Conceptualizing agenda-setting influence

Although the question of interest group influence has provoked significant controversy in the political science discipline, studies analyzing agenda-setting influence are scarce. Most empirical work focuses on how groups react to policy agendas by assessing policy influence, referring to an actor’s ability to bring policy outcomes closer to an ideal point and attain its position during the policy formulation and decision-making stages (Dür et al., Reference Dür2019; Klüver, Reference Klüver2013; Stevens and De Bruycker, Reference Stevens and De Bruycker2020). Nevertheless, as Lowery critically remarks, looking at legislative lobbying is ‘simply beside the point if the agenda itself is shaped via an even deeper level of influence, largely rigging the game before it has even begun’ (2013, p. 8). Influencing the policy agenda holds significant importance for interest groups as it delineates the scope of their advocacy efforts in subsequent stages. The policy formulation process, involving the discussion of various policy alternatives, only commences when an issue reaches the formal agenda (Stevens, Reference Stevens2023). In contrast, when an issue is kept off the agenda, different policy options remain unexplored and no decision-making is possible (Bachrach and Baratz, Reference Bachrach and Baratz1962). In essence, without an issue gaining agenda status, the existing SQ – either the absence of policy or the maintenance of the extant policy framework – persists.

In this study, we refer to interest groups’ agenda-setting influence as control over the formal agenda status of specific issues. This conceptualization centers on the extent to which groups’ agenda goals correspond with the formal status of an issue at a given point in time to be either on or off the agenda as a result of their visible issue engagement (Lowery, Reference Lowery2013). As such, we consider interest groups to be influential agenda-setters when they successfully push their ‘dream’ issues onto the formal agenda while effectively keeping their ‘nightmare’ issues off the formal agenda (Bachrach and Baratz, Reference Bachrach and Baratz1962; McKay et al., Reference McKay2018). Notably, interest groups’ preferences are issue-specific: a single lobby actor may conceive one issue as a ‘dream’ to be realized while considering another a ‘nightmare’. To be precise, when policymakers introduce any alternative to the existing SQ, the issue is ‘on the agenda’ (Kreppel and Oztas, Reference Kreppel and Oztas2017). Conversely, an issue is ‘off the agenda’ when policymakers choose to discard policy change. Within the EU, an issue formally achieves agenda status when the EC incorporates it into a first draft proposal, which may manifest in diverse formats (e.g., a Green or White Paper, a Communication, a Working Paper, or an Annual Work Program). After this formal issue prioritization, further policy formulation kicks off to reach an official legislative proposal that can be sent to the co-legislators.

Our notion of agenda-setting influence has two important implications. First, an ‘issue’ is not conceived as a broad policy area such as ‘Environment’ or ‘Energy’ but is defined as a specific policy topic on which actors may have differential views regarding its agenda status. Hence, we squarely focus on what most interest groups direct their lobbying efforts at to defend the interest of their delineated sub-constituencies (Burstein, Reference Burstein2014). Focusing on broad policy areas would inevitably lead to a mismatch between what groups seek to influence and what is being analyzed. Second, our notion of agenda-setting entails actively constructing a formal agenda, including the decision to (or not to) introduce changes to the extant SQ (Kreppel and Oztas, Reference Kreppel and Oztas2017). This institutionalist conception of the agenda status of policy issues differs from a significant body of agenda-setting research defining agenda items as those that receive (at least some degree of) political attention but are not necessarily up for active policy formulation (Jones and Baumgartner, Reference Jones and Baumgartner2005). However, as Schattschneider (Reference Schattschneider1960) eloquently put it: ‘the definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of power’ because if an interest group can shape the list of active agenda items, then this group is already shaping – to its benefit – the future policies that may come about.

Information, reputation, and agenda-setting influence

Following informational lobbying approaches (Flöthe, Reference Flöthe2019; Schnakenberg, Reference Schnakenberg2017), we argue that interest groups can gain agenda-setting influence by strategically highlighting different types of information in their interactions with policymakers. To that end, we first elaborate on the types of information interest groups can emphasize in their interactions with public officials. However, given that interest groups’ influence depends on policymakers’ perceived value of their informational assets (Hanegraaff and De Bruycker, Reference Hanegraaff and De Bruycker2020), we subsequently discuss the ECs’ reputational-building efforts and accompanying informational requirements when acting as an agenda-setter. We thus draw on supply–demand dynamics to characterize the relationship between interest groups and EC policymakers (Bouwen, Reference Bouwen2002). Based on this interplay between information supply and demand – instructed by reputational concerns – we expect interest groups emphasizing audience support to be more influential agenda-setters than groups focusing on expert information.

Information supply – Information is a crucial resource for interest groups to realize their political objectives. This information is issue-specific, often aggregates various viewpoints into a common stance, and comes with ready-made policy priorities thanks to groups’ direct involvement with affected constituencies (De Bruycker, Reference De Bruycker2016; Flöthe, Reference Flöthe2019). Hence, interest groups hold specialized knowledge, granting them informational advantages over policymakers (Schnakenberg, Reference Schnakenberg2017). If policymakers depend on a group’s information and make decisions aligning with the organization’s requests, this signifies a level of influence since political decisions would have been different without this information provision (Tallberg et al., Reference Tallberg2018).

In this context, interest groups may emphasize different information types in their agenda-setting efforts. First, groups may focus on expert information by underlining the feasibility of legislative action, its economic costs or benefits, and compatibility with existing legislation or potential legal overlaps (De Bruycker, Reference De Bruycker2016). Groups can obtain expert information for a specific issue by developing in-house research programs, hiring expert staff, or buying external expertise for specific policy issues (Stevens and De Bruycker, Reference Stevens and De Bruycker2020). They can subsequently emphasize this information in their interactions with policymakers to demonstrate a solid understanding of the issue at hand, which may help them make a stronger case for their demands. Conversely, advocates may emphasize information on the level of audience support by referring to public preferences or the demands of members and supporters (Flöthe, Reference Flöthe2020). Through their interactions with members and supporters or by closely monitoring the public mood, interest groups can collect information on the scope of support they enjoy for their agenda views. This, in turn, may help them pursue agenda-setting influence as it highlights the representativeness of their objectives (Bouwen, Reference Bouwen2002). In sum, some advocates may consider providing expert information as more relevant, while others prefer to focus on information on audience support (Flöthe, Reference Flöthe2019).

Reputation & Information demands – In this study, we focus on the agenda-setting decisions of the EC, the EU functional equivalent of a national government (Haverland et al., Reference Haverland2018). Through its exclusive right of initiative, the EC determines which issues enter the formal policy agenda and which ones do not. In this role, the EC – like any other executive – demonstrates high selectivity in prioritizing policy issues. Individual EC policymakers persistently face multiple issues competing for their attention. However, limited attention spans constrain their capacity to tackle them all (Jones and Baumgartner, Reference Jones and Baumgartner2005). Although the EC’s functional differentiation into specialized Directorate Generals (DGs) assists in off-loading demands from the political leadership, each organizational unit is still faced with a wide range of issues within its specialization while being time- and resource-constrained (Princen, Reference Princen2013). Moreover, organizational specialization inherently steers DGs to focus on issues within their expertise, inadvertently leaving others unattended. And although the EC can simultaneously monitor multiple issues thanks to its functional specialization, any issue seriously considered for attaining agenda status is eventually deliberated by the political leadership, which is similarly constrained (Jones and Baumgartner, Reference Jones and Baumgartner2005). Consequently, there is a persistent mismatch between numerous issues calling for the EC’s attention and its finite capacity to address them all. This mismatch drives the agenda-setting process: some issues reach the formal agenda while others remain unattended (Green-Pedersen and Walgrave, Reference Green-Pedersen and Walgrave2014).

In contrast to national governments’ agenda decisions, however, the policy priorities of the EC are not driven by the pursuit of votes or fear of electoral consequences (Koop et al., Reference Koop2022; Reh et al., Reference Reh2020). Instead, the EC follows a reputational logic, establishing its legitimacy based on how its actions are perceived by various audiences in the environment in which it is embedded (Busuioc and Rimkutė, Reference Busuioc and Rimkutė2020). These audiences critically assess and judge the EC’s decisions, either upholding or undermining its legitimacy. In this context, reputation refers to ‘a set of symbolic beliefs about the unique or separable capacities, roles, and obligations of an organization’ (Carpenter, Reference Carpenter2010, p. 45). Applied to the EC, scholars have pointed to its established reputation as a responsible actor known for efficiently generating policy output (Bunea and Nørbech, Reference Bunea and Nørbech2023; Rauh, Reference Rauh2016) as well as its newer reputational concerns to be a responsive institution attuned to the level of support for EU action among societal audiences (Haverland et al., Reference Haverland2018; Reh et al., Reference Reh2020). Both types of reputation are constructed in the interplay between the EC’s performance and how multiple audiences perceive it. Audiences can cause reputational threats – and undermine legitimacy – if they perceive the EC to not deliver on its core tasks, while they are likely to uphold the EC’s good reputation when positively evaluating its task execution (Rimkutė, Reference Rimkutė2018).

While several studies have effectively employed the reputational lens to scrutinize the EC’s decision-making as a policy designer (Bunea, Reference Bunea2019) and a rule enforcer (Finke, Reference Finke2022), recent research has shed light on another crucial responsibility of the EC: its formal authority over agenda-setting (Koop et al., Reference Koop2022; Reh et al., Reference Reh2020). This latter stream of literature suggests that the EC’s agenda-setting decisions are similarly shaped by its quest for reputation. Indeed, the EC uses its policy priorities as a signaling device to bolster its reputation: by engaging with issues that foster good reputation while refraining from those that pose reputational risks, the EC can effectively build legitimacy in governance.

In this context, the EC can use its policy agenda to either reinforce its reputation as a responsible actor or cultivate an image as a more responsive institution. On the one hand, the responsible mode of reputation-building is consistent with evidence-based decision-making over policy priorities, underpinned by expert knowledge, and insulated from politicization and public scrutiny (Bunea and Nørbech, Reference Bunea and Nørbech2023). To foster a responsible reputation, the EC depends on information on the feasibility of legislative action, its economic costs or benefits, and its compatibility with existing legislation or potential legal overlaps (De Bruycker, Reference De Bruycker2016). On the other hand, the responsive mode of governance is linked to being more receptive to inputs from citizens and interest groups, aligning with a more societally accountable and politicized agenda-setting process (Haverland et al., Reference Haverland2018; Koop et al., Reference Koop2022; Reh et al., Reference Reh2020). To act responsively, the EC requires information regarding public preferences and demands input from different subgroups to evaluate the societal necessity for action. Building a reputation for responsiveness is vital to achieving input legitimacy, but cultivating a reputation for responsibility is essential to building output legitimacy (Bunea, Reference Bunea2019).

The supply-demand interplay – However, like other public organizations, the EC must balance its multifaceted reputation (Busuioc and Rimkutė, Reference Busuioc and Rimkutė2020). Achieving this balance can prove challenging and may lead to conflicts, given that decision-making based on expertise might not align with the necessity to consider diverse societal perspectives (Bunea and Nørbech, Reference Bunea and Nørbech2023). Existing research has extensively documented the EC’s concentration on establishing its reputation as a responsible institution (Majone, Reference Majone2002; Rauh, Reference Rauh2016). Likewise, studies on EU interest representation indicate that expert information takes precedence in engagements with the EC (Bouwen, Reference Bouwen2002; Chalmers, Reference Chalmers2013; De Bruycker, Reference De Bruycker2016). However, this body of research has mainly focused on the EC’s reputational concerns and accompanying information requirements, either when deliberating complex policy options as a policy designer or implementing specific measures as a rule enforcer. These roles often exhibit a more technocratic nature and tend to be depoliticized, fostering the EC’s inclination toward adopting a responsible approach to decision-making (Truijens and Hanegraaff, 2023).

In contrast, we posit that when the EC acts as an agenda-setter, its primary focus lies in fostering a responsive reputation (Bunea and Nørbech, Reference Bunea and Nørbech2023; Koop et al., Reference Koop2022). While scholars have acknowledged different informational needs across institutional settings, reputation theory stresses the distinct, sometimes conflicting, needs within a single institution (Binderkrantz et al., Reference Binderkrantz2023; Busuioc and Rimkutė, Reference Busuioc and Rimkutė2020). In this vein, we argue that the EC’s approach to reputation-building and its associated informational needs vary depending on its legislative tasks. As an agenda-setter amidst a contentious environment, the EC seeks to actively ‘listen’ to a broad range of audiences (Giurcanu and Kostadinova, Reference Giurcanu and Kostadinova2022; Haverland et al., Reference Haverland2018; Reh et al., Reference Reh2020) and use its agenda-setting authority as a strategic tool to ‘respond’ to societal demands (Koop et al., Reference Koop2022). By carefully prioritizing broadly supported issues while avoiding heavily opposed ones, the EC can establish and maintain its reputation as a responsive institution. Consequently, the EC demonstrates a keen interest in accurately gauging the extent of audience support for the multitude of issues demanding attention (Haverland et al., Reference Haverland2018). However, achieving this objective necessitates understanding the varied composition of its societal audiences, each distinguished by unique interests and viewpoints (Meijers et al., Reference Meijers2019). Through dialog with interest groups articulating signals of support, the EC can gain such understanding, enabling a better evaluation of the level of audience support.

Considering the EC’s informational needs during the agenda-setting stage, we expect that interest groups emphasizing audience support information are more successful in influencing the agenda status of policy issues than those focusing on supplying expert information. These organizations aid the EC in mitigating uncertainty regarding the political urgency of and support for issues (Flöthe, Reference Flöthe2020; Haverland et al., Reference Haverland2018). In turn, the EC is incentivized to listen and respond to advocates signaling the scope of audience support to boost its reputation as a responsive agenda-setter. Disregarding these signals might pose reputational risks and raise concerns about a lack of input legitimacy (Bunea, Reference Bunea2019; Reh et al., Reference Reh2020). Conversely, while expert information remains relevant, its impact on agenda-setting influence is relatively lower due to the EC’s emphasis on responsiveness.

The role of issue politicization

In the preceding section, our argument highlighted the EC’s inclination toward information on audience support during the agenda-setting stage. Nevertheless, significant variation persists across issues (Klüver et al., Reference Klüver2015). We therefore anticipate that the EC’s concerns regarding reputation and its corresponding informational needs vary not only due to its legislative role but also across issues during the agenda-setting process.Footnote ² This, in turn, impacts the potential agenda-setting influence groups can achieve. Specifically, we explore the extent to which our main argument holds across levels of issue politicization. Politicization is commonly conceptualized along three dimensions: salience, polarization, and actor expansion (see Hutter and Grande, Reference Hutter and Grande2014). While these three components appear in many studies of politicization, how they are labeled, conceptualized, and operationalized varies depending on whether studies focus on party politics, public opinion, or the mass media (de Wilde et al., Reference de Wilde2016). In this vein, our attention is directed toward three pertinent aspects of politicization for a study centered on interest groups (De Bruycker, Reference De Bruycker2020; Willems, Reference Willems2020): the importance of the issue (salience), the degree of interest mobilization (actor expansion), and the intensity of disagreement among mobilized groups (polarization).

Following this, the ECs quest for a responsive reputation can be expected to become a focal point of concern on intensely politicized issues or circumstances of ‘noisy’ politics. When politics is ‘noisy’, the EC is incentivized to listen primarily to arguments about support for or opposition to policy action among relevant audiences (De Bruycker, Reference De Bruycker2020). Despite the potentially overwhelming influx of audience-related information in times of ‘noisy’ politics, interest groups continue to serve as pivotal intermediaries between society and policymakers (Flöthe, Reference Flöthe2020). Politicization implies that signals of audience support and opposition may collide. Here, groups provide a succinct, focused, and collective information signal that can pierce through a crowded and complex information environment, allowing the EC to effectively use it to support their agenda decisions. Simultaneously, we examine whether responsible decision-making over policy priorities, guided by expert information, becomes relatively more important once issues are deliberated under circumstances of ‘quiet’ politics (Culpepper, Reference Culpepper2011). Without politicization, the EC’s inclination toward evidence-based agenda-setting is arguably more profound. With less societal pressure being present, the EC has the leeway to rely more heavily on expert information to ensure the effective implementation of its policy priorities (Stevens and De Bruycker, Reference Stevens and De Bruycker2020). In what follows, we discuss how the three dimensions of politicization affect the relative importance the EC attaches to information types and, consequently, how interest groups can use their privately held information as a resource to gain agenda-setting influence.

Salience – Salience refers to the relative importance actors attribute to a specific policy issue (Beyers et al., Reference Beyers2018). When an issue draws the attention of key audiences, it influences their grasp of its implications. Heightened salience then prompts a more responsive decision-making approach within the EC, compelling it to be attentive and receptive to audience pressures (De Bruycker, Reference De Bruycker2020; Stevens and De Bruycker, Reference Stevens and De Bruycker2020). Faced with an attentive audience, the EC encounters challenges in diverging from or dismissing appeals from constituencies for action or restraint (Reh et al., Reference Reh2020). Failing to respond under such circumstances poses a risk to its reputation. Therefore, when a group highlights audience information, it can help the EC assess the audience support level for addressing an issue. In turn, the organization increases the likelihood of advancing its political goals – specifically, influencing the inclusion or exclusion of an issue from the policy agenda. Conversely, the EC is less vulnerable to pressure tactics when relevant audiences assign little importance to an issue (Culpepper, Reference Culpepper2011). In such situations, it faces little pressure and relies less on the backing of societal audiences. As scrutiny of its actions diminishes, the threat to the EC’s reputation as a responsive actor also diminishes.

Polari z ation – Polarization is determined by the degree to which interest groups hold diverging views about the agenda status of a policy issue (Dür et al., Reference Dür2019). When conflicts or disagreements arise, the EC faces an increased necessity to justify and legitimize its political decisions. This necessity occurs because audiences pay more attention to the differing sides of the debate, with conflict serving to solidify opinions (De Bruycker, Reference De Bruycker2020). In such scenarios, the EC relies more on information regarding audience support to sway the agenda status toward a specific direction. By considering divergent societal views when making its agenda decisions, the EC bolsters its reputation by demonstrating a willingness to acknowledge conflicting perspectives. However, there are many instances where issues are advocated by a single interest group without opposition or mobilization from any other organization (Baumgartner et al., Reference Baumgartner2009). Under these circumstances, the EC relies less on audience support to tip the balance toward a political compromise. Little controversy among involved interest groups signals a (latent) consensus about the issue’s agenda status. Information on audience support then holds little leverage for shaping the policy agenda. In sum, we expect that a greater reliance on information on audience support is more likely to result in agenda-setting influence when a policy issue is highly conflictual:

Interest mobili z ation – Third, the level of interest mobilization pertains to the number of mobilized groups on an issue seeking to shape its agenda status. While some issues are characterized by only a few mobilized organizations, others attract a more widespread and diverse set of organized interests (Willems, Reference Willems2020). This has profound consequences for the EC’s preference for distinct types of information. The more organizations mobilize, the higher the volume of voiced demands and the more intensified political debates. Such heightened mobilization puts pressure on the EC to listen and respond to the diversity of expressed demands, making them more sensitive to the level of support signaled. Conversely, if issues are debated among a small set of interest groups, when the volume of demands the EC faces is lower, it will experience less societal pressure to act responsively (De Bruycker, Reference De Bruycker2020). Under these circumstances, the beneficial role of emphasizing information on audience support for gaining agenda-setting influence is expected to decrease.

Analyses

Before examining our hypotheses, we explore the distribution of the dependent variables. First, 178 (53.6%) organizations secured a match between their preferences and the issue’s agenda status. Second, public officials attributed agenda-setting influence to 139 interest groups (41.9%). Notwithstanding the limitations of each approach, our two measures gauging agenda-setting influence are significantly related (r=0.47, p<0.01), pointing at a similar underlying construct. Still, they capture distinct aspects of influence. Measures of attributed influence inherently capture perceived impact, while a preference attainment measure assesses the correspondence between agenda demands and the actual formal agenda status of issues. Therefore, we analyzed the impact of informational lobbying and issue politicization on agenda-setting influence in separate models.

Concerning our modeling strategy, the hierarchical structure of the data must be considered as interest groups are clustered into issues. Therefore, all models are run with random intercepts to account for the heterogeneity of different policy issues. Since our measures of agenda-setting influence were measured dichotomously, we estimate multilevel logistic regression models. Appendix A7 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables included in our models.

We evaluated the effect of our primary independent variable, the type of information supply (Hypothesis 1), in Models 1a and 2a in Table 1. The significant positive coefficients show that prioritizing information on audience support over expert information significantly increases the probability an interest group influences the agenda status of a policy issue. This finding supports Hypothesis 1, stating groups providing information on audience support instead of expert information are more likely to attain agenda-setting influence. The results align with recent studies suggesting that when deciding over policy priorities, the EC is primarily concerned with its reputation as a responsive actor (Haverland et al., Reference Haverland2018). This contrasts with later decision-making stages, where research has indicated that the EC is more open to expert information provision, aligning with its aspiration to establish a reputation as a responsible institution (Chalmers, Reference Chalmers2013).

Table 1. Multilevel logistic regressions modeling agenda-setting influence

Note: Cell entries are estimated coefficients (with two-sided P values referring to H0 that β = 0 indicated for different significant levels: *if significant at the 0.10 level, **if significant at the 0.05 level and ***if significant at the 0.01 level) and standard errors are in parentheses. AIC: Akaike’s Information Criterion; BIC: Bayesian information criterion.

To assess Hypotheses 2-4, we interacted the type of information supply with the three politicization items and included them in Models 1b and 2b (Info*Salience); 1c and 2c (Info*Polarisation); and 1d and 2d (Info*Mobilisation). Overall, the positive interaction coefficients suggest that the beneficial effect of stressing information on audience support plays out in a nuanced manner. To further assess these interaction terms, we present predictive probabilities in Fig. 1. The middle panels illustrate that contrary to Hypothesis 3, stressing information about audience support is more effective than emphasizing expert information, irrespective of the intensity of polarization. Meanwhile, the upper and lower panels in Fig. 1 support Hypotheses 2 and 4, respectively, demonstrating substantial variations in the impact of information types across levels of issue salience and interest mobilization.

Figure 1. Predicted probabilities (confidence interval = 90%) for distinct types of information provision across different levels of salience, polarization, and interest mobilization.

First, for issues characterized by low salience (average of one media article), interest groups emphasizing information about audience support do not experience a significantly lower likelihood of achieving their preferences (60.47%, SE=0.06) or gaining attributed agenda-setting influence (55.79%, SE=0.08) compared to organizations prioritizing expert information (respectively, 40.13%, SE=0.06 and 31.18%, SE=0.07. This finding demonstrates that when issues are debated outside the public spotlight, providing expert information can still be advantageous in gaining agenda-setting influence. Consider, for example, the association representing the inland port industry that effectively lobbied to improve transportation capacity for inland waterways, an issue receiving minimal media coverage, by prioritizing expert information. This organization was also recognized as influential in steering the agenda-setting process regarding their ‘dream’ issue. Conversely, in cases of high salience (averaging fifteen articles), interest groups providing audience support information exhibit a significantly higher probability of realizing their preferences (75.08%, SE=0.07) and being perceived as influential agenda-setters (70.28, SE=0.08) compared to groups relying on expert information (respectively, 43.86%, SE=0.08 and 20.45%, SE=0.08). This trend is, for instance, evident in the context of the highly salient issue of deforestation, where all five organizations identified as influential in both measures prioritized information on the level of audience support.

Second, for groups involved in issues marked by limited interest mobilization (involving three active organizations), prioritizing information about audience support does not result in a significantly lower likelihood of achieving their preferred outcomes (51.08%, SE=0.08), nor does it lead to a lower probability of attaining attributed agenda-setting influence (48.90%, SE=09), when compared to organizations primarily stressing expert information (respectively, 43.80%, SE=0.07 and 27.99%, SE=0.08). This finding is well exemplified by the association representing shipowners’ interests, which successfully prevented the inclusion of their ‘nightmare’ issue – stricter regulations on the carbon intensity of energy used by vessels – by emphasizing expert information. This organization was also perceived as an important driver of the agenda-setting process. In contrast, when dealing with issues attracting numerous interest groups (involving ten advocates), organizations emphasizing information related to audience support exhibit a notably higher probability of achieving their agenda objectives (69.81%, SE=0.08) and being perceived as influential agenda-setters (62.32%, SE=0.06), as opposed to groups emphasizing expert information (respectively, 41.28%, SE=0.05 and 24.83%, SE=0.06). A clear illustration of this finding comes from introducing a nonessential uses concept for chemicals in consumer products. On this issue, which attracted the involvement of several interest groups, all four organizations recognized as influential in both measures offered information regarding the level of audience support.

To enhance the robustness of our analysis, Appendix A8 presents models where the original three politicization items are replaced with perceived politicization measures. Here, EC officials were asked to assess whether each policy issue, compared to other issues, was ‘Much less (=1)’ to ‘Much more (=5)’ important to the public, polarized, and subject to interest mobilization. By integrating these perceived measures alongside our more objective indicators, we gain a more comprehensive understanding of how public officials subjectively perceive issues and how their perceptions subsequently influence the relative value they attach to different informational resources. Overall, our findings remain consistent, underscoring the reliability of our conclusions.

Our control variables also yield interesting insights. To begin with, citizen groups exhibit a significantly higher likelihood of accomplishing their preferred outcomes during the agenda-setting stage when compared to business groups. Nevertheless, the probability of attaining attributed influence does not systematically vary across both group types. Moreover, the mere presence of a larger staff size does not directly translate into agenda-setting influence. This finding emphasizes the need for analyses beyond the sheer counting of financial and human resources and instead examine how groups convert their resources into valuable policy goods and actively deploy them in their interactions with policymakers (Flöthe, Reference Flöthe2019). Furthermore, we observe no systematic differences in interest groups’ agenda-setting influence across different DGs. Lastly, public, and partisan support for EU action do not significantly sway the likelihood of achieving influence in the agenda-setting stage. However, if a substantial number of Member States pushes for policy change, interest groups are more likely to secure agenda-setting influence.