Historical context

In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, Thailand sought to rehabilitate its international standing and distance itself from Phibun’s wartime alliance with Japan. To this end, it had to carefully manage its relations with the major powers, namely the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and China, in the hopes of securing their support or at least avoiding obstruction in international forums such as the United Nations. As part of this effort, Thailand signed treaties with Britain and France to return the territories it had annexed during the war in Malaya and Indochina.Footnote ⁶ It also repealed domestic anti-communist legislation and re-established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.Footnote ⁷ Despite Thailand’s declaration of war against both Britain and the United States on 25 January 1942, post-war American policy adopted a notably more sympathetic tone—treating Thailand as a Japanese conquest rather than as a defeated enemy. This attitude helped lay the groundwork for their subsequent Cold War alliance.Footnote ⁸ Of all these external relationships, Thailand’s ties with China proved to be the most complex.

For an extended period, despite repeated efforts from the Chinese side, Thailand consistently sought to avoid establishing formal diplomatic relations with China. This reluctance was rooted largely in the Thai ruling elites’ long-standing concern over the country’s sizeable ethnic Chinese population—an outlook traceable to the reign of King Vajiravudh (Rama VI). Shortly after ascending the throne, Vajiravudh published a series of sociopolitical essays under the pen name Asvaphahu (อัศวพาหุ) in Nangsuephimthai (หนังสือพิมพ์ไทย), among which the most influential and controversial was titled ‘The Jews of the Orient’. In this essay, he imposed prevailing European anti-Semitic tropes onto the Chinese in Thailand, contending that they posed an even greater threat to the kingdom than Jews did to Europe. As a result, Vajiravudh is widely regarded as the progenitor of modern, top-down anti-Chinese discourse in Thailand. As Sitthithep Eksittipong and Saichon Sattayanurak have argued, this anti-Chinese stance functioned as an ‘emotional regime’ through which the Thai state sought to govern and discipline the Chinese community by means of shame.Footnote ⁹

Towards the end of his reign, Vajiravudh’s suspicions of the Chinese began to intertwine with emerging fears of Bolshevik infiltration. In a private letter, he wrote: ‘I do not think we need fear or anticipate any Bolshevik outrage in Siam for the present, but if ever it comes I am afraid it will come via China, and we are on the look out for likely agents who may slip in along with some Chinese immigrants. All suspicious characters are promptly deported before they have time to do much mischief.’Footnote ¹⁰ From this point onward, anti-communism and anti-Chinese sentiment became tightly entangled in the political imagination and practices of the Thai elite—a linkage that persisted from the early twentieth century to the Cold War era, with perhaps only a brief and circumstantial exception in the immediate post–Second World War years.

In September 1945, a major conflict erupted between local Chinese residents and Thai police and civilians in Bangkok’s Yaowarat (Chinatown), a violent episode known as the ‘Yaowarat Incident’.Footnote ¹¹ In response, the Chinese government lodged a formal protest and used the incident to press for diplomatic recognition. For the Seni Pramoj regime then in power, establishing formal ties with China had become inevitable, especially amid concerns that China might oppose Thailand’s admission to the United Nations. On 23 January 1946, the two sides signed the Treaty of Amity between the ROC and the Kingdom of Siam, which declared that ‘there shall be perpetual peace and everlasting amity’ between the two countries and their peoples. The treaty also stipulated the mutual exchange of diplomatic representatives and consular officials. Li Tiezheng (李铁铮), the ROC’s first ambassador to Thailand, arrived in Bangkok to assume his post on 6 September 1946. The following year, Chinese consulates were officially opened in Bangkok, Chiang Mai, Nakhon Sawan, Nakhon Ratchasima, and Songkhla. At the time, numerous issues remained to be resolved between the two governments, the most urgent of which concerned Chinese immigration and Chinese-language education.

Situated at the very heart of Sino-Thai relations, the post-war Chinese community in Thailand underwent a brief yet intense period of turmoil, adjustment, and restructuring.Footnote ¹² One of the most significant transformations during this period was the marked intensification of organizational and political mobilization within the Chinese diaspora, manifesting notably in two key developments: a surge in Chinese nationalist sentiment and a heightened polarization between pro-KMT and pro-CPC (Communist Party of China) factions. China’s wartime victory and its elevated international status galvanized overseas Chinese communities, spurring a widespread wave of nationalism. In Thailand, a former Axis-aligned country, these rising nationalist sentiments occasionally gave rise to friction between the Thai and Chinese populations. In China, although the KMT and the CPC maintained a nominally cooperative stance following Japan’s surrender, deep-seated mutual distrust rendered civil war all but unavoidable. This growing tension sharply exacerbated political divisions among Thailand’s Chinese population, further delineating pro-KMT and pro-CPC factions. Such polarization permeated the unfolding of the June 15 and August 10 incidents, constituting a critical yet often overlooked undercurrent of the events.

It is crucial to note that during this period, the principal communist organization opposed by the KMT and targeted by the Phibun administration was not the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), but rather the Overseas Chinese Communist Party or Qiaodang (侨党), which was an overseas extension of the CPC predominantly composed of first- and second-generation Chinese immigrants.Footnote ¹³ The rapid expansion of communist forces within Thailand coincided with a major shift in the regional political landscape. In June 1948, the British colonial government declared a state of emergency in Malaya, launching an extensive crackdown against communists and other leftist elements. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP), opting for armed resistance, subsequently established the Malayan National Liberation Army (later renamed the Malayan People’s Army) in 1949. Due to relentless colonial suppression, some MCP members retreated into southern Thailand along the Malayan border, where they sought to establish guerrilla bases. Meanwhile, in northeastern Thailand, the Viet Minh reactivated their revolutionary networks, transforming the region into a critical conduit for arms trafficking and logistical support.Footnote ¹⁴ These developments greatly alarmed Thai authorities, heightening fears of cross-border communist infiltration.

The growing politicization of the diasporic Chinese, combined with their dominant position in multiple key sectors of the Thai economy, made them a prime target in the eyes of Thailand’s ruling elites. Phibun perceived the domestic Chinese population as a latent source of instability and social unrest. The rapid proliferation of communist movements increasingly cast overseas Chinese as a possible fifth column of subversion.Footnote ¹⁵ In this evolving domestic and international context, anti-Chinese and anti-communist agendas became, for the Phibun government, virtually inseparable and mutually reinforcing—a continuity grounded in Thailand’s political culture.

In April 1948, Phibun’s return to power was swiftly followed by an aggressive campaign targeting Chinese-language education. The newly appointed minister of education, Mangkorn Phromyothi (มังกร พรหมโยธี), publicly announced plans to eradicate Chinese schools. Shortly thereafter, the Thai government promulgated and rigorously implemented a revised Private School Act, delivering a severe blow to the post-war revival of Chinese education in Thailand.Footnote ¹⁶ This policy shift provoked immediate and intense resistance from the Chinese community. Leading Chinese newspapers provided sustained coverage, publishing a series of in-depth editorials on the so-called ‘Chinese education problem’ (华教问题).Footnote ¹⁷ At the same time, the ROC embassy in Bangkok, along with prominent local Chinese leaders, lodged formal protests through correspondence and direct visits to relevant Thai government departments, urging clarification and reconsideration. At the grassroots level, a delegation of Chinese school teachers was mobilized to petition the Thai Ministry of Education.Footnote ¹⁸

While various parties anxiously awaited further government responses, the Thai police launched an unexpected, large-scale raid-and-arrest operation in the early hours of 15 June 1948, dramatically escalating tensions. This event soon became known as the June 15 Incident.

Raids at dawn

At approximately 3a.m. on 15 June 1948, a large contingent of armed police in Bangkok conducted coordinated raids on multiple Chinese schools, community associations, newspapers, and businesses, resulting in the arrest of 58 individuals. Most of these targeted institutions were affiliated with the Qiaodang, including the Nanyang Middle School (南洋中学, commonly known as Nanzhong), Qiguang School (启光公学), the Siamese Chinese United Federation for National Reconstruction and Homeland Salvation (暹罗华侨各界抗日救国联合总会, commonly known as Jianjiuhui), the Siamese Chinese Education Association (暹罗华侨教育协会, commonly known as Jiaoxie), the Hainanese Native Association (琼崖同乡会), and several labour unions. Among them, Nanzhong bore the brunt of the crackdown, with over 20 individuals, including Principal Zhuo Jiong (卓炯) and Vice-Principal Qiu Bingjing (邱秉经), taken into custody for interrogation. Many of these detained were core cadres of the Qiaodang. The stated justification for their arrests was the suspects’ alleged involvement in illegal secret society activities. They were first brought to the Special Branch Bureau (กองบัญชาการตำรวจสันติบาล) and later transferred to holding cells across various local police stations. Several KMT offices and affiliated organizations were also subject to police raids during the operation.

According to news reports published in major Chinese-language newspapers in Thailand at the time, the Thai police and relevant government officials provided several clarifications in response to the incident. First, the police stated that the arrests had been carried out under orders from higher authorities, and that the detainees were suspected of involvement in secret society activities that threatened public order and social stability, explicitly dismissing media speculation regarding an alleged plan by the ROC to annex Thailand. Second, the investigations proceeded slowly due to language barriers. Third, it was indicated that if sufficient evidence was obtained, some of the detainees might face deportation. Finally, bail was denied at this stage, and the authorities suggested that further arrests could not be ruled out.Footnote ¹⁹

According to Zhongyuan Bao, one of the most influential Chinese newspapers in Thailand at the time, by 18 June, the police raids and arrests had largely come to an end, with a total of 61 individuals taken into custody. That afternoon, following the completion of preliminary interrogations, the police allowed family members to visit the detainees.Footnote ²⁰ Among the initial group of 58 detainees, two were granted conditional bail. After seven days in police custody, the remaining 56 were transferred on 21 June to a misdemeanour prison for an additional 12 days of detention, as permitted by the criminal court. Concurrently, the police publicly released the names of these 56 individuals.Footnote ²¹ Formal charges, however, were not immediately filed. Instead, the police repeatedly petitioned the court to further extend their detention.Footnote ²² By late July, reports began to circulate that the police were expediting evidence collection for formal prosecution, although Thai authorities had already decided to deport these detainees as ‘undesirable persons’.Footnote ²³

Of the 61 individuals arrested during the June 15 Incident, 43 were identified as members or affiliates of Qiaodang organizations and the Thailand branch of the China Democratic League (中国民主同盟泰国支部, commonly known as Minmeng).Footnote ²⁴ This group included faculty and staff from Nanzhong, labour union leaders, and senior cadres from Jiaoxie and Jianjiuhui.Footnote ²⁵ Among them, 20 were confirmed to be registered Qiaodang members.Footnote ²⁶ According to their accounts, the authorities failed to find concrete evidence against them. Under Thai law, they should have received unconditional release upon the expiration of the legal detention period. However, the police merged their case with an unrelated gang incident, fabricating an unfounded accusation of secret society activities and claiming that the investigation was incomplete and accomplices remained at large. On these grounds, the police repeatedly petitioned the court for extensions of the detention order. The detainees were then transferred to a misdemeanour prison for prolonged incarceration and were required to appear in court every 12 days for continued hearings.Footnote ²⁷

Nanjing’s response

On the night of 15 June 1948, Xie Baoqiao (谢保樵), the newly appointed ROC ambassador to Thailand, urgently contacted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Nanjing regarding the unfolding June 15 Incident. In his telegram, Xie reported that during a meeting with Thai Prime Minister Phibun on 9 June, the latter had explicitly expressed his intention to instruct the police to arrest communist elements.Footnote ²⁸ This communication suggests that the Nationalist government had prior knowledge of the impending crackdown. Therefore, the ROC’s initial response remained limited to standard diplomatic representations by its mission in Thailand, without escalating into a substantive protest.

The following day, Sun Bingqian (孙秉乾), the ROC consul general in Bangkok, visited the commissioner-general of the Thai police to request detailed information about the identities of those arrested, the reasons for their detention, and the anticipated judicial proceedings. Meanwhile, Ouyang Chun (欧阳纯), secretary to the ambassador, met with the Thai deputy minister of foreign affairs, to raise the same enquiries and formally request a written reply. In a telegram sent from the ROC Consulate General in Bangkok to the Foreign Ministry in Nanjing on 16 June, it was noted that most of the detainees were identified as leftist activists.Footnote ²⁹ The telegram also reported that key leaders of the Qiaodang, such as Qiu Ji (邱及), Huang Sheng, and Guo Tianren (郭天任), had successfully fled prior to the raids. The ROC Consulate General assessed that the Thai authorities had carried out the raids and arrests to curry favour with China, Britain, and the United States. The fact that such high-profile figures were able to escape was interpreted as a deliberate concession by the Thai government to appease the Soviet Union.Footnote ³⁰ On 3 July, a subsequent telegram from the ROC embassy in Thailand reiterated that ‘none of the detained overseas Chinese were arrested solely because of their connections with the KMT’.Footnote ³¹ This remark suggests that both the ROC embassy and the Consulate General in Bangkok initially held the same view: the June 15 Incident was merely as a targeted campaign by the Thai government against domestic communist forces.

By contrast, the ROC consulate in Nakon Sawan (Pak Nam Pho) took a more cautious stance. In a 28 June telegram to Nanjing, the consulate provided a comprehensive analysis of the causes behind the June 15 Incident and its implications for local Chinese communities. The report stated:

Furthermore, this telegram also mentioned that the Bangkok KMT General Branch had informed local branches that the crackdown was aimed at communists, assuring them that there was no cause for alarm. Nevertheless, the Nakon Sawan consulate remained concerned, noting:

In retrospect, the initial assessment of the June 15 Incident by the ROC embassy and the Consulate General in Bangkok appears strikingly naive and reductive. While the campaign was, in its immediate form, clearly directed at communist elements within the Chinese community, notably the Qiaodang and the Minmeng, it likely also served as a calculated gesture of alignment by the Phibun regime towards the United States, the United Kingdom, and, to a lesser extent, the ROC. Yet both the embassy and the Bangkok consulate demonstrated a limited grasp of Thailand’s intricate domestic political dynamics and entrenched modes of governance. Their overreliance on the Thai government’s official narratives led them to seriously underestimate the gravity of the incident and to adopt an unduly optimistic view of its future trajectory. By contrast, the report from the consulate in Nakhon Sawan proved considerably more perceptive and analytically grounded. It identified not only the resurgence of communist activity in Thailand and across the region, but also the hyper-nationalist orientation underpinning Phibun’s political programme. Moreover, it linked the incident to the government’s parallel efforts to curb inflation and stabilize consumer prices. This report presciently warned of the potential for escalation—an assessment later substantiated by the August 10 Incident and the series of developments that followed.

The ROC government in Nanjing, seemingly persuaded by reports from its embassy and consulate in Bangkok, adopted a reserved, observational stance towards the June 15 Incident. On 30 June, Minister of National Defense He Yingqin (何应钦) sent a telegram to Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Shijie (王世杰), acknowledging:

In its telegrams to the embassy and various consulates in Thailand, the Nanjing Foreign Ministry repeatedly stressed that if the detainees were indeed CPC members who had violated local laws, the ROC government should not intervene. It also emphasized the importance of withholding information about the incident to prevent external actors from manipulating the situation to sow discord. In cases involving the arrest of non-communist Chinese nationals, diplomatic efforts should be made to secure their release.Footnote ³⁴ Although the Nationalist government exercised a degree of caution, it took no substantive action in response, and the situation quickly evolved beyond its expectations.

In prison

The June 15 Incident quickly drew attention and intervention from various actors beyond the Nanjing government. The Qiaodang promptly initiated responses on multiple fronts. Two cadres—Lin Zhiyuan (林之原) and Ma Tai (马太)—were specifically assigned to maintain contact with imprisoned members and provide support to their families. Additionally, the Qiaodang reported the situation immediately to the CPC’s Hong Kong Central Branch Bureau (中共中央香港分局) and launched rescue and resettlement efforts under its directives.Footnote ³⁵ On the one hand, Qiu Ji, acting in his capacity as president of the Zhenhua Bao, liaised with influential Chinese community leaders, seeking their support and leveraging their connections to engage with relevant government officials. Wu Zeren (吴泽人) was tasked with maintaining direct communication with the police to gauge their intentions and respond accordingly. Wang Hui (王惠) and Hu Qi (胡琦) acted as secret couriers, facilitating the exchange of information between those inside and outside the prison, while Ma Tai organized public support, including arranging visits by Chinese workers and students to detainees and mobilizing their attendance at court hearings.Footnote ³⁶

In parallel, the CPC and its political allies, including the Minmeng and the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang (中国国民党革命委员会, commonly known as Min’ge), publicly condemned the Thai government’s actions. On 2 July 1948, the CPC’s official newspaper, Renmin Ribao, published a strongly worded article titled ‘The Siamese Traitor Phibun Launches a Frenzied Anti-Chinese Campaign; Mass Arrests of Democratic Overseas Chinese Activists’.Footnote ³⁷ The paper continued its coverage in follow-up reports published on 6 July.Footnote ³⁸ The Xinhua News Agency released a statement from a CPC spokesperson regarding the June 15 Incident, issuing a stern warning to the Phibun government. International organizations, including the International Federation for Human Rights, the Women’s International Democratic Federation, the International Union of Students, and the World Federation of Democratic Youth also exerted diplomatic pressure, protesting against Thailand’s arrests, imprisonment, and repression of Chinese immigrants.Footnote ³⁹

The detainees remained incarcerated for nearly three months prior to their eventual deportation. During this period, they organized themselves into a provisional prison branch of the Qiaodang to maintain internal cohesion and coordinate collective actions. This temporary leadership body consisted of Zhuo Jiong, Qiu Bingjing, Yang Baibing, Wang Hu, and Han Shan, each assuming responsibility for liaising with detainees according to their original institutional affiliations. Zhuo and Qiu coordinated communication among the detained Nanzhong faculty and staff; Yang and Wang oversaw those affiliated with Jiaoxie and Jianjiuhui; Han, with Yang’s assistance, managed liaison work among labour union members.Footnote ⁴⁰

Under the guidance of the Qiaodang, the prison branch undertook several initiatives. First, they uncovered efforts by the Thai police and KMT-affiliated operatives—particularly a group allegedly led by Ke Dawen (柯达文), editor of the Qiaosheng Bao (侨声报)—to infiltrate the detainees and facilitate interrogations.Footnote ⁴¹ During court proceedings, in addition to the lawyers appointed by the Qiaodang, the prison branch selected Wu Feng and Zhen Ping, both fluent in Thai, to deliver public statements of protest, directly rebutting the charges. They also petitioned prison authorities to remove their shackles and extend their daily outdoor time. Reports of the harsh prison conditions were relayed to the party leadership, which in turn mobilized supporters outside the prison to deliver food, medicine, and daily necessities. Finally, detainees organized study sessions using reading materials smuggled into the prison, through which they engaged in political and ideological education, reflected on the lessons of the incident, and systematically prepared for post-release activities.Footnote ⁴²

According to a Central News Agency (CNA, 中央通讯社) dispatch dated 7 August, the Thai police recommended the permanent deportation of individuals detained in the June 15 Incident, a proposal that was subsequently approved by the Ministry of the Interior and formally submitted to Phibun for final approval on 6 August. Phibun signed off on the measure the same day.Footnote ⁴³ On 8 August, a government official read the deportation order to the detainees and initiated the administrative procedures for their removal.Footnote ⁴⁴

The decision itself was not entirely unexpected. From the outset of the incident, the Thai police had repeatedly released information suggesting that deportation was the most probable outcome. However, considerable controversy surrounded the question of where the detainees would be deported to. The ROC government repeatedly urged Thai authorities to send the deportees to ports such as Guangzhou or Shantou, both major transit points for Sino-Thai traffic and, crucially, still under KMT control at the time. Given this, the deportees would almost certainly have fallen into the hands of the Nationalist regime upon arrival.

The Qiaodang vehemently opposed this option, and certain Thai political elites shared similar concerns. For example, former Thai Minister of Education Luean Saraphaiwanich (เลื่อน ศราภัยวานิช) wrote in a Thai-language newspaper article on 9 July: ‘If the Siamese government deports these Chinese detainees to Shantou, there is no doubt that they will be sent to their deaths—especially since the KMT has already labelled them as communist agents.’Footnote ⁴⁵ He urged the Thai government to approach the matter with humanitarian consideration and in accordance with international norms, calling for a cautious reassessment of the appropriate means of implementing the deportation.

Crackdown continued

No sooner had the immediate aftermath of the June 15 Incident subsided than a new wave of repression began. In the early hours of 10 August 1948, the Thai police launched another large-scale round of raids and arrests targeting the Chinese community. According to media coverage, the sweep was nationwide in scope, with only three provinces reportedly unaffected. Although the ROC Consulate General in Bangkok suggested that this claim may have been exaggerated, the scale of this operation clearly surpassed that of the June 15 Incident.Footnote ⁴⁶ Based on reports compiled by the embassy and consulates, the raids and arrests were concentrated primarily in provinces such as Nonthaburi, Nakhon Ratchasima, Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, Chonburi, Ayutthaya, and Lampang. Between 150 and 200 individuals were reportedly detained by the police.Footnote ⁴⁷ The crackdown, which began on 10 August, continued intensively until 15 August, with sporadic arrests persisting into early September before the situation gradually stabilized. The operation was jointly carried out by the Metropolitan Police Bureau (กองบัญชาการตำรวจนครบาล) and various provincial police departments. Officers involved in the raids claimed that they were acting under direct orders from the Bangkok headquarters. The targets primarily included Chinese-owned businesses, schools, and associations; in several cases, police confiscated financial records and business licences. Compared with the June 15 Incident, the authorities added an additional charge of ‘illegal fundraising’.

On 14 August, Ji Tifan (季惕凡), the ROC consul general in Chiang Mai, submitted a report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Nanjing detailing the arrests within his consular jurisdiction. According to the report, during raids on Chinese-owned businesses, the police claimed that the operation had been pre-approved by the Chinese ambassador and that a bilateral agreement had been signed concerning the joint suppression of communists.Footnote ⁴⁸ Although this assertion of KMT complicity cannot be substantiated, it is evident that the Thai authorities framed the operation as part of a broader anti-communist campaign.

The outbreak of the August 10 Incident sent shockwaves through the Thai Chinese community, like a splash of cold water into boiling oil, reigniting anxieties that had only recently begun to subside. Panic quickly spread, with many overseas Chinese gripped by a renewed sense of insecurity and alarm. Notably, those detained during this second wave of repression were predominantly affluent Chinese merchants and members of Chinese school boards, including numerous individuals affiliated with the KMT. As a result, the Nationalist government treated the incident with heightened urgency and mounted a considerably stronger response.

In addition to diplomatic representations made by the ROC embassy and consulates in Thailand, on 17 August, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Liu Shishun (刘师舜) formally summoned Sanga Nilkamhaeng (สง่า นิลกำแหง), the Thai chargé d’affaires in Nanjing, to protest the mass arrests of overseas Chinese. During the meeting, Liu handed over an aide-memoire. According to the summary record of the conversation, Sanga claimed that ‘a number of the persons arrested were connected with unregistered associations engaged in subversive activities such as the Communist Party and the Democratic League’.Footnote ⁴⁹ He appealed for the Chinese government’s understanding of Thailand’s efforts to eradicate communist threats within its borders and firmly denied the existence of an anti-Chinese movement in Thailand.

Sanga’s explanation aligned with what Phibun had previously conveyed to Xie Baoqiao, yet it diverged noticeably from the justifications provided by the Thai police to the domestic media. In their public statements, the authorities cited charges such as involvement in secret societies disrupting social order, illegal fundraising, and incitement of labour strikes—without making explicit reference to anti-communism. In response, Vice Minister Liu affirmed the ROC government’s sympathy for Thailand’s anti-communist efforts, but stressed that such measures ‘should not be employed as an anti-Chinese weapon’ or used as ‘a pretext for eliminating the lawful and law-abiding Chinese residents in Siam’. In the aide-memoire, the Nationalist government demanded the immediate release of the Chinese nationals concerned and urged the Thai government to ensure that similar actions would not recur in the future.Footnote ⁵⁰

Over the following two weeks, the Thai government provided no formal written response to the Chinese protest. On 27 August, the CNA reported that Phibun publicly claimed that the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not yet received any protest from the Nationalist government.Footnote ⁵¹ Astonished by this message, the Nanjing Foreign Ministry immediately instructed its embassy in Thailand to resend the protest note and reiterate its position to the Thai authorities. This development underscored the Thai government’s deliberate tactics of delay and evasion in handling the Chinese diplomatic démarche. Expressing his frustration, Sun Bingqian sent a strongly worded telegram to the Nanjing Foreign Ministry on 9 September, in which he remarked indignantly:

Although the Thai government failed to issue any formal response to Nanjing’s protest, the wave of raids and arrests gradually subsided, and many of the detained Chinese were eventually released on bail. Possibly as a way to deflect mounting public pressure resulting from the August 10 Incident, the Thai authorities publicly announced that 51 individuals detained in the June 15 Incident would be released and deported, albeit with nominal discretion over the timing, port of departure, and country or region of destination. While the ROC embassy closely monitored the situation, it refrained from intervening with the Thai government, having already concluded that those involved were insurgent elements. According to a telegram from the ROC Consulate General in Bangkok to the Foreign Ministry in Nanjing dated 9 September, the consulate had repeatedly requested information from the Thai police concerning the deportees’ names, departure dates, modes of transport, and points of exit, and had also urged the embassy to pursue further diplomatic engagement.Footnote ⁵³ Nevertheless, the Thai government continued its customary tactics of delay and evasion, ultimately offering no reply even after the individuals had left the country.

After deportation

In light of the evolving dynamics of the Chinese Civil War and the specific circumstances of the detainees, the Qiaodang initially planned to arrange for some members to leave Thailand in small groups and enter the Dongjiang Column’s (东江纵队) guerrilla base area via Hong Kong to support the CPC’s war efforts. The remaining members were expected to stay in Thailand and continue their assigned work. In late August 1948, Xu Yuanxiong attempted to travel to Hong Kong through private channels. However, upon arrival at Hong Kong airport, he was detained by the British colonial authorities for lacking valid identification documents and was deported back to Bangkok the following day, where he was reincarcerated. This incident made clear that the return route via Hong Kong was no longer viable. As a result, the Qiaodang began to explore the possibility of establishing contact with the Viet Minh, with the intention of rerouting members into Viet Minh-controlled guerrilla zones in Laos.Footnote ⁵⁴

Around this time, Luo Zhengming (罗正明) and Fu Xiaolou (傅晓楼)—pro-communist gentry figures leading armed resistance against the Nationalist regime in southern Yunnan—dispatched a horse caravan leader, Liu Guochang (刘国昌), to Bangkok to seek assistance from the underground CPC network. Liu had previously travelled to Bangkok twice on commercial missions and had become aware of the presence of communist-affiliated organizations through leftist publications such as Zhenhua Bao and Quanmin Bao. Upon his arrival in Bangkok, Liu paid a visit to Qiu Ji, the president of Zhenhua Bao, and conveyed the purpose of his mission. After Liu’s background was verified and the request approved by higher party authorities, the Qiaodang decided that Liu Guochang’s horse caravan would guide the detainees in small groups through Burma and into southern Yunnan.

On 18 September, the release and deportation of the detainees began in staggered groups. The first group, consisting of ten individuals, was accompanied by Qiaodang cadres who, posing as family members, negotiated with the police escorts and travelled alongside them. The group departed Bangkok by train, arrived in Lampang in northern Thailand, and then transferred to automobiles that took them to Mae Sai on the Thai-Burmese border. From there, they crossed the river into Tachileik, Burma. Ten days later, a second group followed the same route out of the country. On 13 October, a third group also prepared for departure. By the end of October, all detainees had left Thailand and successfully entered Burmese territory.

According to first-hand accounts, the Thai authorities, concerned that the detainees might become targets of assassination by KMT agents while still within the country, arranged for their departure in small, discreet groups. To avoid attracting public attention, the escort operations were carried out by plainclothes officers under conditions of strict secrecy.Footnote ⁵⁵

To ensure the safety of the departing detainees and to organize their post-release activities in a planned and systematic manner, the Qiaodang established a ‘June 15 Special Branch’ (六·一五特支). Yang Baibing was appointed as the branch secretary, with Zhuo Jiong, Qiu Bingjing, Wang Hu, and Han Shan serving as branch committee members. Upon crossing into Burmese territory, the entire group was divided into four subgroups, each assigned different missions based on political and logistical considerations.Footnote ⁵⁶

The first group, consisting of ten individuals and led by Zhuo Jiong, followed Liu Guochang’s horse caravan route into Yunnan to participate in the ongoing civil war. The second group, consisting of 15 members under the leadership of Yang Baibing, entered Laos to join the Viet Minh’s anti-French war in Muang Xay, Laos (Figure 1). However, due to shifting strategic needs in southern Yunnan, the majority of this group later rerouted into Yunnan to take part in the civil war. The third group, consisting of seven individuals led by Qiu Bingjing, initially stayed in Kengtung and most of them later proceeded to Yunnan, with only Wang Ping remaining at a liaison post in Kengtung.Footnote ⁵⁷ The fourth group, also consisting of seven individuals and led by Chen Baicang, was tasked to support liaison operations along the Thai-Burmese border. Eventually, all except Chen Yaoguang, who remained in Kengtung to assist Wang Ping with liaison work, also proceeded to Yunnan to join the Chinese Civil War.Footnote ⁵⁸

Figure 1.

Group photograph of deportees from the June 15 Incident who joined the Viet Minh’s anti-French war in Laos.Footnote ⁵⁹ Source: Chen Qi and Guan Ping (eds), From the Chao Phraya to the Lancang River.

In the autumn of 1950, Wang Ping and Chen Yaoguang received instructions to withdraw. They travelled by ship from Rangoon to Guangzhou.Footnote ⁶⁰ With their return, a total of 39 out of the 43 Qiaodang-affiliated individuals arrested during the June 15 Incident had successfully made their way back to China (Figure 2). The remaining four—Yu Liangqin, Xu Chu’nan, Lu Zhongyuan, and Chen Shilu—either remained in Thailand on bail due to their Thai nationality or relocated to Laos and Vietnam because of family considerations.Footnote ⁶¹

Figure 2.

Main routes taken by detainees of the June 15 Incident in their repatriation to China. Source: Map created by Yanbing Chen.

Due to shifts in the external conditions, most of the deportees neither returned to Guangdong nor stayed in Thailand as the Qiaodang had originally planned. Instead, they entered Yunnan in separate groups and dispersed across the regions of Simao, Pu’er, and Lancang. After establishing contact with local CPC branches, their organizational affiliations were formally transferred. Many of them played key roles in founding and leading two local armed forces: the First Detachment of the Yi’nan People’s Self-Defense Army (迤南边区人民自卫军第一支队) and the Puguang Unit (普光部队). Both forces were later incorporated into the Yunnan-Guangxi-Guizhou Border Column of the People’s Liberation Army (中国人民解放军滇桂黔边纵队).Footnote ⁶²

Comparing the two incidents

With the outbreak of the August 10 Incident, the Nationalist government began to recognize the gravity of the situation. Telegrams and reports sent by ROC consulates across Thailand to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Nanjing increasingly characterized the crackdown as a systematic anti-Chinese campaign orchestrated by the Phibun government. This interpretive shift also prompted a re-evaluation of the June 15 Incident itself. One of the most prominent examples of this change in perception came from the Consulate General in Chiang Mai, particularly through the reports submitted by Consul General Ji Tifan.

On 11 August, the day after the crackdown, the Chiang Mai consulate sent a telegram to the Nanjing Foreign Ministry, stating: ‘The Siamese government uses the pretext of communist suppression to curry favour with Britain and the United States, while in fact implementing an anti-Chinese campaign—thus achieving two objectives at once.’Footnote ⁶³ On 14 August, Ji Tifan submitted a detailed report on the recent raids and arrests of overseas Chinese in his jurisdiction. The report outlined what he described as a ‘military-led anti-Chinese campaign’ that had been in motion since the coup of 8 November 1947, and identified both the June 15 and August 10 incidents as components of a larger, organized anti-Chinese initiative, rather than singular anti-communist crackdowns. In concluding the report, Ji noted that on the evening of 10 August, the Chiang Mai police released three detainees—Zhou Yunzhang (周云章), Lin Kefu (林克甫), and Du Chaobao (杜朝宝)—despite the fact that Zhou had been identified as a key communist figure. Moreover, two Chinese commercial establishments widely believed to be communist strongholds, Ji’antang (集安堂) and Taishengyuan (泰生源), were raided but saw no arrests. Ji thus asserted that the August 10 Incident was ‘an anti-Chinese campaign disguised as a communist purge’.Footnote ⁶⁴

Subsequent telegrams and reports from the Chiang Mai consulate frequently continued to refer to what was described as the Thai government’s ‘anti-Chinese conspiracy’. In a particularly strongly worded report dated 7 September, Ji Tifan directly named Phibun as the mastermind behind this campaign. He wrote:

Local officials, Ji continued, followed Phibun’s lead enthusiastically:

Ji Tifan’s statements were by no means isolated. In fact, officials across various levels of the Nationalist government—from consulates and the embassy in Thailand to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other central departments—had ceased to view the successive raids and arrests as mere anti-communist operations. Instead, they increasingly framed them as organized, systematic campaigns of anti-Chinese repression as well. Telegrams sent by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission on 1 September and by Yu Youren (于右任), president of the Control Yuan (监察院), on 3 September explicitly conveyed this assessment.Footnote ⁶⁶ Among such interpretations, the report submitted by the Bangkok Consulate General to the Foreign Ministry on 9 September offers one of the clearest and most direct descriptions of both the June 15 and August 10 incidents. It stated:

It is evident that the ROC government’s assessment of the two incidents underwent a marked shift. While the June 15 Incident was primarily characterized as an anti-communist crackdown, the August 10 Incident came to be interpreted more explicitly as a broadly anti-Chinese campaign. A comparative analysis of the two incidents may therefore proceed along the following lines.

First, there is a notable difference in the composition of those arrested. In the June 15 Incident, the vast majority of detainees were members of the Qiaodang or the Minmeng. By contrast, the August 10 crackdown predominantly targeted prominent Chinese merchants and board members of Chinese schools, many of whom were affiliated with the KMT. While media reports and ROC archival records confirm that some communist or sympathizers were also arrested, particularly in Chonburi Province, the overall proportion of such individuals among the detainees was relatively low. Second, the Nationalist government’s reactions differed significantly. Following the June 15 Incident, Nanjing remained largely passive, aside from limited interventions by the embassy and the Consulate General in Bangkok. By contrast, in the aftermath of the August 10 Incident, the Nanjing Foreign Ministry swiftly summoned the Thai chargé d’affaires to lodge a formal protest, accompanied by a written aide-memoire. Additionally, the Chinese authorities sought to exert pressure on Thailand through domestic media campaigns, diplomatic appeals to the United States, and attempts to involve the United Nations. Third, there was a marked contrast in how the two sets of detainees were treated. Those arrested in the June 15 Incident were mostly denied bail, had their detention periods repeatedly extended, and were ultimately deported in groups. Deportation, notably, had been the most common and widely used method employed by the Thai government since the 1920s to deal with radical elements within the Chinese community, particularly those associated with communism.Footnote ⁶⁸ In contrast, most of those detained during the August 10 Incident were released relatively quickly. Although instances of exorbitant bail payments, particularly in Chiang Mai, were reported, the legal consequences faced by August 10 detainees were considerably less severe.

Given the comparison above, it is clear that the June 15 Incident bore a distinctly anti-communist character. While both Skinner and Wiese, noting that local KMT branches were also targeted during the August 10 Incident, interpret the Phibun regime’s early second-term repression of the Chinese community as politically neutral and nonpartisan, such a reading risks obscuring—or at least downplaying—the explicitly anti-communist orientation of the June 15 Incident.Footnote ⁶⁹ By contrast, the August 10 Incident cast a much wider net, targeting not only communists, but also KMT affiliates, merchants, and Chinese school board members. This does not mean, of course, that the Phibun government’s repressive measures were indiscriminately directed at the entire Chinese community. Nonetheless, there is little doubt that the scope and impact of the August 10 Incident extended beyond the anti-communist sphere, generating widespread panic throughout the diasporic Chinese population. As noted in a telegram from the ROC embassy to the Nanjing Foreign Ministry dated 16 August, ‘… the mass arrests have created an atmosphere of terror—overseas Chinese are gripped by anxiety and fear, and the commercial economy of the Chinese community has suffered as a result’.Footnote ⁷⁰

Anti-communist or anti-Chinese?

Existing scholarship on the Phibun regime during this period—regardless of its normative stance—has largely focused on questions of intent. Two lines of enquiry have been especially prominent: first, whether these policies and actions were fundamentally anti-communist or anti-Chinese in nature; and second, whether they stemmed from a genuine perception of threat posed by Chinese or communist elements, or were primarily instrumental tools for political legitimation.Footnote ⁷¹ Although the June 15 and August 10 incidents, as presented in the available sources, may not directly reflect the true intentions of the Phibun administration, they do shed considerable light on how these agendas were carried out on the ground and what long-term consequences they produced. By closely examining the narratives of two key actors directly implicated in these events—the KMT government and the Qiaodang—it becomes possible to reconstruct the operational logic behind the Thai government’s actions. Such an analysis of implementation and impact may ultimately prove more revealing than attempts to discern intent alone.

Throughout the period between the June 15 and August 10 incidents, the Phibun government demonstrated a highly strategic and calculated approach. Its rhetoric and actions displayed considerable variation and flexibility, depending on the political context. When faced with protests from the ROC government, the Phibun administration initially justified its actions on the grounds of anti-communism. As the situation escalated and distrust from the Chinese side deepened, Thai officials reframed the arrests as primarily aimed at curbing inflation, while consistently denying the existence of any systematic anti-Chinese campaign.Footnote ⁷² Within the broader international environment, especially as the Cold War intensified, the Thai government actively employed anti-communist discourse to secure support from the Western powers, in particular seeking military and economic assistance from the United States.

However, possibly to avoid provoking direct confrontation with the Soviet Union or the CPC, the regime maintained a degree of ambiguity in practice, steering clear of irreversible alignments. For instance, the regime arranged for the detainees from the June 15 Incident to leave the country voluntarily, granting them discretion over their destination rather than subjecting them to forced deportation to KMT-controlled port cities. Another notable example was its selective handling of the press following the June 15 Incident. While a number of left-leaning publications, including Mangu Shangbao, Minzhu Xinwen (民主新闻), and Guangming Zhoukan (光明周刊), were forced to cease publication, the Qiaodang’s official organs, Zhenhua Bao and Quanmin Bao, were nonetheless allowed to continue publishing openly. During this period, Quanmin Bao not only maintained its circulation but even expanded its reach and influence.Footnote ⁷³ Such gestures of ‘compromise’ also reflect the Thai ruling elites’ characteristic modus operandi towards diasporic communist forces—marked by firm repression, yet tempered by a degree of tactical restraint.

Thus, in the case of the June 15 and August 10 incidents, anti-communist and anti-Chinese agendas took shape as mutually constitutive, complementary, and symbiotic discourses and practices. This interpretation is echoed in a contemporaneous article titled ‘Siam’s Anti-Communism and the Overseas Chinese’, published in the Nanqiao Ribao, a pro-communist Chinese-language newspaper based in Singapore, on 16–17 August 1948. The article observes:

This symbiosis was not only recognized by contemporary observers, but has also been noted by later scholars. Daniel Fineman, for instance, has offered a similar interpretation of the Phibun government’s stance and policies during the late 1940s.Footnote ⁷⁵ While the extent to which anti-communist campaigns were inherently anti-Chinese—or vice versa—remains a subject of debate, this article affirms that, given the fact that the overwhelming majority of communists in Thailand at the time were ethnic Chinese, Phibun’s early anti-communist crackdowns amounted to a de facto repression of the overseas Chinese community. This dynamic would become even more apparent in the subsequent developments and long-term consequences of the two incidents.

The long shadow

Within the framework of the ‘Chinese education problem’, the series of raids, arrests, and deportations from 15 June to 10 August 1948, constituted a successful anti-Chinese campaign by the Thai government. In the aftermath, the number of Chinese schools was significantly reduced, Chinese school teachers were required to learn Thai, and the entire Chinese education system was brought under tighter state control. These measures collectively conveyed a clear message to the diasporic Chinese community: the Thai government expected Chinese immigrants to reorient themselves towards Thailand—ultimately integrating as Thai citizens—rather than maintaining emotional or political attachments to China. Above all, any engagement in Chinese political activities was to be strictly prohibited.Footnote ⁷⁶

When we move beyond the one-sided anti-Chinese narrative, the far-reaching consequences of the June 15 Incident come into sharper focus. From the perspective of the Qiaodang, the crackdown inflicted significant damage on its network of schools, newspapers, associations, and labour unions. This repression manifested in several key ways: the closure of Chinese-language schools such as Nanzhong, Qiguang, Zhonghua (中华公学, sponsored by the Sawmill Workers’ Union), and Yuhua (育华小学, sponsored by the Foreign-Service Workers’ Union); the forced shutdown of left-leaning publications including Minzhu Xinwen, Mangu Shangbao, and Guangming Zhoukan; and the dissolution or suspension of key affiliated organizations such as the Jianjiuhui, the Siamese Chinese Women’s Association (暹华妇女总会, commonly known as Fuzong), the Literary and Art Research Association (暹华文艺研究会, commonly known as Wenyanhui), and the Arts Association (暹华艺术协会, commonly known as Yixie). Other groups, including the Jiaoxie, the All-Siam Federation of Labor Unions (全暹职工联合总会, commonly known as Quanzong), the Siamese Chinese Youth Association (暹罗华侨青年总会, commonly known as Qiaoqinghui), the Hainanese Native Association, the Thailand branch of the Minmeng, and various labour unions, were forced to shift to semi-clandestine or fully underground modes of operation. Even Quanmin Bao, Zhenhua Bao, and the Dazhong Bookstore (大众书店), which remained active following the June 15 Incident, were repeatedly subjected to police raids, with their staff frequently summoned for interrogation.

Once legally registered and publicly recognized, these organizations were now either disbanded or forced underground, severely curtailing the Qiaodang’s capacity for political organization, mass mobilization, cultural activity, and ideological propaganda. Only a few outlets such as Quanmin Bao and Zhenhua Bao remained operational and in public view. In response, the Qiaodang rapidly adjusted its strategy and shifted from a semi-public back into a fully underground operation. The June 15 Incident thus marked a watershed moment in the post-war trajectory of the Qiaodang—a turning point from expansion to decline. The deteriorating political climate signalled the beginning of the end, foreshadowing the party’s eventual dissolution in 1953. At the same time, the incident also accelerated the localization of the communist movement in Thailand, shifting its backbone from immigrant-based networks to more Thai-identifying actors.

Despite Phibun’s increasingly hardline posture during this period—and the severe constraints imposed on the Qiaodang’s survival following the June 15 Incident—his anti-communist and anti-Chinese policies were never implemented in an entirely uncompromising or absolute manner. Instead, each retained a degree of flexibility and room for manoeuvre. According to a historical outline of the Qiaodang penned by a core party leader, the leadership at the time assessed Phibun’s repression as ‘loud thunder but little rain’ (雷声大, 雨点小)—rhetorically aggressive but restrained in actual implementation.Footnote ⁷⁷ After the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Phibun even sought to establish backchannel communication with the Qiaodang through his close confidante, Sang Phatthanothai, who approached the party via Chen Wenbin (陈文彬), a Chinese-Thai official in the Thai government’s Publicity Division. Phibun reportedly conveyed that his anti-communist stance was largely the result of pressure from the United States and the KMT, and that he might reconsider his policies if the PRC provided $100 million in financial assistance.Footnote ⁷⁸ Although the Qiaodang ultimately dismissed this offer as untrustworthy and chose not to respond, the Phibun government nonetheless continued to pursue clandestine contacts with Beijing and consistently released conciliatory signals aimed at easing bilateral tensions, particularly after the Bandung Conference of April 1955. Major initiatives included the covert dispatch of envoys to the PRC; Sang’s secret meeting in Burma with the Chinese ambassador, during which a bilateral memorandum of friendship was signed; and official approval for multiple trade and cultural delegations to visit China. Among these gestures, however, the most striking—and the one that still captures public imagination today—was Sang’s decision in 1956 to send his two still-young children to Beijing to be raised and educated under the personal care of Premier Zhou Enlai and his wife. This extraordinary move has often been viewed, both contemporaneously and retrospectively, as a form of ‘hostage diplomacy’ or ‘tributary diplomacy’.Footnote ⁷⁹

Logics of selective segregation

As Wasana Wongsurawat has argued, Thailand’s ruling elites manipulated the anti-Chinese agenda and implemented policies that appeared systematic and racially discriminatory—not with the aim of targeting the entire overseas Chinese population as an ethnic group, but rather to ‘segregate the industrious, docile, rich Chinese capitalists from the restless, revolutionary, poor Chinese proletariats, with the pragmatic purpose of entering into a mutually beneficial hegemonic alliance with the former and suppressing/eliminating the latter’.Footnote ⁸⁰ In this light, the June 15 and August 10 incidents can also be seen as products of this logic of selective segregation.

Regardless of whether those raided and arrested were members of the Qiaodang, the Minmeng, the KMT, or even pro-ROC affluent merchants and community leaders, the underlying logic of both the June 15 and August 10 incidents remained consistent: the state’s repressive apparatus was mobilized against individuals and groups who were highly politicized and closely connected to China. In effect, these operations sought to distinguish and isolate the more thoroughly ‘Sinicized’ segments of the Chinese diaspora from those with weaker ties to China and lower levels of political engagement.Footnote ⁸¹

Furthermore, a closer examination of the differences between the two incidents reveals a second layer of selective segregation, one that more closely aligns with the class-based differentiation articulated by Wasana. While the formal charges in both cases—such as illegal fundraising and secret society activities—were ostensibly similar, the Thai government’s treatment of those arrested varied markedly depending on their economic and political backgrounds. In the case of KMT-affiliated Chinese capitalists, punishment was primarily financial in nature, including the imposition of exorbitant bail fees on affluent overseas Chinese merchants in northern Thailand. By contrast, when dealing with the ‘restless, revolutionary, poor’ Chinese proletariat represented by the Qiaodang, the Thai government adopted a far more punitive approach. Despite mounting domestic and international pressure, the Phibun regime ultimately reverted to its long-standing strategy for handling Chinese communists: forced deportation.

Although the two incidents are often reduced to what is commonly referred to as the ‘Chinese education problem’, education was, in reality, merely the most visible expression—or the tip of the iceberg—of a much broader political campaign. Peeling back these layers of appearance, the logics of governance underpinning the Phibun regime’s actions begin to come into view. Yet one critical question remains: why were these repressive measures initiated at that particular historical juncture? To fully comprehend the comprehensive political implications of the June 15 and August 10 incidents, it is essential to move beyond domestic affairs and instead situate these events within the broader and more complex landscape of power struggles and strategic balancing in post–Second World War and early Cold War Southeast Asia.

From world war to Cold War

During the Second World War, Thailand aligned itself with Japan and became part of the Axis powers. Although it largely avoided the fate of a defeated nation in the aftermath, the negative consequences of the war nevertheless lingered. In the post-war period, Thailand found itself in a state of acute tension, grappling with profound internal and external challenges. While the Phibun government actively courted the United States in an effort to resolve these issues, Thailand had not yet been incorporated into the American-led Cold War framework by 1948, nor had a formal alliance between the two countries been established.

Jittipat Poonkham has identified four dominant discourses in Thailand’s modern foreign policy: the discourse of independence, the discourse of lost territory or ‘national humiliation’, the discourse of anticommunism, and the discourse of flexible diplomacy.Footnote ⁸² The expansionist foreign policy of Phibun’s first premiership, rooted in the ideology of pan-Thai nationalism, was driven by the discourse of lost territory.Footnote ⁸³ However, with the end of the Second World War and the collapse of the Thai-Japanese alliance, this discourse lost much of its legitimacy. At the same time, the American-backed anti-communist discourse would not become dominant until the rise of Sarit Thanarat in 1958. Thus, during Phibun’s second premiership, although he continued to project the image of an ardent nationalist, his domestic and foreign policies increasingly shifted towards a more pragmatic and flexible approach.Footnote ⁸⁴

At the core of the June 15 and August 10 incidents was the deliberate construction of ambiguity, flexibility, and interchangeability between anti-communist and anti-Chinese rhetorics and practices. This strategic manoeuvring allowed the Phibun government to navigate the complex domestic and international terrain of the immediate post-war period, a time marked by the uncertain transition from the Second World War to the Cold War.

Domestically, although Phibun had returned to power, the political landscape he confronted during his second premiership differed markedly from that of his first. He no longer exercised full control over the army or the coup group that had orchestrated his return. In this constrained environment, consolidating his rule required the cultivation of new political resources.Footnote ⁸⁵ Thai nationalism remained one of the most effective instruments for securing internal stability and popular support. Within this framework, suppressing Chinese nationalism served as a highly visible and exemplary demonstration of state power to discipline alternative political or cultural loyalties—or ‘killing the chicken to scare the monkey’ (เชือดไก่ให้ลิงดู; 杀鸡儆猴).

At the same time, anti-communism provided a convenient and versatile rhetorical tool for marginalizing domestic rivals and silencing political dissent. Phibun’s principal adversaries at the time included the liberals led by Pridi Banomyong as well as emerging young leaders within the military and the coup group itself. By invoking the threat of communism, the regime was able to discredit and eliminate these opponents under the guise of national security. Internationally, the shifting geopolitical climate and the evolving strategic priorities of the United States made anti-communism an ideal entry point for re-engagement with the West. Framing domestic crackdowns in anti-communist terms also functioned as a diplomatic overture—a means of testing the waters and positioning Thailand as a potential Cold War ally worthy of American support and assistance. As to the extent to which the intensifying geopolitical tensions shaped Thai politics, nowhere is this influence more evident than in the reactions and reflections of the Qiaodang members.

Thirty-five years after the June 15 Incident, a group of participants revisited and documented the event, producing a consolidated narrative reviewed and approved by Zhuo Jiong and Qiu Bingjing, both leading figures at the time.Footnote ⁸⁶ In the opening section of the article, the incident is explicitly characterized as ‘the first counteroffensive launched by the military clique [led by Phibun] against the patriotic and democratic movement of the overseas Chinese in Thailand upon its return to power’.Footnote ⁸⁷ In recounting the context and primary catalysts of the incident, these accounts emphasize the pivotal role of two external forces: the KMT and American imperialism. According to the authors, the KMT provided the Thai government with a blacklist of suspected communists that facilitated subsequent door-to-door police raids. KMT operatives were allegedly embedded among the detainees to assist with interrogations, and the party pressured the Phibun regime to deport the ‘offenders’ to KMT-controlled ports such as Guangzhou and Shantou. The United States, in their view, acted in concert with the KMT—intervening in the Chinese Civil War and seeking to contain the spread of communism throughout the region.

In this framing, the June 15 Incident was far from an isolated event. Rather, it was perceived as part of a broader American-led containment strategy in Southeast Asia—on par with efforts to divide Korea into North and South, to suppress Vietnam’s independence struggle in Indochina, and to support conservative factions in Burma implicated in the assassination of Aung San and his cabinet.