13.1 Introduction
Without exception, women across the globe have suffered from the economic and social consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.Footnote 1 In particular, women entrepreneurs and employees have been disproportionately impacted due to the pre-pandemic disadvantages they have faced in the economic, social, financial, and regulatory ecosystems in which they operate.Footnote 2 These disadvantages may include, but are not limited to, lack of access to educational opportunities; the digital divide between men and women caused by lack of affordability and digital know-how; lack of access to productive resources such as land, finances, and other assets; disproportionately high tariff and non-tariff barriers faced by women-owned businesses engaged in agriculture and textiles; lack of access to trade-related information and business networks; and disproportionately high burdens in discharging household responsibilities.Footnote 3 The COVID-19 pandemic is magnifying the impact of the pre-existing barriers that women face, bringing about massive loss of jobs and business opportunities, declining access to education as it goes online, spiralling increases in household responsibilities, and domestic violence against women.Footnote 4 Recent studies have shown how limited gains made in respect of gender equality are now at serious risk of being rolled back.Footnote 5
Countries can employ two different approaches to counter these challenges: a bottom-up and a top-down approach. Using a bottom-up approach, countries can directly try to change national laws, culture, and social norms at the domestic level, which then permeates to the higher levels of policy making. Alternatively (or complementarily), in the top-down approach, they can use international law to create incentives to bring about a change at the domestic level.
In the realm of women’s empowerment, international trade law and policies can form part of this ‘top-down’ approach. The WTO’s Joint Declaration on Trade and Women’s Economic EmpowermentFootnote 6 is an important step in this direction. The Declaration, signed in December 2017 at Buenos Aires by almost 70 per cent of the WTO membership, reaffirms that ‘international trade and investment are engines of economic growth for both developing and developed countries, and that improving women’s access to opportunities and removing barriers to their participation in national and international economies contributes to sustainable economic development’.Footnote 7 The Declaration is aligned with and complements the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 1979Footnote 8 and Goal 5 of the Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDGs) in the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.Footnote 9
Moreover, recent trends show a promise in terms of the role that Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) can play in this respect.Footnote 10 Since 2016, there has been an upsurge of FTAs that are carving out space for gender-equality concerns through the incorporation of provisions and chapters on trade and gender. These trends show that FTAs can act as laboratories in which to experiment with the complex amalgamation of trade and gender concerns. In this race towards making trade more inclusive, have FTAs proven to be trend-setters? This chapter shows that they have pushed for an inclusive trade agenda aiming to distribute trade benefits in a gender-just manner.
This chapter provides a comprehensive account and assessment of gender-related provisions included in the existing trade agreements negotiated by countries in the Asia-Pacific, considers the extent to which gender concerns are mainstreamed in these agreements, and examines the reasons that impede such mainstreaming efforts in the region. Section 13.2 provides an overview of different gender-mainstreaming trends in trade agreements. Section 13.3 clarifies what gender mainstreaming entails in the trade policy context. Section 13.4 provides an overview of those trade agreements signed by Asia-Pacific countries that have accommodated gender-equality concerns. Section 13.5 concludes and provides a discussion on potential barriers and hesitations that impede gender-mainstreaming efforts in this region.
13.2 An Overview of FTAs Mainstreaming Gender Concerns
In recent years, more and more countries have included gender considerations in their trade agreements, albeit in different ways, formats, and drafting styles. Some FTAs have a whole chapter with a number of provisions on trade and gender, but no compulsory and enforceable obligations.Footnote 11 Some FTAs have a single gender-explicit provision, but that single provision creates a legally binding obligation.Footnote 12 Some countries have sought to work on these concerns via cooperative actions, including exchange of best practices and organization of capacity-building workshops;Footnote 13 while others have reserved the right to regulate particular services that directly impact women or services related to nutrition or childcare for instance.Footnote 14 In some agreements, all we find are general statements wherein parties acknowledge the importance of the role of women in trade and commerce.Footnote 15 In other agreements, we find affirming and reaffirming provisions, wherein parties commit to engaging in concrete actions or reaffirm their commitments made under other international instruments.Footnote 16 Moreover, several agreements are completely silent or merely make a single mention of expressions relating to gender equality, and others mention gender-explicit expressions more than forty times in their main text.Footnote 17
In most agreements, gender-related provisions are non-binding, and are drafted with non-mandatory expressions and ‘soft’ permissive grammatical constructions.Footnote 18 However, a handful of countries have drafted such provisions with legally binding obligations.Footnote 19 Gender-related provisions are considered legally binding when they are drafted with mandatory verbs (such as ‘shall’ or ‘must’) and their implementation is compulsory in nature, and enforceable under dispute settlement mechanisms.Footnote 20 Most of the gender-related provisions are found in chapters on cooperation, which mostly are excluded from the agreement’s dispute settlement mechanism’s scope.
The topics addressed in gender provisions also vary from one region to the other, as some regions have included provisions on social and healthcare concerns of women (such as Asia-Pacific),Footnote 21 and others have covered purely economic and market-oriented interests (such as North or South America).Footnote 22 The location of gender provisions in different agreements is also diverse, as they are included in agreements’ preambles, objectives and principles clauses, stand-alone chapters, side agreements, specific provisions, cross-cutting provisions or chapters, protocols, arrangements, and even annexes.Footnote 23
Variations are also found in the level of readiness countries have developed over the years to discuss and negotiate gender concerns in the context of trade policy. On one hand, various countries in North and South America, Africa, and the European Union are leading gender-mainstreaming efforts.Footnote 24 On the other hand, many countries are yet to take their very first step in this regard.Footnote 25 For example, several countries in Asia-Pacific have either opposed the inclusion of gender concerns in trade policy instruments or are reluctant to engage in such negotiations without fully comprehending the impact such provisions can have on their trade, economy, sovereignty, and social concerns.Footnote 26
Most of the agreements negotiated by countries in Asia-Pacific are gender-blind, as they do not contain any gender-related or gender-considerate provision.Footnote 27 As compared to other regions, the Asia-Pacific countries have negotiated the lowest number of agreements with provisions relating to gender-equality concerns. For example, 38 per cent of trade agreements signed by North American countries have included at least one gender-explicit provision.Footnote 28 For South American countries, this number is just over 20 per cent, and it is 32 per cent in the case of African countries.Footnote 29 As many as 78 per cent of the EU’s agreements contain at least one gender-explicit provision, even though most of these agreements are not merely trade agreements in a strict sense, and are drafted as association or integration agreements that include gender commitments in social or cooperation pillars of such agreements.Footnote 30 Out of all trade agreements signed by the Asia-Pacific countries, only 14 per cent have incorporated one or more gender-related or gender-explicit provision.Footnote 31
These numbers show that the Asia-Pacific is behind other regions in respect of using trade agreements to further gender equality concerns. Moreover, unlike gender provisions on market, employment, or resource access negotiated by countries in the Americas or East Africa, the focus of gender-related provisions in Asia-Pacific has been on women’s personal welfare concerns.Footnote 32 A handful of agreements that have included such commitments have mainly envisaged women as mothers as they have focused on enhancing women’s access to affordable childcare facilities, and other maternity benefits, and protection of healthcare interests.Footnote 33 In addition, the style of these provisions is in stark contrast to how such provisions have been drafted by countries in other regions.
13.3 What Is Gender Mainstreaming in a Trade Policy Context?
Gender mainstreaming can be defined as ‘the (re)organization, improvement, development, and evaluation of policy processes so that gender equality perspective is incorporated in all policies at all levels at all stages, by the actors normally involved in policymaking’.Footnote 34 It is a means to achieve gender equality. Gender mainstreaming in FTAs means the inclusion of gender concerns in the drafting and implementation of FTAs. This is a process by which parties seek to include the gender perspective in trade liberalization efforts and policies. The process of mainstreaming affirms a country’s commitment, understanding, and political will to reduce gender inequalities through trade policies and agreements. The process also aims to maximize the positive impact and minimize the negative impact of trade agreements on women’s empowerment goals. The term ‘gender responsiveness’ is also used extensively in this chapter, and refers to an assessment of how sensitive, informed, or committed the provisions of a trade agreement are to gender equality.Footnote 35 In other words, the way and extent to which an agreement mainstreams gender equality considerations defines how responsive that agreement is to gender equality concerns.
Gender mainstreaming in trade agreements can be employed to strengthen women’s empowerment. FTAs can play an important role in reducing gender inequality because countries can encourage their trade partners to create laws and procedures that can reduce barriers and create encouraging conditions for women’s participation in trade and commerce.Footnote 36 In this manner, countries can use these negotiating instruments to incentivize change at the domestic level in other countries in exchange for enhanced or unfettered market access. In short, the lure of market access to important markets can be used to enhance gender equality through FTAs.
13.4 Trade Agreements Signed by Asia-Pacific Countries: Best Practice Examples
The Asia-Pacific region is home to almost half of the world’s population, and hence any action to reduce gender inequality by countries in this region can impact the lives of many women in the world. Moreover, the region accounts for almost 37 per cent of world GDP at purchasing power parity and major economic powers such as the United States, China, Australia, India, Singapore, Japan, and Taiwan are also situated here.Footnote 37 These states in Asia-Pacific play an important economic role as they contribute significantly to the world economy.Footnote 38
In total, the 66 countries in the Asia-Pacific region have notified a total of 152 trade agreements to the WTO that are currently in force.Footnote 39 Amongst these, 22 agreements have gender-explicit provisions; that is, only about 14 per cent of its agreements have some sort of gender consideration.Footnote 40 The countries that lead the gender mainstreaming trend in this region are Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam, and most recently Japan. The most commonly found provisions are drafted in the form of ‘right to regulate’ reservations. These reservations help countries to strike a balance between protection of investment or trade liberalization and the signatory’s policy space to regulate on issues such as national security, public health, environment, and gender equality, among others.Footnote 41
13.4.1 Best Practice Examples
The FTAs’ gender provisions negotiated by countries in this region mostly relate to women’s personal welfare concerns. Access to affordable childcare, and other maternity benefits, protection of healthcare interests, and physical safety are considered some of the effective enablers for empowering women in this region. The Australia–New Zealand Closer Economic Agreement (ANZCERTA),Footnote 42 for example, contains a reservation wherein New Zealand reserves the right to regulate in the area of social services, including childcare.Footnote 43 Childcare challenges pose a significant barrier to work, especially for mothers, who disproportionately take on unpaid responsibilities when they cannot find affordable childcare.Footnote 44 Provision of affordable childcare facilities is therefore vital, as their absence limits women’s employment opportunities and educational aspirations.
Similar provisions regarding the right to regulate in respect of childcare services are also found in the Peru–South Korea FTAFootnote 45 and the South Korea–Central America FTA.Footnote 46 In addition, in Annex I to the South Korea–Central America FTA, Costa Rica reserves the right to prevent the issuance of licences to sell alcoholic beverages in certain zones and areas (such as near child nutrition centres). This is not a gender-explicit provision per se, but it is relevant in the sense that it prohibits the selling of alcohol around child nutrition centres, and it is mostly women that are responsible for child nutrition and other caregiving responsibilities, which include accompanying children to such centres.Footnote 47 Therefore, such a restriction may enhance the physical safety of mothers regarding people who may, under the influence of alcohol, engage in socially undesirable behaviour and hence may become a cause of concern for their safety.
The signatories to the FTA between Hong Kong, China, and New ZealandFootnote 48 reserve the right to regulate certain services that relate to female professionals and women’s health interests. In Annex II and III to Chapter 13 on Services, the signatories reserve the right to regulate services provided by nurses, a profession which is significantly dominated by female professionals.Footnote 49 The reservation also extends to services relating to childcare, maternity care, services provided by midwives, services relating to supervision during pregnancy, childbirth, and the supervision of the mother after birth.
In the agreement between Association of Southeast Asian Nations and South Korea,Footnote 50 Singapore reserves the right to regulate certain types of social services including statutory supervision services related to the provision of accommodation for women and girls detained in a place of safety under Section 160 of the Singapore’s Women’s Charter (CPC 93312).Footnote 51 Section 160 stipulates four cases in which the Director-General (DG)Footnote 52 may order the detention or commitment of a woman or girl: (a) where a lawful guardian has requested the DG to detain her in a place of safety or to commit her to the care of a fit individual; or (b) if the DG feels that she is in need of protection and whose lawful guardian cannot be found; or (c) if the DG believes that she has been ill-treated and is in need of protection; (d) for whom the DG considers to be in moral danger. In these cases, Singapore reserves the right to regulate its supervision services for women and girls. This provision can be construed as both favourable and unfavourable for women and girls. It can be seen as a favourable provision as it seeks to ensure the physical safety of women and girls. However, the fourth instance mentioned above, where the DG can order detention or ‘commitment’ if a woman or a girl is considered to be in moral danger, gives unfettered discretion to the DG. This is because the concept of ‘morality’ is highly subjective and may change or evolve from place to place and with the passage of time. Another problem with this provision is the use of the word ‘commitment’. It is not defined in the statute itself, but the scope of this expression could extend to decisions relating to adoption, allocation to foster care homes or welfare centres, or even decisions related to matrimony. If that is the case, and if the statute is interpreted to allow the DG to interfere with a woman’s or a girl’s life in all these aspects owing to the DG’s moral judgement, it could be seen as an undue interference with, and a violation of, women’s right to freedom. Hence, in this sense, such a legal provision could be a double-edged sword and its impact would depend on how it is applied by the country.
The above-mentioned examples show that, unlike in other regions, several countries in the Asia-Pacific region have signed FTAs with legally binding reservations. South Korea and New Zealand seem to have currently led this approach, as they have negotiated several agreements with a binding ‘right to regulate’ provision. In the New Zealand–South Korea FTA,Footnote 53 parties have reserved the right to regulate certain health and social services that relate to female professionals and women’s health interests. In Annex II, which relates to Services and Investment, parties have reserved the right to adopt or maintain any measure with respect to maternity and related services, including services provided by midwives, and with respect to childcare. In the South Korea–Singapore FTA,Footnote 54 Chapter 9 on cross-border trade in services does not apply to subsidies or grants (including government-supported loans, guarantees, and insurance) or social services provided in conjunction with childcare (Article 9.2). Also, in Chapter 10 on investment, parties have reserved the right to regulate foreign investment in respect of childcare services (Article 10.2).
Though countries in the Asia-Pacific region have not engaged previously in negotiating a standalone chapter on trade and gender in their trade agreements, a recent development is worth mentioning. Japan and the United Kingdom have signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with a standalone chapter titled ‘Trade and Women’s Economic Empowerment’.Footnote 55 This includes declarative statements on the importance of enhancing opportunities for women in the domestic and global economy. It also contains parties’ affirmations on cooperation activities aimed at improving the access of women to markets, technology and financing, and developing women’s leadership and business networks. Parties have also committed to work on activities related to the WTO’s Joint Declaration on Trade and Women’s Economic Empowerment. Japan and the United Kingdom have also agreed to establish a Working Group to oversee and implement the cooperation activities mentioned in the chapter. The agreement’s preamble is gender-explicit, and states that the parties seek to ‘increase women’s access to and ability to benefit from the opportunities created by this Agreement and to support the conditions for women to participate equitably in the domestic and global economy’.Footnote 56 Such provisions in a trade agreement are unique in this region.
As can be seen from these examples, several agreements in this region seek to protect maternity and safety concerns of women. Hence, signatories to these agreements have envisaged the role of women as mothers and caretakers and not as employees, entrepreneurs, or decision-makers. This discussion shows why there is merely a slightly opened door in FTAs that countries in this region need to push further by recognizing women’s economic interests and including commitments on enhancing women’s participation in their markets and economies. Moreover, as noted before, only about 14 per cent of bilateral trade agreements in this region contain provisions with gender-explicit expressions.Footnote 57 This can be attributed to various hesitations that may impede such efforts in this region. The following section provides a discussion on three such factors.
13.4.2 Potential Factors Impeding Gender Mainstreaming Efforts
There are various factors that could have hindered the negotiation of bilateral trade agreements with gender provisions in this region. These factors may include, among others, lack of understanding and expertise, paucity of gender-disaggregated data, lack of political willingness, fear of protectionism, high cost and low probability of compliance, and fears of cultural imperialism.Footnote 58 The discussions in this section focus on the latter three factors – i.e., the high cost and low probability of compliance; fears of cultural imperialism; and lack of understanding and relevant expertise.
A first deterrent for countries in the Asia-Pacific region could be the high cost and low probability of compliance. Countries’ willingness and appetite for such inducements rely on their domestic conditions as countries may not be willing to be a part of agreements that contain obligations they cannot comply with.Footnote 59 Hence, countries may not usually engage in cooperation efforts that require departure from their domestic policies and practices or the ones that require countries to act differently than they would otherwise. The cost of compliance is therefore fundamental to a country’s decision to join an agreement which may require that country to change the status quo in respect of its laws, policies, and practices.
The further a country’s practices and policies discourage gender inequality and adhere to universally accepted gender equality norms, the more likely it is that the country will accept such a commitment in its trade policy instruments. Countries with practices and policies that do not adhere to commonly accepted norms (such as the elimination of discrimination based on sex) and hence are ranked poorly in gender-related indexes, might be less likely to accept such a provision.Footnote 60 Together with this cost of compliance, another deterrent could be the uncertainty as to the inconvenience countries might face with such gender commitments, as countries can invoke these provisions to justify a value that may either be related only remotely to gender equality or be a value that is not shared or observed by other countries.
The cost of compliance associated with gender-responsive trade agreements for several countries in this region could be discouragingly high, as most are found to have the widest inequality between women and men across health, education, economy, laws, and politics (with few exception of countries that score a high rating such as Japan, Australia, and New Zealand) as per Global Gender Gap ReportsFootnote 61 or World Bank’s Women, Business and the Law Reports.Footnote 62 Hence, negotiating gender-responsive trade agreements may often require a departure from domestic policies for some of these countries and countries may also face difficulties in the ratification and implementation of such agreements, especially if they require changes in domestic laws, policies, and practices.
A second deterrent may be the fear of cultural imperialism. Trade agreements with commitments on gender equality or interpretation of gender-explicit provisions can allow another country (i.e., a trade partner) to effectively define the moral or cultural values of foreign jurisdictions without regard for their moral norms. If country A justifies a measure that bans or restricts trade with country B because country B ranks poorly on WEF Gender Gap Reports or because it does not adhere to its commitments under International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions, country B could perceive this as country A’s attempt to impose its own cultural standards on country B. An actual WTO case demonstrates this problem. The WTO Appellate Body’s (AB) ruling in EC – SealsFootnote 63 may be seen as legitimizing the moral imperialism that was inherent in the EU Seal Regime, since it could be seen as an attempt by the EU to impose its moral values on foreign jurisdictions without any consideration for their moral interests.Footnote 64 This imposition in a sense also contradicted the traditions and cultural practices related to seal hunting in Canada and Norway. In other words, by giving legitimacy to animal welfare concerns as a public moral concern, both the WTO panel and the AB subordinated the moral concerns of the indigenous sealing communities in other countries to those of the EU’s animal welfare concerns. This is a classic example that reflects how justifying a trade measure under a vaguely defined value (such as morality or gender equality) may allow the responding country to effectively define the moral concerns of foreign jurisdictions without any regard for their morals or even sometimes at the cost of destroying their comparative advantage in a particular product or industry.Footnote 65
Another associated consideration may be the risk of eliminating a country’s competitive advantage, given the low cost of women’s labour in a particular labour-intensive industry in several countries of this region.Footnote 66 ‘Cultural imperialism’ could therefore be perceived as a protectionist weapon to take advantage of unequal market power, as countries may use gender provisions to enhance their own competitive advantage by imposing their social or cultural model on countries that have a different set of values and concerns. At the European Parliament, some members have openly voiced opposition to the incorporation of gender equality in trade agreements owing to their fears that it might be seen as ‘colonialist behaviour’. Joachim Starbatty of the European Conservatives and Reformists Group said the following: ‘If we start putting forward clauses such as the one you are proposing, then we will be laughed at … We cannot impose our vision of gender on the world. It’s colonialist behaviour.’Footnote 67 The fears of cultural imperialism and the use of gender standards for protection of domestic industries are in fact the main concerns several countries have voiced when they have resisted or opposed any development in respect of trade and gender, such as the signing of the WTO 2017 Declaration, or even for joining the recently formed WTO informal group to discuss these matters.Footnote 68
In this connection, one might question how some countries, including Japan, have signed trade accords with gender-related commitments; ‘cultural imperialism’, and the risk of ‘reduced competitive advantage’ could act as limiting factors for these countries as well. The explanation seems to be particularly apt in the case of the UK–Japan Agreement, where both parties share similar levels of human development (i.e., they are both highly developed free market economies).Footnote 69 This finding is in line with a recent study that has shown that parties are more willing to accept gender-related commitments when they are negotiating these provisions with countries that are similarly situated in terms of gender development levels (as measured by the gender development index).Footnote 70 Having trade partners with similar domestic conditions minimizes fears of cultural imperialism. In the Asia-Pacific region, Japan is the only country that has signed a trade agreement (the UK–Japan CEPA) with a stand-alone chapter on trade and gender and a set of best practice provisions that seek to empower women economically within the trade policy context. Japan and the United Kingdom were both willing to negotiate gender-related legal provisions.Footnote 71 Hence, another important factor is whether both trading partners in a particular agreement are willing and able to assume gender commitments within their trade policy context.
A third factor may be a lack of understanding and relevant expertise. The nexus between trade and gender is far from straightforward, and globalization and trade liberalization have contradictory effects on women’s employment and livelihoods.Footnote 72 In some cases, they generate employment and business opportunities for women; in others, they create burdens by disrupting industries that employ women or are prevalent with small businesses run by women.Footnote 73 Lack of understanding and awareness on how international trade and gender equality are related impede gender mainstreaming efforts. Lack of understanding may also manifest itself in disbelief in and indifference to this approach.
Even though increased international visibility is being given to the gender equality dimension of trade, multiple countries fail to understand how these two different issues are interrelated. Several countries believe that FTAs are trade instruments concerned with market access issues, and hence they are not appropriate forums to discuss gender issues.Footnote 74 To overcome this impediment, countries need to ensure that their policymakers and negotiators gain an understanding of how trade can have gendered implications and how inclusion of women in economies is not merely the morally right thing to do but also has a compelling business case.Footnote 75 The government officials at the negotiating table must understand the gender equality implications of all substantive issues they are negotiating as part of the package. Enhancing this understanding within relevant government ministries responsible for trade negotiations is vital.
Even though multiple advances are made in research on enhancing understanding of this nexus, it has to some extent been held back by limited sex-disaggregated data. Multiple studies have shown a clear correlation between international trade and women as employees, business actors, and customers. However, what remains to be done is the gathering of concrete numbers that can attest to this correlation. Hence, the paucity of country-wise and industry-wise gender-disaggregated data on how trade disciplines impact women is perhaps slowing down the gender-mainstreaming efforts in trade negotiations.
Lack of understanding, data, and political willingness can translate to a complete absence of expertise within government offices in this respect. One trade negotiator has for instance noted that some trading partners just do not want to talk about gender while they are engaged in trade negotiations on the grounds that trade is gender-neutral, that FTA negotiations are no place for gender considerations, or that a FTA is not a tool to advance social issues.Footnote 76 Countries holding these views have no incentive or motivation to create capacity and expertise in negotiating agreements with a gender lens. The absence of expertise on gender issues within government departments responsible for carrying out trade negotiations is therefore another impediment that needs to be overcome in this respect.
Negotiators need to possess expertise on how to add a gender lens to the process of negotiations, drafting, and implementation of trade agreements. To build this expertise, negotiators and policymakers should be provided with up-to-date knowledge and developments on these issues through inclusion of debate on them in parliamentary discussions and high-level conferences, requiring negotiators to read relevant studies, and carrying out exchange visits to discuss and share experiences with negotiators from other countries in this respect. In addition, negotiators and policymakers can receive hands-on training on the following: (i) How are gender considerations mainstreamed by other countries? (ii) What are some best-practice provisions in this respect? (iii) What benefits have other countries realized from gender mainstreaming in the past few years? (iv) What are the main arguments behind mainstreaming gender in trade instruments? (v) What are the different ways of including gender considerations in trade agreements? (vi) How can the negotiators measure the gender-responsiveness of the trade agreements they are either negotiating or renegotiating, and if needed increase this responsiveness content? Answers to such questions would increase the understanding of negotiators and policymakers to reorient trade negotiations by mainstreaming gender equality concerns.
13.5 Conclusion
As discussed in this chapter, most of the agreements negotiated by countries in Asia-Pacific are gender-blind, as they do not contain any gender-related or gender-considerate provisions. The ones that contain gender-related provisions do not include commitments relating to women’s economic interests or economic empowerment as they mainly relate to their personal welfare concerns. However, recent developments show that the trade community in this region is slowly recognizing that trade policy can be used as a tool to empower women, which represents a positive change in the trade policymaking mindset. Yet, to ensure that the gender commitments that are included in trade agreements can become a ‘game-changer’ for women in the future, it is crucial to think about overcoming limitations and challenges that continue to impede gender-mainstreaming efforts in several countries including those of the Asia-Pacific region.
Open access