Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic, which originated in China in late 2019 and rapidly spread worldwide in 2020, lasted over 2 years and significantly disrupted nearly every sphere of public and private life, including political, economic, social, cultural, and educational domains. In the initial phase, many countries implemented strict containment measures such as nationwide lockdowns, social distancing measures, and curfews to prevent virus transmission. These measures led to widespread closure of early childhood education and care (ECEC) facilities and schools, mass shift to remote work, and restrictions on informal caregiving support from grandparents and friends. The resulting disruption to the everyday environments where children were cared for and educated had profound negative implications for their well-being and development. Between March 2020 and February 2021, school closures alone averaged 95 days globally, affecting over 168 million children and placing an unprecedented burden on families to provide full-time care at home (UNICEF, 2021). The interruption of ECEC services raised critical concerns about children’s rights and access to essential care and education, as well as increased risks of malnutrition, domestic violence, anxiety, and cyberbullying (OECD, 2020; UNESCO, 2020).
While national containment strategies varied in stringency and duration, the closure of formal childcare services across many countries presented shared care challenges for young children.
In response, governments implemented a variety of social policy interventions to address the pandemic’s impact on children and families. However, despite growing literature on general policy responses to COVID-19, cross-national comparative studies focusing specifically on childcare-related strategies remain limited (Blum and Dobrotic, Reference Blum and Dobrotic2020; Collombet and Riedel, Reference Collombet and Riedel2023; Daly and Ryu, Reference Daly and Ryu2023; Eggers and Grages, Reference Eggers, Grages and Pfau-Effinger2024). Scholars indicate that while all welfare states faced pressure to support families, their responses diverged in line with institutional legacies, welfare regimes, and governance structures (Béland et al., Reference Béland, Cantillon, Hick, Greve, Moreira, Borner and Seeleib-Kaiser2023; Cruz-Martinez et al., Reference Cruz-Martinez, Pellissery and Velazquez Leyer2023). Some countries adapted existing systems, whereas others introduced new or temporary measures to address emerging childcare needs (Daly, Reference Daly2022; Mäntyneva et al., Reference Mäntyneva, Ketonen and Hiilamo2023; O’Donoghue et al., Reference O’Donoghue, Sologon and Kyzyma2023).
This study examines how these childcare-related disruptions were managed in three countries with distinct welfare regimes: the UK (liberal), France (conservative/corporatist), and South Korea (East Asian) (Esping-Andersen, Reference Esping-Andersen1990; Jones, Reference Jones and Jones1993; Holliday, Reference Holliday2000). The countries were selected for their implementation of lockdowns or stringent social distancing measures during the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, as well as their differing institutional structures. In contrast, Nordic social-democratic countries such as Sweden, Finland, and Denmark were excluded. These countries operate highly universal, publicly funded childcare systems offering seamless transitions from well-compensated parental leave to full-time ECEC entitlement (Serapioni, Reference Serapioni2025), requiring minimal policy adjustment during the pandemic. Indeed, only Finland, Sweden, and Estonia kept childcare facilities fully open during the initial outbreak (Daly, Reference Daly2022). By comparing Korea, France, and the UK, this paper explores how governments with varying welfare frameworks addressed heightened childcare needs during the crisis. Understanding these responses is essential for developing resilient childcare systems capable of withstanding future emergencies.
Given these institutional differences, this study aims to answer the following key research questions: (1) What kinds of childcare-related policy changes occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic in Korea, France, and the UK? (2) What practical policy lessons can be drawn from these national experiences?
Analytical scope
This study examines both pre-pandemic childcare-related policies and those introduced or amended during COVID-19. Childcare-related social policy in this article is defined as the set of public measures that enable families to provide care for young children while ensuring children’s developmental needs and rights to care and education are met. Childcare-related policies are not limited to labour market instruments but encompass a broad range of services and supports that contribute to the realisation of children’s rights and equality (Mahon et al., Reference Mahon, Anttonen, Bergqvist, Brennan and Hobson2012; Moss, Reference Moss2018). Building on this understanding, the article examines childcare-related policy changes in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic in Korea, France, and the UK. It focuses on four key childcare-related policies that support childcare and parental labour market participation: (1) ECEC policies, which directly influence parental employment rates and fertility trends (Esping-Andersen, Reference Esping-Andersen1999; OECD, 2017); (2) family leave policies, which help parents balance work and caregiving responsibilities (Gornick and Meyers, Reference Gornick and Meyers2003; Moss and Deven, Reference Moss and Deven2015); (3) flexible work arrangements, including teleworking, are also essential work-family balance easing childcare burdens (Crompton and Lyonette, Reference Crompton and Lyonette2006; OECD, 2021a); and (4) financial support measures, such as subsidies and direct cash transfers, which influence childcare choices, parental labour market participation, and access to childcare services (Immervoll and Barber, Reference Immervoll and Barber2005; Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser, Reference Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser2015).
We examined social policies related to childcare for families with children aged 0–5 years, including infants, toddlers, and preschoolers. This study focuses on institutional responses to childcare during COVID-19, assessed by the maintenance of existing policies, introduction of new measures, target expansion, or increased benefit levels. Data were collected through a focused search for relevant policies, legislation, governmental publications, and funding packages introduced from early 2020 to late 2021. A descriptive comparative approach is adopted to highlight concrete policy changes and their implications for equitable, sustainable childcare systems. Given the regional variations in the UK’s pandemic response, this paper focuses on England, which accounts for 85% of the UK population (Office for National Statistics, 2024), making it the most representative case for analysing overall UK policy trends.
Pre-pandemic childcare arrangements in Korea, France, and the UK
Before examining each country’s COVID-19 childcare-related policy responses, it is necessary to first understand the institutional context within which these policies were implemented, particularly the structure of childcare provision, the role of the state, market, and families. In Korea, childcare is provided through a dual structure: centre-based services, including daycare centres for children aged 0–5 and kindergartens for children aged 3–5, and home-based care, primarily through the I-Dolbom programme. I-Dolbom targets socioeconomically vulnerable households, including dual-earner households, single parents, guardians with disabilities, multicultural families, families with multiple children, and those at risk of child abuse. In 2019, ECEC enrolment for children aged 0–5 was 73.5%; for those aged 0–2, the childcare centres’ enrolment was 56.9%, and for children aged 3–5, 90.2% were enrolled in ECEC (Korea Institute of Child Care and Education, 2020). Despite universal free childcare introduced in 2013 and substantial public investment, private provision still dominates the sector. In 2023, 67.6% of daycare centres were privately operated, compared to 21.4% public and 11% not-for-profit. While centre-based care subsidies are provided regardless of income, I-Dolbom support is means-tested and varies according to household circumstances. Informal care, particularly by grandparents, plays a major role. In 2021, 11.5% of young children relied on home-based childcare; among these, 85% received care from grandparents, and 6.2% from other relatives (MOHW & KICCE, 2022). Although the government has sought to formalise informal care via subsidies for registered caregivers under I-Dolbom, familial responsibility remains dominant. Korea’s parental leave system is relatively generous. The Employment Insurance System provides 90 days of paid maternity leave and up to 20 working days of paternity leave. Each parent is eligible for 1 year of earnings-related parental leave per child under age 8. If both parents use at least 3 months of leave, the duration may be extended to 1.5 years per parent. Parents receive 80% of their average wage for the first 3 months, dropping to 50% thereafter (Ministry of Employment and Labour, n.d.). Prior to the 2020 introduction of family care leave, no dedicated leave existed for caring for sick children, with parents needing to rely on sick or annual leave.
In France, the childcare system is distinguished by its strong state-led structure, which frames childcare as a public responsibility. Universal access école maternelle – a free and compulsory preschool for children aged 3–5 – is fully integrated into the national education system (Observatoire national de la petite enfance, 2021). This ensures near-universal enrolment in the preschool stage and reflects a rights-based approach that places children’s access to early education at the heart of public policy. For children under the age of 3, France offers a diversified care model combining publicly funded crèches and state-subsidised home-based care through registered assistantes maternelles (childminders). This system balances public and private elements and reflects a middle ground between de-familialised care and parental choice. In 2019, 59.8% of children under three were enrolled in formal childcare arrangements (Observatoire national de la petite enfance, 2021). France’s leave policies complement its ECEC services by offering job-protected maternity, paternity leave, and parental leave options. Mothers are entitled to 16 weeks of fully paid maternity leave, extended for multiple births. Fathers receive 5 weeks of paternity leave at 100% of net earnings (OECD, 2021b). Parental leave is available but only modestly compensated – covering 14.3% of net earnings – and can be taken for up to 3 years, depending on the number of children and how the leave is shared. Parents may also take 3–5 unpaid days of family leave annually to care for sick children (Service-public, 2023a).
In the UK, pre-pandemic ECEC was characterised by a fragmented, market-oriented system with a mix of private, voluntary, and public providers. Direct public provision was limited, and out-of-pocket expenses for families were high (OECD, 2022). The UK adopted a means-tested and work-contingent approach, providing entitlements rather than a universal right to care (Naumann, Reference Naumann2011). Formal entitlements consisted of three main schemes: 15 hours per week of free childcare for all 3- and 4-year-olds; a targeted 15-hour offer for disadvantaged 2-year-olds; and a 30-hour entitlement for working parents of 3- and 4-year-olds meeting certain criteria (Coleman and Cottell, Reference Coleman and Cottell2019). These entitlements could be used with registered providers such as nurseries, childminders, and playgroups approved by Ofsted or an accredited agency. However, the system’s complexity with over seven different routes to childcare support made the system complex and less accessible (Coleman and Cottell, Reference Coleman and Cottell2019). Outside these entitlements, most families continued to face considerable childcare expenses, with costs remaining among the highest in Europe (OECD, 2022). For children under age 3, reliance on informal or private care, including registered childminders, remained high. Only 39% of children under three were enrolled in formal care, compared with 70% for those aged three and over, mainly due to the universal entitlement (Eurostat, 2020). Provision was often part-time, and high reliance on grandparents for unpaid childcare was observed – about one-third of families used informal care as their main source, with over 50% incurring no childcare expenses (Farquharson and Olorenshaw, Reference Farquharson and Olorenshaw2022). Regarding leave policies, the UK offers one of the longest maternity leave durations in Europe – up to 52 weeks – but with modest financial support. Mothers receive 90% of earnings for the first 6 weeks, followed by a flat-rate payment (up to £156.66 per week) for the 33 weeks, and the final 13 weeks are unpaid. Fathers were eligible for 2 weeks of paid paternity leave at 90% of earnings, subject to the same cap (OECD, 2021b). Each parent may also take up to 18 weeks of unpaid parental leave per child, up to the child’s 18th birthday. However, no statutory paid leave exists for caring for sick children. Instead, parents must rely on short-term, unpaid options such as “emergency leave for dependents,” which often falls short of meeting care needs (UK Government, n.d.).
Childcare-related social policies during the COVID-19 pandemic in Korea, France, and the UK
South Korea
ECEC
The COVID-19 pandemic severely disrupted Korea’s childcare system, necessitating urgent policy responses. During 2020, daycare centres and kindergartens remained closed for 4 months, mainly from March to June and again in August and September. To mitigate the effects of these closures, emergency childcare services were provided for parents unable to care for their children at home. The government introduced phased guidelines for closures and attendance restrictions, which public facilities strictly followed, while private centres operated with greater flexibility, enabling some to reopen earlier. To further support families, the I-Dolbom service was expanded by loosening eligibility criteria and increasing government subsidies from 75% to 90% of service costs. Subsidised service hours also rose from 480 hours in 2017 to 840 hours in 2021 (MOGEF, 2021). Additionally, financial aid was allocated to daycare centres and kindergartens to prevent provider closures caused by declining enrolment.
Family leave
Korea’s parental leave and maternity leave policies were continuously expanded during the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2020, the maternity leave allowance increased from KRW 1.8 million to KRW 2 million per month, and eligibility expanded with artists (Dec 2020) and platform workers (July 2021) becoming covered under employment insurance. In 2020, the parental leave benefits increased for single-parent workers, simultaneous parental leave was introduced for couples, and the permitted division of parental leave increased from once to twice. In 2021, maternity leave and flexible commuting arrangements for pregnant workers were implemented. The most significant policy shift involved the introduction of family care leave. Originally unpaid when launched in January 2020, family care leave was modified during the pandemic to provide up to 10 days of paid leave (KRW 50,000 per day) for childcare in case of school or daycare closures, with the possibility of extending an additional 10 days during national emergencies (MOEL, 2020).
Work environment
During the pandemic, no entirely new work environment policies were introduced, but the government actively promoted teleworking to ensure employment continuity and workplace safety. In response, the government strengthened support through financial incentives such as indirect labour cost subsidies and remote work infrastructure support, both as part of flexible work arrangements. The indirect labour cost subsidy provided financial support to employers of small and medium-sized enterprises who implemented flexible work arrangements. In the early stages of the pandemic, employers could receive up to KRW 5.2 million per employee annually (later reduced to 3.6 million KRW in May 2021), depending on the number of flexible working days per week, and the application processes were simplified to expedite adoption. In addition, the government covered 50% of teleworking infrastructure costs, up to 20 million KRW (MOEL, 2020). Despite these efforts, remote work remained voluntary, with no legal mandate for employers to accommodate requests.
Financial support
In response to COVID-19, South Korea provided both direct financial assistance and employment-related subsidies to support families. Existing measures were maintained and expanded, including the introduction of one-time emergency relief payments for all households. A four-person household received up to 1 million KRW, with additional childcare vouchers for families with young children (Joint Ministries, 2020; MOHW, 2020). The asset criteria for emergency welfare programmes were relaxed to ensure broader access to aid. Employment protection was also prioritized. The government expanded employment maintenance subsidies for freelancers and special employment workers, aiming to sustain income and prevent job losses. Moreover, four rounds of disaster relief funds, totalling 16 trillion KRW, were allocated to small businesses affected by COVID-19 restrictions. While not exclusive to households with children, these measures contributed to income stability for many working parents. However, the support remained fragmented and time-limited, revealing a lack of institutional financial support for caregiving during the crisis.
France
ECEC
During the first lockdown from 17 March to 11 May 2020, ECEC faced significant challenges due to COVID-19, resulting in nearly complete closures except for childcare services exclusively reserved for essential workers. Group sizes were restricted to 10 children, and childminders were granted flexibility to care for more children, aiming to ensure childcare for essential workers, while also accommodating non-essential workers (Cordier, Reference Cordier2021). Childcare primarily relied on childminders due to lower infection risks with free-of-charge services for essential workers. Pre-primary schools similarly limited attendance to children of essential workers, adopting remote learning initially and transitioning to phased on-site learning from 2 June 2020 (MDSDS, 2020d). Despite subsequent lockdowns and social distancing measures, efforts were made to keep ECEC facilities open whenever feasible, supported by COVID-19 response guidelines. After-school recreation centres remained operational to support working parents. Notably, France had one of the world’s shortest school and ECEC facility closure durations (UNESCO, 2022).
Family leave
During the COVID-19 pandemic, France implemented comprehensive measures to support parents, including utilising existing family leave options and introducing novel provisions to address emerging childcare needs. Paid leave and extended sick leave schemes were deployed to families with children, while exceptional family leave offered additional flexibility. Adjustments proposed on 17 April 2020 allowed for compensation for employees on paid sickness leave for childcare responsibilities (Ministère des solidarités et de la santé, 2020a) (Henceforth MDSDS). Until 30 April, employees received compensation from their employers, combined with daily social security allowances, totalling 90% of their salary. From 1 May 2020, this support transitioned to partial unemployment (activité partielle), for one parent unable to telework while caring for their children (MDSDS, 2020b). Self-employed workers also became eligible for extended family leave, while civil servants could take special leave permission if remote work was not possible (Service-Public, 2023b). These measures supported parents caring for children under 16, especially during childcare facility closures or when the child was in proximity to a COVID-19-infected person. Importantly, arrangements were established for family care leave, expanding provision to cover situations involving childminders or someone within their household (MDSDS, 2020c).
Work environment
In France, the legal framework for telework was established by the 22 September 2017 ordinance, with Article 21 requiring employers to justify refusal of telework requests. During exceptional circumstances such as an epidemic or force majeure, employees may be required to telework without contractual amendments (Article L.1222–11 of the Labour Code). The COVID-19 pandemic triggered a surge in telework, initially implemented during the first lockdown, increasing from 2 to 3 days and eventually to 5 days per week by 29 October 2020 (Hardy, Reference Hardy2021). The Ministry of Labour further solidified telework regulations through a health protocol in March 2021 (MDSDS, 2021a). The government actively promoted teleworking to protect workers from COVID-19 infection and mitigate the socioeconomic impact of lockdowns, while also addressing family caregiving responsibilities (Service-public, 2023b). When ECEC facilities closed or childcare was unavailable due to confirmed COVID-19 cases, parents were encouraged to telework. Where remote work was not possible, alternative supports such as partial unemployment, amended sickness leave, and special leave permission were provided to help parents balance employment with caregiving responsibilities.
Financial support
During the COVID-19 pandemic, France maintained its existing family benefits like childcare allowances, child benefit, and financial subsidies for childcare services, while introducing a 45 billion euros economic relief package to mitigate the impact on the labour market (Prudhomme and Tonnelier, Reference Prudhomme and Tonnelier2020). Two key support mechanisms were implemented. First, the partial activity/unemployment scheme, originally pre-existing, was significantly expanded to support companies and workers (République française, 2022). A specific partial unemployment scheme further assisted vulnerable individuals and those with childcare responsibilities from 25 March 2020 to 31 July 2020 (MDSDS, 2020c). Eligibility requires evidence of inability to telecommute, school closures, child COVID-19 exposure, or adherence to health guidelines for part-time school attendance. Employees received a Partial Activity Allowance equivalent to 84% of their net salary, later reduced to 60% in March 2021 (Ministère de l’économie, des finances et de la souveraineté industrielle et numérique, 2022). Second, a solidarity fund was created to support small businesses, initially targeting those with a 70% turnover decline between March 2019 and March 2020, later expanded to those with at least a 25% loss in 2020 and 2021 (Soulignac and Bellégo, Reference Soulignac and Bellégo2023). The fund largely ended by September 2021. Additionally, one-off Exceptional Solidarity Aid payments totalling 970 million euros were issued in May and September 2020 to over 4 million low-income households (MDSDS, 2020d).
The UK
ECEC
The government’s COVID-19 response prioritised sustaining private providers while offering limited direct support to families. All nurseries and preschools were required to close for about 10 weeks, from 23 March to 1 June 2020, except for children of essential workers and vulnerable children (Blum and Dobrotic, Reference Blum and Dobrotic2020). Reopening with safety measures began on 1 June 2020, and group size restrictions were lifted on 20 July 2020. Despite subsequent local restrictions and two national lockdowns, ECEC settings were encouraged to remain open, guided by a contingency framework and supported by the Department of Education due to low COVID-19 rates observed in children aged 0–5 years (Foster, Reference Foster2021). However, a lack of state-led emergency childcare strategies forced many working parents, including key workers, to rely on informal care or reduce employment participation (House of Commons and Petitions Committee, 2020). The closure of childcare settings and social distancing measures further constrained grandparental support, exacerbating childcare burdens.
Family leave
Unlike Korea and France, the UK did not introduce new or extended paid family leave during COVID-19. Despite an e-petition signed by over 226,000 people urging the government to extend maternity leave by 3 months, with pay, the request was declined. The government maintained the existing maternity leave system, which allows up to 52 weeks of leave, with 39 weeks of pay. In addition, the Coronavirus Act 2020 allowed unpaid leave for volunteering in health and social care services. The UK extended certain benefits to self-employed workers, a group often left out of statutory leave policies. Financial support for parents came through alternative mechanisms, such as the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) (UK Government, 2021). The Self-Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS) provided financial relief to self-employed individuals. Although these measures allowed some parents to step away from work temporarily, the UK did not introduce a legal right to paid caregiving leave.
Work environment
The COVID-19 pandemic brought about a profound shift in the work dynamics of parents, with a significant increase in flexible working arrangements. A survey of 1,063 English parents and carers of children under 18 revealed that while only 65% had flexible working opportunities before the pandemic, 84% reported working flexibly in 2020. The main arrangements included working from home (63%) and adjusting working hours (52%) (Working Families, 2020). Lockdowns led to a sharp rise in homeworking, from 5% pre-pandemic to 43.1% in April 2020 (Felstead and Reuschke, Reference Felstead and Reuschke2020). The shift to remote work in the UK was largely at employers’ discretion, with no government subsidies or mandates. While encouraged, participation was voluntary, and employers had no legal duty to allow telework. Parents unable to telework received no additional leave, relying instead on the employer-dependent furlough scheme. Support for caregiving beyond flexible work was minimal, leaving many parents without targeted assistance.
Financial support
The UK did not introduce specific financial aid for families with children during the pandemic. Instead, the UK focused on broader welfare enhancements and employment protection schemes that indirectly benefited families. The Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS), introduced on 20 March 2020, initially covered wages from 1 March 2020 to 31 May 2020, later extended to 30 September 2021, and reimbursing up to 80% of the gross salaries, capped at ₤2,500 per month, reduced to 60% by August 2021, capped at ₤1,875 (Gov.uk, 2021a).
The Self-Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS), initiated on 26 March 2020, provided five taxable grants from May 2020 to September 2021. The first offered 80% of 3 months’ average trading profits, capped at ₤7,500, followed by a second grant at 70% (capped at ₤6,570), and a third at 80% (capped at ₤7,500), with subsequent grants similarly structured (Gov.uk, 2022). Additional support included the ₤170 million COVID Winter Grant Scheme (December 2020 to March 2021), extended until 16 April 2021, with an additional ₤59.1 million, along with increased Universal Credit and Tax Credits, focusing on supporting families and children (Gov.uk, 2021b).
Conclusions and discussion
This section discusses the key findings of the cross-country similarities and differences in childcare-related social policy responses during the COVID-19 pandemic. It examines how each country’s policy responses related to their institutional care arrangements and policy legacies, while highlighting both continuities with pre-existing frameworks and adaptive shifts prompted by the crisis.
At the onset of the pandemic, all three countries responded by widely closing ECEC facilities, reflecting a shared prioritisation of public health amidst uncertainties regarding COVID-19 transmission. However, significant differences emerged in the duration and management of these closures. France prioritised the rapid reopening of childcare facilities, seeking to balance the preservation of children’s developmental rights and educational continuity with the necessity of supporting parental employment (Thévenon and Adema, Reference Thévenon and Adema2020). This approach was facilitated by France’s strong, centrally governed public childcare infrastructure. In contrast, Korea prolonged the closure of ECEC facilities, shifting the burden of care primarily onto families. Despite having expanded public childcare services prior to the pandemic, Korea’s care arrangement remained heavily reliant on familial caregiving. Meanwhile, the UK adopted a cautious stance, maintaining limited formal childcare access primarily for children of key workers and vulnerable families, in line with longstanding patterns of market-based and informal care provision.
In all three countries, the increased childcare burden on working parents was recognised, but the scope and generosity of family leave provisions diverged. France introduced a COVID-19 special childcare leave with substantial income replacement via its social insurance mechanisms, reflecting its longstanding commitment to de-familialisation and comprehensive social protection (Adema and Thévenon, Reference Adema and Thévenon2008). Conversely, Korea’s response was more limited: the government implemented a temporary paid family care leave for parents of young children, but with narrow eligibility and modest compensation, possibly reflecting budgetary constraints and prioritisation of economic productivity. In the UK, no specific paid family leave for pandemic-related childcare was introduced, leaving parents to rely on unpaid emergency leave or annual leave. This response was consistent with pre-existing patterns of limited state involvement in caregiving in the UK, which are often associated with liberal welfare approaches.
The promotion of telework emerged as another critical strategy for addressing the challenges of childcare and work-life balance. France and the UK demonstrated relatively high rates of remote working, with approximately 47% of employees working from home during the 2020 lockdowns (OECD, 2021a). These outcomes reflected not only policy interventions but also pre-existing labour market structures and stronger institutional support for flexible working arrangements. By contrast, Korea, despite recommending telework, did not mandate it, and adoption rates remained comparatively low, increasing only from 4.3% in 2019 to 17.4% in 2020 (Statistics Korea, 2023). This limited uptake underscores Korea’s emphasis on corporate autonomy and economic considerations, in line with its productivist orientation (Choi, Reference Choi and Izuhara2013; Gurin, Reference Gurin2023).
Financial interventions also revealed significant cross-country differences. Although all three expanded financial support to mitigate economic hardship, only Korea and France explicitly integrated childcare considerations into their emergency financial measures. Korea introduced emergency cash transfers and childcare vouchers to support families during facility closures. France maintained child allowances and introduced additional targeted benefits for low-income families, while also expanding wage replacement schemes for parents unable to telework. These measures underscored a recognition of childcare as a legitimate focus of crisis response. By contrast, the UK’s financial response, while generous in terms of employment protection through schemes like CJRS and SEISS, remained less directly oriented towards supporting caregiving needs, aligning with existing patterns of individual and market-based solutions (Naumann, Reference Naumann2011).
In summary, the findings of this study demonstrate that the pandemic responses of Korea, France, and the UK appeared to reflect their distinct institutional care arrangements and policy legacies, often associated with different welfare state traditions. Nevertheless, the countries did not necessarily respond strictly according to their pre-existing childcare policy frameworks. France and the UK largely built on existing frameworks, although both introduced notable adaptive measures. France expanded family support mechanisms through enhanced childcare leave, solidarity funds, and financial aid for the self-employed, demonstrating flexibility within its state-led approach. Similarly, although the UK adhered to its liberal welfare tradition, the magnitude of its income protection programmes during COVID-19, such as the CJRS and the SEISS, represented a significant policy expansion beyond the typical minimal state intervention. Nevertheless, the focus remained predominantly on employment protection rather than directly addressing the increased care burdens faced by families. In contrast, Korea shifted from its previous childcare policy, which was centred on institutional care, towards strengthening support for parental home-based care, marking a return to a more family-centred approach. Although the socialisation of childcare had been progressing prior to the pandemic, COVID-19 appeared to reinforce Korea’s reliance on family-based caregiving, a feature often associated with traditional East Asian welfare patterns, while slowing efforts to further institutionalise early childhood services.
Drawing on the preceding comparative analysis, this study outlines several policy and practical implications for enhancing childcare policy responses in times of crisis. First, countries with well-established, centrally governed childcare systems, such as France, demonstrated a capacity to promptly resume the operation of childcare facilities during crises. This facilitated the protection of children’s developmental rights while simultaneously supporting parental employment continuity. These outcomes highlight the critical importance of recognizing childcare facilities as essential public infrastructure and of establishing clear national-level operational guidelines and safety protocols in preparation for emergency situations. Conversely, Korea experienced repeated and prolonged closures and reopenings of childcare facilities, which exacerbated the care crisis. Emergency childcare services were implemented inconsistently across facilities, resulting in considerable confusion among both parents and staff. To minimize similar disruptions in the future, it is imperative that Korea develop comprehensive, rapid restoration plans and enforce uniform, mandatory operational protocols for childcare institutions during crises at the national level. Second, the findings underscore the urgent need to expand and institutionalise family care leave provisions in the context of sudden childcare disruptions. France implemented a special COVID-19 childcare leave policy, significantly alleviating parental caregiving burdens. In contrast, Korea and the UK exhibited relatively limited responses in both scope and implementation. Given the necessity of ensuring adequate caregiving time alongside income security during emergencies, the advance establishment of paid family care leave policies that allow for flexible and timely utilisation is essential. Specifically, it is recommended that Korea expand the eligibility for paid family care leave – currently paid only for civil servants (3 days) but unpaid for other workers – and ensure adequate compensation for caregiving responsibilities, particularly as the leave, temporarily paid during the COVID-19 pandemic, has reverted to an unpaid scheme post-pandemic. Similarly, consideration should be given to introducing a paid family care leave policy in the UK to support caregiving needs as they arise. Thirdly, the promotion of teleworking proved to be a vital policy instrument in supporting the reconciliation of paid work and caregiving responsibilities during crises, as illustrated by the cases of France and the UK. These findings underscore the need to establish a national institutional framework and the necessary digital infrastructure to support telework on a wider scale. In Korea, the expansion of teleworking remained limited, primarily due to reliance on corporate autonomy. Consequently, it is necessary to reinforce clear national-level policy guidelines and incentive structures to facilitate the broader adoption of teleworking during future crises. In particular, institutional mechanisms should be designed to encourage employers’ voluntary implementation of telework arrangements through targeted incentives and regulatory support. Finally, while the structure characteristics of existing welfare regimes significantly influenced national crisis response, the findings reveal that countries with greater institutional flexibility were better positioned to adapt effectively. This suggests a need for institutional innovation and the development of a more resilient, multi-layered childcare system. France, for instance, primarily relies on public childcare facilities but also provided substantial support for family-based care via home-based childcare providers and family allowances. During the pandemic, this dual structure allowed for a smooth transition to home-based care during facility closures and a prompt return to institutional care thereafter. Conversely, Korea predominantly relied on institutional care prior to the crisis, resulting in a sudden and unprepared shift to family-based care during extended closures. Although Korea introduced temporary measures such as paid family care leave and emergency childcare services, these were short-lived and limited in scope and duration. This situation highlighted the lack of institutional flexibility and the underdevelopment of a diversified childcare model in Korea. Embedding mechanisms that allow for fluid transitions between institutional and home-based childcare will be critical to ensuring more effective responses to future crises, while also reinforcing children’s developmental rights, parental labour rights, and the public value of childcare.
Open access
