China encircled

In order to fully grasp Beijing's reluctance to seek rapprochement with South Korea, it is necessary first to understand the security environment of the early 1980s, when Beijing was greatly concerned by the Soviet threat.

In the north, China was confronted with a strengthening Soviet military presence along its porous border. Following the conclusion of the Soviet–Mongolian friendship treaty in 1966, the Soviet Union deployed military divisions along the Sino-Mongolian border.Footnote ³ In the aftermath of the Sino-Soviet clashes at Zhenbao Island 珍宝岛 in 1969, Moscow further brandished its military capabilities to pressure Beijing by doubling the number of its troops on the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders from 21 divisions to 45 between 1969 and 1972.Footnote ⁴ Moscow also installed SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles with a maximum range of 5,000 kilometres and the Backfire bomber with a combat radius of 5,500 kilometres in its far east, giving it the capability to strike virtually all Chinese territory with its strategic weapons.Footnote ⁵ In April 1978, the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, and the Soviet defence minister, Dmitriy Ustinov, visited Khabarovsk and Vladivostok in the Soviet far east to observe military exercises, which allegedly were staged in preparation for a Sino-Soviet war.Footnote ⁶ Infuriated by the visit, China's defence minister, Xu Xiangqian 徐向前, published an article entitled “Be alert and be ready for war” in People's Daily, vehemently criticizing Moscow's assertive military posturing and the “one million Soviet soldiers” deployed along China's northern borders.Footnote ⁷

In the south, China viewed Vietnam as increasingly moving into the Soviet Union's orbit. In November 1978, Moscow and Hanoi formally signed an alliance treaty.Footnote ⁸ The following month, “at the instigation of the Soviet Union,” Hanoi launched a full-scale invasion of Cambodia and ousted the Khmer Rouge, the Maoist government supported by Beijing. When China's manoeuvre to teach Vietnam “an appropriate limited lesson” in February 1979 backfired, Hanoi aligned itself completely with the Soviet Union.Footnote ⁹ In May 1979, Hanoi granted Moscow access to Cam Ranh Bay, a former US military base on the south-eastern coast of South Vietnam, with a 25-year lease.Footnote ¹⁰ This was of enormous strategic value to Moscow as it enabled the Soviets to forward-deploy their Pacific Fleet at Vladivostok to the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean and monitor China's naval activities.Footnote ¹¹ An article in People's Daily stressed that “[the Soviet] deployment of warships into Cam Ranh Bay … and avidity to control South-East Asia and dominate Asia inevitably arouse the concern and firm opposition of Asian countries.”Footnote ¹² In Beijing's eyes, Hanoi was “willing to serve as an accomplice” to Moscow's expansionism.Footnote ¹³

On its western border, China had deep concerns about the latest developments in Afghanistan. In April 1978, a pro-Soviet group led by Nur Muhammad Taraki staged a bloody coup in Kabul, relinquishing Afghanistan's longstanding neutrality in the relationship between Moscow and Beijing. Moscow immediately recognized the newly established pro-Soviet regime,Footnote ¹⁴ and in December 1978, it signed a 20-year friendship treaty with Kabul.Footnote ¹⁵ More importantly, a few months after the assassination of Taraki, the Soviet troops directly intervened in Afghan's internal affairs to establish another pro-Soviet regime in December 1979, signalling the onset of the Soviet–Afghan War. China was exceedingly alarmed by the Soviet expansion into Afghanistan. On 30 December, Beijing issued a statement condemning Moscow's “flagrant and large-scale military invasion of Afghanistan” and its “hegemonic ambition.”Footnote ¹⁶ In addition to verbal warnings, Beijing covertly supported anti-Soviet guerrilla warfare led by local insurgents such as the Mujahideen rebels and Maoist groups.Footnote ¹⁷

In summary, China was encircled by pro-Soviet powers to the north, south and west in the early 1980s. An article in People's Daily stated that Moscow's expansion in East Asia was a “significant wing of the Soviet's global strategy” designed “to encircle China.”Footnote ¹⁸ In a meeting with US delegations in August 1983, Deng Xiaoping candidly opined that “[the Soviet Union] invaded Afghanistan, supported Vietnam's incursion into Cambodia, deployed one million troops and one-third of its missiles on the Sino-Soviet border, and stationed troops in Mongolia, all of which posed a serious threat to China.”Footnote ¹⁹ In July 1982, China internally established the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia and Afghanistan and the retreat of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia as prerequisites for Sino-Soviet reconciliation.Footnote ²⁰ Thereafter, Beijing repeatedly demanded that Moscow remove these “three obstacles.”Footnote ²¹

A closed yet unlocked door

Contrary to assumptions prevalent in the existing research, it was not ideological fraternity but the aforementioned security environment that hindered China's rapprochement with South Korea in the early 1980s. Considering Pyongyang's ambivalent position and following the equidistant diplomacy between Beijing and Moscow in the 1960s and 1970s, China's ideological fraternity with North Korea was all but negligible – if not non-existent – by 1980. In January 1980, China's foreign minister, Huang Hua 黄华, succinctly summed up the situation at an internal meeting: “In the Korean Peninsula … one country [South Korea] used to be our enemy but is now a friend of our friend [the US], while the other country [North Korea] used to be our comrade but is now a friend of our enemy [the Soviet Union].”Footnote ²² In the absence of ideological affinity, Beijing's primary consideration was its security interests. With the Soviet sabre-rattling in the north, west and south, China was concerned that any conciliatory move towards South Korea might compel North Korea to join the Soviets’ encirclement policy, thus rendering China fully besieged from all sides. Huang Hua further expounded, “We … don't want to see a second Vietnam appearing in north-east China, let alone … the Soviet Union opening the gate of the Korea Strait and entering the Asia-Pacific … We have to vigilantly watch the expansion of Soviet influence in North Korea and the possibility of the [Soviet] use of North Korean ports.”Footnote ²³

In this context, Beijing had no choice but to strengthen its ties with the DPRK and provide Pyongyang with extensive economic and military assistance to “neutralize Soviet influence” and “win sympathy and understanding for the Chinese position,” which would “enhance the status of the pro-China elements” and “weaken the temerarious tendency of pro-Soviet elements within North Korea.”Footnote ²⁴ For Beijing, therefore, any Sino-ROK rapprochement that would run counter to these goals was a non-starter. Deng Xiaoping informed Jimmy Carter in January 1979 that China “cannot have direct contact with the South Koreans”Footnote ²⁵ and reaffirmed this position when meeting Japanese delegations on 29 March 1980.Footnote ²⁶

Nevertheless, Beijing was not against non-political exchanges with South Korea, which had the potential to not only invigorate China's economy but also to drive a wedge between Seoul and Taipei.Footnote ²⁷ Above all, such relations could check North Korea's possible alignment with the Soviet Union by planting seeds of doubt about Beijing's unqualified endorsement in Pyongyang's consciousness – that is, Pyongyang could be jettisoned if its fidelity came into question. Huang Hua emphatically stated, “Whereas North Korea has a ‘Soviet card’ in its hand … we also have a ‘South Korea card.’ If North Korea were to lean to the Soviet side, we would cut off all kinds of assistance and turn our back and support South Korea.”Footnote ²⁸ Thus, Beijing cautiously sought to increase non-political Sino-ROK contact. In July 1982, Deng Xiaoping authorized the mutual participation of Chinese and South Korean personnel in multilateral activities held in the opposite countries.Footnote ²⁹ In discussing the repatriation of the crew members and passengers of a hijacked Chinese civilian airliner that was forced to land on Chuncheon Air Force base in South Korea in May 1983, Beijing made its first official contact with Seoul and referred to South Korea as the “Republic of Korea” for the first time.Footnote ³⁰ In July 1983, Beijing further adjusted its policy regarding South Korea to permit unofficial exchanges in the economic, cultural and technological realms.Footnote ³¹ Pyongyang was, of course, disgruntled by this development: the North Korean ambassador to China complained that “There is no reason for socialist countries to have relations with South Korea.”Footnote ³² However, with concerns about possible abandonment instilled in Pyongyang's consciousness, Beijing continued to gradually widen its contacts with Seoul.Footnote ³³ The volume of Sino-ROK indirect trade also soared.Footnote ³⁴

In brief, Beijing, besieged on three sides by the Soviet threat, could not accept South Korea's overture for rapprochement in the early 1980s. Instead, to check Pyongyang's alignment with Moscow, Beijing played the “South Korea card” through piecemeal non-political exchanges with Seoul. This was a subtle balance to strike. Huang Hua metaphorically described China's South Korean policy as “a door, closed, yet unlocked” (guanmen bu shang suo 关门不上锁). The purpose was “not to push North Korea to the Soviet side, while forcing it not to dare to lean on the Soviet Union.”Footnote ³⁵

Pyongyang's strategic value shrinks

Beijing's policy recalibration concerning both the Soviet Union and the Korean Peninsula came in 1985. On 11 March, Moscow announced the death of the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Konstantin Chernenko, and the inauguration of Mikhail Gorbachev as its new leader. On the same day, Gorbachev gave a speech at the plenary session of the Central Committee, expressing his willingness to “greatly improve relations with the People's Republic of China.”Footnote ³⁶ Beijing promptly grasped the Soviet olive branch and dispatched a delegation, led by vice-premier Li Peng 李鹏, to Chernenko's funeral.Footnote ³⁷ In retrospect, this was a watershed moment in the Sino-Soviet rapprochement. In June 1985, Deng Xiaoping made a momentous adjustment to China's grand strategy. At the enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission (CMC), Deng declared that he had discarded Beijing's long-held tenet that a war was imminent, and that China would renounce its anti-Soviet strategy.Footnote ³⁸ In October, Deng sent a tantalizing verbal message to Gorbachev through the Romanian president, Nicolae Ceaușescu, stating that he was willing to hold a summit with Gorbachev if Vietnamese troops were withdrawn from Cambodia. After receiving the message on 22 October and after a month of “serious consideration,” Gorbachev finally replied in the affirmative on 23 November.Footnote ³⁹

As illustrated above, it was Beijing's apprehension of the Soviet encirclement policy that buttressed Pyongyang's strategic value for China. Now, with Gorbachev's favourable reply, its strategic value shrank greatly. At that time, Beijing had already been irritated by Pyongyang's extensive demands for aid. On 13 December 1985, only 20 days after Gorbachev's reply, Deng made an internal announcement that: “We should not let North Korea have the wrong understanding that we will give whatever [they] want … We have put a lot of effort into helping Vietnam, Albania and North Korea. We have fallen out with Vietnam and Albania. [We] have to prepare to fall out with the third one, although [we should] try not to.”Footnote ⁴⁰

At a speech in Vladivostok on 28 July 1986, Gorbachev made a clearer conciliatory gesture: he pledged a partial withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, Mongolia and the Sino-Soviet border.Footnote ⁴¹ Although the problem of the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia remained unaddressed, his speech signalled an explicit indication of a profound change in Moscow's policy towards Beijing. Deng evaluated the speech to contain “positive elements” and reiterated his proposal: “If Gorbachev takes a solid step in removing the three major obstacles … I would like to meet him personally.”Footnote ⁴² In a meeting with Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivokov en route to Moscow in May 1987, Zhao Ziyang 赵紫阳 again stressed the significance of resolving the Vietnam–Cambodia problem.Footnote ⁴³ Upon receiving this message, Moscow promptly published a statement: “The Soviet Union … is ready to help solve the situation in Cambodia as much as possible and ready to discuss this regional issue with other countries including China.”Footnote ⁴⁴ Finally, all three obstacles were brought to the negotiating table.

As the Beijing–Moscow reconciliation progressed, Pyongyang's leverage rapidly decreased. During a meeting with Kim Il-sung in May 1987, Deng Xiaoping stressed that “Every single country and every single party can only deal with the problem based on its own situation … Comrades in other countries must understand this point.”Footnote ⁴⁵ Although Soviet–DPRK cooperation was strengthened by Kim Il-sung's visit to Moscow in October 1986, Deng seemed less vexed this time, informing a Japanese delegation in June 1987 that “the improvement of Soviet–DPRK relations is not a bad thing.” Evidently, the Soviet Union was no longer a serious threat to Beijing; Deng openly stated, “Even if North Korea invades the South, [China] would not support it.”Footnote ⁴⁶

Beijing's low politics approach to Seoul

With the Sino-Soviet reconciliation looming, Pyongyang was now of little strategic value to Beijing. This change allowed Beijing the latitude to engage in economic cooperation with South Korea. During the Beidaihe 北戴河 conference on 22 July 1987, Deng Xiaoping issued a significant instruction: “[We] should seriously consider the issue of developing economic relations with South Korea.” Following this, the Sino-ROK Economic Coordination Group 中韩经济协调小组 was established and led by vice-premier of the State Council, Tian Jiyun 田纪云.Footnote ⁴⁷ Deng was already envisioning the gradual escalation of economic exchange into political rapprochement, adding, “Normalization of relations with South Korea cannot be put off any longer.”Footnote ⁴⁸ However, this does not mean that Beijing did not consider the Sino-DPRK fraternity whatsoever. For instance, on 14 November 1987, the Party's Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group stated that, “In view of our relations with North Korea and North Korea's capability to accept [the situation], the adjustment of our relations with South Korea should not be too hasty. [It] should be carried out step by step. At present [we] should only conduct indirect trade with South Korea without making a breakthrough.”Footnote ⁴⁹ Nevertheless, this fraternity, if any, paled in the face of national interest. In March 1988, soon after Moscow announced that it had already withdrawn large numbers of troops from the Sino-Soviet border and would complete the total withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan within ten months,Footnote ⁵⁰ Beijing made a “breakthrough” by authorizing direct trade with South Korea.Footnote ⁵¹ Four months later, Deng issued a further instruction: “Now it seems that the time has come to develop the economic and cultural relations with South Korea. The pace can be faster and wider than originally planned.”Footnote ⁵² In line with this instruction, Beijing went on to expand its relations with Seoul, despite Pyongyang's indignation.Footnote ⁵³

Following the authorization of direct transactions between the two countries, it became necessary to establish Sino-ROK trade representative offices to administrate the two countries’ trade. In early September 1988, South Korea sent a message to the Beijing authorities through Colonel Liu Yazhou 刘亚洲, a core figure affiliated with the Sino-ROK Economic Coordination Group and the general political department of the CMC, stating that it hoped to establish a trade representative office. In reporting this message to Premier Li Peng, Liu added his personal view that China should not be too indulgent of North Korea and that the improvement in Sino-ROK relations would make Pyongyang further value its ties with Beijing. Li Peng ratified and championed Liu's view.Footnote ⁵⁴ Accordingly, the following month, Beijing informed Pyongyang that China would exchange trade representative offices with South Korea. Pyongyang complained vociferously, only to hear that in the light of the expansion of the Sino-ROK trade volume, the mutual establishment of trade representative offices was inevitable.Footnote ⁵⁵ With the evaporation of its “Soviet card,” Pyongyang was left with no substantial leverage to obstruct Beijing's approach to Seoul. In January 1989, China suggested to South Korea that the two countries mutually establish these offices.Footnote ⁵⁶

The following month, China and the Soviet Union held a joint press conference, announcing that “substantial progress” had been made in eliminating the three obstacles.Footnote ⁵⁷ By this time, Moscow had already begun its withdrawal of troops from the Sino-Soviet border and Afghanistan. The two countries also affirmed that Vietnam would withdraw all of its troops from Cambodia by the end of September 1989 and that Gorbachev would visit China in May.Footnote ⁵⁸ Beijing now appeared to have no reason to hesitate in improving Sino-ROK relations. In April 1989, Deng finally instructed Zhao Ziyang to deliver a verbal message to Kim Il-sung, informing the latter of Beijing's resolve to further improve its relations with Seoul: “It is better for us to develop economic relations with South Korea than with the Soviet Union. Now it seems that [we] can no longer do what [we] used to do in the economic realm.” However, this development was not without due caution: “Tell [Kim Il-sung] first that we are only considering economic relations with South Korea, not political relations,” Deng stated. “If he asks whether China would really stop there … then you can tell him that in the case that China considers any political action in the future, it would surely discuss it with you.”Footnote ⁵⁹

Normalization postponed

Shortly after Zhao Ziyang delivered this verbal message to Kim Il-sung, Gorbachev paid a state visit to China and held a historic summit with Deng Xiaoping, proclaiming full normalization of the relations between China and the Soviet Union in May 1989.Footnote ⁶⁰ However, this monumental diplomatic event was soon overshadowed by a subsequent tragedy: Beijing's draconian crackdown of the Tiananmen Square protests in June. The US and other Western countries promptly imposed sanctions on China. Amid these external pressures and internal turmoil, Beijing temporarily stalled Sino-ROK rapprochement; when meeting with Kim Il-sung in November 1989, Jiang Zemin 江泽民 reversed Beijing's position and stated that the “Sino-DPRK friendship was forged with blood … We have no official relationship with South Korea, only a non-governmental trade relationship. With regard to the issue of establishing trade offices between China and South Korea … we would like to postpone it.”Footnote ⁶¹

Behind Beijing's about-face was a newly perceived security environment. From the perspective of Beijing's leadership, the Tiananmen incident was provoked by a malignant scheme by Western countries to topple the communist regime. At the meeting that decided upon the forceful crackdown of the protest on 2 June, Deng claimed that “The cause of this incident … came from the international climate. The Western world, especially the United States, has turned on all the propaganda machines to incite and encourage the so-called democrats and the so-called opposition in China … thus causing the current chaotic situation.” The meeting concluded that Western countries were waging “a world war without smoke” (meiyou xiaoyan de shijie dazhan 没有硝烟的世界大战) with the aim of “overthrowing the communist party and the socialist system.”Footnote ⁶² Thereafter, Chinese leaders repeatedly stressed the need to be alert to the Western powers’ scheme to change regimes, dubbed as “peaceful evolution.”Footnote ⁶³ Deng shared his analysis in a meeting in Beijing with Kim Il-sung in November 1989: “The period of US–Soviet confrontation and of the global domination of two superpowers is already over. It has been replaced by a new thing, which is that the Western world topples the socialist countries through peaceful evolution.” Political instability in Eastern Europe further added to Beijing's trepidation, with Deng commenting, “Having started in Hungary and Poland relatively smoothly, [Western countries are] itching for China as well.”Footnote ⁶⁴

After Kim Il-sung returned to Pyongyang, the dissolution of the Socialist Bloc was further accelerated, with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November and the Romanian revolution in December. The convulsions in Eastern Europe cast a long shadow on the outlook of North Korea, which was extremely anxious about ideological contagion amid serious food shortages and the decline in economic assistance from the Socialist Bloc.Footnote ⁶⁵ From Beijing's perspective, the subversion of North Korea, which it had long considered as a strategic buffer, was another stepping stone in the Western powers’ peaceful evolution strategy against China.Footnote ⁶⁶ In reporting his analysis of North Korea's prospects to other leaders in January 1990, Liu Yazhou wrote, “The West and the United States never give up trying to change China. They always want to conquer this bastion. If [they] want to conquer China, [they] have to conquer North Korea first.” It seemed that Pyongyang would be little able to withstand the peaceful evolution: “North Korea is still calm, but it is only an ostensible state on the surface. In fact, it is in crisis … There may be a palace coup or a military coup.”Footnote ⁶⁷ By April, Liu's tone had become yet more assertive. He wrote to the vice-premier, Tian Jiyun, “The United States and Japan will certainly step up their infiltration and subversion of the North … That a change will take place in North Korea is absolute … It is just a matter of time and the degree of change.”Footnote ⁶⁸

Deng Xiaoping also shared the same apprehension. At an internal discussion immediately before meeting Kim Il-sung in September 1990, he contended that “If the North collapses or is eaten up by the South, China will be on the front line of South Korea–Japan–the United States and will be directly besieged by them, with no intermediate buffer zone … If the North collapses, it will be very detrimental to us.” Deng further advised, “The unification [of the Korean Peninsula] is not necessarily good … It is good to maintain the status quo.”Footnote ⁶⁹ Beijing was indeed sensing Seoul's increasingly belligerent posture towards the North.Footnote ⁷⁰ Given the changes in China's security environment, Deng believed that the establishment of diplomatic relations with South Korea would be “a generous gift” (houli 厚礼) to South Korea, Japan and the US. Eventually, Deng decided to “put it off for two, three, or even five years.”Footnote ⁷¹ Sino-ROK diplomatic normalization was, therefore, temporarily postponed.

Establishing a cordon sanitaire

In the face of domestic instability and external threats, China sought to establish a cordon sanitaire to secure a buffer to fend off ideological contagion spreading towards the Sino-DPRK border. Beijing immediately provided North Korea with extensive economic and military aid, including the renewal of a five-year economic and military aid package, despite the economic hardship inflicted by Tiananmen-triggered sanctions.Footnote ⁷² Simultaneously, it sought to bolster economic exchange with Seoul “to strengthen its weight over South Korea and to weaken the relationship between South Korea and the United States.”Footnote ⁷³ In April 1990, Tian Jiyun proposed to Seoul that the two sides resume their discussions regarding establishing trade representative offices.Footnote ⁷⁴ Jiang Zemin explained to Kim Il-sung in September 1990 that the exchange of trade offices was “out of consideration of the current international situation, not just from China's own interests; it is conducive to maintaining and strengthening our special voice on the Korean Peninsula issue.” Kim Il-sung acknowledged this stance.Footnote ⁷⁵ Thereafter, Seoul and Beijing signed an agreement to exchange trade representative offices in October 1990, which were formally opened in January 1991.Footnote ⁷⁶

Beijing's next step was to compel Pyongyang to accept separate entries for the two Koreas into the United Nations. China's fears of North Korea being “eaten up” by the South were further heightened after witnessing the German reunification.Footnote ⁷⁷ To forestall such an event, China sought Pyongyang's admission to the United Nations. Pyongyang's preservation was more likely if it were recognized as an independent political entity by the international community; the ideological contagion would also be contained. However, unlike Seoul, which was supportive of both Koreas being admitted into the United Nations, Pyongyang adamantly insisted that they should be admitted as one confederation, arguing that separate entries would only perpetuate the division of the peninsula.Footnote ⁷⁸ To ease the deadlock, Beijing dispatched Li Peng to Pyongyang in early May to inform Kim Il-sung that “If South Korea raises the issue of joining the United Nations again during this year's UN General Assembly, it will be difficult for China to oppose it.”Footnote ⁷⁹ At that time, Moscow, having already recognized South Korea in September 1990, was unlikely to oppose Seoul's bid. Thus, without China's veto, South Korea would be admitted to the United Nations as the sole Korean nation and North Korea would be further isolated. Kim Il-sung had no choice but to relinquish the idea of building a confederation of two Koreas.Footnote ⁸⁰ Eventually, 20 days after Li Peng's visit, North Korea announced that it would accept the separate entries of two Koreas into the United Nations; it could not “stand idly by” amid a “temporary predicament.”Footnote ⁸¹ Thus, with the two Koreas being admitted into the United Nations in September 1991, Beijing had come one step closer to securing its buffer state and establishing the cordon sanitaire.

Nevertheless, the conditions for Sino-ROK normalization were not yet ripe. In September 1990, when Kim demanded that Beijing should not establish diplomatic relations with Seoul until the US recognized North Korea, Jiang Zemin answered: “We will not establish diplomatic relations with South Korea.”Footnote ⁸² Deng Xiaoping further promised Kim that Sino-ROK normalization would be delayed for three years.Footnote ⁸³ Both Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin reaffirmed in October 1991 that only after Washington recognized Pyongyang would Beijing establish relations with Seoul.Footnote ⁸⁴ This was not out of any ideological affinity between the two countries; even as he promised Kim Il-sung that Beijing would not hastily seek Sino-ROK diplomatic normalization, Deng Xiaoping manifestly repudiated the Sino-DPRK alliance and redefined the nature of their relations: “We [should] adhere to the five principles of peaceful coexistence. It is good for each other. [We] are brothers but not allies.”Footnote ⁸⁵ Three days later, Jiang Zemin also told a Japanese Komeito Party delegation that “As comrades who fought together in the past, [China and North Korea] have strong ties. Nevertheless, China and North Korea are not allies.”Footnote ⁸⁶ Thus, it is more reasonable to think that Beijing still had some room to wait and observe how developments in the peninsula unfolded, given that the high-level US–DPRK talks were being resumed and negotiations for Japan–DPRK diplomatic normalization were also being conducted at the time. Upon meeting the South Korean president Roh Tae-woo, who requested diplomatic normalization in November 1991, Qian Qichen 钱其琛 stated that “Sino-ROK relations will be readily improved if only North Korea establishes diplomatic relations with Japan and the United States.”Footnote ⁸⁷ It appeared that the normalization of Sino-ROK diplomatic ties was still remote.

Sino-ROK diplomatic normalization

In early January 1992, Li Peng issued an internal instruction to find a way to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea while helping North Korea save face.Footnote ⁸⁸ On 23 January, Tian Jiyun informed Seoul that China had already decided to normalize relations with South Korea.Footnote ⁸⁹ This was only three months after Deng and Jiang had assured Kim that Beijing would not establish diplomatic relations with Seoul until Washington recognized Pyongyang, and only 16 months since Deng had decided to delay the normalization for “two, three, and even five years.” At that time, Beijing was well aware that Washington was not ready to recognize Pyongyang: Qian Qichen's cross-recognition proposal, in which the US would recognize North Korea while China would recognize South Korea, had been flatly rejected just two months prior by the-then US secretary of state James Baker.Footnote ⁹⁰ So what made Beijing suddenly expedite the Sino-ROK normalization?

The abrupt collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 was behind China's volte-face. Fearing the threat of Western countries’ “peaceful evolution” against socialist countries, Beijing “originally hoped that the Soviet Union would stand firm and share the pressure” with China.Footnote ⁹¹ The existence of the Soviet Union could serve to bind the US to Europe, thereby preventing it from concentrating all its energy on East Asian countries. At an internal meeting in September 1990, Deng stated, “As for the Soviet Union, we should not pressure it … There are many problems in the Soviet Union, but it can still hold the United States back.”Footnote ⁹² Based on this analysis, Deng advised Kim Il-sung that “We should see that the Soviet Union still has a role to play … We need to make use of the Soviet Union's role.” Believing that “the imperialists [were] looking for a target,” Deng stressed that “it [was] important not to draw their attention.”Footnote ⁹³ He repeated this advice when the two leaders met for the final time in October 1991.Footnote ⁹⁴

Nevertheless, the situation changed drastically in December 1991: a cascade of events that began with the Ukrainian independence referendum on 1 December eventually culminated with the total collapse of the Soviet Union on 26 December. Suddenly, Moscow was not in a position to play its “role” and China was brought to the fore of the “peaceful evolution” sought by the West.Footnote ⁹⁵ While the “spearhead and focus of peaceful evolution” was anticipated to be directed towards China,Footnote ⁹⁶ its buffer state, despite assistance, seemed unable to withstand the internal and external pressure for long. At that time, North Korea's foreign trade was completely disrupted by the dissolution of the Socialist Bloc and its economy spiralled downwards.Footnote ⁹⁷ To exacerbate matters, Moscow, amid its own upheaval, not only stopped its preferential economic policies concerning the North but also demanded that Pyongyang pay back its debt.Footnote ⁹⁸ Further, there were already other signals that Pyongyang was on the verge of political turmoil, such as defections, sabotage, civil protests and an alleged military coup.Footnote ⁹⁹ Under these circumstances, Beijing hastily sought to foreclose the possibility of Washington scheming with its allies to subvert the Chinese regime and moved towards establishing diplomatic relations with South Korea. Seoul, unlike Washington and Tokyo, was unsupportive of the Tiananmen-triggered sanctions and continued to strengthen its ties with Beijing. As such, it appeared to be the weakest link in the US alliance network.Footnote ¹⁰⁰ Further, it was expected that normalization between the two states could give Beijing enough leverage to soften Seoul's aggressive stance against Pyongyang. With its buffer strengthened, China could better resist pressures for a regime change and “peaceful evolution.”

On 15 April 1992, Beijing officially suggested that Seoul establish a formal channel through which to discuss Sino-ROK relations.Footnote ¹⁰¹ Two days earlier, Beijing had dispatched Yang Shangkun 杨尚昆 to Pyongyang to inform Kim Il-sung of the upcoming Sino-ROK normalization. Upon hearing of Beijing's decision on his 80th birthday on 15 April, Kim Il-sung beseeched Yang to delay the normalization by one more year, given that “changes [were] now taking place in US–DRPK relations and inter-Korean relations and a new situation might emerge.”Footnote ¹⁰² However, Beijing rejected Pyongyang's plea and began negotiations with Seoul in May, revealing a sense of urgency. The negotiations proceeded extraordinarily fast: within two months, the two sides had finalized all procedures and had reached an agreement. Approximately one month before the formal conclusion of the Sino-ROK joint communiqué for diplomatic normalization, Beijing dispatched Qian Qichen to appease Pyongyang. Qian conveyed to Kim Il-sung that “China will, as always, devote itself to developing friendly relations between China and North Korea, and … will use our influence to relax the situation on the Korean Peninsula.” Feeling betrayed, Kim responded bitterly: “If there are any difficulties, we will overcome them ourselves.”Footnote ¹⁰³ On 24 August, China and South Korea formally established diplomatic relations. As the two countries’ bilateral relations entered “a new stage,” Beijing successfully secured its strategic buffer and survived the alleged “peaceful evolution” orchestrated by the West.Footnote ¹⁰⁴