, and policy-making (Eckersley and Ferry Reference Eckersley and Ferry2020). Other challenges that can hamper the smooth operationalization of outsourcing arrangements include inadequate analysis of cost savings (Hodge and Bowman Reference Hodge and Bowman2006, Bel, et al. Reference Bel, Fageda and Warner2010), uncompetitive market (Brown and Potoski Reference Brown and Potoski2003, Caldwell, et al. Reference Caldwell, Walker, Harland, Knight, Zheng and Wakeley2005, Marvel and Marvel Reference Marvel and Marvel2007, Girth, et al. Reference Girth, Hefetz, Johnston and Warner2012), undemocratic decision-making (Andrews and Entwistle Reference Andrews and Entwistle2010, Dannin Reference Dannin2011, Warner and Hefetz Reference Warner and Hefetz2020) and poor contract management skills of the civil servants (Heinrich Reference Heinrich2007, Heinrich and Choi Reference Heinrich and Choi2007, Amirkhanyan Reference Amirkhanyan2011, Warner and Hefetz Reference Warner and Hefetz2012, Hefetz, et al. Reference Hefetz, Warner and Vigoda-Gadot2014, Taponen Reference Taponen2017, Gradus and Budding Reference Gradus and Budding2020).

As all contracts are inherently incomplete (Broadbent and Laughlin Reference Broadbent and Laughlin2003, Jensen and Stonecash Reference Jensen and Stonecash2004), political will and administrative competence to enforce a complicated contract (Freeman and Minow Reference Freeman and Minow2009) are the prerequisites for efficacious operationalization. Moreover, interweaving the traditional hierarchical structure of the government with the network model required for outsourcing (Cooper and Cooper Reference Cooper and Cooper2002) further underlines risk transfer and accountability concerns, especially if the private service provider fails to meet the obligations (Walker and Tizard Reference Walker and Tizard2018).

Performance management for effective outsourcing

The plethora of challenges identified earlier clearly points out the need for a new performance management framework distinct from the earlier systems to manage the coordination and network of various stakeholders in the outsourcing arrangements. A seamless transition to outsourcing in the government requires regular performance evaluation to alert about issues in quality and accessibility. An essential precondition for this is an effective performance management system. Unfortunately, this kind of sophisticated performance management system having qualitative and quantitative parameters with a focus on citizen welfare is largely absent in public organizations (Noordegraaf and Abma Reference Noordegraaf and Abma2003, Bradbury and Waechter Reference Bradbury and David Waechter2009, Cohen and Eimicke Reference Cohen and Eimicke2011, Torres, et al. Reference Torres, Pina and Yetano2011, Cohen, et al. Reference Cohen, Eimicke and Heikkila2013, Taponen and Kauppi Reference Taponen and Kauppi2017). Instead, performance management is confined chiefly to tools like service level agreements with outsourcing agencies that align with the contemporary wisdom of identifying quantifiable performance norms in the government. Unfortunately, this emphasis can cause more harm than good if implemented without understanding the embedded contextual nuances and limitations (Kravchuk and Schack Reference Kravchuk and Schack1996, Radin Reference Radin2000).

Additionally, dispersed accountability in the outsourcing model (Dannin Reference Dannin2011) necessitates citizen engagement in service delivery, planning, and design, especially in local governments (Forester Reference Forester1999, Denhardt and Denhardt Reference Denhardt and Denhardt2003). To achieve this, the government must encourage openness and transparent communication (Smitha & Sangita, Reference Smitha and Sangita2008). Hence, performance management should also be able to address social inclusion concerns and stakeholders’ priorities (Yang and Holzer Reference Yang and Holzer2006).

Government outsourcing in India – performance management perspective

As a fast-developing country with the highest population in the world, India is an excellent case to study the qualities of a performance management system for effective outsourcing in the government. Outsourcing in India is getting increasing traction from management and ideological points of view (Datta Reference Datta2009, Hans Reference Hans2017). Public-private partnerships are the preferred medium for these outsourcing efforts, and such initiatives abound in infrastructure, education, skill development, health, water, sanitation, technology, and social services (Devkar, et al. Reference Devkar, Mahalingam and Kalidindi2013, Luthra and Mahajan Reference Luthra and Mahajan2013, Maclean, et al. Reference Maclean, Jagannathan and Sarvi2013, Ponnusamy Reference Ponnusamy2013, Parvez and Kumar Reference Parvez and Anil Kumar2020). Some specific examples of outsourcing in public service delivery are telecenters (Madon Reference Madon2005, Kuriyan and Ray Reference Kuriyan and Ray2009), passport issuing, National ID, police modernization, land record management, taxation, and birth and death registration (Chanana Reference Chanana2007, Datta Reference Datta2009).

These outsourcing arrangements in various sectors follow different collaborative models with varying scopes. For example, the choice of outsourcing in school education may vary from a single public school to an entire public school district run by private organizations or contracting out specific instructional and non-instructional activities (Luthra and Mahajan Reference Luthra and Mahajan2013). In agriculture, these outsourcing arrangements may involve cooperation in research and development, quality enhancement, crop production, extension, and marketing (Ponnusamy Reference Ponnusamy2013). Similar models exist where responsibilities and cooperation duration differ in infrastructure development (Parvez and Kumar Reference Parvez and Anil Kumar2020) and technology outsourcing also (Datta Reference Datta2009).

Success stories like E-Seva, in the state of Andhra Pradesh, where in one place citizens can access various government services (Kuriyan and Ray Reference Kuriyan and Ray2009), BATF12 in Bengaluru in the state of Karnataka, consisting of 15 member organizations representing government, corporate sector, and civil society collaborating for the city development (Raghunath and Sen Reference Raghunath and Sen2003, Heitzman Reference Heitzman2004, Smitha and Sangita Reference Smitha and Sangita2008), Kudumbashree in Kerala equipping self-help groups to provide IT service to the public and private organizations (Heeks and Arun Reference Heeks and Arun2010), have built a positive halo around government outsourcing.

Many of the challenges these partnerships face have much in common with the other countries. However, issues related to inadequate management competencies directly impacting performance management are particularly highlighted in the Indian context (Post, et al. Reference Post, Broekema and Obirih-Opareh2003, Gupta Reference Gupta2008, Devkar, et al. Reference Devkar, Mahalingam and Kalidindi2013).

Further, there is a shortage of comparative studies in the international context, and those available are primarily focused on technology outsourcing in developed countries. Studies of developing countries, including India, are rare and often narrowly focused on specific cases and examples than theory building. The increasing adoption of outsourcing in developing societies demands nuanced attention on the interplay of context and general principles for effective performance management. Therefore, academicians and practitioners must build a multidisciplinary perspective (Sullivan, et al. Reference Sullivan, Williams, Marchington and Knight2013) to develop a complete understanding of outsourcing in the government.

Salient findings from literature review and research questions

In the literature and among practitioners, most of the discussion about outsourcing focuses on identifying triggers and theoretical explanations for outsourcing rooted in politico-economic factors, and empirical research on the role of performance management is limited (Henderson and Bromberg Reference Henderson and Bromberg2015). However, to take full advantage of the outsourcing model in the government, implementing a strong performance management system to improve citizen experience and provide timely feedback is paramount.

Therefore, the present study focuses on answering the following questions:

1. (1) What are the differentiating dimensions to classify outsourcing services in the government based on their nature and scope?

2. (2) How does performance management differ in different types of government outsourcing?

In the previous section, we have looked at outsourcing through several theoretical lenses from multiple disciplines. These include transaction cost theory, new public management, agency theory, contract state, public value, and general principles of government performance management to identify key dimensions and thematic frameworks for outsourcing decisions. From this discussion, the four common differentiating attributes of outsourcing arrangements that have relevance for ensuring desirable outcomes are identified as,

1. 1. Context-driven role boundaries of the outsourcing agency and the government

2. 2. Classification of the service as distinctly more public or private

3. 3. Probability of monopolization by the outsourcing agency

4. 4. Limited or enhanced scale of the service in terms of last-mile delivery

Further, four systemic requirements are identified for effective performance management. These requirements are- (1) contract design and management skills, (2) the ability to identify performance gaps, (3) dealing with internal and external resistance, and (4) ensuring citizen participation.

These differentiating attributes and systemic requirements are further analyzed and consolidated to build a structured matrix to help answer the research questions. The same is presented in the subsequent discussion.

Rationale

Once the government decides to outsource a specific service, steps toward creating a service specification, provider selection, contract management, and monitoring and evaluating outsourcing outcomes are obligatory (Van der Valk and Rozemeijer Reference Van der Valk and Rozemeijer2009). The difficulty of transitioning from government provisioning to outsourcing depends on the contract value, duration, and complexity of the contract between the government and the service provider (Jiang and Qureshi Reference Jiang and Qureshi2006). Standard ex-ante triggers of outsourcing like projected cost efficiency, lack of expertise, or ideological bent of the government do not credibly assure ex-post benefits without conscious and discreet handling of the whole process by public officials.

Identifying and understanding the pertinent variables that ensure a smooth transition to outsourcing will help develop a prescriptive framework to equip public managers with needed tools and reorient the performance management system within the government to this new role.

Development of Government Outsourcing Performance Matrix (GOPM)

As derived from the literature review, four differentiating attributes and four requirements form the substratum of the proposed GOPM. The following four differentiating attributes indicate the complexity and differentiation among outsourcing arrangements.

• Context-driven role boundaries of the outsourcing agency and the government

• Classification of the service as distinctly more public or private

• Probability of monopolization by the outsourcing agency

• Limited or enhanced scale of the service in terms of last-mile delivery

The two factors that underlie these common differentiating attributes are the nature of the relationship and accountability for outcome. These factors manifest as the scope or “breadth” and intensity or “depth” of the relationship between government and outsourcing agencies and constitute the two proposed dimensions of the GOPM.

The nature of the relationship can range from purely advisory to the complete execution of the government’s agency mission, which is characterized as “depth” of the relationship. The degree of involvement can vary from no participation to full responsibility for the outcomes (Datta Reference Datta2009, Parvez and Kumar Reference Parvez and Anil Kumar2020). Hence, this aspect is characterized as the “breadth” of the relationship.

As the next step in building an evaluative model, the four common differentiating factors presented in the earlier section were evaluated against the interview responses. Mapping of the common differentiating factors and performance management system requirements to the questions is detailed in the Table 1 and Table 2 respectively.

Table 1.

Mapping of the common differentiating factors to the interview questions

Table 2.

Mapping of the performance management system requirements to the interview questions

Four pillars of performance management

As highlighted in the previous sections, outsourcing in the government has necessitated a new performance management paradigm to ensure effectiveness and efficiency (Noordegraaf and Abma Reference Noordegraaf and Abma2003, Liu, et al. Reference Liu, Love, Davis, Smith and Regan2015a, Liu, et al. Reference Liu, Love, Smith, Regan and Palaneeswaran2015b). As a result, factors like contract management, objective performance parameters, capacity building, stakeholder communication, proper monitoring, and evaluation have come into sharper focus (Holzer and Kloby Reference Holzer and Kloby2005, Warner and Hefetz Reference Warner and Hefetz2012, Doellgast and Gospel Reference Doellgast and Gospel2013).

Stemming from this discussion, four important competencies that denote the contours of effective performance management in the context of outsourcing arrangements are identified as (1) contract design and management skills, (2) the ability to identify performance gaps, (3) dealing with internal and external resistance, and (4) ensuring citizen participation.

Based on this approach, we have proposed four pillars of performance management in government outsourcing for meaningful assessment and evaluation. These pillars are (1) robustness and granularity of performance parameters, (2) systematic monitoring and evaluation, (3) capacity building of the public servants, and (4) stakeholder communication. Questions were mapped against the four effective outsourcing management requirements emanating from the literature to further validate these categories through semi-structured interviews. The emerging themes from this analysis were compared with the proposed four pillars.

Details of Two-dimensional Government Performance Outsourcing Matrix (GOPM)

The interaction of “breadth” and “depth” of an outsourcing relationship between the government and the outsourcing agency is presented through the 2x2 GOPM. In this matrix, “depth” is represented on the X-axis and “breadth” on the Y-axis. Combining these two dimensions creates four quadrants that help classify different outsourcing activities based on operational requirements and assess the contours of an effective performance management system (Figure 1).

Activities in the first quadrant involve the execution and implementation role of the outsourcing agency, with the responsibility to ensure defined outcomes. This quadrant corresponds to the “building” role. Outsourcing activities focused on execution and having a lesser relationship with the overall results are part of the second quadrant.

These activities are synonymous with a “plumbing” role. Outsourcing activities that are primarily advisory with less participation in ensuring outcomes will lie in the third quadrant and are analogous to a “consulting” role. Finally, the fourth quadrant consists of outsourcing activities that are advisory and directly linked to the outcomes. These activities are synonymous with a “coaching” role.

In the ensuing discussion, the characteristics of the four quadrants and their relation to the four performance management pillars for effective outsourcing are explained in detail.

Quadrant IV

In Quadrant IV, the role of the outsourcing agency is that of a “coach,” who is not really on the playing field but is equally held responsible for results. Various technical consultants, advisors, and other non-governmental organizations often play this role. This role requires a high degree of involvement, though the outsourcing agency is not responsible for the execution but for providing detailed advice to the government. Outside advisors are brought in to provide the necessary guidance in activities where the government does not have expertise, but outsourcing the whole function is impossible because of sovereignty, political, or regulatory issues. Many technical consultations on financial investment, disinvestment of public sector entities, lobbying in foreign countries, and infrastructure planning do fall in this quadrant. For example, in recent years, consultants have also provided various services in the signature programs of the Government of India, like Clean India, Green India, and Digital India (Jain Gupta and Suri Reference Jain Gupta and Suri2017). These services are amenable to outsourcing in those situations where public officials are clear about the goals and have the necessary expertise to evaluate the quality and credentials of the outsourcing agency.

As the role is advisory but fundamental to the government agency’s mission, performance parameters must be robust, as mission clarity is essential for performing the “coaching” role. However, granularity will vary from low to moderate as this is an advisory role. The monitoring and evaluation will be primarily ex-post and with some degree of concurrent monitoring.

The capacity-building requirements of public officials would be high as the consultant’s role is mainly advisory. Enhancing public servants’ technical capabilities and contract management skills is necessary to bridge the conceptual and implementation gaps and give the outsourcing agency usable feedback. Stakeholder communication is of moderate to high priority depending on the work area, as the complexity of the context may require simplified articulation of the ideas to the stakeholders.

In conclusion, the performance management system needs to be adapted according to the characteristics of the outsourcing relationship between the government and the outsourcing agency. Table 3 summarizes the prescriptive relationship between the performance management system’s pillars and the four quadrants of the GOPM.

Table 3.

Four pillars of performance management

Akshaya Patra Foundation

School feeding programs are used worldwide to address nutrition issues, ensure better educational outcomes, improve health and hygiene, and promote social inclusion (Subbarao, et al. Reference Subbarao, Bonnerjee, Braithwaite, Soniya Carvalho, Graham and Thompson1997). India’s mid-day meal scheme is the world’s largest such program (Alim, et al. Reference Alim, Khalil, Mirz and Khan2012), covering about 118 million children studying in 1.2 million schools during 2020–21, with cumulative spending of Rs 244 billion (equivalent to USD 3.25 billion) by the Government of India (PM-Poshan 2022). The scheme was recently relaunched as Pradhan Mantri Poshan Shakti Nirman (PM Poshan) in 2021 with broader coverage (PM-Poshan 2021).

Starting in the southern state of Tamilnadu, these programs are now implemented in most Indian states following a ruling by the Supreme Court of India in November 2001 (Porter, et al. Reference Porter, Singh and Sinha2010, Kantawala, et al. Reference Kantawala, Iyer, Dhruv and Gandhi2013). Various independent evaluations have found significant gaps between the promise of these programs and actual outcomes. For example, the Comptroller and Auditor General of India has commented that despite mid-day meal provision, enrollment in government schools has declined from 146.9 million to 138.7 million between the fiscal year 2009–10 and 2013–14 but increased by 38 % in private schools during the same period (CAG 2015). This trend proves that merely the mid-day meal is not a sufficient incentive to keep children in school. Regarding the content and quality of meals, CAG has recommended.

One of the critical issues the mid-day meal scheme faces is the logistics of onsite cooking and feeding that requires cooks, utensils, procurement, and distribution at each school. These challenges have triggered the development of program models that include taking benefits of economies of scale to ensure efficient delivery of meals to the children (Banerjee Reference Banerjee2019). Therefore, since 2000, the Government of India has experimented with outsourcing by involving private partners from the not-for-profit sector in mid-day meal schemes (Naidu, et al.). Other countries have also undergone similar evolution of the mid-day meal programs to augment the capacity and improve efficiency (Rose Reference Rose2009, Symaco Reference Symaco2016).

An example of this partnership is the agreement between the national government of India and the Akshaya Patra Foundation. This prominent non-governmental organization focuses on the nutrition requirements of the underprivileged sections of society (Banerjee Reference Banerjee2019). This partnership aims to improve the efficiencies in the delivery channels by using a centralized kitchen and enhancing the quality of food to match local taste to improve nutritional and educational outcomes. Akshaya Patra started its program in June of 2000 in Bengaluru, Karnataka. It now provides services in 12 states and two union territories with 1.8 million beneficiaries (Akshaya-Patra 2018–19), conforming to government-mandated guidelines and priorities.

The critical aspect of this model is a centralized kitchen and transportation of the cooked food to the schools within four hours of cooking in sterilized vessels at a minimum temperature of 65 degrees. The government provides food grains through the Food Co-operation of India, eliminating intermediaries. Initially, Akshaya Patra only served urban locations, but the partnership has expanded to rural areas since 2017 with increased rural road connectivity (Banerjee Reference Banerjee2019).

The government makes 55% to 60 % of the total expenditure, and Akshaya Patra generates the rest through donations and other sources. They have provided a good substitution for earlier school cooking-based models without any additional financial burden on the government (Naidu, et al.). The performance of Akshaya Patra has been generally applauded for providing hygienic, fresh, and nutritious food transported in sterilized vessels (Kantawala, et al. Reference Kantawala, Iyer, Dhruv and Gandhi2013). However, there have been criticisms about the financial irregularities and nutrition value of food in recent years (Srinivasaraju Reference Srinivasaraju2020). Moreover, they provide only vegetarian food, leading to a heated debate on cultural linkages of food habits and imposition by the state. A mid-day meal is “not only meal” but relates to educational, health, and social inclusion outcomes in India, requiring outsourcing decisions to be sensitive to the community’s requirements.

Passport Seva Kendra (PSK)

In India, many government services still require the physical presence of citizens, as well as long queues and visits to multiple government officials. These interactions are often perceived as bothersome by the citizens and amplify the perception of inefficiency, lethargy, and indifference to the government systems. Therefore, transforming service delivery through e-governance initiatives is a practical and cost-effective solution to promote citizen-centricity. Toward this end, information technology (IT) enabled service delivery not only has the potential to improve efficiencies by quality improvement and cost management but also contributes to the vital objective of enhancement of public value and trust between the government and the citizens (Yang and Holzer Reference Yang and Holzer2006, Jain Gupta and Suri Reference Jain Gupta and Suri2017). These initiatives also positively impact social inclusion, fulfilling a key demand of citizens by exponentially increasing the reach of government machinery and services (Calista, et al. Reference Calista, Melitski, Holzer and Manoharan2010).

Given this, in 2006, as part of its National e-governance plan, the Government of India modernized 31 public services in mission mode. Re-engineering the passport issuing process through information technology in partnership with the private sector was one of the main initiatives envisaged in this plan (Agarwal Reference Agarwal2016). The citizens have generally praised this initiative (Saxena, et al. Reference Saxena and Popli2021), and it is often showcased as the success of outsourcing and integrating information technology in public service delivery.

In India, issuing the passport is the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) function that runs 37 Regional Passport Offices and a central passport printing facility. However, the process was highly cumbersome, with long delays and multiple checkpoints. Therefore, as part of the national e-governance plan 2006, the Government of India partnered with a private IT consultancy-TCS, to streamline the process. In this case, absolute control and accountability remain with the government as passport issuing is a sovereign function done in the name of the President of India. TCS was assigned responsibilities related to infrastructure, human resources, IT applications, and primary citizen interface (Agarwal Reference Agarwal2016).

The change required re-engineering the whole process instead of simply substituting the existing process with technology. The vision for this transformation is stated as

TCS has established 93 offices known as PSKs across India to realize this vision, attached to the 37 regional passport offices. These PSKs have a modern infrastructure with citizen-friendly services and helpful staff (Agarwal Reference Agarwal2016, Saxena, et al. Reference Saxena and Popli2021).

Passport issuing in India requires coordination among multiple agencies, including local police, to verify the applicant’s antecedents. This process has always been a significant challenge in the legacy system, requiring the police officer to visit the residence of the applicant. This issue has been addressed in the revamped process by using technology and providing mobile applications with the hardware to the police department for ready application processing, substantially reducing time delays. PSKs also provide real-time information, online slot booking, electronic queue management, and services for processing and filing documents. Passport camps and Passport Adalat (Passport Court) are some initiatives that have made the process hassle-free (Agarwal Reference Agarwal2016). One unique feature of PSK is that government officials and TCS employees work together in the same physical space. After initial documentation, government officials are responsible for checking and deciding on the application almost immediately. This collaboration and speed were new to the government employees and required many adjustments from both parties.

As one of the government employees who worked in PSK commented during the interview:

In January 2022, the government signed a contract with TCS for the second phase of the Passport Seva Program (PSP- V2.0) with further augmentation of the digital eco-system, process overhauling, and integration among various stakeholders and databases, improving the citizen interface and strengthening data security (MEA 2022).

A senior retired civil servant who was part of the initial proposal for the outsourcing commented during the interview.