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Elicitation effects in a multi-stage bargaining experiment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Swee-Hoon Chuah ,
Robert Hoffmann  and
Jeremy Larner
Swee-Hoon Chuah
Affiliation:
Nottingham University Business School, Jubilee Campus, Wollaton Road, NG8 1BB Nottingham, UK
Robert Hoffmann*
Affiliation:
Nottingham University Business School, Jubilee Campus, Wollaton Road, NG8 1BB Nottingham, UK
Jeremy Larner
Affiliation:
Nottingham University Business School, Jubilee Campus, Wollaton Road, NG8 1BB Nottingham, UK
*
robert.hoffmann@nottingham.ac.uk
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Abstract

We examine elicitation effects in a multi-stage bargaining experiment with escalating stakes conducted under direct-response and strategy-method elicitation. We find a significantly greater incidence of decisions leading to bargaining failure under direct responses. In addition, the predictive power of alternative risk attitude measures differs between the elicitation methods. Potential sources of the effects and resulting implications are discussed.

Keywords

Elicitation effectsBargainingEmotionEscalation

JEL classification

B49: Other C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior C90: General C72: Noncooperative Games

Information

Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 17 , Issue 2 , June 2014 , pp. 335 - 345
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 Economic Science Association

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