As evidence has accumulated regarding democratic backsliding, scholars of both comparative and American politics have turned their attention to scrutinizing the public's commitment to democracy and democratic norms. While it has been argued that the public's support for democracy is declining (Mounk, Reference Mounk2018), support for democracy from public surveys remains high, including in the US (Voeten, Reference Voeten2018). However, a growing body of evidence indicates these positive attitudes may be held less firmly than it seems. Along these lines, in this note we examine if a social norm to support democracy has led to an overestimate of positive attitudes toward democracy.

Although expressed support for democracy remains high, a substantial portion of the public expresses openness to “at least one nondemocratic approach—expert rule, autocracy, or military rule—as a good way to govern...” including “many in economically advanced nations”—this includes 53 percent in the United States (Wike and Fetterolf, Reference Wike and Fetterolf2018, 140). That is, there exists a portion of the public who could be termed “democrats in name only” in that they express support for democracy but also endorse processes incompatible with liberal democracy (Wuttke et al., Reference Wuttke, Gavras and Schoen2022, 426).

These observational findings are consistent with experimental evidence demonstrating the limits of the public's commitments to democratic norms. For example, partisans fail to punish their leaders for espousing undemocratic positions (Graham and Svolik, Reference Graham and Svolik2020). Failure to punish co-partisans in power is particularly notable as voters’ knowledge of democratic norms was pre-tested. In short, partisans support their preferred parties despite the knowledge that their policies would undermine democracy (Simonovits et al., Reference Simonovits, McCoy and Littvay2022) and may even be willing to compromise on the constitutional process underpinning a democracy if their supported leaders believe it is appropriate for political expediency (Kingzette et al., Reference Kingzette, Druckman, Klar, Krupnikov, Levendusky and Ryan2021). It has become increasingly clear that partisanship can trump support for democracy—a key component of which is accepting electoral outcomes, particularly when preferred parties or candidates face defeat. Elite rhetoric may play an important role in this regard: exposure to elite allegations of electoral irregularities may lead to public disillusionment with the process of transition of power in a democracy (Clayton et al., Reference Clayton, Davis, Nyhan, Porter, Ryan and Wood2021).

Taken together, both survey and experimental findings suggest that public support for democracy is less firmly held than the existing literature supposed. An assumption that underlies much of this literature is that there exists a norm around expressing support for democracy (Svolik, Reference Svolik2019). If such a norm exists, this implies that responses to questions about democracy will be influenced by the presence of an interviewer as there is an expectation to express support for democracy.

It has long been recognized that characteristics of the survey process can influence responses (Deming, Reference Deming1944). Among these characteristics, the presence or absence of an interviewer has been identified as a source of variation in survey responses (Wiseman, Reference Wiseman1972). As such, the potential for survey mode effects was recognized since the advent of surveys administered over the internet (Joinson, Reference Joinson1999), confirmed by more recent evidence (e.g., Chang and Krosnick, Reference Chang and Krosnick2009).

If a particular response to a question is perceived as socially undesirable, a respondent may avoid being entirely honest when answering (Locander et al., Reference Locander, Sudman and Bradburn1976) as individuals engage, consciously or not, in a process of image management whereby they answer questions so as to present themselves in the most positive light (Millham and Kellogg, Reference Millham and Kellogg1980; Paulhus, Reference Paulhus1984). If respondents are less susceptible to the pressures that drive social desirability when surveys are self-administered, those interviewed via the internet will be more honest as the perceived cost of social sanctions is diminished. Social desirability effects are pervasive (Tourangeau et al., Reference Tourangeau, Rips and Rasinski2000, ch. 9) and their relevance is well established for both political attitudes (e.g., Krysan, Reference Krysan1998) and behavior (e.g., Karp and Brockington, Reference Karp and Brockington2005). Different patterns of responses between internet and face-to-face surveys are similarly well documented—for example, levels of partisan acrimony are higher among respondents interviewed via the internet (Iyengar and Krupenkin, Reference Iyengar and Krupenkin2018).

We combine insights from the literatures on social desirability and support for democracy. We argue if it is the case that (1) there is a norm to support democracy and (2) that respondents feel freer to be honest in internet surveys then differences should emerge in reported satisfaction across survey mode. Specifically, we hypothesize that those interviewed in-person will express greater satisfaction with democracy. We test this hypothesis with surveys that are nearly identical with the exception of the mode of administration. We find support for our hypothesis and identify a politically relevant difference in self-reported satisfaction. We conclude that absent the possibility of an immediate social sanction, respondents report less satisfaction with democracy indicating a lower level of support than was often appreciated. Our result is robust to different measures and estimation strategies. Reassuringly we demonstrate that substantive relationships—we examine winner–loser status and satisfaction—are not necessarily altered by survey mode.

Our focus on satisfaction with democracy warrants some discussion as the ubiquitous satisfaction item does not directly tap the sort of illiberal attitudes associated with deconsolidation. While there exists disagreement among scholars as to what precisely the item measures, there is some degree of consensus: it is thought to be an intermediate-level variable for measuring political support, that lies between diffuse support variables such as regime-type preferences and specific support variables such as executive approval of an incumbent political leader (Foa et al., Reference Foa, Klassen, Slade, Rand and Collins2020). Nevertheless, the lack of specificity in the question wording of the measure is an issue (Canache et al., Reference Canache, Mondak and Seligson2001). Literal interpretations of this measure run into problems arising from subjective evaluations of what democracy is, and its consistent evolution of what it has come to be at the time of research (Ferrin, Reference Ferrin2016). However, as indicated by Foa et al. (Reference Foa, Klassen, Slade, Rand and Collins2020), satisfaction with democracy reliably measures individual assessment of the democratic performance in the country. In this sense, satisfaction with democracy can be interpreted as an individual's assessment of the country's political system in their experience more than a generalized experience of democracy (Linde and Ekman, Reference Linde and Ekman2003) if not quite “ an expression of approval of the democratic process” (Singh et al., Reference Singh, Karakoç and Blais2012, 205). As a practical matter, the item is related to a host of relevant indicators, including satisfaction with democratic institutions (Lundmark et al., Reference Lundmark, Oscarsson and Weissenbilder2020) and the performance of democracy, including the rule of law and corruption (Wagner et al., Reference Wagner, Schneider and Halla2009). Thus, even if dissatisfaction is not synonymous with illiberalism, the item can be utilized to test our hypothesis of a norm to express support for democracy.

2. Results

We begin by presenting the distribution of satisfaction conditioned on survey mode in Figure 1, where the satisfaction measure is coded dichotomously.Footnote ³ The columns represent survey mode, while each row presents the data for a particular year. The gap between the percent who are satisfied and unsatisfied is noticeably smaller in the internet sample in both years. For example, in 2016 the gap is 35 percentage points in the FTF sample compared to 28 percentage points in the internet sample.

Figure 1.

Satisfaction with democracy conditioned on survey mode. Satisfaction is measured dichotomously—the precent satisfied represents those who are at least “somewhat satisfied” with democracy.

We estimate a linear regression model with a dummy variable representing survey mode to estimate the effect of mode on self-reported satisfaction. We code those interviewed by internet as one and those interviewed FTF as zero. A negative coefficient therefore indicates a lower likelihood of being satisfied among internet respondents. We present results for each year separately as well as for a pooled model. The result of interest, the coefficient for mode, is presented in Table 1. Full results are presented in the supplementary material (Appendix B). In 2012, being interviewed in person increases the probability of being at least somewhat satisfied by 16.5 percentage points (p < 0.001) and in 2016 by 7.5 percentage points (p < 0.001). This shift is similar in magnitude to known sources of satisfaction, including winner–loser status (e.g., Bernauer and Vatter, Reference Bernauer and Vatter2012; Halliez and Thornton, Reference Halliez and Thornton2022,5). Models estimated with logistic regression—presented in the supplementary material (Appendix C)—return identical results.

Table 1.

The relationship between survey mode and satisfaction with democracy

The different sampling frames used for the two samples in each year do not influence our results. Models excluding respondents from Alaska and Hawaii return identical coefficients to those in Table 1. Full results are presented in the supplementary material (Appendix D).

Given the oversampling in the 2012 FTF sample discussed earlier, we assess if the decision to utilize survey weights is driving our results. We unsurprisingly identify demographic differences across the two modes when we examine the 2012 data without weights. When we estimate the relationship between survey mode and satisfaction while adjusting for demographic characteristics without weights, the estimated coefficient is quite similar to those reported in the first column in Table 1: −0.153 (p < 0.001). A model without weights using the 2016 data returns a coefficient of −0.071 (p < 0.001). Full results of these analyses are presented in the supplementary material (Appendix E).

We further examine the robustness of our main result by retaining the original four category coding of satisfaction. We again observe a meaningful shift as a result of survey mode. Being interviewed via the internet leads to a decline of 0.244 (p < 0.001) in 2012 and 0.130 (p < 0.001) in 2016. Further, our substantive conclusions remain the same when explicitly taking the ordered nature of the satisfaction item into account. Full results of each of these analyses are presented in the supplementary material (Appendix F).

Finally, our main analyses did not adjust for partisanship, ideological self-identification, or vote choice, as each variable itself might be driven by survey mode. Reassuringly, we observe balance for each of these three variables across the samples in either year. Further, results from models that adjust for all three return similar results: the coefficient for mode is −0.147 (p < 0.000) in 2012, −0.084 (p = 0.001) in 2016, and −0.120 (p < 0.001) in a pooled model. Full results are presented in the supplementary material (Appendix G).