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Part III - Current Trends

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 October 2025

David Tan
Affiliation:
National University of Singapore
Jeanne Fromer
Affiliation:
New York University
Dev Gangjee
Affiliation:
University of Oxford

Information

Part III Current Trends

8 Fashion Upcycling and Trademark Infringement A Circular Economy/Freedom of the Arts Approach

8.1 Introduction

Fashion upcycling offers unprecedented opportunities for the sustainable reuse of clothing: using second-hand garments as raw materials for new creations, individuals and businesses can transform used pieces of clothing into new fashion products that may become even more sought-after than the source material.Footnote 1 The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines ‘upcycling’ as the act of ‘recycl[ing] (something) in such a way that the resulting product is of a higher value than the original item: to create an object of greater value from (a discarded object of lesser value)’.Footnote 2 Wikipedia describes upcycling as ‘the process of transforming by-products, materials, useless, or unwanted products into new materials or products perceived to be of greater quality, such as artistic value or environmental value’.Footnote 3 Obviously, the transformation of pre-existing source materials, such as second-hand clothing in the case of fashion upcycling, lies at the core of upcycling initiatives.

The productive reuse of garment components in upcycling projects is socially desirable in the light of the overarching policy goal to achieve environmental sustainability. With rapid product cycles – new collections each season, at least eight seasons for menswear and womenswear luxury brand designers each year – the fashion industry produces a highly problematic fashion garbage heap every year.Footnote 4 Fashion upcycling that adds new value to worn pieces of clothing can contribute to the reduction of fashion waste.Footnote 5

The more individual fashion elements and garment components enjoy trademark protection, however, the more legal obstacles arise. Upcycling may trigger allegations of consumer confusion and unfair freeriding when fashion elements bearing third-party brand insignia become elements of the upcycled product. Once it is assumed that the display of third-party trademarks on upcycled products constitutes an actionable form of use in the sense of trademark law, the exhaustion of trademark rights after the first sale does not necessarily offer a solution because the change and rearrangement of branded garment components may render the first sale doctrine inapplicable and give the trademark proprietor ammunition to oppose the resale (Part II). Therefore, the question arises whether other defences are available in trademark law to escape the verdict of infringement. In the EU, the referential use defence seems capable of offering a robust basis for upcycling (Part III). To fully develop this defence, however, it is important to go beyond circular economy arguments and include lines of reasoning that consider the particular importance of the message that is conveyed with the sale of upcycled products: the urgent need for a change of production and consumption patterns (Part IV). Despite the societal value of this statement, labelling guidelines are necessary to ensure compliance with the overarching requirement of honest practices in industrial or commercial matters (Part V). By attaching their own logos to upcycled products and clearly displaying these logos in shops, upcyclers can ensure sufficient clarity about the commercial source of their products and successfully rebut allegations of misleading behaviour and misappropriation (Part VI).

8.2 Use as a Mark and Exhaustion

Trademark law offers several starting points for trademark infringement actions against the use of trademarked garment elements in fashion upcycling projects. In the EU, general gatekeeper criteria set forth in the Trade Mark Regulation (EUTMR)Footnote 6 and the Trade Mark Directive (TMD)Footnote 7 – requiring use ‘in the course of trade’ and ‘in relation to goods or services’Footnote 8 – may fail to prevent trademark owners from establishing prima facie infringement. As the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) applies these general infringement criteria flexibly, they are incapable of providing a reliable shield against allegations of trademark infringement. According to CJEU jurisprudence, the requirement of use ‘in the course of trade’Footnote 9 implies that unauthorised use is only actionable where it occurs ‘in the context of commercial activity with a view to economic advantage and not as a private matter’.Footnote 10 This formula confines EU trademark rights to use that takes place in a commercial context. The use of a trademark for the purposes of private study, political debate, teaching or academic research is unlikely to constitute use in the course of trade as long as it does not occur against a commercial background.Footnote 11 If use for upcycling purposes does not enter the commercial sphere, the requirement of use in the course of trade can serve as an effective gatekeeper that blocks access to trademark protection from the outset.Footnote 12 However, use of a trademark in an upcycling context will be qualified as use in trade the moment it is combined with a commercial activity.Footnote 13 When upcycled fashion products are placed on the market, the assumption of use in the course of trade will be inescapable.Footnote 14

This does not mean that the trademark owner will automatically succeed in an infringement lawsuit. In addition to use in the course of trade, EU trademark law also requires use ‘in relation to goods or services’.Footnote 15 In principle, this further prerequisite for protection could be understood to require ‘use as a trademark’. It may be applied to confine the scope of trademark rights to instances where another’s trademark is employed as an identifier of commercial source with regard to one’s own goods or services.Footnote 16 Following this approach, access to trademark protection in fashion upcycling cases could be confined from the outset.Footnote 17 The gatekeeper requirement of ‘use in relation to goods or services’ – understood in the sense of ‘use as a trademark’ – would serve as a filter to exclude claims that do not concern use for the purpose of identifying the commercial source of upcycled products. Trademark infringement claims would be doomed to fail as long as a fashion designer only makes decorative use of fashion elements bearing third-party brand insignia and refrains from including third-party trademarks as indications of the commercial origin of her own, upcycled products.

Instead of adopting this approach, however, the CJEU opted for a much more flexible application of the gatekeeper criterion of use in relation to goods or services.Footnote 18 In Bayerische Motorenwerke AG (BMW) and BMW Nederland BV v Ronald Karel Deenik, the Court concluded that use for the purpose of informing the public about repair and maintenance services offered with regard to trademarked products satisfied the criterion of ‘use in relation to goods or services’ – even though Deenik had not used the trademark BMW to pass off his second-hand cars and repair services as offers stemming from BMW. In advertising, Deenik had merely referred to BMW as the owner of the car brand that was central to his own activities.Footnote 19 The CJEU also qualified use in comparative advertising as use in relation to goods or services on the ground that the advertiser made use of a competitor’s trademark to distinguish her own products from those of the competitor.Footnote 20

Summarising the current broad notion of ‘use in relation to goods or services’, the Court stated that for satisfying this precondition for an infringement action, it was sufficient that a link was established with goods or services. This formula can also be found in the fashion-related decision in Céline SARL v Céline SA where the Court held with regard to the interface between trademark and trade name rights that once a link was established between the company, trade or shop name and the goods or services offered by the alleged infringer, trademark use in relation to goods or services could no longer be denied – even where the name was not affixed to marketed goods as such.Footnote 21 The formula of a link with goods or services, then, became established case law in later decisions dealing with keyword advertising. In Google France SARL, Google Inc v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA the CJEU confirmed that relevant use in relation to goods or services existed ‘in any event’ where a third party used a conflicting sign in such a way that a link was established between that sign and the goods or services offered by the third party.Footnote 22 In L’Oréal SA v eBay International AG, the Court found that the criterion of a link was satisfied because eBay’s advertisements created ‘an obvious association between the trade-marked goods which are mentioned in the advertisements and the possibility of buying those goods through eBay’.Footnote 23 The CJEU thus adopted a low threshold requirement with regard to the connection with goods or service: a mere ‘link’ or ‘association’ is sufficient.Footnote 24

As a result, the gatekeeper criterion of ‘use in relation to goods or services’ does not prevent a trademark claim against references to the trademark that are only made to identify goods or services as those of the trademark owner and are not perceived by the public as indications of commercial source. The CJEU has brought several forms of referential use – references to the trademark as being the distinctive sign of the trademark owner – within the scope of EU trademark rights.Footnote 25 This elastic interpretation can have a deep impact on fashion upcycling. In the absence of a strict requirement of use as a trademark – understood in the sense of use for the purpose of identifying and distinguishing the goods of the fashion upcycler – the threshold criterion of use in relation to goods or services loses its gatekeeper function.Footnote 26 The moment a mere link with trademarked fashion elements is sufficient to bring unauthorised use within the scope of trademark rights, the Court erases the boundary line between non-actionable use for upcycling purposes and actionable use as a trademark. A trademark claim can no longer be excluded when upcycled products merely display trademarked fashion elements that have served as raw material (e.g. buttons or parts of dresses bearing the logos of luxury fashion houses), and even when these upcycled products are sold under the prominent mark of the upcycler. In the EU, the mere use of a trademark in some relation to the upcycled product can already serve as a starting point for an infringement claim.Footnote 27

As a result, fashion upcyclers are exposed to confusion and dilution claims that cannot be dismissed as evidently unfounded from the outset. Once the trademark proprietor has surmounted the hurdles of ‘use in the course of trade’ and ‘use in relation to goods or services’,Footnote 28 she can establish prima facie infringement by arguing that the display of brand insignia on upcycled products is confusing because it indicates a commercial connection with the trademark owner.Footnote 29 A confusion claim may also be based on post-sale confusion. Even if the true commercial origin is clearly indicated at the point of sale, the trademark owner may argue that confusion may arise once the purchaser leaves the store. The public seeing upcycled goods outside – without a shop environment ensuring clarity about the upcycling – may misinterpret third-party trademarks as indications of commercial source.Footnote 30 The trademark proprietor may also argue that use on the upcycled product constitutes unfair freeriding because it exploits the positive image evoked by the third-party brand.Footnote 31 In the case of marks with a reputation, this line of argument seems promising. In L’Oréal SA and Others v Bellure NV and Others, the CJEU confirmed that, in contrast to blurring and tarnishment, the freeriding branch of the EU dilution doctrine does not require proof of damageFootnote 32 – in the sense of providing evidence of a change in the economic behaviour of the average consumer.Footnote 33 The doors to trademark infringement claims are thus wide open.Footnote 34

To create breathing space for upcycling, it is thus important to explore defences that may immunise upcycling initiatives from allegations of trademark infringement. Considering the specific context in which the use takes place – the reuse of garments that have previously been sold with the consent of the trademark proprietor – the exhaustion of trademark rights after the first sale immediately comes to mind. Article 15(1) TMD and Article 15(1) EUTMR state in this regard that:

[a] trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to goods which have been put on the market in the Union under that trade mark by the proprietor or with the proprietor’s consent.Footnote 35

Evidently, it is tempting to jump to the conclusion that the use of second-hand clothes for upcycling purposes does not amount to infringement in the light of this exhaustion rule. The crux, however, lies in the focus on goods ‘put on the market … by the proprietor’. Rightly understood, the exhaustion rule is intended to cover the resale of goods in the specific form in which these goods have been marketed by the trademark owner. Changes can render the exhaustion doctrine inapplicable.Footnote 36 More specifically, Article 15(2) TMD and Article 15(2) EUTMR stipulate that the exhaustion of the rights conferred by a trademark shall not occur:

where there exist legitimate reasons for the proprietor to oppose further commercialisation of the goods, especially where the condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they have been put on the market.Footnote 37

This configuration of the exhaustion rule renders the doctrine inapplicable in many upcycling scenarios. As explained above, changes to the goods are inherent in the concept of upcycling. The transformation of pre-existing source materials, such as second-hand clothing in the case of fashion upcycling, lies at the core of upcycling initiatives. As a result, trademark proprietors will often have the opportunity to rebut exhaustion arguments by pointing out that the condition of the goods has been changed or that elements of the original goods have become part of new and different, upcycled goods.Footnote 38

These counterarguments need not always have success. As indicated above, the EU exhaustion rule requires that the trademark proprietor have a ‘legitimate reason’ for opposing the further commercialisation of the goods after the first sale. Considering the societal interest in a sustainable circular economy, it is conceivable to assume that in upcycling cases, arguments based on the change/transformation of goods must be deemed illegitimate from the outset unless the trademark proprietor manages to substantiate an unusual necessity to oppose the commercialisation of upcycled products containing protected brand insignia. For instance, the trademark proprietor could be obliged to produce evidence of use that deliberately aims at misleading consumers, damaging the mark, denigrating the business of the trademark proprietor etc.Footnote 39 This approach could be based on Article 37 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Charter or CFR) that brings the strong societal interest in environmental protection and sustainable development into focus:

[a] high level of environmental protection and the improvement of the quality of the environment must be integrated into the policies of the Union and ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable development.Footnote 40

Additional support for this approach may follow from the Circular Economy Action PlanFootnote 41 which the European Commission adopted in 2020 as a pillar of the European Green Deal – Europe’s agenda for sustainable growth.Footnote 42 The Action Plan seeks to make the EU economy fit for a green future, strengthen its competitiveness whilst protecting the environment, and give new rights to consumers. An important element of the Action Plan is the objective to establish a legal framework that makes product policies more sustainable, in particular by enhancing the sustainability and repairability of goods in the European market. Evidently, legal solutions that shield upcycling initiatives from allegations of trademark infringement are compliant with these goals.Footnote 43

Nonetheless, doubts about the robustness of this solution remain. Even if particular importance is attached to the objective to protect the environment and support sustainable development, it must not be overlooked that the protection of intellectual property also enjoys protection under the Charter. Article 17(2) CFR explicitly offers protection for intellectual property rights under the umbrella of the right to property.Footnote 44 The environmental protection clause in Article 37 CFR, thus, does not constitute a carte blanche for overriding trademark rules. By contrast, it follows from Article 52(1) CFR that limitations of the trademark proprietor’s right to property are subject to the principle of proportionality. While Article 37 CFR shows clearly that environmental protection constitutes an objective of general interest in the EU, this interest must be weighed against the trademark proprietor’s interest in trademark protection and the broader societal interest in a well-functioning trademark system.Footnote 45 According to the above-described rules of EU trademark law, a change of the condition of branded goods is a standard scenario in which the trademark proprietor has the opportunity to oppose the resale of goods on the basis of the exhaustion doctrine. While the societal goal of environmental protection and sustainable development supports the position of fashion upcyclers in trademark infringement procedures, it is unclear whether this overarching objective, which has found its way into Article 37 of the Charter, will allow upcyclers to prevail routinely in infringement cases.Footnote 46 Therefore, it is important to look beyond the exhaustion rule and assess the potential of other defences to provide stronger support for upcycling initiatives.

8.3 Referential Use Defence

As the foregoing analysis has shown, general gatekeeper criteria in EU trademark law – use; in the course of trade; and; in relation to goods or services’Footnote 47 – are incapable of immunising fashion upcycling projects effectively against allegations of trademark infringement. In addition, trademark proprietors may have success in demonstrating prima facie infringement by relying on broad concepts of confusion and dilution that include confusion about an economic connection with the trademark owner and protection against unfair freeriding. The doctrine of exhaustion can offer only limited support for fashion upcycling. To arrive at a robust solution, however, it would be necessary to declare trademark owner arguments against the further commercialisation of trademarked fashion elements a priori illegitimate after the first sale. As upcycled products, by definition, present trademarked fashion elements in an altered and transformed way, the success of this strategy is unclear. Article 15(2) TMD and Article 15(2) EUTMR explicitly afford trademark proprietors the opportunity to oppose the further commercialisation of trademarked goods if their condition has been changed.

Luckily, EU trademark law contains additional limitations of exclusive rights that may support fashion upcycling projects. The referential use defence and the descriptive use defence are of particular relevance. In line with Article 17 TRIPS which explicitly refers to ‘fair use of descriptive terms’, Article 14(1)(b) TMD and Article 14(1)(b) EUTMR permit the unauthorised use of:

signs or indications which are not distinctive or which concern the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, the time of production of goods or of rendering of the service, or other characteristics of goods or services.

Arguably, the inclusion of trademarked fashion elements in upcycled products can constitute permissible decorative use. As long as consumers do not perceive the third-party trademark as an indication of commercial source,Footnote 48 the use can be qualified as non-distinctive or descriptive: fashion elements bearing third-party trademarks appear as mere embellishments.

The success of this defence argument, however, is unclear. CJEU jurisprudence indicates that the descriptive use defence is unavailable when a third-party trademark becomes a central element of the very contents of a product. Decorative use of this nature is unlikely to fall within the scope of the descriptive use concept.Footnote 49 As the CJEU concluded in Adidas AG and Adidas Benelux BV v Marca Mode CV and Others, the purely decorative use of a two-stripe motif on sports clothing ‘is not intended to give an indication concerning one of the characteristics of those goods’.Footnote 50 Constituting design features, the stripes were not intended to indicate the characteristics of the sports and leisure garments.Footnote 51 Similarly, the Court denied descriptive use in Adam Opel AG v Autec AG on the ground that the faithful reproduction of the Opel logo on a scale model car could not be regarded as an indication of product characteristics. Instead, the logo became part of the product itself:

However, the affixing of a sign which is identical to a trade mark registered, inter alia, in respect of motor vehicles to scale models of that make of vehicle in order to reproduce those vehicles faithfully is not intended to provide an indication as to a characteristic of those scale models, but is merely an element in the faithful reproduction of the original vehicles.Footnote 52

Quite clearly, this case law may render the descriptive use defence inapplicable in fashion upcycling cases. For example, sewing buttons bearing the Chanel double-C logo onto a distressed denim jacket may be deemed a central element of the product itself, even if the garment clearly bears the logo of a new upcycling designer. According to prevailing CJEU case law, such a use is unlikely to be regarded as a descriptive use.

It is an open question whether the CJEU is willing to give the second branch of Article 14(1)(b) TMD – the non-distinctive use defence – an independent meaning in upcycling cases. The reference to signs or indications ‘which are not distinctive’ in Article 14(1)(b) TMD is the result of the 2015 trademark law reform. It extends the scope of the traditional descriptive use concept to non-distinctive signs and indications. Theoretically, it is possible to qualify the inclusion of third-party trademarks in upcycled products as a form of non-distinctive use.Footnote 53 In this specific context, third-party brand insignia only serve non-distinctive, decorative purposes. They are not intended to indicate the commercial source of the product. The CJEU, however, has not clarified the concept of ‘which are not distinctive’ yet.Footnote 54 In particular, it remains unclear whether a sign or indication that actually enjoys trademark protection could be found non-distinctive in certain contexts, such as the particular circumstances arising from upcycling.

In the light of these legal uncertainties, it is important to explore further defence arguments, in particular the referential use defence. Referential use arguments may provide stronger and more robust support for fashion upcycling. The defence of referential use is laid down in Article 14(1)(c) TMD and Article 14(1)(c) EUTMR. It defines referential use as use ‘for the purpose of identifying or referring to goods or services as those of the proprietor of that trade mark’. For instance, a parody using a trademark to symbolise and criticise the business conduct and policies of the trademark proprietor may fall within the scope of the referential use defence.Footnote 55 Prior to the 2015 trademark law reform, EU law only exempted the unauthorised use of trademarks to ‘indicate the intended purpose of a product or service’.Footnote 56 The law reform broadened the referential use defence substantially. It introduced the more general concept of use for the purpose of identifying and referring to the trademark proprietor’s goods or services.Footnote 57

Arguably, the display of trademarked fashion elements on upcycled products can fall within the scope of the referential use defence. To fully develop this line of argument, however, it is necessary to identify the specific message which upcyclers convey when they include third-party trademarks in their creations as decorative references to the original fashion products of brand owners. As the following discussion based on freedom of artistic expression and cultural sciences will show, the statement made with the inclusion of third-party trademarks contributes significantly to the achievement of the societal goal of moving towards a sustainable circular economy.

8.4 Environmental Sustainability and Artistic Expression

As already pointed out, overarching goals of environmental sustainability, including the aim to reduce fashion waste, support freedom of upcyclers to include fashion items even if these items bear third-party trademarks. Article 37 CFR reflects the objective to achieve a high level of environmental protection. Upcycling projects contribute to the realisation of this objective. To cultivate the referential use defence in this context, however, it is necessary to explain why freedom to refer to the goods of third-party brand owners plays a crucial role. If it can be demonstrated that, by reworking fashion elements bearing third-party trademarks, upcyclers make a statement that has particular societal value, it becomes possible to substantially broaden the arsenal of constitutional arguments that can be invoked to support the application of the referential use defence: not only the general goal of environmental protection (Article 37 CFR) but also freedom of artistic expression (Articles 11 and 13 CFR) militate in favour of employing the referential use defence as a legal tool to exempt upcycling from the control of trademark owners.

In literature, the free expression dimension of upcycling has already been pointed out. As Andie Bain explains, upcycling is not only an act of adding particular value to second-hand garments; it also constitutes an act of communication. The reworked goods ‘are reinterpreting the initial communicative act of a trademark’.Footnote 58 Therefore, robust defences against allegations of trademark infringement appear desirable not only from the perspective of the goal of environmental protection, but also as a tool to preserve freedom of expression and freedom of the arts.Footnote 59 Upcycling goes far beyond a neutral reinterpretation of brand messages. A foray into cultural sciences yields the important insight that the reinterpretation resulting from upcycling has particular societal importance. To explore this societal value, the ‘Aeneous Peer Coat’ created by the Amsterdam-based artist Duran Lantink – sold for €3.500 (Figure 8.1)Footnote 60 – can serve as a reference point:

A photo of a model dressed in a jacket with a fur collar, a section of leather or faux leather with a prominent Louis Vuitton-Esque pattern at the waist, and a skirt-like portion that flares out. The model is wearing boots.

Figure 8.1 Upcycled coat by Duran Lantink

Credit: Duran Lantink

Evidently, the iconic LV logo – stemming from Louis Vuitton leather bags – is featured on this upcycled fashion product. Lantink’s creation offers a suitable point of reference because it constitutes not only upcycled fashion but also a work of upcycling art. Its artistic nature opens the gates to aesthetic theory. It raises the question which role art – and freedom of artistic expression – can play in society.

In his aesthetic theory, Theodor Adorno underlines the societal relevance of art. Against the background of the alienation which the individual faces in a fully rationalised, efficiency-driven world, he warns of the affirmative nature of art. An artwork bringing a conciliatory reflection of enchantment into the disenchanted, empirical reality offers comfort in the rationalised world and supports the unbearable status quo.Footnote 61 In the light of the inhumanity of the real world, art would make itself an accomplice of present and coming disasters if it sustained positive visions of society and obscured the defects and poorness of reality.Footnote 62 With the prospect of a better world which, as an ultimate truth,Footnote 63 shimmers through each genuine artwork,Footnote 64 art may falsely pretend that existing societal conditions are acceptable. Therefore, art is constantly at risk of becoming guilty of supporting the inhuman status quo and fortifying present ideologies.Footnote 65

On the other hand, art must not be condemned altogether because artworks are capable of unmasking the negativity of present societal conditions. Showing visions of a better, happier life, art can rouse opposition against the existing reality and contribute to necessary societal changes.Footnote 66 Artworks can play a decisive role in society because they generate utopian views of a better life that may become drivers of a change for the better. This role of art defines its social character: art is the ‘social antithesis’ of society.Footnote 67 Given this delicate position in the social fabric of modern societies, there is a fine line to be walked: the artist must relentlessly expose the inhumanity of reality without offering any prospect of reconciliation. In doing so, the artist creates genuine works which, by their very nature, offer shining visions of a better life and a better society in spite of the hopelessness reflected in the artworks themselves.Footnote 68 As an antithesis of real-world disasters, art becomes the messenger of an ideal, utopian world.Footnote 69

According to Adorno, there is thus an inescapable dualism in contemporary artistic productions: the sadness of presenting a happier life as a goal that remains unattainable under present societal conditions.Footnote 70 To accomplish this task, art must seek to escape tendencies to undermine and neutralise its critical and irrational impetus, such as the efforts of the cultural industry to commercialise and canonise even the most rebellious and resistant works.Footnote 71 Reacting to the growing demand for enchantment in the disenchanted, rationalised reality,Footnote 72 the cultural industry offers artworks as consumer goods: abstract objects that function as a tabula rasa into which the purchaser can project her own feelings and aspirations.Footnote 73 As a result, an artwork becomes an echo and confirmation of the viewer’s own hopes and attitudes. It becomes an escape from the unbearable real world.

This, however, leads to the ‘disartification’ of art. Once art is consumed as an object of pleasure that offers comfort in an inhuman world, its critical impetus – the exposure of shortcomings of reality as an impulse for societal changes – is negated.Footnote 74 To escape this threat of disqualification, art must insist on its difference and autonomy by refusing claims for rule obedience and resisting the temptation to fulfil societal expectations. It must preserve its opposition and dissonance by producing works of a non-identical and fragmentary nature that negate the unity of traditional productions, fall outside aesthetical categories and bring chaos in the established order.Footnote 75 Distancing itself from reality, the world of art must become a counter universe: the last refuge of humanity in an inhuman world that is disfigured by deal and profit maxims.Footnote 76 Remaining alien to the world, true art, by definition, is puzzling and gives rise to conflicting interpretations based on internal tension in the work or its connection to conflicts in society.Footnote 77

This aesthetic theory makes it possible to develop arguments in favour of freedom of referential use in upcycling cases. In line with Adorno’s analysis, the use of third-party trademarks in upcycling projects constitutes a communicative act protected by the freedom of expression with particular value for society: using fabric fragments and embellishments from worn pieces of clothing or parts of unused bags as source materials for new fashion items, upcyclers create important counterpoints to the glamorous, shining world of fashion that causes waste problems. In fact, it has been reported that many luxury brands, including Louis Vuitton, destroy unsold products every year to prevent discount sales and preserve the aura of exclusivity.Footnote 78

Breaking this vicious circle of lavish overproduction and end-of-season destruction, upcycling projects, such as Duran Lantink’s activities, create an aura of luxury and exclusivity without using brand-new, polished product components.Footnote 79 Instead, source materials can be old and used. It is the inclusion in an art project that lends upcycled fashion products the status of unique masterpieces. Creating this contrast, works of upcycling art mirror current societal conditions and, at the same time, offer a vision of a better society in the sense of Adorno’s theory: the use of worn pieces of clothing – instead of new fabrics – reflects the urgent need for a radical change of production and consumption patterns. Upcycling artworks reflect the policy goal of environmental sustainability that has been confirmed in Article 37 CFR. At the same time, they attest to the necessity of limitations of trademark rights that offer breathing space for freedom of expression. For upcycling artists to develop their alternative vision of fashion production and consumption, they must be free to transform worn garment components into new fashion items and offer these new fashion items in the marketplace. Only in this way can they show that there is no need to use – and waste – new raw materials. Creations made from used clothes are equally capable of satisfying the appetite for iconic fashion.

Arguably, this message is particularly clear and strong when fashion upcycling involves the use of trademarked pieces of clothing. Trademarked fashion elements allow consumers to recognise and identify the second-hand resources that have served as raw materials for the upcycled fashion product. Strong brands play a central role in this context: the more iconic the source material, the sharper the contrast produced by the upcycling project. An upcycled fashion product with LV leather elements is more surprising and has a deeper impact than the transformation of less prestigious or no-name fashion items. The use of iconic brand insignia indicates clearly that the whole sector must rethink and change its production and marketing strategy. The luxury segment is not exempted from the obligation to contribute to more sustainable modes of production and consumption.Footnote 80 Instead of fostering and profiting from wasteful materialism and consumerism, the fashion industry as a whole must find new, more sustainable ways of steering and satisfying consumer demand.

Creating this alternative vision of production and consumption, fashion upcycling with trademarked fashion elements reduces the pressure of consumerism and materialism substantially. This insight can be derived from Peter Bürger’s analysis of avant-garde movements of the last century. Bürger refers to the central goal of avant-garde movements to organise a new life practice on the basis of art.Footnote 81 The avant-garde artists sought to overcome the isolation of art as a societal institution for the preservation of values that had no place in the modern, rationalised world, such as humanity, happiness, truthfulness and solidarity. Criticising the detachment of art from everyday life, they strove for the integration of art in the societal mainstream to transform the inhuman, rationalised world by providing models for a new, better practice of life.Footnote 82

According to Bürger, these avant-garde movements failed: art has not become a transforming factor changing daily life for the better. Instead, a false integration of art occurred. Due to the efforts of the branding industry, everyday products have become more aesthetical. Consumer goods have become more appealing. This aestheticisation of daily life, however, enhances the pressure of consumerism and materialism. It intensifies the subjection of the individual to the dictates of the market. Life does not become more human, truthful, solidary and happier. By contrast, the pressure of the rationalised world is further increased. Instead of helping the individual to emancipate herself from the pressure of consumerism and materialism, aesthetical consumer goods are a driving force and stabilising factor behind the rationalisation of daily life. They encourage mainstream consumption patterns. At the same time, they mask the exertion of pressure in the form of enhanced consumerism and materialism by lending mainstream consumption patterns the air of extravagance.Footnote 83

Bürger’s analysis can easily be placed in the context of Adorno’s theory about works of art showing visions of a better, happier life that can rouse opposition against the existing reality and contribute to necessary societal changes.Footnote 84 Considering the ambition of historical avant-garde movements to change life for the better on the one hand, and the risk of aesthetical consumer goods intensifying and obscuring the inhumanity of the status quo on the other, it becomes possible to draw a distinction between ‘true’ art capable of fulfilling the societal function of providing a stimulus for societal change, and ‘false art’ making consumer goods more appealing: art that stabilises the modern, rationalised world and does not provide impulses for societal change.

Applying this matrix to fashion upcycling, it can be said that creations, such as Duran Lantink’s works, constitute true artworks that deliver on the promise of historical avant-garde movements to impact daily life and change it for the better. Employing LV leather bags as raw material, fashion upcycling reverses the false integration of art that Bürger denounces. Duran Lantink’s work does not enhance the pressure of consumerism and materialism. It refrains from adding a false, aesthetic gloss to daily life and concealing the need for reforms. Instead, it employs the gloss of iconic fashion products – exponents of the false integration of art that only makes consumer goods more appealing and amplifies the trend towards wasteful consumerism – to mirror the false, pressure-enhancing aestheticisation of daily life. In this way, fashion upcycling reveals the risk of harmful production and consumption patterns.Footnote 85 It does not distract from the environmental crisis. By contrast, it points directly at it.

8.5 Honest Upcycling Practices

Considering these lessons from cultural sciences, it becomes apparent that strong free expression objectives undergird fashion upcycling.Footnote 86 In the quest for environmental sustainability, upcycling projects in the fashion sector provide important alternative visions of production and consumption patterns. With the creation and sale of upcycled fashion products bearing third-party trademarks – and even iconic third-party brand insignia that constitute well-known marksFootnote 87 – upcyclers make a critical statement on the wasteful use of resources in the fashion industry.

To allow upcyclers to create this counterpoint to the fashion waste machinery, it is necessary to develop robust defences: defence arguments that are capable of immunising the unauthorised use of third-party trademarks in upcycling projects from trademark infringement claims. The referential use defence laid down in Article 14(1)(c) EUTMR and Article 14(1)(c) TMD can fulfil this function. As explained, the use of trademarked fashion elements plays an essential role. It makes the use of second-hand source material visible to consumers and enables them to understand the upcycled fashion product as an exponent of an alternative, different approach: as a harbinger of an indispensable change of course. The message emanating from upcycled fashion products carries particular weight in the current environmental crisis. It reflects the need for strategies to reduce fashion waste and paves the way for a fundamental change of production and consumption patterns. Rightly understood, the use of third-party trademarks in upcycling projects, thus, is a legitimate form of referring to the original branded fashion items as goods stemming from the trademark owner. It is a specific form of referential use that is legitimate and particularly important in the light of the overarching goal of environmental protection (Article 37 CFR) and the need to protect the fundamental right to freedom of artistic expression (Articles 11 and 13 CFR).

Moreover, fashion upcycling projects allow the societal subsystem of artistic production to emancipate itself from the false integration of art in the fashion industry. Instead of developing aesthetic design to lull the public and distract from the need for reforms, upcycling projects use the gloss of iconic fashion to shake up consumers. With the sharp contrast arising from second-hand use of iconic fashion items, upcycling art points directly to the urgent need for profound change in the light of the environmental crisis. Within the upcycling habitat, individual artistic creations, such as the pieces designed by Duran Lantink, can provide important haute couture prototypes for broader upcycling projects. Individual masterpieces offer key impetus and central reference points for broader initiatives leading to the productive reuse of second-hand fashion items on a larger scale.

Therefore, both – the overarching societal objective to attain environmental sustainability and the fashion designer’s individual freedom of artistic expression – must be factored into the equation when exposing upcycled fashion products to a trademark infringement analysis. The fact that third-party brand insignia remain visible must not automatically tip the scales against the upcycling project. Both constitutional arguments – environmental protection and freedom of artistic expressionFootnote 88 – strongly support an interpretation of defences that enables upcyclers to rebut infringement arguments. Both constitutional arguments support the transformation of the referential use defence into a robust bulwark against allegations of trademark infringement. Rightly understood, fashion upcycling constitutes a legitimate form of use for the purpose of identifying and referring to reworked fashion products as those of the trademark proprietor. As a socially desirable and particularly important form of referential use, it falls within the scope of Article 14(1)(c) TMD and Article 14(1)(c) EUTMR.

However, the invocation of limitations of exclusive rights in EU trademark law, such as the exemption of referential use, depends on compliance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters. This additional, open-ended prerequisite follows from Article 14(2) TMD and Article 14(2) EUTMR. Before jumping to the conclusion that EU trademark law offers sufficiently strong defence arguments for fashion upcycling, it is thus necessary to explore the proviso that the referential use defence ‘shall only apply where the use made by the third party is in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters’.Footnote 89

Unfortunately, this overarching requirement of honest practices can pose substantial difficulties. The CJEU tends to determine compliance with honesty in industrial and commercial matters on the basis of the same criteria that inform the analysis of prima facie infringement in trademark confusion and dilution cases.Footnote 90 This jurisprudence has led to concerns that the inquiry into honest commercial practices may ignore competing societal values, such as the attainment of environmental sustainability and freedom of artistic expression.Footnote 91 Instead of shaping the honest practices test in a way that offers room for competing policy objectives, the CJEU may simply focus on the values underlying trademark protectionFootnote 92 and replicate standard criteria of the trademark infringement analysis. In The Gillette Company and Gillette Group Finland Oy v LA-Laboratories Ltd Oy, for instance, the Court held that use would fail to comply with honest practices in industrial and commercial matters if:

  • – it is done in such a manner as to give the impression that there is a commercial connection between the third party and the trade mark owner;

  • – it affects the value of the trade mark by taking unfair advantage of its distinctive character or repute;

  • – it entails the discrediting or denigration of that mark;

  • – or where the third party presents its product as an imitation or replica of the product bearing the trade mark of which it is not the owner.Footnote 93

While some of these assessment factors can be traced back to EU legislation in the field of comparative advertising,Footnote 94 the prohibition of use that gives the impression of a commercial connection with the trademark owner, and the ban on use that damages or takes unfair advantage of the mark’s distinctive character or repute, correspond to infringement criteria in the field of trademark protection against confusion and dilution.Footnote 95 The risk of circularity is obvious: by copying almost literally the criteria for establishing prima facie infringement, the CJEU subjects defences to additional scrutiny in the light of the same criteria that enabled the trademark owner to bring the infringement claim in the first place. This circular line of reasoning may render defence arguments, such as referential use, moot in practice.Footnote 96 In the keyword advertising case Portakabin Ltd and Portakabin BV v Primakabin BV, for instance, the Court did not find it contradictory to conclude that:

the circumstances under which a trade mark proprietor is, pursuant to Article 5(1) of Directive 89/104 [nowadays Article 10(2)(a) TMD], entitled to prevent an advertiser from using a sign identical with, or similar to, that trade mark as a keyword may […] easily correspond to a situation in which the advertiser cannot claim that it is acting in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters, and cannot therefore validly rely on the exception…Footnote 97

(comment within brackets added)

The corrosive effect of this circular approach on defence arguments that could support fashion upcycling is evident. Following the current CJEU approach, the same findings that have led to the verdict of prima facie infringement, support the denial of compliance with honest practices. In consequence, the requirement of use in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters degenerates into a torpedo which the trademark proprietor can employ to neutralise referential use arguments that support the activities of fashion upcyclers. The symmetry of criteria for assessing prima facie infringement and determining honesty in industrial and commercial matters can easily lead to a situation where a finding of a likelihood of confusion or unfair freeriding already foreshadows a finding of dishonest practices.

Hence, the question arises whether, despite the described CJEU jurisprudence, it is possible to alleviate the problems arising from a circular approach to the test of honest practices. A first signpost for potential solutions came to light during the debate on the amendment of EU trademark law. Seeking to provide guidance for the 2015 law reform, the ‘Recommendation on Measures to Safeguard Freedom of Expression and Undistorted Competition in EU Trade Mark Law’Footnote 98 proposed to solve the problem of circularity in the honest practices jurisprudence as follows:

The only way to make sense of the wording would be to clarify that although the basic concepts (likelihood of confusion, abuse of reputation) informing the evaluation of honest business practices are the same as those governing infringement, their application is different in that the leeway for using a basically conflicting mark is much broader where applications or limitations apply, thereby confining the proprietor’s right to oppose such use to cases of disproportionate harm.Footnote 99

The argument, thus, runs as follows: even if the assessment of honesty in industrial and commercial matters rests on the same criteria that have previously been used to establish prima facie infringement, the outcome can still be different when the criteria are applied in a more flexible way.Footnote 100 The required flexibility can be derived from the values underlying the defences in EU trademark law, such as freedom of referring to trademarked fashion elements for the purposes of environmental protection and freedom of artistic expression in cases where fashion upcyclers invoke the referential use defence. Weighing the interests of the trademark ownerFootnote 101 against the interests of the upcycler and the societal interest in a change of production and consumption patterns in the fashion industry, trademark judges can attach particular importance to the values that support the application of the referential use defence and avoid the verdict of infringement in this way. In the balancing process, the principle of proportionality plays a central role.Footnote 102 The scope of the trademark owner’s exclusive rights should be confined to cases of disproportionate harm.

Operationalising this approach, one can consider a proposal by Annette Kur in the discussion about the marketing of repaired and refurbished products. She argues for a ‘context-sensitive evaluation of infringement’Footnote 103 that devotes sufficient attention to the behaviour of the alleged infringerFootnote 104 and, in particular, to information surrounding the allegedly infringing product, including labelling that clearly indicates the changed status of the product and the person that has carried out the repair or refurbishment:

This means that inter alia account must be taken of accompanying information given by the reseller, as well as of overarching aspects such as the societal goal of preserving resources and reducing waste. It is true that by factoring the reseller’s motivation as well as his readiness to provide neutral background information into the assessment of trade mark infringement, the evaluation gradually shifts from a pure trade mark law analysis towards an unfair competition-informed approach. However, that phenomenon is neither new nor unusual.Footnote 105

For the development of appropriate labelling rules in upcycling cases, the CJEU decision in Viking Gas A/S v Kosan Gas A/S can serve as a reference point.Footnote 106 The case concerned composite gas bottles which were intended for reuse a number of times. Against this background, the Court was satisfied that the bottles did not constitute mere packaging, but had an independent economic value which made them goods in themselves. Purchasers would be prevented from fully enjoying this property if the trademark proprietor could restrict their rights even after the first sale with her consent.Footnote 107 For this reason, the Court held that the sale of a composite bottle exhausted trademark rights and transferred to the purchaser the right to use that bottle freely, including the right to exchange it, or have it refilled, by an undertaking of his choice, including competitors of the trademark proprietor. As a corollary of this right of purchasers, competitors had the right to refill and exchange empty bottles – as long as they kept their activities within the limits of the honest practices proviso following from Article 14(2) TMD.Footnote 108

Arriving at this conclusion, the CJEU had the opportunity to formulate guidelines for meeting the honest practices test in refill cases. As a general rule, the Court emphasised the obligation to act fairly in the light of the legitimate interests of the trademark proprietor. More concretely, competitors offering refill services had to avoid the erroneous impression of a commercial connection with the trademark proprietor. To assess whether this condition was met, it was necessary to take into account the labelling of the bottles, the circumstances in which they had been exchanged, the practices in the sector concerned, and, in particular, whether consumers were accustomed to empty containers being filled by other dealers.Footnote 109 In Viking Gas, it had been established that the composite gas bottles at issue bore word and figurative marks made up of the name and logo of the original producer and trademark owner Kosan Gas, and that these marks remained visible when the competitor Viking Gas affixed additional labels indicating that it had refilled the bottles.Footnote 110 According to the Court, this additional product labelling constituted a proper means of reducing the risk of an erroneous impression of a commercial connection and escaping the verdict of trademark infringement.Footnote 111

In the more recent decision in Soda-Club (CO2) SA and SodaStream International BV v MySoda Oy, the CJEU confirmed these guidelines.Footnote 112 In particular, the Court stated again that a finding of non-infringement is possible even if the trademark of the original seller remains visible on the refilled product. As long as additional product labelling ensures clarity about the commercial source of the refilled product in the light of the practices in the sector and consumer awareness, the use can be permitted without prior authorisation of the trademark proprietor.Footnote 113

Applying these guidelines to the fashion upcycling cases, it can be said that the behaviour of the upcycler is decisive. In particular, it is important to assess the effort made to avoid the impression of a commercial connection with the trademark proprietor.Footnote 114 Appropriate labelling of upcycled products – clearly indicating the logo of the upcycler – plays a central role. To give fashion upcycling a chance and realise the societal benefits of environmental sustainability and artistic expression based on the reuse of trademarked goods,Footnote 115 it can be assumed that upcycling is an accepted and increasingly widespread contemporary practice in the fashion industry.Footnote 116 Moreover, it should be assumed that consumers are well aware that second-hand fashion pieces may be reworked and included in upcycled products.Footnote 117 Third-party trademarks that remain visible as a result of the productive reuse process may be reminiscent of the original fashion items that served as raw materials. Consumers, however, are unlikely to misinterpret these references to the original products as indications of the commercial source of the upcycled product. They are also unlikely to assume that these upcycled products are in any way approved or endorsed by the original brands.Footnote 118 Instead, consumers will look for additional labelling, such as the upcycler’s logo on clothes, tags showing the logo on the inside, logos displayed on packaging, in shops etc. Indicating the upcycler’s logo clearly on the products themselves and offering appropriate information in connection with their sale, the upcycler can thus dispel concerns about (post-sale)Footnote 119 confusion, and avoid the impression of blurring, tarnishment or unfair freeriding.Footnote 120 In the light of the overarching policy objective to support environmental sustainability and artistic expression, the assessment must be based on the perception of an average consumer who knows about upcycling and looks actively for indications of commercial origin which the upcycler has added to ensure transparency.Footnote 121

Additional support for this approach can be offered by drawing a parallel with the use of trademarks in appropriation art. In the preceding section, fashion upcycling has already been placed in the context of aesthetic theory and artistic expression. Duran Lantink’s creations, for instance, show clearly that upcycling projects can have an artistic nature. Considering this connection with the field of art, it is consistent to rely on honest practice guidelines that can be derived from trademark decisions in appropriation art cases. The decision of the Benelux Court of Justice in Moët Hennessy is of particular interest. In this case, the Court reached beyond traditional parody rulingsFootnote 122 and developed a broader exceptio artis that does not require a critical statement in the guise of brand mockery.Footnote 123 The case concerned the use of the trademarked Dom Pérignon bottleFootnote 124 in stylised form and neon colours in paintings which, according to the artist Cédric Peers, played with pointillism and pop art.Footnote 125 To rebut infringement arguments based on blurring, tarnishment and unfair freeriding,Footnote 126 Peers invoked the open-ended defence of ‘due cause’ that is available under Article 2.20(2)(d) of the Benelux Convention on Intellectual Property.Footnote 127

Assessing the unauthorised use of Hennessy’s trademark in Peers’ artworks, the Benelux Court of Justice stated that artistic freedom – as an aspect of the artist’s right to freedom of expression – could constitute a due cause when ‘there is an artistic expression that is the original result of a creative shaping process’.Footnote 128 The Court added that the artistic expression must not specifically aim at harming the trademark or the proprietor of the trademark.Footnote 129 Accordingly, the Court required evidence of an intention by the artist to harm the trademark or the trademark owner.Footnote 130

Similar to the CJEU approach in Viking Gas and Soda-Club, this decision brings the behaviour of the appropriation artist into focus.Footnote 131 To succeed in a trademark infringement action, merely some likelihood of confusion, risk of damage, or a likelihood of exploiting the magnetism of an iconic fashion trademark, would not suffice; more is necessary. The trademark owner must demonstrate that the appropriation artist deliberately aims at causing damage or deriving unfair profit.Footnote 132 Applying this assessment standard mutatis mutandis to the question of honest practices in upcycling cases, it can be said that the threshold for accepting arguments based on blurring, tarnishment or unfair freeriding is particularly high. Unless the circumstances of the upcycling project indicate clearly that the upcycler specifically aimed at causing harm or exploiting the third-party brand in an unfair manner, no dishonesty can be found.Footnote 133

Again, appropriate labelling is decisive. The use of the upcycler’s own logo on garments (typically sewn on as the inside tag), on packaging, in shops etc. can serve as evidence that the upcycler has no intention of bringing damage or deriving unfair profit. Instead, the labelling proves that the upcycler seeks to act fairly and inform consumers about the commercial origin of the upcycled goods. The third-party trademark only serves as a reference to the original fashion product that is made to pave the way for circular sustainable modes of fashion production and consumption. Using customary modes of indicating the commercial origin of fashion products, upcyclers can thus ensure compliance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters, as required by Article 14(2) TMD and Article 14(2) EUTMR. Achieving this result, they can ensure at the same time that their referential use defence prevails over trademark infringement arguments. The referential use defence, thus, allows upcycling initiatives in the fashion industry to survive allegations of trademark infringement. The productive use of trademarked fashion elements as raw materials does not amount to trademark infringement when customary modes of labelling are used to indicate the true commercial origin of upcycled products.

The facts underlying the US case Chanel, Inc. v Shiver and Duke LLC, Edith Anne Hunt and John Does shed light on the limits of this defence argument. Shiver and Duke sold jewellery incorporating recycled Chanel buttons featuring the famous ‘CC monogram’ consisting of two interlocking back-to-back letter Cs.Footnote 134 Seeking to rebut Chanel’s trademark infringement claims, Shiver and Duke argued that the inclusion of buttons displaying the CC monogram in its own products constituted a permissible act of reusing Chanel fashion items. According to Shiver and Duke, the button reuse was intended to contribute to the reduction of fashion waste.Footnote 135

However, even in the light of the described relaxed infringement test that requires deliberately misleading use, or use that deliberately aims at causing damage or deriving unfair benefit from the trademark, Shiver and Duke’s use of the CC monogram can hardly escape the verdict of infringement. In this specific case, the use of Chanel trademarks is a mere pretext for exploiting the magnetism and selling power of the original brand. Instead of conveying the message that consumption patterns in the fashion industry must change to save the planet, the glorification of CC monogram buttons on Shiver and Duke jewellery only confirms the luxury brand message and its problematic environmental implications. A redefinition of Chanel brand insignia in an upcycling context is sought in vain. The distance from the original brand and the contrast with the original brand message are missing. In consequence, consumers will find it difficult to distinguish Shiver and Duke jewellery from Chanel jewellery once the Shiver and Duke shopping environment is left and clear indications of a different commercial origin no longer prevent confusion. The reuse of Chanel buttons in the Shiver and Duke case, thus, cannot be regarded as a valid form of permissible upcycling. The described referential use argument and the accompanying relaxation of infringement criteria are incapable of shielding Shiver and Duke against trademark infringement claims.Footnote 136 The use of the CC monogram is merely an attempt to disguise unfair brand exploitation as a legitimate form of fashion waste reduction.

8.6 Conclusion

Fashion upcycling is a productive form of reworking second-hand garments that has particular societal importance. Considering the environmental crisis – fuelled by the wasteful use of resources in the fashion industry – it is desirable to develop robust defences that enable fashion upcyclers to prevail in trademark infringement cases. In EU law, the referential use defence has the potential to offer solid support. Rightly understood, fashion upcycling constitutes an important, constitutionally protected form of free expression. Upcyclers use second-hand fashion elements to convey the important message that production and consumption patterns in the fashion sector must change. Considering the overarching policy objective to ensure a circular economy, the use of fashion elements that bear third-party trademarks for this purpose can be qualified as a legitimate form of referential use. The reference to products of the original trademark owner is made for the socially valuable purpose of providing a vision of better, more sustainable production and consumption practices in the fashion sector. Using customary modes of labelling to indicate the true origin of upcycled products, the upcycler can ensure compliance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters. As a result, the referential use defence can be invoked successfully to rebut infringement arguments – regardless of whether these arguments are based on confusion, blurring, tarnishment or unfair freeriding.

9 Shanzhai Fashion and Intellectual Property in China

9.1 Introduction

The first two decades of the twenty-first century witnessed the emergence and expansion of the shanzhai phenomenon in China.Footnote 1 Originally a term used to describe a fortress in a mountainous region, shanzhai has gained a metaphorical meaning in the country, denoting local factories’ low-cost imitation or copying of a well-known product from an international brand,Footnote 2 a phenomenon specific to China’s labour-intensive, low-value-added economy and top-down imitation strategy at that time. Despite having been massively covered by Western media and thoroughly investigated in economics studies, there is no precise definition of shanzhai, given its dynamic characteristics.Footnote 3 In the fashion world, shanzhai usually refers to fashion items, including outfits, handbags or accessories, pirated from designer brands, typically with an inferior quality and a lower price. In the fashion industry, there are two perceived types of shanzhai: imitation or copying of a brand’s name or trademarks (defined as ‘counterfeit’ items) and imitation or copying of a brand’s designs (defined as ‘knockoffs’). While international brand owners have successfully claimed trademark infringement against makers of ‘Amani’Footnote 4 or ‘Baneberry’ garments,Footnote 5 they are often stymied by cheap knockoffs that merely copy their iconic designs, such as Gucci’s green-red-green stripes or Burberry’s famous check pattern. Although these design elements have a source-identifying function, it is much more challenging for the company to protect them as trademarks due to their lack of distinctiveness.Footnote 6

As one of the largest consumer markets for fashion items, China has also been noted as the major source of fake fashion products in the past few decades.Footnote 7 However, since late 2010s, China has moved aggressively from an imitation economy to an innovation economyFootnote 8 and endeavoured to strengthen its long-criticised lax intellectual property (IP) system. Improving protection for fashion designs is a key aspect of its innovation strategy.Footnote 9 In addition to more active legislation and enforcement pertaining to IP,Footnote 10 recent judicial developments reveal that Chinese courts are more willing to embrace the registration of signature design patterns as non-traditional trademarks, such as three-dimensional (3D) trademarks or colour trademarks. In 2018, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) of China signalled the possibility of acquiring distinctiveness through use by ordering the Trademark Review and Adjudication Board (TRAB)Footnote 11 to reconsider a decision against Dior’s 3D trademark application for the J’Adore fragrance bottle.Footnote 12 The Beijing High Court similarly ordered the TRAB to re-examine the registrability of Christian Louboutin’s signature red-soled shoe as an non-traditional trademark, and the decision was upheld by the SPC.Footnote 13 Will these new trends help ameliorate luxury houses’ concerns related to shanzhai in China? Are there any alternative solutions for fashion houses to guard their iconic designs? This chapter seeks to answer these questions through a detailed examination of recent court decisions in the country.

This chapter first briefly introduces the piracy ecosystem in fashion, consisting of blatant counterfeits and knockoffs. It then compares brand owners’ different approaches under Chinese law to claim copyright, trademark, design patent and unfair competition protection against imitators. Finally, by examining changing judicial practices, this chapter details China’s changing attitude towards the registration and enforcement of fashion design and design features, which may be a reflection of the country’s policy-level shift to an innovation-driven strategy.Footnote 14

9.2 A Two-Tier Piracy Hierarchy in the Fashion Industry

As has been noted by many indie designers, entrepreneurs and persons immersed in the fashion industry, ‘fashion is a lucrative business’.Footnote 15 According to the career site Zippa, the global fashion industry was valued at US$1.7 trillion as of 2022.Footnote 16 Due to its fast pace, short product life and ever-changing fashion trends,Footnote 17 creativity is the heart of the fashion industry.Footnote 18 Therefore, many believe that IP plays a critical role in the fashion industry, which requires intensive creativity.Footnote 19 However, the existence of ‘piracy paradox’, a theory purporting that design copying does not drive out but rather fuels creativity by accelerating fashion cycles, has constrained IP law’s intervention in fashion to the minimal.Footnote 20 That said, as noted by Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman, it is important to distinguish between the copying of brand names and the copying of designs.Footnote 21 While brand names and logos can undisputedly be protected as trademarks, specific design patterns, elements or features cannot be easily protected by IP law.Footnote 22

9.2.1 Counterfeits

Although sometimes used interchangeably, the terms ‘counterfeit’ and ‘knockoff’ are conceptually different in IP literature.Footnote 23 Counterfeit, by definition, refers to a pirated product bearing the trademark of the original brand with the obvious intention to imitate and deceive consumers that this is indeed a genuine product.Footnote 24 Therefore, counterfeits inevitably involve trademark infringement and passing off.Footnote 25 While counterfeit product logos may exhibit similarities to the original trademarks, they are not necessarily exact replicas. These counterfeit items are often indistinguishable from authentic products for Chinese consumers, particularly when the trademarks are in foreign languages. Examples of such counterfeits include ‘Amani’ T-shirts or ‘Baneberry’ trench coats with designs slightly different from the originals, which could easily be mistaken for authentic Armani or Burberry products. Sometimes, the imitators even register trademarks over their counterfeited designs or logos. For example, the defendant in Burberry Limited v Baneberry Trading Co. Ltd. et al had managed to register its ‘Baneberry’ trademark in China in multiple classes.Footnote 26 Amusing as it may seem at first glance, there is actually a fair chance of consumer confusion when such counterfeiting techniques are combined with other imitative tactics (e.g., displaying the counterfeits in a physical or online store whose layout is also confusingly similar to that of the original brand).Footnote 27 Although consumers are aware that they are buying counterfeits, the court held that actionable initial-interest confusion prior to the sale existed when they were attracted to those products. In these scenarios, infringement still exists due to the substantial similarity between the counterfeited trademark and the original mark, alongside the imitator’s intention to free-ride on the original mark’s reputation.Footnote 28 This type of clumsy imitation accounted for a great proportion of shanzhai fashion in China in the 2000s and are still sold today. The following products were found in Manila, Shenzhen and Hong Kong (Figures 9.19.4).

A photo of a waist bag. It has a Gucci-style pattern, with an interlocking "G" logo design. The vertical stripes of black and gray run down the side of the bag. The bag has a zipper closure. The word "G U D I D" is printed on the front of the bag.

Figure 9.1 Shanzhai ‘GUDID’ evocative of ‘GUCCI’.

Credit: David Tan
A close-up photo of a person wearing black Calvin Klein boxer briefs. The waistband is gray in shade. The person's legs and torso are visible.

Figure 9.2 Shanzhai ‘CALVNI KELIN’ evocative of ‘CALVIN KLEIN’.

Credit: David Tan
A close-up photo of several handbags. A quilted Chanel-style bag is prominent in the center. The words "Chaine Paris" are printed on it. Other bags are visible in the background and partially overlap the quilted bag.

Figure 9.3 Shanzhai ‘CHAINE’ evocative of ‘CHANEL’.

Credit: Jingwen Liu
A photo of a large bag which is prominent in the center. The words "Christian Dorio" are printed horizontally toward the top. A bar is partially visible in the background along with several handbag straps on hangers.

Figure 9.4 Shanzhai ‘CHRISTAN DORIO’ evocative of ‘CHRISTIAN DIOR’.

Credit: Jingwen Liu

Trademark owners’ enforcement options against such blatant counterfeits are straightforward. As long as the original brand owner has secured valid trademark registration for its brand name or logo, it will enjoy a fair chance of success in civil proceedings.Footnote 29 In the Baneberry case mentioned above, Burberry successfully obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining the copyist from selling and marketing the counterfeited garments in a manner that was found to be confusing and deceptive.Footnote 30 When the value of the counterfeited goods meets the criminal threshold, the manufacturer could even be held criminally liable.Footnote 31 The brand owner can also resort to administrative remedies, such as filing complaints with local administration for market supervision or seeking assistance from customs.Footnote 32

9.2.2 Knockoffs

A knockoff is usually labelled with the imitator’s own trademark, which is sometimes completely unrelated to the brand of the original mark owner.Footnote 33 The product’s resemblance to the original comes solely from the imitation of style and design features (Figures 9.59.7). There is only a thin line between licit and illicit knockoffs,Footnote 34 since it is hard to discern if a subsequent design is plagiarising a prior work or just treats it as a source of inspiration. Popular fast fashion brands such as H&M, Zara and Forever 21 are frequently accused of knocking off designers.Footnote 35

A photo of handbags on three display shelves. The shelf in the center is in focus. It has a Fendi patterned bag on the left, a Louis Vuitton patterned bag in the center, and a Gucci-style pattern, with an interlocking "G" logo design on the right.

Figure 9.5 Handbags – knockoffs of FENDI, LOUIS VUITTON and GUCCI.

Credit: Jingwen Liu
A photo of two off-white wallets with black border partially overlaying one another. The off-white portion has a repeating flower and star pattern embossed on it. The brand name "Revivalism Paris" is visible on the wallet. Zippers are also visible.

Figure 9.6 Wallets – knockoff of LOUIS VUITTON with own brand name ‘REVIVALSM’.

Credit: Jingwen Liu
A photo of a rack of handbags. Two handbags hanging on hooks feature a checkered pattern along with two Louis Vuitton bags on the left side. A hanging rod in the foreground has multiple hangers.

Figure 9.7 Handbags – knockoff of LOUIS VUITTON ‘Damier’ but no logo.

Credit: Jingwen Liu

One key feature that distinguishes knockoffs from counterfeits is that knockoffs do not aim to create consumer confusion.Footnote 36 An ordinary consumer can easily discern that a bomber jacket she purchases from Forever 21 – although it has similar design features or confusing elements, such as green and red stripes – is not actually a Gucci product, based on its texture, material, price, other design features and, most obviously, the ‘Forever 21’ label inside. In fact, many consumers consciously and actively seek to purchase more affordable knockoffs because the original products from coveted luxury fashion brands are often beyond their financial means. If consumer confusion is eliminated, claims based on trademark infringement or passing off are less likely to succeed.Footnote 37 Therefore, legal actions against the producers of such knockoffs are generally more limited and more challenging than those against the producers of trademark-infringing counterfeits.Footnote 38 Not surprisingly, in recent years, knockoffs have become a major form of shanzhai and a major challenge for fashion companies in China. Section 9.3 focuses on how and to what extent these design elements in fashion products are protected in China.

9.3 Protection of Design Elements under Chinese Law

Design companies have sought to protect their design elements through different categories of IP. This section explains the use of copyright, trademarks, design patents and unfair competition to protect those elements, as well as the limitations of each approach.

9.3.1 Copyright

It is occasionally disputed whether fashion products, such as clothing, shoes and handbags, are subject to copyright protection because their aesthetic value is sometimes built upon their utility function.Footnote 39 For instance, in 2022, the Federal Court of Australia refused to recognise the Neoprene tote bag as a work of artistic craftsmanship.Footnote 40 The court ruled that the subject design was undoubtedly constrained by functional considerations because the designer intended to design a stylish ‘carry all’ bag from the beginning, and in that endeavour, the function and utility of the bag to ‘carry all’ had governed the overall design of it.Footnote 41 In contrast, the design of a pair of sandals was protected in Germany under the category of ‘applied art’ in the same year.Footnote 42 The Regional Court of Cologne, applying the framework established by the Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU), decided that the sandal design ‘went beyond mere functional elements and was not exclusively determined by technical considerations’.Footnote 43 Some commentators observed that this case suggested a lower threshold for applied art that blurred the boundaries between copyright and design systems in the European Union (EU).Footnote 44

This divergence of viewpoints also exists in Chinese judicial practices. In Yunchuang Design v Kashilan Clothing, the plaintiff registered copyright for a sun dress design, while the defendant offered for sale online dresses with a similar design. The court held that the contour of the sun dress together with the black-and-white dots reflected the designer’s personal choice and special arrangement, and thus the garment had the aesthetic value of a ‘work of art’ required by the Copyright Law.Footnote 45 The Chongqing Pilot Free Trade Zone People’s Court explained that if the contour or black-and-white dots were revised or removed, the function of the piece of clothing would be unaffected.Footnote 46 Therefore, the aesthetic value of the dress could be separated from its utility functions.Footnote 47 Notably, the court’s perspective on separability mirrors that of the US Supreme Court’s decision in Varsity Brands, Inc. v Star Athletica, LLC.Footnote 48 The Supreme Court held that the design features of a cheerleading uniform, such as stripes, chevrons, zigzags, and colour-blocking, were ‘wholly unnecessary’ and separable from its ability to cover the body, permit free movement and wick moisture.Footnote 49 Nevertheless, at around the same time of the Chongqing court’s decision, Yunchuang’s action against another knockoff designer in Guangzhou for the same dress was rejected by the Guangzhou Internet Court, which ruled that the design was merely a combination of common design features such as V-neck, short sleeves and invisible zipper, and it fell short of the aesthetic value required by the Copyright Law.Footnote 50 The inconsistent application of the law in different Chinese courts indicates that copyright infringement suits against manufacturers of knockoffs face great uncertainty in terms of success and is dependent on the fora or even views of individual judges.

It should be noted, however, that the aesthetics–utility dichotomy only restrains copyright in three-dimensional articles; therefore, fashion sketches, design features and textile patterns printed on a fashion item are not considered ‘useful’.Footnote 51 In other words, while a bomber jacket itself may be denied copyright, the design patterns (e.g., prints) on it could be eligible for copyright protection. Nevertheless, to be shielded under copyright law, the design pattern needs to demonstrate other requisites of a copyrightable work, such as expression, originality and human authorship.Footnote 52 A simple pattern of dots and stripes that falls under the public domain clearly does not possess sufficient originality for copyright protection.Footnote 53

9.3.2 Trademark

If a certain pattern or print has repetitively occurred on almost every product and therefore been perceived as a symbol of a brand, this particular pattern or print may acquire the status of a trademark.Footnote 54 For example, Louis Vuitton (LV) has successfully trademarked its Toile Monogram, consisting of the entwined ‘LV’ initials in the United States.Footnote 55 The iconic Burberry check and the LV ‘Damier’ check pattern that appear ubiquitously on many of the brands’ products ranging from apparel to accessories have also been trademarked. A trademark, by its statutory definition, is a mark used in trade that identifies the source of goods or services.Footnote 56 In the Gucci–Forever 21 dispute, what gives the Forever 21 knockoff a Gucci-vibe is the pattern of the design, especially the green-red-green stripes on the collar and cuffs of the jacket. If the stripes were removed or appeared in other colours, this fashion piece could hardly be considered piracy, because a bomber jacket is a generic apparel design in the fashion market. After being used by Gucci extensively and continuously for decades, the stripes in this particular configuration of colours are associated with the brand by consumers and have become a representative feature of its style and brand image. Therefore, stripes in these colours have, in essence, functioned as a source-identifying trademark, and Gucci has indeed registered the mark in various jurisdictions, including China.Footnote 57 In Gucci Am., Inc. v Guess Inc., the District Court for the Southern District of New York recognised Gucci’s rights to the green-red-green stripes and imposed a permanent injunction prohibiting Guess from using Gucci’s proprietary stripes without authorisation.Footnote 58

The idea of trademarking an iconic design may be attractive. However, the prosecution process is sometimes challenging. Generally speaking, there are three grounds on which a trademark application can be rejected in China: lack of distinctiveness,Footnote 59 having adverse connotationsFootnote 60 and the existence of prior rights, including similar prior marks.Footnote 61 The distinctiveness ground has two elements: inherent distinctiveness and acquired distinctiveness.Footnote 62 A mark is inherently distinctive when it serves to identify the source of the product or service. An inherently generic mark could acquire a ‘secondary meaningand become distinctive when consumers have developed an association between the mark and the source of the product or service.Footnote 63 Some fashion designs fail the distinctiveness test because they are inseparable parts of the underlying products.Footnote 64

In 2014, Van Cleef & Arpels (VCA) applied for registration in China of its signature four-leaf clover–inspired jewellery design as a three-dimensional (3D) trademark, which proceeded to registration in 2016. This line of jewellery is branded under VCA’s ‘Alhambra’ trademark. In 2018, a third party initiated an invalidation proceeding at the TRAB, successfully requesting that the TRAB nullify the registration in 2019. VCA then appealed to the Beijing Intellectual Property Court and then the Beijing High Court. The Beijing High Court, upholding the lower court’s decision, denied the distinctiveness of VCA’s most iconic design.Footnote 65 The court ruled, first, that the four-leaf clover pattern, although originated by VCA, was more likely to be perceived by the relevant public as the shape, appearance or ornament of the product when used on the designated goods, rather than a source identifier, and hence was inherently indistinctive.Footnote 66 Second, although VCA had adduced evidence to show its extensive use of the applied-for mark, such use was, again, found to be the shape, appearance or ornament of the designated goods, diluting its function as a source-identifier.Footnote 67

VCA was not the first company to lose a case because of inadequate distinctiveness. Hermès encountered a similar setback a few years before the VCA decision when attempting to trademark the design of its world-renowned Kelly bag as a 3D symbol. The SPC, in dismissing Hermès’ petition for a retrial against a Beijing High Court decision, reasoned that when a 3D symbol cannot be separated from the product, consumers are more likely to view it as a component of the product rather than a trademark, unless the unique features make the symbol distinguishable from those on similar products or there is sufficient evidence to prove that the relevant public associates the symbol with the brand. The SPC ruled against both the inherent and acquired distinctiveness of the design features of the Kelly bag.Footnote 68

It is worth mentioning that the disputed marks in both cases are 3D marks. While Chinese Trademark Law acknowledges 3D marks,Footnote 69 two-dimensional (2D) marks, such as words, devices, letters and numbers, constitute the majority of marks in the country. These 2D marks are typically considered as traditional trademarks, whereas marks incorporating other elements such as colour configurations or shapes are generally viewed as less conventional.Footnote 70 For instance, the ‘BOTTEGA VENETA’ logo is what one typically associates with a mark; the intrecciato weave ranging from 8–12 mm in width – registered as a mark in many jurisdictions – would be an unconventional one. Trademark examination and judicial practices have set a higher bar for 3D and other non-traditional trademarks in the determination of distinctiveness. Although VCA’s above-mentioned 3D mark was declared invalid by the court, its registration and enforcement of the 2D device trademark over the same four-leaf clover design has been successful.Footnote 71 In another invalidation case brought against this 2D trademark, both the China National Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA) and the Beijing Intellectual Property Court recognised the 2D mark’s inherent distinctiveness.Footnote 72 In reaching that decision, the Beijing Intellectual Property Court explicitly stated that the standards to determine distinctiveness for a 3D trademark and those for a 2D trademark should be differentiated.Footnote 73 While the court did not explicitly specify these standards, it is reasonable to assume that the threshold for a 3D trademark to be considered ‘distinctive’ should be higher than that for a 2D trademark.

9.3.3 Design Patent

There are many examples of registering a novel design of apparel, shoes or watch as a design patent in China. For example, Nike has various design patent registrations in China for its footwear designs.Footnote 74 In one case, a domestic brand successfully enforced its design patent rights against an online store selling garments with similar designs and obtained damages of RMB 420,000 (US$57,600), in addition to an injunction.Footnote 75 However, design patents have their limitations. First and foremost, the Patent Law requires novelty, which means that the design is not known by the public before the application.Footnote 76 This requirement contradicts with the promotional nature of the fashion industry, which frequently built consumer excitement by showcasing new designs and products long before their official launch dates.Footnote 77 To illustrate, LV filed a design patent for its Archlight sneaker in China in 2017. In December 2020, upon the application of a third party, the CNIPA invalidated the said patent. The reason is simple and somehow ironic: The design had been disclosed to the public by the photos and videos featuring the Archlight sneaker posted on Chinese social media platforms Tencent and Sohu before the application date as a result of LV’s promotional activities.Footnote 78

Second, the filing and examination procedure associated with patent application is incompatible with the fast-paced nature of the fashion industry.Footnote 79 In contrast, the EU regime allows an unregistered community design (UCD) to be enforced without prior registration, which entails no acquisition fees.Footnote 80 This is why the EU is usually viewed as being more designer friendly.Footnote 81 Compared to design patents, copyright is sometimes a more efficient option because it does not require filing and examination. Trademarks also have the advantage of being renewable every 10 years hence conferring a perpetual monopoly,Footnote 82 whereas the duration of design patents in China is 15 years.Footnote 83

9.3.4 Unfair Competition

The Anti-Unfair Competition Law (AUCL) provides fashion companies with another option to protect their designs. Specifically, Article 6.1 of the AUCL prohibits business operators from using without authorisation ‘product names, packages, decorations and other identical or similar symbols with certain influence’ in a way that would mislead the public to associate the product with others.Footnote 84 Although VCA was not able to claim a 3D trademark over its above-mentioned four-leaf clover jewellery design, it successfully relied on Article 6.1 to protect the design against a knockoff manufactured by Shanghai Aijing Jewellery Co., Ltd. (SAJC), which brought an invalidation action against VCA’s 3D trademark to the CNIPA.Footnote 85 After VCA’s 3D trademark was declared invalid by the CNIPA, the Beijing Chaoyang District Court nonetheless accepted VCA’s claims based on the AUCL and granted VCA damages of RMB 1.5 million (US$215,000).Footnote 86

The Beijing Chaoyang District Court reasoned that, first, although a ‘decoration’ in the AUCL typically requires the separability of functionality and artistic values, the nature and features of the jewellery meant that the whole piece had no function other than being ornamental.Footnote 87 As such, it was fair to recognise the whole piece of jewellery as a decoration.Footnote 88 Second, the four-leaf clover pattern was uniquely developed by VCA and was not generic in jewellery design.Footnote 89 No other firm had used similar designs before VCA, and any subsequent use could not directly deprive the design of its distinctiveness.Footnote 90 Third, VCA had adduced evidence to show that the relevant public would associate the decoration with the brand, establishing itself as a ‘decoration with certain influence’ as stipulated by the AUCL.Footnote 91

VCA’s successful enforcement of the AUCL against the knockoff manufacturer has provided an important precedent for itself, as well as for other fashion design companies. Subsequently, VCA embarked on more anti-piracy enforcement projects in China based on unfair competition claims.Footnote 92 Apart from the traditional copyright, trademark and design patent approaches, designs now have the potential to be protected as a ‘decoration with certain influence’ under the AUCL. Compared to trademark and design patent claims, a claim made under the AUCL does not require ex ante prosecution. This protection of design elements resembles trade dress protection in the United States.Footnote 93 First, they both entail a lower degree of market recognition than what is required under trademark laws. In Two Pesos, Inc. v Taco Cabana, Inc., the US Supreme Court expressly ruled that a trade dress could be inherently distinctive and therefore acquiring secondary meaning was not necessary.Footnote 94 Second, aligned with the US Supreme Court’s refusal to extend trade dress protection to a functional design that was the subject of an expired patent,Footnote 95 the Beijing court’s decision in VCA v Shanghai Aijing seems to suggest a similar approach, requiring a finding of an absence of functionality to obtain protection under the AUCL.Footnote 96 Since a separate protection for fashion works is currently unavailable, a trade dress protection or its equivalent may be the best alternative.Footnote 97 The shortcoming, however, lies in the claim’s dependence on the owner’s market reputation, which is a relatively vague concept.Footnote 98

9.4 Accepting Design Elements as Non-traditional Trademarks

When comparing the prosecution and enforcement histories of VCA’s 2D and 3D trademarks, one can observe that while a 3D trademark typically offers broader protection than a 2D trademark for the same design in litigation, obtaining a 3D trademark is also more challenging due to its higher distinctiveness threshold. This is illustrated by the fact that, while the 3D registration for the ‘Alhambra’ design was invalidated, the attempt to invalidate the 2D registration ultimately failed. The same is true for the pairing of a colour trademark and a regular trademark applied to particular colours. Although colour trademarks are usually harder to acquire, they could have a larger protection scope than a regular trademark designated to particular colours, as they are not confined by the shape of the specimen. For example, should Gucci have registered its green-red-green stripes as a colour trademark instead of a device mark, it would not be confined by the specimen filed in the application, which would allow greater flexibility in enforcement actions.Footnote 99 However, recent judicial practicesFootnote 100 and the revision of trademark examination standards in 2021Footnote 101 have sent a positive signal to fashion companies regarding the use of non-traditional trademarks to protect their designs.

9.4.1 3D Trademark

In 2021, a 400-page review and examination guideline was issued by the CNIPA, replacing the previous version and elaborating in great detail examination standards under the 2019 Trademark Law.Footnote 102 According to this guideline, a 3D trademark refers to a trademark consisting of a stand-alone 3D symbol or a 3D symbol containing other elements.Footnote 103 When determining the distinctiveness of a 3D symbol, the examiner should also look into the way in which it is used before drawing conclusions about its source-identifying role.Footnote 104 An inherently indistinctive 3D symbol may acquire distinctiveness through use.Footnote 105 However, if a 3D symbol is considered ‘functional’, it cannot be registered, even with extensive evidence of use.Footnote 106 The ability to register 3D marks is important especially for luxury fashion brands whose iconic products in fact comprise widely recognisable features that are then replicated by a shanzhai manufacturer such as the Bottega Veneta’s intrecciato weave and Hermes’ Birkin and Kelly bags.

The section focusing on 3D symbols in the guideline was largely derived from the SPC’s 2018 decision in Christian Dior v China National Intellectual Property Administration (hereinafter Dior).Footnote 107 In this case, Dior sought to extend its international 3D trademark registration of the J’Adore fragrance bottle to China through the Madrid Protocol, but the extension application was rejected by the China Trademark Office,Footnote 108 and Dior’s appeals were denied all the way up to the Beijing High Court.Footnote 109

Dior then petitioned the SPC based on two grounds: (1) the Trademark Office and the TRAB had mistakenly examined the application as a regular device trademark instead of a 3D trademark; and (2) the J’Adore fragrance bottle was uniquely devised and not a generic design for perfume bottles (and therefore possessed inherent distinctiveness); the design had also been extensively used and promoted in China and generated considerable market reputation and public association (and therefore acquired distinctiveness).Footnote 110 The SPC acknowledged the procedural error in not properly identifying the application as a 3D trademark and ordered the TRAB to re-examine the registrability of the applied-for mark. Nonetheless, the SPC did not comment on the distinctiveness issue but only named a few factors that the TRAB should take into consideration before reaching a decision, including the time when the applied-for mark entered the Chinese market, the evidence supporting the use and promotion of the concerned trademark, the possibility of acquiring source-identifying function and the consistency of examination standards.Footnote 111 The SPC seemed to imply that these are the factors to be considered in the determination of acquired distinctiveness.

Pursuant to the SPC’s order, the TRAB reissued a decision in 2019, allowing the registration of the J’Adore fragrance bottle as a 3D trademark designated on ‘perfumes’ in class 3, while rejecting the application on all other goods applied for.Footnote 112 The reason was that, while the TRAB still found the bottle inherently indistinctive, it accepted Dior’s evidence of use and made a finding of acquired distinctiveness.Footnote 113 However, the evidence of use could only justify public association when used on perfumes; therefore, the application related to all other goods was rejected.Footnote 114

Considering the difficulties in protecting fashion design with 3D trademarks, Dior’s victory in China is commendable. Examples in other jurisdictions include the European Intellectual Property Office’s (EUIPO) partial refusal in 2022 to grant a 3D trademark to another example of Dior’s famous designs – the design of its Saddle Bag – based on a lack of distinctiveness.Footnote 115 Hermès also encountered failure in Italy when trying to enforce its EU-registered 3D trademarks on the shape of their Kelly and Birkin bags against a competitor, when both the Court of Florence and the Florence Court of Appeal upheld the defendant’s invalidity counterclaim.Footnote 116 However, following the instruction of the Italian Supreme Court, this case will soon go through a second appeal, and some practitioners have predicted a favourable result for Hermès.Footnote 117

9.4.2 Colour Trademark

China currently does not accept the registration of single-colour trademarks because of the monopoly power this may create,Footnote 118 nor does it generally accept registration of a colour-combination mark because a colour-combination mark is presumed to be inherently indistinctive. According to the examination standards,Footnote 119 the owner must submit evidence to prove that the colour combination mark has acquired sufficient distinctiveness through use to get it registered.Footnote 120 Again here, the fashion brands that use specific colours as emblematic of their products – such as Christian Louboutin’s lacquered red sole or Gucci’s red-and-green stripes – would desire to secure trademark registration so that they may more easily enforce their rights against shanzhai manufacturers as well as knockoffs by fast fashion brands.

In fact, there have been debates within China on the registrability of a single colour. The Draft Amendment of the Trademark Law, published in 2012, included a paragraph stating that ‘a single colour used on a product or package of a product, which has acquired distinctiveness and can distinguish the product from others, can be registered as a trademark’.Footnote 121 However, this sentence was deleted in the final version.Footnote 122 China decided to take a rather conservative approach to recognising and protecting single colours as trademarks.

Nevertheless, there have been some encouraging developments for fashion design companies interested in obtaining 3D trademarks in China. Christian Louboutin has faced defeats in several countries, including Japan, France and Switzerland, in trademarking its famous high-end women’s high-heeled shoes with a red-lacquered outsole design,Footnote 123 but succeeded in the United States. In 2010, Louboutin filed an international registration for its red sole under the Madrid Protocol and sought to extend the registration to several member states, including China.Footnote 124 The TRAB rejected registration because the mark lacked distinctiveness. The TRAB first identified the mark as a combination of a high-heeled device and a single colour applied to the sole, which was inherently indistinctive.Footnote 125 The TRAB also held that the evidence submitted by Louboutin did not meet the threshold for acquired distinctiveness.Footnote 126 The case then went to the Beijing High Court. Eventually, the SPC upheld the Beijing High Court’s decision recognising Louboutin’s design as ‘a single-colour trademark designated to a particular position’, although it was not listed in Article 8 of the Trademark Law.Footnote 127 This categorisation is consistent with Louboutin’s filing strategy in the EU, which was accepted by the CJEU.Footnote 128

Louboutin’s trademark application strategy in the United States might have valuable implications for China as well. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit instructed the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) that the registration of the red-sole mark could be approved for ‘only those situations in which the red lacquered outsole contrasts in colour with the adjoining “upper” of the shoe’.Footnote 129 In other words, Louboutin could only obtain a trademark for the red sole with a contrasting upper colour (i.e., non-red). Since defendant Yves Saint Laurent’s (YSL) outsole and the adjoining upper of the shoe were both red, its design did not infringe Louboutin’s red-sole mark;Footnote 130 it was also worth noting that the YSL range of monochromatic high-heeled shoes all featured soles in the same colour as the adjoining upper of the shoe (e.g., red-red, blue-blue, green-green). The concept of a red sole with a contrasting upper colour is similar to the colour-combination trademark, but the former provides trademark owners with broader protection because there is no need to identify the exact contrasting upper colour.

9.5 Conclusion

In the fashion world, shanzhai has been a concern for both high-end luxury brands and indie designers for many years. While it is easier to report to local authorities or claim trademark infringement in legal proceedings against manufacturers of counterfeits, the most effective action against knockoffs remains ambiguous. Design elements may be protected by laws governing copyright, trademarks, design patents and unfair competition, but each of these laws has some limitations. Just like the originality requirement for copyright and the novelty requirement for design patents, the distinctiveness requirement has prevented numerous fashion designs from being registered as trademarks.

Although the SPC’s decision in Dior suggests that it is possible for a sign that was not inherently distinctive to acquire distinctiveness through use, and ultimately qualify for registration as a trademark, the standard for achieving that is extremely high and almost equal to that for a ‘well-known trademark’. Alternatively, VCA has provided the fashion industry with a rather innovative approach based on the protection of ‘decoration with certain influence’ in the AUCL. It is easier for design companies like VCA to prove that their design elements have ‘certain influence’ under AUCL than that they have ‘acquired distinctiveness’ under the Trademark Law. Notably, Louboutin has also successfully enforced its rights against a knockoff designer of similar red-sole heels in China under the AUCL,Footnote 131 while the status of its trademark application is still uncertain. Chanel also protected the shape of its signature No.5 fragrance bottle under the AUCL against a perfume brand in China.Footnote 132 The series of cases revealed that there is huge potential for fashion companies to use the AUCL to protect their designs in China.

Nevertheless, the legal standards with respect to the application of the AUCL need to be further clarified by the judiciary. The current law does not clearly distinguish between ‘certain influence’ and ‘acquired distinctiveness’. Moreover, while the AUCL stipulates that a symbol possesses ‘certain influence’ when it exhibits a specific level of market recognition and distinctive attributes that can identify the product’s source,Footnote 133 the statutory wording is remarkably similar to the definition of distinctiveness in the Trademark Law.Footnote 134 This similarity could lead to confusion regarding the legal treatment of a symbol under the AUCL and a mark under the Trademark Law. It is also unclear whether the standard used to determine the separability of aesthetic value and functionality in the AUCL is the same as that used in copyright law. If they are different, a clear explanation regarding how, why and to what extent they differ is desirable. If these issues are resolved, the AUCL is anticipated to become the most potent tool for fashion designers in the fight against knockoffs. This, in turn, would address fashion houses’ enduring concerns about investing in creativity and expanding in the Chinese market.

Footnotes

8 Fashion Upcycling and Trademark Infringement A Circular Economy/Freedom of the Arts Approach

1 For a detailed description of different upcycling practices, see J B Schenerman, ‘One Consumer’s Trash Is Another’s Treasure: Upcycling’s Place in Trademark Law’ (2020) 38 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 745, 755–762 (hereafter Schenerman, ‘Upcycling’s Place’). Cf N Q Dorenbosch, ‘Upcycling – op het snijvlak van duurzaamheid en intellectuele eigendom’ (2022) Intellectuele eigendom en reclamerecht 147 (hereafter Dorenbosch, ‘Upcycling’); Andie Bain, ‘“Dank” Customs, Bootlegs, and Reworked Pieces’ (2020) 23 Journal of World Intellectual Property 375, 383–384 (hereafter Bain, ‘Customs’).

2 See ‘Upcycle’, Merriam Webster <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/upcycle>. Cf Dorenbosch, ‘Upcycling’, above Footnote n 1, 147; Martin Senftleben (2022), ‘Robustness Check: Evaluating and Strengthening Artistic Use Defences in EU Trademark Law’ (2022) 53 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 567, 572 (hereafter Senftleben, ‘Robustness’); Bain, ‘Customs’, above Footnote n 1, 383; A M Keats, ‘Trendy Product Upcycling: Permissible Recycling or Impermissible Commercial Hitchhiking?’ (2020) 110 The Trademark Reporter 712 (hereafter Keats, ‘Trendy Product’); Elisha Teibel, ‘Waste Size: The Skinny on the Environmental Costs of the Fashion Industry’ (2019) 43 William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review 595, 624–625 (hereafter Teibel, ‘Waste Size’).

3 See ‘Upcycling’, Wikipedia <https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Upcycling>.

4 Ashly Riches, ‘The Fashion Industry Is Not as “Green” as It Would Like You to Believe’ (2022) 33 Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum 83, 84–86; Ariele Elia, ‘Fashion’s Destruction of Unsold Goods: Responsible Solutions for an Environmentally Conscious Future’ (2020) 30 Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal 539, 541–551 (hereafter Elia, ‘Fashion’s Destruction’); Teibel, ‘Waste Size’, above Footnote n 2, 597–598.

5 Elia, ‘Fashion’s Destruction’, above Footnote n 4, 576–577. See also the examples given by Schenerman, ‘Upcycling’s Place’, above Footnote n 1, 755–762.

6 Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 14, 2017, on the European Union Trade Mark (codification) [2017] OJL 154/1.

7 Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 16, 2015, to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks [2015] OJL 336/1.

8 Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 14, 2017, on the European Union Trade Mark (codification) [2017] OJL 154/1 art 9(2); Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks [2015] OJL 336/1 art 10(2).

9 Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 14, 2017, on the European Union Trade Mark (codification) [2017] OJL 154/1 art 9(2); Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 16, 2015, to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks [2015] OJL 336/1 art 10(2).

10 Google France SARL, Google Inc v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, Cases C-236/08 to 238/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:159, at [50] (CJEU, March 23, 2010); Arsenal Football Club plc v Matthew Reed, Case C-206/01, ECLI:EU:C:2002:651, at [40] (CJEU, November 12, 2002).

11 Annette Kur and Martin Senftleben, European Trade Mark Law – A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2017) para 5.24–5.25 (hereafter Kur and Senftleben, European Trade Mark Law).

12 Łukasz Żelechowski, ‘Invoking Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Competition in Trade Mark Infringement Disputes: Legal Mechanisms for Striking a Balance’ (2018) 19 European Research Area Forum 115, 118–119 (hereafter Żelechowski, ‘Invoking Freedom of Expression’).

13 See case law on trademark reuse in parody scenarios, such as Lila Postkarte, Case I ZR 159/02, 583 (German Federal Court of Justice, February 3, 2005); Greenpeace v Esso, Case 06-10961 (French Supreme Court, April 8, 2008); Greenpeace France and Greenpeace New-Zealand v Areva, Case 07-11251 (French Supreme Court, April 8, 2008). For commentary, see Żelechowski, ‘Invoking Freedom of Expression’, above Footnote n 12, 119–120; Kur and Senftleben, European Trade Mark Law, above Footnote n 11, para 6.59–6.70; Sabine Jacques, ‘A Parody Exception: Why Trade Mark Owners Should Get the Joke’ (2016) 38 European Intellectual Property Review 471, 471–472 and 479; Christophe Geiger, ‘Trade Marks and Freedom of Expression – the Proportionality of Criticism’ (2007) 38 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 317 (hereafter Geiger, ‘Proportionality of Criticism’).

14 Cf Katya Assaf, ‘The Dilution of Culture and the Law of Trademarks’ (2008) 1 IDEA: The Intellectual Property Law Review 49, 56, for a similar conclusion based on US trademark law.

15 Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 14, 2017, on the European Union Trade Mark (codification) [2017] OJL 154/1 art 9(2); Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 16, 2015, to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks [2015] OJL 336/1 art 10(2).

16 Adam Opel AG v Autec AG, Case C-48/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:55, at [24] (CJEU, January 25, 2007), pointed in this direction. The course adopted in this judgment, however, was not followed in further decisions.

17 Graeme B Dinwoodie and Mark D Janis, ‘Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law’ (2007) 92 Iowa Law Review 1597, 1599–1600; S L Dogan and M Lemley, ‘Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet’ (2004) 41 Houston Law Review 777, 809–811.

18 Cf Angsar Ohly, ‘Schutz von Kulturgütern durch das Markenrecht?’ in Franz Hacker and Frederik Thiering (eds), Festschrift für Paul Ströbele zum 75. Geburtstag (Carl Heymanns, 2019) 335 (hereafter Ohly, ‘Schutz’). For an overview of developments in this area, see Annette Kur, ‘Confusion over Use? – Die Benutzung “als Marke” im Lichte der EuGH-Rechtsprechung’ (2008) 1 Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht – International 11 (hereafter Kur, ‘Confusion’).

19 Bayerische Motorenwerke AG (BMW) and BMW Nederland BV v Ronald Karel Deenik, Case C-63/97, ECLI:EU:C:1999:82, at [42] (CJEU, February 23, 1999). For an overview of the development of the trademark use requirement in CJEU jurisprudence, see Kur, ‘Confusion’, above Footnote n 18, 1–11.

20 O2 Holdings Limited and O2 (UK) Limited v Hutchison 3G UK Limited, Case C-533/06, ECLI:EU:C:2008:339, at [35]–[36] (CJEU, June 12, 2008). As to keyword advertising on the basis of services offered by a search engine, use of a competitor’s trademark as a keyword for a sponsored link with one’s own advertising has been found to constitute trademark use on similar grounds. See Google France SARL, Google Inc v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, Case 236/08 to 238/08, at [71] (CJEU, March 23, 2010).

21 Céline SARL v Céline SA, Case C-17/06, ECLI:EU:C:2007:497, at [23] (CJEU, September 11, 2007).

22 Google France SARL, Google Inc. v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, Cases C-236/08 to 238/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:159, at [72] (CJEU, March 23, 2010); L’Oréal SA v eBay International AG, Case C-324/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:474, at [92] (CJEU, July 12, 2011).

23 Footnote Ibid at [93].

24 As to the debate on this development, see the summary in Roland Knaak, Annette Kur and Alexander von Mühlendahl (2011), ‘Study on the Functioning of the European Trade Mark System’, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property & Competition Law Research Paper No. 12–13, 2011, para 2.178 <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/tm/index_en.htm>.

25 Cf Ohly, ‘Schutz’, above Footnote n 18, 335; Kur and Senftleben, European Trade Mark Law, above Footnote n 11, para 5.50–5.54.

26 Kur and Senftleben, European Trade Mark Law, above Footnote n 11, para 5.14–5.15 and 5.49–5.56.

27 Cf Estelle Derclaye and Matthias Leistner, Intellectual Property Overlaps – A European Perspective (Hart, 2011) 328; Ilanah Simon Fhima, ‘Embellishment: Trademark Use Triumph or Decorative Disaster?’ (2006) 28 European Intellectual Property Review 321; Kur, ‘Confusion’, above Footnote n 18, 12.

28 Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 14, 2017, on the European Union Trade Mark (codification) [2017] OJL 154/1 art 9(2); Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 16, 2015, to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks [2015] OJL 336/1 art 10(2).

29 Adidas AG and Adidas Benelux BV v Marca Mode CV and Others, Case C-102/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:217, at [30]–[34] (CJEU, April 10, 2008). As to the broad concept of confusion in modern trademark law, cf Anna Tischner and Katarzyna Stasiuk, ‘Spare Parts, Repairs, Trade Marks and Consumer Understanding’ (2023) 54 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 26, 35–36 (hereafter Tischner and Stasiuk, ‘Spare Parts’); Dorenbosch, ‘Upcycling’, above Footnote n 1, 148–149; Keats, ‘Trendy Product’, above Footnote n 2, 713–714 and 718–719; Mark Lemley and Mark McKenna, ‘Irrelevant Confusion’ (2010) 62 Stanford Law Review 413, 414–422.

30 Arsenal Football Club plc v Matthew Reed, Case C-206/01, ECLI:EU:C:2002:651, at [57] (CJEU, November 12, 2002). Cf Dorenbosch, ‘Upcycling’, above Footnote n 1, 148–149; Schenerman, ‘Upcycling’s Place’, above Footnote n 1, 766–767 and 778–779; Kur and Senftleben, European Trade Mark Law, above Footnote n 11, para 5.131–5.146.

31 L’Oréal SA and Others v Bellure NV and Others, Case C-487/07, ECLI:EU:C:2009:378, at [49] (CJEU, June 18, 2009). Cf Tischner and Stasiuk, ‘Spare Parts’, above Footnote n 29, 38–39. As to the additional risk of tarnishing that may arise under specific circumstances, see Keats, ‘Trendy Product’, above Footnote n 2, 719–720.

32 L’Oréal SA and Others v Bellure NV and Others, Case C-487/07, ECLI:EU:C:2009:378, at [47]–[49] (CJEU, June 18, 2009).

33 Intel Corporation Inc v CPM United Kingdom Ltd, Case C-252/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:655, at [77] (CJEU, November 27, 2008); Environmental Manufacturing LLP v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) and Société Elmar Wolf, Case C-383/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:741, at [37], [43] (CJEU, November 14, 2013).

34 Martin Senftleben, The Copyright/Trademark Interface – How the Expansion of Trademark Protection Is Stifling Cultural Creativity (Wolters Kluwer, 2020) 156170 (hereafter Senftleben, The Copyright Trademark Interface).

35 Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 16, 2015, to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks [2015] OJL 336/1 art 15(1).

36 Dorenbosch, ‘Upcycling’, above Footnote n 1, 148.

37 Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 16, 2015, to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks [2015] OJL 336/1 art 15(2).

38 Dorenbosch, ‘Upcycling’, above Footnote n 1, 148–149; A Kur, ‘“As Good as New” – Sale of Repaired or Refurbished Goods: Commendable Practice or Trade Mark Infringement?’ (2021) 70 Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht - International 228, 232–233 (hereafter Kur, ‘Sale of Repaired Goods’); Keats, ‘Trendy Product’, above Footnote n 2, 715–716. Cf Gefärbte Jeans, Case I ZR 210/93, 726 (German Federal Supreme Court, December 14, 1995), stating that the exhaustion rule did not cover the resale of ‘stonewashed’ second-hand jeans.

39 Cf The Gillette Company and Gillette Group Finland Oy v LA-Laboratories Ltd Oy, Case C-228/03, ECLI:EU:C:2005:177, at [42]–[45] (CJEU, March 17, 2005).

40 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OLJ 364/1 art 37.

41 European Commission, Communication, ‘A New Circular Economy Action Plan for a Cleaner and More Competitive Europe’, COM (March 11, 2020) 98 (hereafter European Commission, ‘Circular Economy’).

42 European Commission, Communication, ‘The European Green Deal’, COM (December 11, 2019) 640.

43 European Commission, ‘Circular Economy’, above Footnote n 41, 7–9. Cf Tischner and Stasiuk, ‘Spare Parts’, above Footnote n 29, 28; Charlotte Vrendenbarg, ‘IE en de circulaire economie: Stimulans of obstakel?’ (2023) Nederlands Juristenblad 971, 971–972 (hereafter Vrendenbard, ‘IE’).

44 For a more detailed discussion of this provision, see D J W Jongsma, Creating EU Copyright Law – Striking a Fair Balance (Hanken School of Economics, 2019) 163168; J Griffiths and L McDonagh, ‘Fundamental Rights and European IP Law – the Case of Art 17(2) of the EU Charter’ in C Geiger (ed), Constructing European Intellectual Property Achievements and New Perspectives (Edward Elgar, 2013) 75; C Geiger, ‘Intellectual Property Shall Be Protected!? Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: A Mysterious Provision with an Unclear Scope’ (2009) 31 European Intellectual Property Review 113.

45 For an overview of the rationales of trademark protection, see Kur and Senftleben, European Trade Mark Law, above Footnote n 11, para 1.06–1.15.

46 Bain, ‘Customs’, above Footnote n 1, 402–403.

47 Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 14, 2017, on the European Union Trade Mark (codification) [2017] OJL 154/1 art 9(2); Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 16, 2015, to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks [2015] OJL 336/1 art 10(2).

48 Adidas-Salomon AG and Adidas Benelux BV v Fitnessworld Trading Ltd, Case C-408/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:582, at [39]–[41] (CJEU, October 23, 2003); Adidas AG and Adidas Benelux BV v Marca Mode CV and Others, Case C-102/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:217, at [34] (CJEU, April 10, 2008); Medusa, Case I ZR 175/09, at [23]–[30] (German Federal Court of Justice, November 24, 2011). Cf Senftleben, The Copyright Trademark Interface, above Footnote n 34, 158–161.

49 Kur and Senftleben, European Trade Mark Law, above Footnote n 11, para 6.23–6.27.

50 Adidas AG and Adidas Benelux BV v Marca Mode CV and Others, Case C-102/07, ECLI:EU:C:2008:217, at [48] (CJEU, April 10, 2008).

52 Adam Opel AG v Autec AG, Case C-48/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:55, at [44] (CJEU, January 25, 2007).

53 Cf Tischner and Stasiuk, ‘Spare Parts’, above Footnote n 29, 39–40.

54 For a more detailed discussion of the field of application of this defence, see Senftleben, The Copyright Trademark Interface, above Footnote n 34, 510–512; Annette Kur, ‘Yellow Dictionaries, Red Banking Services, Some Candies, and a Sitting Bunny: Protection of Color and Shape Marks from a German and European Perspective’ in Irene Calboli and Martin Senftleben (eds), The Protection of Non-Traditional Trademarks – Critical Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 2018) 101 (hereafter Kur, ‘Protection of Color’).

55 Senftleben, ‘Robustness’, above Footnote n 2, 581–582. For non-infringement arguments based on a parallel between parody cases and upcycling, see Schenerman, ‘Upcycling’s Place’, above Footnote n 1, 772–775.

56 Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of October 22, 2008, to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks [2008] OJL 299 art 6(1)(c). Cf The Gillette Company and Gillette Group Finland Oy v LA-Laboratories Ltd Oy, Case C-228/03, ECLI:EU:C:2005:177, at [49] (CJEU, March 17, 2005).

57 As to the considerations underlying the broadening of the referential use concept as a result of the trademark law reform, see Kur and Senftleben, European Trade Mark Law, above Footnote n 11, para 6.39–6.41.

58 Bain, ‘Customs’, above Footnote n 1, 389. As to the initial communicative act to which Bain refers, it has been demonstrated that luxury fashion brands in particular carry important semiotic connotations. Arguably, their recoding can be classed as acts of communicative expression that merit protection in the light of freedom of expression. See David Tan, ‘The Semiotics of Alpha Brands: Encoding/Decoding/Recoding/Transcoding of Louis Vuitton and Implications for Trademark Laws’ (2013) 32 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 221 (hereafter Tan, ‘Semiotics’).

59 Bain, ‘Customs’, above Footnote n 1, 406. As to the independent role of the guarantee of freedom of the arts in intellectual property cases, see Pelham GmbH and Others v Ralf Hütter and Florian Schneider‑Esleben, Case C-476/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:624, at [29]–[35] (CJEU, July 29, 2019). Cf C Geiger and E Izyumenko, ‘The Constitutionalization of Intellectual Property Law in the EU and the Funke Medien, Pelham and Spiegel Online Decisions of the CJEU: Progress, but Still Some Way to Go!’ (2020) 51 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 282, 293–294.

60 See the information provided at ‘Coats’, Duran Lantink <https://duranlantink.com/ssaw21>.

61 T Adorno, Ästhetische Theorie (G Adorno and R Tiedemann, eds) (Suhrkamp, 1970) 10, 34.

62 Footnote Ibid 28, 503.

63 Footnote Ibid 128, 196–197.

64 Footnote Ibid 199–200.

66 Footnote Ibid 25–26, 56.

67 Footnote Ibid 9–10, 19, 53.

68 Footnote Ibid 127, 199.

69 Footnote Ibid 55–56.

70 Footnote Ibid 204–205.

74 Footnote Ibid 27–28, 32–33.

76 Footnote Ibid 337–338.

77 Footnote Ibid 197–198.

78 S Kaur, ‘Does Louis Vuitton Really Destroy Unsold Bags?’, Luxury Viewer (December 24, 2020) <https://luxuryviewer.com/does-louis-vuitton-really-destroy-unsold-bags/> (hereafter Kaur, ‘LV’). See also Elia, ‘Fashion’s Destruction’, above Footnote n 4, 547–548, 557–560, who explains as well that luxury brands cause their own, significant environmental problems by destroying unsold items.

79 For an analysis of the importance and magnetism of this aura, see Tan, ‘Semiotics’, above Footnote n 58, 225–227.

80 In fact, the fashion waste problem is not only due to the wasteful use of relatively cheap raw material by fast fashion producers. See Elia, ‘Fashion’s Destruction’, above Footnote n 4, 547–548, 557–560; Kaur, ‘LV’, above Footnote n 78.

81 P Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde (Suhrkamp, 1974) 28–29, 67 (hereafter Bürger, Theorie).

82 Footnote Ibid 67–68.

83 Footnote Ibid 72–73. As to the magnetism and importance of brand culture, see Tan, ‘Semiotics’, above Footnote n 58, 225–227.

84 Footnote Ibid 60–63, 81–85.

85 For a detailed description of these risks and the need for a change of production and consumption patterns, see Teibel, ‘Waste Size’, above Footnote n 2, 601–616.

86 Cf Schenerman, ‘Upcycling’s Place’, above Footnote n 1, 772–775.

87 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, WIPO TRT/PARIS/001 (September 28, 1979) art 6bis; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature April 15, 1994, 1869 UNTS 299, 33 ILM 1197 (signed April 15, 1994) art 16(2), 16(3). Cf Martin Senftleben, ‘The Trademark Tower of Babel – Dilution Concepts in International, US and EC Trademark Law’ (2009) 40 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 45, 50–77.

88 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OLJ 364/1 art 11, 13, 37.

89 Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 14, 2017, on the European Union Trade Mark (codification) [2017] OJL 154/1 art 14(2); Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 16, 2015, to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks [2015] OJL 336/1 art 14(2).

90 Portakabin Ltd and Portakabin BV v Primakabin BV, Case C-558/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:416, at [69] (CJEU, July 8, 2010); The Gillette Company and Gillette Group Finland Oy v LA-Laboratories Ltd Oy, Case C-228/03, ECLI:EU:C:2005:177, at [49] (CJEU, March 17, 2005). Cf Kur and Senftleben, European Trade Mark Law, above Footnote n 11, para 6.73; Martin Senftleben, Lionel Bently and Graeme B Dinwoodie et al, ‘The Recommendation on Measures to Safeguard Freedom of Expression and Undistorted Competition: Guiding Principles for the Further Development of EU Trade Mark Law’ (2015) 37 European Intellectual Property Review 337, 339 (hereafter Senftleben, Bently and Dinwoodie, ‘Recommendation’); Martin Senftleben, ‘Adapting EU Trademark Law to New Technologies – Back to Basics?’ in C Geiger (ed), Constructing European Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar, 2013) 168169 (hereafter Senftleben, ‘Back to Basics’); Ilanah Simon Fhima and Robin Jacob, ‘Unfair Advantage Law in the European Union’ in Daniel Bereskin (ed), International Trademark Dilution (Thomson Reuters Westlaw, 2014) 274; Ilanah Simon Fhima, ‘The Role of Legitimacy in Trade Mark Law’ (2012) 65 Current Legal Problems 489, 501–502.

91 Senftleben, ‘Robustness’, above Footnote n 2, 588–590.

92 Cf Kur and Senftleben, European Trade Mark Law, above Footnote n 11, para 1.06–1.15.

93 The Gillette Company and Gillette Group Finland Oy v LA-Laboratories Ltd Oy, Case C-228/03, ECLI:EU:C:2005:177, at [49] (CJEU, March 17, 2005).

94 Directive 2006/114/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 12, 2006, Concerning Misleading and Comparative Advertising [2006] OJL 376/21 art 4(d), (f), (g), (h). Cf Kur and Senftleben, European Trade Mark Law, above Footnote n 11, para 6.72.

95 Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 14, 2017, on the European Union Trade Mark (codification) [2017] OJL 154/1 art 9(2)(b), (c); Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 16, 2015, to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks [2015] OJL 336/1 art 10(2)(b), (c).

96 Cf Kur and Senftleben, European Trade Mark Law, above Footnote n 11, para 6.73, and the further references, above Footnote n 90.

97 Portakabin Ltd and Portakabin BV v Primakabin BV, Case C-558/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:416, at [69] (CJEU, July 8, 2010).

98 Senftleben, Bently and Dinwoodie, ‘Recommendation’, above Footnote n 90, 341–343. Cf Kur, ‘Protection of Color’, above Footnote n 54, 105; Kur and Senftleben, European Trade Mark Law, above Footnote n 11, para 6.74.

99 Senftleben, Bently and Dinwoodie, ‘Recommendation’, above Footnote n 90, 339.

100 Kur, ‘Protection of Color’, above Footnote n 54, 105. Cf Kur and Senftleben, European Trade Mark Law, above Footnote n 11, para 6.74; Vincenzo Di Cataldo, ‘The Trade Mark with a Reputation in EU Law – Some Remarks on the Negative Condition “Without Due Cause”’ (2011) 42 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 833, 837 (hereafter Cataldo, ‘Negative Condition’).

101 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OLJ 364/1 art 17(2).

102 Ibid at art 52(1).

103 Kur, ‘Sale of Repaired Goods’, above Footnote n 38, 235–236.

104 For a further plea for a stronger focus on the concrete behaviour of the alleged infringer, see Lotte Anemaet (2021), ‘Which Honesty Test for Trademark Law? Why Traders’ Efforts to Avoid Trademark Harm Should Matter When Assessing Honest Business Practices’ (2021) 70 Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht – International 1025, 1037–1038 (hereafter Anemaet, ‘Honesty’).

105 Kur, ‘Sale of Repaired Goods’, above Footnote n 38, 236.

106 Cf Dorenbosch, ‘Upcycling’, above Footnote n 1, 148–149; Kur, ‘Sale of Repaired Goods’, above Footnote n 38, 235–236.

107 Viking Gas A/S v Kosan Gas A/S, Case C-46/10, ECLI:EU:C:2011:485, at [30]–[33] (CJEU, July 14, 2011).

108 Footnote Ibid at [35].

109 Footnote Ibid at [39]–[40].

110 Footnote Ibid at [11].

111 Footnote Ibid at [39]–[41].

112 Soda-Club (CO2) SA and SodaStream International BV v MySoda Oy, Case C-197/21, ECLI:EU:C:2022:834, at [54] (CJEU, October 27, 2022). For a discussion of underlying circular economy considerations, see Vrendenbard, ‘IE’, above Footnote n 43, 973–974.

113 Footnote Ibid at [54].

114 Cf Anemaet, ‘Honesty’, above Footnote n 104, 1037–1038, 1041.

115 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OLJ 364/1 art 11, 13, 37. As to the need for a proper balance that gives room for circular economy initiatives, see Vrendenbard, ‘IE’, above Footnote n 43, 973–974.

116 For a similar line of argument in the area of repaired goods, see Tischner and Stasiuk, ‘Spare Parts’, above Footnote n 29, 35–36.

117 Cf Tischner and Stasiuk, ‘Spare Parts’, above Footnote n 29, 41–42.

118 Schenerman, ‘Upcycling’s Place’, above Footnote n 1, 765–766. Admittedly, a study of consumer responses to repaired goods bearing the logo of the original manufacturers yielded mixed results and showed that, in this specific case, consumers may be misled. See Tischner and Stasiuk, ‘Spare Parts’, above Footnote n 29, 53. The situation in the field of upcycled products, however, is different because third-party trademarks will appear on reworked, modified products. It is not the purpose of upcycling to restore the original appearance of products. The consumer perception will thus be different.

119 Schenerman, ‘Upcycling’s Place’, above Footnote n 1, 778–780.

120 Tischner and Stasiuk, ‘Spare Parts’, above Footnote n 29, 33–34; Kur, ‘Sale of Repaired Goods’, above Footnote n 38, 235; Anemaet, ‘Honesty’, above Footnote n 104, 1037–1038 and 1041; Schenerman, ‘Upcycling’s Place’, above Footnote n 1, 766–769; Keats, ‘Trendy Product’, above Footnote n 2, 717–718.

121 As to the inclusion of normative considerations in the consumer concept and the determination of the consumer’s level of knowledge, see Senftleben, The Copyright Trademark Interface, above Footnote n 34, 352–355; Graeme B Dinwoodie and Dev Gangjee, ‘The Image of the Consumer in European Trade Mark Law’ in Dorota Leczykiewicz and Stephen Weatherill (eds), The Images of the Consumer in EU Law: Legislation, Free Movement and Competition Law (Hart, 2016) 367.

122 Mercis BV and Hendrik Magdalenus Bruna v Punt.nl BV (Court of Appeals of Amsterdam, September 13, 2011, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2011:BS7825) at [4.19]. For a further example of the successful invocation of the due cause defence in an artistic context, see Lila Postkarte, Case I ZR 159/02, 585 (German Federal Supreme Court, February 3, 2005). Cf Martin Senftleben, ‘The Perfect Match – Civil Law Judges and Open-Ended Fair Use Provisions’ (2017) 33 American University International Law Review 231, 256–265.

123 Moët Hennessy Champagne Services v Cedric Art, Case A2018/1/8, at [9] (Benelux Court of Justice, October 14, 2019). As to the traditional parody requirement of a critical comment, see Geiger, ‘Proportionality of Criticism’, above Footnote n 13, 317.

124 IR no 323543.

125 See ‘Cedric’ (Cedric Gallery) <https://www.cedricgallery.com/> for examples.

126 Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 14, 2017, on the European Union Trade Mark (codification) [2017] OJL 154/1 art 9(2); Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 16, 2015, to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks [2015] OJL 336/1 art 10(2). As to these three anti-dilution actions, see L’Oréal SA and Others v Bellure NV and Others, Case C-487/07, ECLI:EU:C:2009:378, at [39]–[41] (CJEU, June 18, 2009). Cf Kur and Senftleben, European Trade Mark Law, above Footnote n 11, para 5.182–5.192; Senftleben, ‘Back to Basics’, above Footnote n 90, 152.

127 As to the due cause defence at EU level, see Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 14, 2017, on the European Union Trade Mark (codification) [2017] OJL 154/1 art 9(2); Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 16, 2015, to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks [2015] OJL 336/1 art 10(2). See also Interflora Inc and Interflora British Unit v Marks & Spencer plc and Flowers Direct Online Ltd, ECR I-08625, at [91] (CJEU, September 22, 2011); Leidseplein Beheer BV and Hendrikus de Vries v Red Bull GmbH and Red Bull Nederland BV, Case C-65/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:49, at [54]–[58] (CJEU, February 6, 2014). Cf Kur and Senftleben, European Trade Mark Law, above Footnote n 11, para 5.265–5.268 and 6.59–6.63; Cataldo, ‘Negative Condition’, above Footnote n 100, 833.

128 Moët Hennessy Champagne Services v Cedric Art, Case A2018/1/8, at [9] (Benelux Court of Justice, October 14, 2019).

131 Cf Anemaet, ‘Honesty’, above Footnote n 104, 1037–1038.

132 Cf Senftleben, The Copyright Trademark Interface, above Footnote n 34, 468–469.

133 Cf Senftleben, ‘Robustness’, above Footnote n 2, 598–600.

134 Chanel, Inc. v Shiver and Duke LLC, Edith Anne Hunt and John Does, Case 1:21-cv-01277 (Order of Dismissal) (SDNY, August 30, 2022).

135 See the disclaimer on the Shiver and Duke website, ‘S+D creates unique designs using Authentic buttons and bags to preserve their beauty while reducing waste and its impact on the planet’: ‘Non-Affiliation’ (Shiver + Duke) <https://shiverandduke.com/pages/non-affiliation>.

136 There is no final word on the infringement issue in the United States because of a settlement. See Chanel, Inc, v Shiver and Duke LLC, Edith Anne Hunt and John Does, Case 1:21-cv-01277 (Order of Dismissal) (SDNY, November 14, 2022).

9 Shanzhai Fashion and Intellectual Property in China

1 Barton Beebe, ‘Shanzhai, Sumptuary Law, and Intellectual Property Law in Contemporary China’ (2014) 47 UC Davis Law Review 849, 860–861 (explaining the emergence and conventional history of shanzhai in the mid-2000s); Haochen Sun, ‘Can Louis Vuitton Dance with Hiphone – Rethinking the Idea of Social Justice in Intellectual Property Law’ (2012) 15 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Law & Social Change 389, 395 (‘China has witnessed the rise of the shanzhai phenomenon over the past few years’).

2 Sky Canaves and Juliet Ye, ‘Imitation Is the Sincerest Form of Rebellion in China’, Wall Street Journal (January 22, 2009) <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123257138952903561>.

3 Sun, above Footnote n 1, at 396 (‘Despite having many references, shanzhai has no precise definition that can encapsulate all of its dynamic elements. This is because the phenomenon itself has developed very rapidly over the years with the mushrooming of new products and events, all labeled as shanzhai.’).

4 Qiaozhi Amani Youxian Gongsi Su Guangzhou Lideng Biaoye Youxian Gongsi Deng (乔治·阿玛尼有限公司诉广州利登表业有限公司等) [Giorgio Armani S.P.A. v Guangzhou Lideng Timepiece Co, Ltd et al] (Guangzhou Baiyun District Court 2022).

5 Boboli Youxian Gongsi Su Xinboli Shangmao Youxian Gongsi Deng (博柏利有限公司诉新帛利商贸有限公司等) [Burberry Limited v Baneberry Trading Co. Ltd et al] (Jiangsu Suzhou Interim People’s Court November 29, 2020) (hereinafter Baneberry).

6 Eg, Van Cleef & Arpels’ failure in securing the three-dimensional (3D) trademark registration of its four-leaf clover jewellery in China. See Fanke Yabao Youxian Gongsi Deng Su Guojia Zhishi Chanquan Ju (梵克雅宝有限公司等诉国家知识产权局) [Van Cleef & Arpels et al, v China National Intellectual Property Administration] (Beijing High People’s Court, December 26, 2020) (hereinafter VCA v CNIPA).

7 Angela Terese Timpone, ‘The True Price for Your Fake Gucci Bag Is Life: Why Eliminating Unsafe Labor Practices Is the Right Answer to the Fashion Counterfeit Problem’ (2017) 15 Cardozo Public Law Policy & Ethics Journal 351, 371.

8 See generally, Guojia Chuangxin Qudong Fazhan Gangyao (国家创新驱动发展战略纲要) [Outline of the National Innovation-Driven Development Strategy] (promulgated by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council, May 2016). English translation could be found at <https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/outline-of-the-national-innovation-driven-development-strategy/>.

9 See ‘Shi Si Wu’ Guojia Zhishi Chanquan Baohu He Yunyong Guihua (‘十四五’国家知识产权保护和运用规划) [The 14th ‘Five-Year Plan’ National Plan on Intellectual Property Protection and Utilization] (promulgated by the State Council, October 2021), Article 3.

10 All three departmental IP laws had been amended from 2019 to 2020.

11 Having been absorbed and replaced by the China National Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA) since 2019.

12 Kelisidiang Diaoer Xiangliao Gongsi Su Yuan Guojia Gongshang Xingzheng Guanli Zongju Shangbiao Pingshen Weiyuanhui (克里斯蒂昂迪奥尔香料公司诉原国家工商行政管理总局商标评审委员会) [Parfums Christian Dior v The Former Trademark Review and Adjudication Board of the State Administration of Industry and Commerce] (Supreme People’s Court April 26, 2018) (hereinafter Dior).

13 Kelisiti Lubutuo Su Yuan Guojia Gongshang Xingzheng Guanli Zongju Shangbiao Pingshen Weiyuanhui (克里斯提鲁布托诉原国家工商行政管理总局商标评审委员会) [Christian Louboutin v The Former Trademark Review and Adjudication Board of the State Administration of Industry and Commerce] (Beijing High People’s Court, December 24, 2018) (hereinafter Louboutin v TRAB).

14 See, eg, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guomin Jingji He Shehui Fazhan Di Shisi Ge Wunian Guihua He 2035 Nian Yuanjing Mubiao Gangyao (中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和2035年远景目标纲要) ‘Outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China and the Long-Term Goals for 2035’ (promulgated by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council March 12, 2021) <www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021-03/13/content_5592681.htm> (China).

15 Africh Royale, ‘Interview with Adelaja Temitope Adeola, Fashion Designer and CEO Of Grat Apparel’ <https://africhroyale.com/fashion-is-a-lucrative-business-says-the-ceo-of-grat-apparel/>.

16 Sky Ariella, ‘Dazzling Fashion Industry Statistics [2022]: How Much Is the Fashion Industry Worth’, Zippa (October 3, 2022) <www.zippia.com/advice/fashion-industry-statistics/>.

17 Violet Atkinson et al, ‘Comparative Study of Fashion and IP: Copyright and Designs in France, Europe and Australia’ (2016) 11(7) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 516, 528; Paige Holton, ‘Intellectual Property Laws for Fashion Designers Need No Embellishments: They Are Already in Style’ (2014) 39 Journal of Corporation Law 415, 418; Ronald Urbach and Jennifer Soussa, ‘Is the Design Piracy Protection Act a Step Forward for Copyright Law or Is It Destined to Fall Apart at the Seams?’ (2008) 16 Metropolitan Corporate Counsel 28, 28.

18 Pammi Sinha, ‘Creativity in Fashion’ (2002) 2(1V) Journal of Textile and Apparel, Technology and Management 1, 2–3 (‘Creativity is a form of problem solving and fashion design is a problem.’).

19 C Scott Hemphill and Jeannie Suk, ‘The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion’ (2009) 61 Stanford Law Review 1147, 1150 (‘In the legal realm, this social dynamic of innovation and continuity is most directly engaged by the law of intellectual property.’).

20 See generally Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman, ‘The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design’ (2006) 92 Virginia Law Review 1687.

21 Footnote Ibid, 1692 (‘Our focus is the copying of apparel designs, not brand names …. It is also important to distinguish textile designs from apparel designs, though there is sometimes overlap.’).

23 Marra M Clay, ‘Copycat Cosmetics: The Beauty Industry and the Bounds of the American Intellectual Property System’ (2021) 106 Minnesota Law Review 425, 436; Kenneth L Port, ‘A Case against the ACTA’ (2012) 33 Cardozo Law Review 1131, 1141; Meghan Collins et al, ‘Knock-off the Knockoffs: The Fight against Trademark and Copyright Infringement’ (2009) 9 Illinois Business Law Journal 227, 231.

24 Port, above Footnote n 23, 1141–1142; Clay, above Footnote n 23, 436–437; Julio O De Castro et al, ‘Can Entrepreneurial Firms Benefit from Product Piracy?’ (2008) 28 Journal of Business Venturing 75, 78.

25 Port, above Footnote n 23, 1141–1142; Clay, above Footnote n 23, 436–437.

26 Baneberry, above Footnote n 5.

27 See, eg, Baneberry, above Footnote n 5. In that case, the Court reasoned that the alleged infringement was a ‘multi-dimensional imitation’ of the Burberry brand, which will inevitably degrade, dilute and damage the distinctiveness, recognisability and reputation of Burberry.

28 Baneberry, above Footnote n 5.

29 Shangbiao Fa (商标法) [Trademark Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm National People’s Congress, April 23, 2019, effective November 1, 2019) (China) (hereinafter Trademark Law 2019), Article 60 (‘Where any party has committed any of such acts to infringe the exclusive right to use a registered trademark … where they are reluctant to resolve the matter through consultation or the consultation fails, the trademark registrant or interested party may institute legal proceedings in the People’s Court or request the administrative authority for industry and commerce for actions.’).

30 Baneberry, above Footnote n 5.

31 Xing Fa (刑法) [Criminal Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm National People’s Congress, December 26, 2020, effective March 1, 2021) (China) Article 213 (‘Whoever, without permission from the owner of a registered trademark, uses a trademark which is identical with the registered trademark on the same kind of commodities shall, if the circumstances are serious, be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention and shall also, or shall only, be fined; if the circumstances are especially serious, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than seven years and shall also be fined.’). According to the Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate on Several Issues Related to the Application of Law in Adjudicating Criminal Cases of Intellectual Property Infringement, a trademark infringement is ‘severe’ if the infringer is with a turnover of more than RMB 50,000 or with a revenue of more than RMB 30,000. See Guanyu Banli Qinfan Zhishi Chanquan Xingshi Anjian Juti Yingyong Falv Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi (关于办理侵犯知识产权刑事案件具体应用法律若干问题的解释) [Interpretation on Several Issues Related to the Application of Law in Adjudicating Criminal Cases of Intellectual Property Infringement] (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, December 8, 2004, effective December 22, 2004) (China).

32 Trademark Law 2019, above Footnote n 29, Article 60.

33 Clay, above Footnote n 23, 437.

34 Beebe, above Footnote n 1, 852 (explaining that shanzhai is sometimes licit but usually illicit).

35 See, eg, Forever 21, Inc v Gucci America, Inc, et al, No. 2:17-cv-04706 (C.D.Cal), in which case Forever 21 filed a suit against Gucci to seek a declaratory judgment determining its use of the green-red-green stripes on clothing does not infringe Gucci’s trademark. The case was settled outside the court before a substantive ruling could be made. See also Anna Sui Corp v Forever 21, Inc, et al., No. 1:07-cv-03235 (SDNY 2008); Irene Tan, ‘Knock It Off, Forever 21 – The Fashion Industry’s Battle against Design Piracy’ (2010) 18 Journal of Law & Policy 893, 913–921; ‘The Many (Law)suits of Forever 21’, TFR News (October 2, 2019) <https://tfr.news/articles/2019/10/2/the-many-lawsuits-of-forever-21>; ‘Converse Sues Wal-Mart, H&M over Knockoff Sneakers’, CNN Wire (October 15, 2014) <https://kdvr.com/news/money/converse-sues-wal-mart-hm-over-knockoff-sneakers/>. Most of the disputes above were settled outside the court.

36 Port, above Footnote n 23, 1141 (‘When no consumer confusion is likely, the appropriate label is knockoff.’).

37 Clay, above Footnote n 23, 436 (‘Under this definition, knockoffs are not illegal unless a brand can prove that a knockoff is so close to the original product that the consumer is misled into believing they are purchasing the original.’).

38 Notably, such disputes and accusations of design piracy often occur between two high fashion houses or between two fast fashion brands. See, eg, Christian Louboutin S.A. et al v Yves Saint Laurent American Holding, Inc et al, 696 F 3d 206 (2nd Cir. 2012) (hereinafter Louboutin v YSL); H&M Hennes & Mauritz AB v Forever 21, Inc, No. 1:15-cv-05678 (SDNY 2015).

39 See, eg, Galiano v Harrah’s Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411, 422 (5th Cir. 2005); Raustiala and Sprigman, above Footnote n 20, 1699. See also Shanghai Lukun Fushi Youxian Gongsi Su Shanghai Rongmei Pinpai Guanli Youxian Gongsi Deng (上海陆坤服饰有限公司诉上海戎美品牌管理有限公司等) [Shanghai Lukun Clothing Co, Ltd v Shanghai Rongmei Brand Management Co, Ltd et al] (Shanghai Intellectual. Property People’s Court, May 10, 2018) (China) (hereinafter Shanghai Lukun). An exception in this respect may be France, capital of the fashion world. In addition to recognising garment designs as copyrightable subject matters, the French law, as well as the law of the European Union (EU), also provides a design registration system and allows for cumulative protection from copyright, registered design and unregistered design. See Raustiala and Sprigman, above Footnote n 20, 1735–1737 (introducing the EU design registration system and the EU approach for design protection); Atkinson et al, above Footnote n 17, 531 (‘Australian law does not recognize copyright as existing in a garment itself – whereas French law does.’).

40 State of Escape Accessories Pty Limited v Schwartz (2022) FCAFC 63.

42 Regional Court of Cologne (Landgericht Kol̈n), case no. 14 O 366/21, decision of March 3, 2022 (Germany). For detailed discussion of the two cases, see The Bird & Bird IP Team, ‘Round-up of Fashion-related IP Decisions in 2022’ (2023) 18(3) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 199.

43 Footnote Ibid at 202.

45 Yunchuang Sheji (Shenzhen) Jituan Youxian Gongsi Su Chongqing Kashilan Fushi Youxian Gongsi (云创设计(深圳)集团有限公司诉重庆卡诗兰服饰有限公司) [Yunchuang Design (Shenzhen) Group Co, Ltd v Chongqing Kashilan Clothing Co, Ltd] (Chongqing Pilot Free Trade Zone People’s Court, 2021).

48 Star Athletica, L.L.C. v Varsity Brands, Inc, 136 S Ct 1823 (2016).

49 Footnote Ibid. However, this decision has been open to wide critiques by scholars. See, eg, Rebecca Tushnet, ‘Shoveling a Path after Star Athletica’ (2019) 66 UCLA Law Review 1216; Christopher Buccafusco and Jeanne C Fromer, ‘Fashion’s Function in Intellectual Property Law’ (2017) 93 Notre Dame Law Review 51; Lili Levi, ‘The New Separability’ (2018) 20 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law 709; Jane C Ginsburg, ‘“Courts Have Twisted Themselves into Knots”: US Copyright Protection for Applied Art’ (2016) 40 Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 1.

50 Yunchuang Sheji (Shenzhen) Jituan Youxian Gongsi Su Guangzhou Hongboya Trading Co, Ltd. (云创设计(深圳)集团有限公司诉广州弘薄雅贸易有限公司) [Yunchuang Design (Shenzhen) Group Co, Ltd v Guangzhou Hongboya Trading Co, Ltd] (Guangzhou Internet Court, July 21, 2021).

51 Raustiala and Sprigman, above Footnote n 20, 1692.

52 Zhuozuo Quan Fa (著作权法) [Copyright Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm National People’s Congress, November 11, 2020, effective June 1, 2021) (China) (hereinafter Copyright Law 2020), Articles 3 and 4.

53 See, eg, Deyang Kaifa Qu Manwu Xiuhua Fuzhuang Gongzuoshi Su Shaoxing Shi Yuecheng Qu Gongmei Xiupinchang (德阳开发区满屋绣花服装设计工作室诉绍兴市越城区共美绣品厂) [Deyang Development Zone Manwu Embroidery Clothing Design Studio v Shaoxing Yuecheng District Gongmei Embroidery Factory] (Shaoxing Interim Court, February 22, 2022) (reasoning that common geometric patterns including dots, stripes and surfaces belong to the public domain and therefore protection as private right would be an invasion to the public interest)

54 Article 8 of the Chinese Trademark Law provided that ‘any visible sign, including any word, design, letter of the alphabet, numeral, three-dimensional symbol and color combination, or any combination of the above, that can serve to distinguish the goods of a natural person, legal person, or other organization from those of another, may be made a trademark for application for registration’. See Trademark Law 2019, above Footnote n 30, Article 8.

55 Ashley E Hofmeister, ‘Louis Vuitton Malletier v Dooney & Bourke, Inc: Resisting Expansion of Trademark Protection in the Fashion Industry’ (2008) 3 Journal of Business & Technology Law 187, 188–189.

56 Trademark Law 2019, above Footnote n 29, Article 8. See also 15 USC § 1127 (United States).

57 See Yiwu Haiguan Guanyu Yiwu Shilutong Jinchukou Youxian Gongsi QinfanGUCCI (Zhiding Yanse Tuxing Lv-Hong-Lv)Shangbiao Quan Liankuwa De Xingzheng Chufa Jueding Shu (义乌市海关关于义乌市诗路通进出口有限公司侵犯 ‘GUCCI(指定颜色图形绿红绿’商标权连裤袜的行政处罚决定书) [Administrative Penalty Decision of the Yiwu Customs on Yiwu Shilutong Import & Export Co, Ltd’s Stockings Infringing the Trademark ‘GUCCI (Device Designated to Colour Green-Red-Green)’] (Yiwu Customs 2022) (China).

58 Gucci America, Inc v Guess, Inc, 843 F Supp 2d 412 (SDNY 2012).

59 Trademark Law 2019, above Footnote n 29, Article 11.

60 Trademark Law 2019, above Footnote n 29, Article 10.

61 Trademark Law 2019, above Footnote n 29, Article 9. See also Jyh-An Lee and Thomas Mehaffy, ‘Prior Rights in the Chinese Trademark Law’ (2015) 37 European Intellectual Property Review 673.

62 Trademark Law 2019, above Footnote n 29, Article 11.2 (stipulating that an inherently indistinctive mark could acquire distinctiveness through use). See also Haochen Sun, ‘Protecting Non-traditional Trademarks in China: New Opportunities and Challenges’ in Irene Calboli and Martin Senftleben (eds), The Protection of Non-Traditional Trademarks (Oxford University Press, 2018) 185, 187.

63 See, eg, Shenzhen Guang Shifu Wenhua Chuanbo Youxian Gongsi Su Pang Suanguang (深圳广师傅文化传播有限公司诉庞算光) [Shenzhen Guang Shifu Cultural Communications Co., Ltd v Pang Suanguan] (Supreme People’s Court, July 7, 2022); Beijing Mingjia Shuhua Yishu Guan Su Guojia Zhishi Chanquan Ju (北京茗佳书画艺术馆诉国家知识产权局) [Beijing Mingjia Gallary of Calligraphy and Painting v China National Intellectual Property Administration] (Beijing High. People’s Court, May 18, 2021). See also Louboutin v YSL, 696 F 3d 206, 216 (citing Inwood Labs, Inc v Ives Labs., Inc, 456 US 844, 851 Footnote n 11 (1982)) (‘A mark has acquired “secondary meaning” when, “in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a product feature … is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself.”’).

64 See, eg, VCA v CNIPA, above Footnote n 6; Yidali Aimashi Gongsi Su Guojia Gongshang Xingzheng Guanli Zongju Shangbiao Pingshen Weiyuanhui (意大利爱马仕公司诉国家工商行政管理总局商标评审委员会) [Hermes Italia SpA v Trademark Appeal Board of the State Administration of Industry and Commerce] (Supreme People’s Court, December 13, 2012) (hereinafter Hermès v TRAB).

65 VCA v CNIPA, above Footnote n 6.

68 Hermès v TRAB, above Footnote n 64. See also Sun, above Footnote n 62, 189.

69 Trademark Law 2019, above Footnote n 29, Article 8.

70 Sun, above Footnote n 62, 185 (‘Non-traditional trademarks … offer new ways to attract consumers, as they differ from the words, logos, letters, and numbers that are traditionally used as trademarks.’).

72 Feng Wei Su Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guojia Zhishi Chanquan Ju (冯伟诉中华人民共和国国家知识产权局) [Feng Wei v China National Intellectual Property Administration] (Beijing Intellectual Property Court, July 2022).

74 See, eg, PRC patent publications nos. CN308000051S, CN307950857S, CN307950671S, CN307935731S, and CN307935734S <https://pss-system.cponline.cnipa.gov.cn/conventionalSearch>.

75 Nanjing Shengdiao Shizhuang Youxian Gongsi Su Liu Shiqin Deng (南京圣迪奥时装有限公司诉刘世琴等) [Nanjing SDeer Clothing Co, Ltd. v Liu Shiqin et al] (Nanjing Interim People’s Court 2016).

76 Zhuanli Fa (专利法) [Patent Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm National People’s Congress, October 17, 2020, effective June 1, 2021) (hereinafter Patent Law 2020), Article 23.

77 See generally, Anne Theodore Briggs, ‘Hung out to Dry: Clothing Design Protection Pitfalls in United States Law’ (2002) 24 Hastings Communications & Entertainment Law Journal 169.

78 Wuxiao Xuangao Qingqiu Shencha Juedingshu Di 47305 Hao (无效宣告请求审查决定书第47305号) [Decision No. 47305 on the Examination of Invalidation Application] (China National Intellectual Property Administration, December 30, 2020).

79 Atkinson et al, above Footnote n 17, at 528; Holton, above Footnote n 17, at 418; Urbach and Soussa, above Footnote n 17, at 28.

80 Council Regulation (EC) 1891/2006 amending Regulations (EC) No 6/2002 and (EC) No 40/94 to give effect to the accession of the European Community to the Geneva Act of the Hague Agreement concerning the international registration of industrial designs (2006) OJ L386/14.

81 See, eg, Kaitlyn N Pytlak, ‘The Devil Wears Fraud-a: An Aristotelian-Randian Approach to Intellectual Property Law in the Fashion Industry’ (2016) 15 Virginia Sports & Entertainment Law Journal 273, 286–287; Anya Jenkins Ferris, ‘Real Art Calls for Real Legislation: An Argument against Adoption of the Design Piracy Prohibition Act’ (2008) 26 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 559, 573.

82 Trademark Law 2019, above Footnote n 29, Article 40.

83 Patent Law 2020, above Footnote n 76, Article 42.

84 Fan Buzhengdang Jingzheng Fa (反不正当竞争法) [Anti-Unfair Competition Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm National People’s Congress, April 23, 2019, effective April 23, 2019) (China) (hereinafter Anti-Unfair Competition Law 2019), Article 6(1). This is similar to the Lanham Act § 43(a) (United States).

85 Fanke Yabao Youxian Gongsi Su Shanghai Aijing Zhubao Youxian Gongsi Deng (梵克雅宝有限公司诉上海瑷晶珠宝有限公司等) [Van Cleef & Arpels SA v Shanghai Aijing Jewelry Co, Ltd et al] (Beijing Chaoyang District. People’s Court 2021) (China) (hereinafter VCA v Shanghai Aijing).

87 Compare this with the aesthetic functionality doctrine in the United States: Christian Louboutin SA v Yves Saint Laurent America Hldg, 696 F 3d 206, 220 (citing Pagliero v Wallace China Co, 198 F 2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952); Qualitex Co v Jacobson Products Co, 514 US 159, 162 (1995); Knitwaves, Inc v Lollytogs Ltd, 71 F 3d 996, 1006 (2nd Cir. 1995)).

88 VCA v Shanghai Aijing, above Footnote n 85.

92 See, eg, Fanke Yabao Youxian Gongsi Su Yiwu Zhuiyi Shipin Youxian Gongsi (梵克雅宝有限公司诉义乌市缀宜饰品有限公司) [Van Cleef & Arpels SA v Yiwu Zhuiyi Accessories Co, Ltd] (Zhejiang Jinhua Interm. People’s Court 2021).

93 15 USC §1125(a).

94 Two Pesos, Inc v Taco Cabana, Inc, 505 US 763 (1992).

95 TrafFix Devices, Inc v Marketing Displays, Inc, 532 US 23 (2001).

96 VCA v Shanghai Aijing, above Footnote n 85. See also Guanyu Shiyong <Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Buzhengdang Jingzheng Fa> Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi (关于适用〈中华人民共和国反不正当竞争法〉若干问题的解释) [Interpretation on Issues Related to the Application of the <Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People’s Republic of China>] (promulgated by the Supreme. People’s Court, March 16, 2022, effective March 20, 2022) (China) (hereinafter ‘Interpretation on the Anti-Unfair Competition Law 2022’).

97 Inga Munsinger, ‘Trade Dress for Success: Fashion Designs as Distinctive Product Configurations’ (2000) 1 Texas Review of Entertainment & Sports Law 47, 49 (‘Absent a new statutory approach to design infringement, trade dress law is the remaining best approach.’); S Priya Bharathi, ‘There Is More Than One Way to Skin a Copycat: The Emergence of Trade Dress to Combat Design Piracy of Fashion Work’ (1996) 27 Texas Technology Law Review 1667, 1689.

98 Jyh-An Lee, ‘Unfair Competition and Antitrust Law’ in Christopher Heath (ed) Intellectual Property Law in China 418–19 (Wolters Kluwer, 2nd edn, 2021).

99 For example, enforcement actions could be brought against similar marks where one of the three stripes, say, the red one in the middle, could narrower or wider than the other two.

100 See, eg, Dior, above Footnote n 12; Louboutin v TRAB, above Footnote n 13.

101 Shangbiao Shencha Shenli Zhinan (商标审查审理指南) [Guide on Trademark Review and Examination] (promulgated by the China National Intellectual Property Administration, November 16, 2021, effective January 1, 2022) (China) (hereinafter Guide on Trademark Review and Examination 2021).

103 Footnote Ibid at Chapter 6, Article 2.

105 Footnote Ibid at Chapter 6, Article 3.2.5.

106 Footnote Ibid at Chapter 6, Article 3.3.

107 Dior, above Footnote n 12.

108 Taken over by the CNIPA since 2019.

109 Dior, above Footnote n 12.

111 Footnote Ibid. Just like Van Cleef & Arpels and the four-leaf clover, Dior’s registration of the J’Adore fragrance bottle as a 2D device mark was accepted by the TRAB. It is for such reason that the SPC mentioned the consistency issue when correcting the TRAB’s decision.

112 Guanyu Guoji Zhuce Di 1221382 Hao ‘Tuxing (Sanwei Biaozhi, Zhiding Yanse)Shangbiao Bohui Fushen Juedingshu (关于国际注册第1221382号 ‘图形(三维标志、指定颜色)’商标驳回复审决定书) [Review Decision on the Refusal of Trademark International Registration No.1221382 ‘Device (3D Symbol, Designated Colour)’] (Trademark Review and Adjudication Board, January 14, 2019) (China).

115 EUIPO Decision of the Second Board of Appeal in Christian Dior v EUIPO, Case R 32/2022-2 (EUIPO Board of Appeal, September 7, 2022).

116 Hermès International Scpa (+1) + Buti S.r.l. (+2), Decision no. 30455 (Italian Supreme Court, 17 October 2022).

117 The Bird & Bird IP Team, above Footnote n 42.

118 Guide on Trademark Review and Examination 2021, above Footnote n 101, at Chapter 7, Article 2.

121 Shangbiao Fa Xiuzhengan (Caoan) (商标法修正案(草案)) [Draft Amendment of the Trademark Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm National People’s Congress, December 28, 2012) (China), Article 2(2).

122 Trademark Law 2019, above Footnote n 29, at Article 8.

123 Cassidy Aranda, ‘The Worldwide Trademark Battle over the Iconic Red Bottom Shoe’, Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property (January 22, 2023) <https://studentorgs.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip/the-worldwide-trademark-battle-over-the-iconic-red-bottom-shoe/>.

124 See Yong Wan and Hongxuyang Lu, ‘Trademark Protection of Single-Colour Trademarks: A Study of the Chinese Louboutin Case’ (2020) 10 (2) Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property 255, 257.

125 Louboutin v TRAB, above Footnote n 13.

127 Guojia Zhishi Chanquan Ju Su Kelisiti Lubutuo (国家知识产权局诉克里斯提鲁布托) [China National Intellectual Property Administration v Christian Louboutin] (Supreme People’s Court, December 24, 2019) (China) (hereinafter CNIPA v Louboutin).

128 Louboutin v Van Haren Schoenen BV, Case C‑163/16 (CJEU, June 12, 2018).

129 Louboutin v YSL, above Footnote n 38.

131 Kelisiti Lubutuo Jianyi Gufen Youxian Gongsi Deng Su Guangdong Wanlima Shiye Gufen Youxian Gongsi Deng (克里斯提·鲁布托简易股份有限公司等诉广东万里马实业股份有限公司等) [Christian Louboutin Ltd et al v Guangdong Wanlima Industrial Co, Ltd] (Beijing Intellectual Property Court 2022). The case is pending appeal at Beijing Higher People’s Court.

132 Xiangnaier Gufen Youxian Gongsi Su Yiwu Shi Aizhiyu Huazhuangpin Youxian Gongsi (香奈儿股份有限公司诉义乌市爱之语化妆品有限公司) [Chanel, Inc v Yiwu Story of Love Co, Ltd] (Shaanxi High People’s Court, 2021).

133 Interpretation on the Anti-Unfair Competition Law 2022, above Footnote n 96, at Article 4.1.

134 See Guide on Trademark Review and Examination 2021, above Footnote n 101, at Chapter 4, Article 2 (‘The distinctiveness of a trademark requires a mark to have features that enable the relevant public to identify the source of the product of service.’).

Figure 0

Figure 8.1 Upcycled coat by Duran Lantink

Credit: Duran Lantink
Figure 1

Figure 9.1 Shanzhai ‘GUDID’ evocative of ‘GUCCI’.

Credit: David Tan
Figure 2

Figure 9.2 Shanzhai ‘CALVNI KELIN’ evocative of ‘CALVIN KLEIN’.

Credit: David Tan
Figure 3

Figure 9.3 Shanzhai ‘CHAINE’ evocative of ‘CHANEL’.

Credit: Jingwen Liu
Figure 4

Figure 9.4 Shanzhai ‘CHRISTAN DORIO’ evocative of ‘CHRISTIAN DIOR’.

Credit: Jingwen Liu
Figure 5

Figure 9.5 Handbags – knockoffs of FENDI, LOUIS VUITTON and GUCCI.

Credit: Jingwen Liu
Figure 6

Figure 9.6 Wallets – knockoff of LOUIS VUITTON with own brand name ‘REVIVALSM’.

Credit: Jingwen Liu
Figure 7

Figure 9.7 Handbags – knockoff of LOUIS VUITTON ‘Damier’ but no logo.

Credit: Jingwen Liu

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  • Current Trends
  • Edited by David Tan, National University of Singapore, Jeanne Fromer, New York University, Dev Gangjee, University of Oxford
  • Book: Fashion and Intellectual Property
  • Online publication: 27 October 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009519618.011
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  • Current Trends
  • Edited by David Tan, National University of Singapore, Jeanne Fromer, New York University, Dev Gangjee, University of Oxford
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  • Current Trends
  • Edited by David Tan, National University of Singapore, Jeanne Fromer, New York University, Dev Gangjee, University of Oxford
  • Book: Fashion and Intellectual Property
  • Online publication: 27 October 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009519618.011
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