Introduction
In May 2025, I was invited to attend a marriage ceremony in a Tharu family, residing in the Tarai region in Nepal. I was greeted with food, drinks, and a warm welcome. The family thanked me for taking the time to attend the ceremony. It was an absolute honor for me to be present at the marriage ceremony of an Indigenous family whose cultures and practices were entirely distinct from mine. I was born and raised in an upper-caste Hindu family of the hilly region and did not have firsthand knowledge of Tharu practices. I was quite excited to learn about Indigenous rituals and ceremonies. At the venue, food was buffet-served. Each guest held the plate in hand, raised the tongs, and picked any food item they wanted. It was quite the opposite of the traditional Tharu culture to serve food in leaf plates. I walked to the altar where the bride and groom were taking vows. An upper-caste Hindu Pandit was chanting mantras and instructing the couple to perform rituals. I was told that Thakura, a Tharu Pandit, was also present in the ceremony, but I did not get the chance to see them. Only the Hindu Pandit was leading the ceremony. Each part of the ritual was being performed according to the Hindu tradition of the upper-caste hill people. A Nepali-language song was playing in the background; the Tharu music was not heard.
The rituals were entirely adapted from the cultural practices of the hilly people, the dominant Hindu high-caste people who were relocated or migrated to the Tarai region from what is known as the Pahaad, the hill region of Nepal. My encounter with the Tharu cultural practices piqued my interest in understanding the impacts of population resettlements upon ethnic and Indigenous Peoples. Tarai is the homeland of the Madhesis and the Tharus along with other ethnic groups. Whereas the Madhesis are Hindu caste groups who speak Maithili, Bhojpuri, Abadi, Hindi, and Urdu languages, have around 22% of the total population, and are mainly concentrated in the East, the Tharus identify themselves as Aadibaasi / Mulbaasi, Indigenous Peoples, speak the Tharu language, have 6.49% of the total population, practice customary laws, and are mainly concentrated in the Western Tarai (CA Secretariat Reference Secretariat2014; National Statistics Office 2021). The Tharus have different sub-groups, including the Rana Tharu, Daguara Tharu, and Kochila Tharu. Both the Madhesis and the Tharus presented their claims to autonomy; therefore, resettlements have been considered from their perspectives.
In the 1950s, Nepal advanced organized population resettlement projects and transferred the hilly people to the Tarai (Kansakar Reference Kansakar, Kosinski and Elahi1985). The Nepalese government introduced numerous habitat-related adjustments and reforms, which attracted hilly people to these projects. Settlement projects ultimately transformed into mass migration. Consequently, the hilly people have been migrating to the Tarai in search of opportunities and economic growth even in the present. Not finding the current migratory patterns tenable from demographic and economic perspectives, Nepal has discontinued resettlement projects, adopting the policy of retaining the hilly people in their homelands (National Planning Commission 2002). Accordingly, the government has expedited infrastructure developments and various income opportunities in the hilly areas. These policy shifts have not yet stopped the migration to the Tarai.
Studies in population resettlements mostly focus on settler colonial and post-colonial countries (Eiran Reference Eiran2019; Fearon and Laitin Reference Fearon and Laitin2011; Haklai Reference Haklai2022). Nepal has retained its independent national history and does not fall into either of these categories. Its population resettlement practices have not received strong academic attention from ethnic perspectives. In Nepal, the Tharu Indigenous Peoples were on the losing side of immigration practices; they lost their land to upper-caste hill immigrants and were turned into bonded labor (Guneratne Reference Guneratne2010). Nepal used hilly migration as a measure to impose its policies of homogenization, rejecting the distinct status of the Madhesis and the Tharu Indigenous Peoples (Jha Reference Jha2017). Settlement projects led to the mixed habitation of the Tarai region, which, in turn, was used as a reason for rejecting the Madhesi autonomy and self-determination in the Nepalese Constitution of 2015 (Jnawali and Haklai Reference Jnawali and Haklai2025). None of these studies considers the impacts of population resettlements on the Madhesis and the Tharu Indigenous Peoples, nor do they consider the role of such projects on the nationalist resurgence.
How have population resettlements impacted the Madhesi and the Tharu Indigenous Peoples in Nepal? In what ways have these impacts interacted with the nationalist ambitions? The findings suggest that population resettlements, which were chosen to enhance economic growth and agricultural development, did not give the intended outcomes; they hindered the Madhesi and the Tharu Indigenous Peoples’ access to languages, cultures, customary laws, and natural resources. These sociocultural damages added to the Madhesi and the Tharu Indigenous Peoples’ ambitions to seek autonomy as a remedial measure against all historical grievances, including the harms incurred by the demographic projects.
Population resettlements and autonomy are the two most frequently used terms. Autonomy refers to a mechanism that allows certain parts of a state’s territory to gove rn themselves in specific matters, e.g., languages, cultures, traditions, and natural resources, without constituting a separate state (Ghai Reference Ghai and Ghai2000a; Hannum Reference Hannum1996; Heintze Reference Heintze1998). It provides the right to self-determination through self-rule, addresses the state’s concern for territorial integrity, and offers a middle ground for conflicting parties (Anderson Reference Anderson2004). Population resettlement refers to the relocation of mainstream people to the territories inhabited by ethnic groups and Indigenous Peoples, with a deliberate intention to neutralize nationalist claims (Haklai Reference Haklai2022). Some resettlement projects are also undertaken to pursue economic interests in territories that Indigenous Peoples cannot or do not fully exploit (Fearon and Laitin Reference Fearon and Laitin2011).
Structurally, this paper proceeds as follows. The second section discusses the research method, while the third section locates the Nepalese state’s population resettlement projects in international and regional contexts, illustrating the unique nature of this case. The fourth section discusses the theoretical framework, which touches on population resettlement, migration, and autonomy. While the fifth section analyzes population resettlements from the Nepali state’s perspective, the sixth section considers the impacts on the Madhesi and the Tharu Indigenous Peoples’ languages, cultures, customary practices, and natural resources. The seventh section articulates the nexus between resettlement projects and autonomy movements. The conclusions come at the end.
Research Methods
I have used the mixed methodological approach that combines archival research with in-depth interviews. The archival materials, such as national planning commission reports, official statements, transcripts of the Constituent Assembly (CA) debates, demand papers, agreements, and the constitutions of 1990, 2007, and 2015, were studied to understand the government policies regarding the population resettlements. However, these historical documents mostly articulated the state’s perspectives and were insufficient to explain the impacts of the demographic projects on the Madhesis and the Tharus.
The in-depth interviews were thus used to articulate ethnic and Indigenous perspectives in the population resettlements. I completed all ethical procedures for the research involving human participants from the Research Ethics Board at Queen’s University, ON, Canada, and the Ethics Clearance no is # 6040150. The interviews were conducted after obtaining the free, prior, and informed consent of the participants. Participants were fully informed of the risks and benefits of participating in the research, as well as their rights to withdraw consent before, during, and after the interviews were completed.
A total of 18 locals participated in the study; the participants were from diverse backgrounds, including the grocers, teachers, university students, and farmers. The differences in professional backgrounds helped me in bringing divergent voices in the analysis. The participants aged between the 30s and 60s and were actively involved in Madhesi and Tharu movements that took place between 2007 and 2015; their information was relevant to understand the impacts of state-sponsored population resettlements on their communities. The interviews were conducted in May, June, and July of 2025. On average, each interview lasted one and a half hours. The Madhesi participants were from Nawalparasi and Rupandehi, while the Tharu participants belonged to Bardiya and Kailali districts.
The participants were identified using the snowball sampling method. I requested each participant to connect with another potential participant who was familiar as well as willing to explain the impacts of population resettlements. The participants were evenly distributed between the Madhesis and the Tharu Indigenous Peoples. Being the referral-based method, the snowball technique could result in homogenous perspectives due to the presence of people having similar background, which is its inherent bias (Parker et al. Reference Parker, Scott and Geddes2019). I addressed this selection bias by using the multiple referral points, including social media connection, family relations, and academic relations. I started recruiting participants by contacting my former student at Tribhuvan University; this contact led me to three interviews. But the data quickly saturated. Then I identified participants through a local grocer, a politician, and a journalist. In short, multiple seeds were used to broaden the sample and minimize the selection bias.
Both archival documents and interview transcripts were used to conduct thematic analysis, following the six-step coding system, including i) familiarizing with the data, ii) generating initial codes, iii) searching for themes, iv) reviewing potential themes, v) defining and naming themes, and vi) preparing the final report (Braun and Clarke Reference Braun and Clarke2006). The descriptive codes were generated using the actual words and phrases that frequently occurred in the transcripts; the following four specific themes were accordingly developed.
First, the terms, such as “poverty in the hills,” “abundant natural resources in the Tarai region,” “economic growth,” “agricultural development,” and “migration as a human measure” were frequently noticed in official documents and interview transcripts; these codes led to the theme that population resettlement was used to pursue economic objectives. Second, the Madhesi participants and political leaders used the terms, such as “loss of languages,” “loss of cultures,” “weak or no access to natural resources,” and the “Madhesis as the Indian immigrants;” these codes were used to develop the theme that the Madhesis were impacted in the areas of their languages, cultures, natural resources, and identity. Third, the Tharu political leaders and participants frequently used terms, such as “loss of language,” “loss of customary practices,” “weak or no access to natural resources,” and “bonded labor,” which were used to develop the theme that the Tharus suffered differently from the Madhesis, although their grievances were identical in many respects. Fourth, “self-rule” was one of the descriptive codes that was the most frequent of all. During interviews, all 18 participants and almost all CA transcripts, belonging to the Madhesi and Tharu leaders, referred to Swayatata, self-rule, as the remedial measure against the damages of population resettlements. As the opening marriage-related anecdote indicates, my goal was to comprehensively analyze the impacts of population resettlements on ethnic and Indigenous Peoples; autonomy was not my initial concern. However, the consistent iteration of the idea of self-rule by the participants led me to develop the theme that population resettlements contributed to the rise of autonomy movements.
Population Resettlements in International Contexts: Nepal as a Unique Case
Nepal is a unique case of population resettlement in broader international contexts in terms of its political history and realities. Settler colonialism used population resettlement as a strategy to gain control over foreign territories (Cain and Hopkins Reference Cain and Hopkins2016; Cavanagh and Veracini Reference Cavanagh and Veracini2017). The colonizers obtained large swaths of the foreign lands and transferred people whom they considered loyal and supportive of their territorial ambitions. The end of colonialism did not, however, spell the end of this settler colonial practice.
Population settlements are being practiced even in the post-colonial world (Eiran Reference Eiran2019; Fearon and Laitin Reference Fearon and Laitin2011; Haklai Reference Haklai2022). Post-colonial states have pursued settlement projects to obtain permanent territorial expansion in the contested territories, dominantly inhabited by ethnic and Indigenous Peoples (Eiran Reference Eiran2019). They provide economic and political incentives to the mainstream people to settle in the ethnic territories (Fearon and Laitin Reference Fearon and Laitin2011). Israel in the West Bank, Gaza, the Sinai, and the Golan Heights, Morocco in Western Sahara, Turkey in Northern Cyprus, and Indonesia in Timor Leste are some illustrations of the post-colonial resettlement practices (Haklai Reference Haklai2022). The purpose of all these settlement projects was to transform ethnic groups into a minority in their homelands, impairing their capacity to pursue autonomy.
South Asia is not an exception to this practice. In 2019, the Indian government amended the Constitution, relaxed settlement measures, and issued residency permits for non-Kashmiri People to settle in Kashmir, the contested India-administered region of Indigenous Muslims (Korbel Reference Korbel2021). It has been using population resettlement to obtain territorial control over the region.
Sri Lanka adopted a colonial policy to resettle the Sinhalese in the Eastern province even after its independence in 1948. In 1949, it sought to settle landless peasants into the fertile area of the East, which transformed into the relocation of mainstream Sinhalese from the Central and other provinces (Fearon and Laitin Reference Fearon and Laitin2011). The resettlement was used to overwhelm and crush the Tamil-speaking people in their ancestral homeland (Peebles Reference Peebles1990). In Bangladesh, Indigenous Paharis of the Chittagong Hill Tracts demanded recognition of their distinct status and autonomy, which the government considered a threat to its territorial integrity and responded with the resettlement of Bangla people. Bangladesh aimed to transform the Paharis into a minority in their homelands, permanently changing the direction of ethnic politics (Chakma Reference Chakma2025). In the 1990s, the Bhutanese government evicted around 100,000 Nepali-speaking ethnic Lhotsampas from its Southern region and offered incentives to the mainstream Bhutanese people to settle in the ethnic territory (Evans Reference Evans2010). In short, population resettlement is an ongoing reality in South Asia.
However, these South Asian countries differ in their political history. Whereas India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka were subjected to British colonialism and can be said to have “learned” the colonial policy from their past colonizers, Bhutan had prolonged independence and did not have any predecessor to emulate. Yet, the Bhutanese government pursued this policy to contain the potential rise of ethnic nationalism among its Nepali-speaking ethnic minorities.
Nepal is different from all of these cases in two respects. First, it does not have any colonial legacies as India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, nor does it intend to contain ethnic nationalism as in Bhutan. It has remained independent throughout its political history. The Nepalese government adopted a settler colonial policy of population resettlement, even though diversity management was not its objective. Second, the impacts of population resettlements in other countries were the obvious outcomes. In contrast, these outcomes are the unintended consequences of the process-oriented toward economic growth in Nepal, which further adds to the uniqueness of the case.
Population Resettlements, Economic Migration, and Autonomy: A Theoretical Framework
Population resettlement refers to an “organized movement of a population belonging to one national group into a territory in order to create a permanent presence and influence the patterns of sovereignty” (Haklai and Loizides Reference Haklai, Loizides, eds. and Loizides2015, 3). Such settlement projects intend to reduce ethnic groups’ numeric strength, transform them into a minority in their ancestral territories, and weaken their nationalist claims. Not all population movements are against ethnic cohesion, though. Some are related to economic migration in which migrants from the dominant ethnic group settle in a new area, often encouraged by state policy intended to reduce poverty and develop regions that are not part of the modern economy (Fearon and Laitin Reference Fearon and Laitin2011). Nepal pursued population resettlements that are more or less aligned with economic migration.
In settler colonial and post-colonial states, countries use population resettlement to manage ethnic diversity and neutralize territorial claims. The demographic structure of a territory provides ethnic groups with legitimate grounds to make a territorial claim. When a territory is “populated by the co-nationals, the claim that the territory belongs to the national homeland gains credibility” (Haklai Reference Haklai2022, 5). People have a jurisdictional authority over a territory and can thus claim their self-determination in their ancestral homelands (Hannum Reference Hannum1996). Therefore, states aim to change the demographic picture of ethnic territories and defuse nationalist claims; they make plans to “right people” a territory so that people are loyal to the settler-sending state (O’Leary Reference O’Leary2001). Population resettlement is a part of the “demographic engineering” in which ethnic minority groups and Indigenous Peoples lose their numeric capacity to continue their demands for self-determination (McGarry Reference McGarry1998). States can utilize this situation to reassert their continued sovereignty over the contested territories. Even if minorities demand a referendum, states can influence the outcomes (Eiran Reference Eiran2019, 1).
States do not intend to influence sovereignty patterns in all instances. Some settlement projects are carried out with “economic” motivations. States may encourage migration to outlying territories to increase access to fertile land, which may lead to a Sons-of-the-Soil (SoS) conflict, “between members of a minority ethnic group concentrated in some region of a country, and relatively recent, ethnically distinct migrants to this region from other parts of the same country,” and ethnic groups consider themselves as rightfully possessing the area as their group’s ancestral home (Fearon and Laitin Reference Fearon and Laitin2011, 200–201). The term “conflict” refers to competition and dispute over scarce resources, such as land, natural resources, government services, etc., and may not always necessarily be violent (Fearon and Laitin Reference Fearon and Laitin2011). In such cases, Indigenous Peoples have more grievances than the recent migrants.
Whether the motivations are political or economic, settlement projects do not always give the intended outcomes. Contrary to the government’s intentions, they often result in the strengthening of group solidarity and ethnic mobilization against the outsiders (McGarry Reference McGarry1998). Population resettlements come with cultural erosion, material displacement, and changed demographic structures, directly hurting the distinct status of ethnic groups and Indigenous Peoples. Ultimately, these damages prepare the grounds for nationalist resurgence. Nationalist movements emerge when a nation or a community feels threatened in its character, extent, or importance by the state system of which it is a part (Hastings Reference Hastings1997). Nationalism rejects imperial structures, becoming a vehicle to promote ‘ethnic cleavages and group solidarity (Smith Reference Smith1998). Autonomy is the central thrust of all nationalist movements. Ethnic groups and Indigenous Peoples demand autonomy as a remedial measure against the threats posed by the state’s policies and practices.
In plural societies, the population is not homogeneous. Population resettlements further change the demographic structure of ethnic and Indigenous territories, posing threats to their distinct status (Haklai Reference Haklai2022). Ethnic groups seek to exercise autonomy in local matters, shaping their social, cultural, and linguistic futures. Autonomy provides legislative and executive powers to the different segments of society and transforms them into “constructive elements of stable democracy” (Lijphart Reference Lijphart1977, 42). Autonomy contests authoritarian politics and practices, making people sovereign in practice (Freeman Reference Freeman1996).
In Nepal, the demand for autonomy has strengthened due to the damage caused by the population resettlements. Settlement projects impaired ethnic groups and Indigenous Peoples’ right to land and natural resources, languages, and demographic strength, giving rise to aspirations for autonomy and self-government.
What Nepal Wanted and What It Achieved
Nepal sought to achieve economic growth through population resettlement projects that were launched in the 1950s. It wanted to resettle the hill people in the Tarai region and bring more land under cultivation even before this period. However, its attempts were not successful. The hill people were not interested in relocating to Tarai due to its habitat conditions, including Malaria, dense forests, and a complex land tenure system (Kansakar et al. Reference Kansakar, Kosinski and Elahi1985). Nepal thus invited Indian immigrants to settle in the region (Ojha Reference Ojha1983). Indian farmers were settled on the virgin land of Tarai, with the hope that the new immigrants would contribute to the economic growth and agricultural enhancement (Regmi Reference Regmi1985).
Expectedly, Nepal received a significant number of Indian immigrants, which impacted demographic patterns of the Tarai region. Harka Gurung, the former vice-Chairperson of the National Planning Commission, identified that the number of foreign-born populations had increased in Tarai due to the state’s policy to host Indian immigrants. In 1961, the foreign-born population of Nepal was 337, 620 (3.6% of the total population); among them, 96% were born in India, and 95.2% of Indian immigrants settled in Tarai (Gurung Reference Gurung1989). But the Nepalese government had not entirely renounced its policy to attract the hilly people. Therefore, it eradicated Malaria, cleared forests, and introduced land reforms, which attracted the landless hill farmers to the Tarai region (National Planning Commission n.d. a).
Objectives
Population resettlement was needed for economic growth, agricultural advancement, and overall national development. Nepal was isolated from effective contact with modern influences that had transformed the economic life of other countries. It was lagging behind in social and economic development; the economy was primitive and underdeveloped (National Planning Commission n.d. a). In response, the Nepalese government advanced various planned development initiatives. It introduced the first five-year plan (1956–1961), which aimed to foster the rational utilization of available resources and healthy economic growth (National Planning Commission n.d. b).
However, the unequal population distribution was also adding to the challenges. The population density on the cultivated land was 1002 persons per square kilometer in the hilly region, while it was just 336 persons in the same area in Tarai (National Planning Commission n.d. d). Despite the high population density, the arable land resources in the hilly region were limited (Shrestha and Conway Reference Shrestha and Conway1999). The hilly people were moving toward the marginal land in which irrigation was difficult. The soil nutrients were exhausted, making it extremely difficult to feed the increasing population. The hilly region was a food-deficient area; Tarai was the surplus area. Population pressure in the hilly region, along with deforestation, was leading to floods and erosion in the lowland of Tarai. Some easing of population pressure was also necessary to control floods and destruction in the Tarai (National Planning Commission n.d. a). Nepal thus adopted population resettlement as an integral part of its development efforts. Its objective was to increase total agricultural production, decrease landlessness, and alleviate population pressure (Shrestha and Conway Reference Shrestha and Conway1985).
All official activities were oriented toward meeting this objective. The government embraced some preparatory initiatives to expedite settlement projects. It undertook land surveying, soil testing, mapping of the area, plotting, demarcation, clearance, road construction, and irrigation, along with several initial arrangements for sanitation, health protection, and schools, ultimately moving the farmers and their families into the area (National Planning Commission n.d. a). The farmers were also provided with loans to purchase tools, implements, seeds, and food in the new land (National Planning Commission n.d. b). The Nepalese government wanted to ensure that farmers got all they needed.
It launched the land reform program to accomplish its goal, which was not sufficient to improve the economic condition of the tillers. Production loans, cottage industry development, cooperative credit, marketing societies, and resettlement programs were also essential (National Planning Commission n.d. c). The government then advanced the large-scale migration of people from the hills to the Terai area (National Planning Commission n.d. d). Population resettlement was used as “a human measure” to check the tragic destruction of the most precious natural resource: good farmland (National Planning Commission 2016, 10). Accordingly, more than 45,000 households were settled under the resettlement program in more than 50,000 hectares of land between 1964 and 1980 (Kansakar et al. Reference Kansakar, Kosinski and Elahi1985).
Nepal did not intend to use population resettlements against any ethnic groups residing in the Tarai. It did not use the resettlement program solely for the hill people. Even the Tarai residents were a part of it. They had been randomly clearing the jungles for the settlements. They moved from one place to another, clearing a different area of the jungle each time. Such a random clearing was reducing the forest resources in the Tarai (National Planning Commission n.d. a). Nepal thus needed a plan to stop deforestation and bring additional land under cultivation (National Planning Commission 1980).
The Madhesis and the Tharus do not question the economic objectives of the resettlement projects. They consider resettlement a necessary step to enhance growth and development. Prem, a Madhesi farmer, said:
“Poverty was high in the hilly areas. People did not have jobs or any other means to earn money. The government considered that the hilly people would find survival means, admit their children to schools and colleges, and progress, if they relocated to the Tarai.”
Other Madhesis also agree that the resettlement was necessary to increase agricultural production. Rambali, a Madhesi teacher in the 60s, said:
“Even in my childhood, Tarai was sparsely populated. It had dense forests and was malaria-infested. People died of Malaria, Diarrhea, and Mosquito bites. Ghata laijane manche thiyena. (We did not have people to take the dead ones to the cremation). It was uninhabitable.”
The Madhesis did not consider that the government was seeking to hurt their communities, which the Tharus agreed with. Binayak, a local Tharu politician, stated:
“The Nepalese government settled the hilly people near highway lines, not in the middle of the Tharu settlements. It cleared forests or settled them in the empty lands. The settlement was for economic reasons. Tarai was developed; Pahaad (hill) was not.”
Vagra, a local Tharu grocer, also argued that the government cleared the forests and settled the people. Tarai was a quiet place. The government brought people; it became developed.
Outcomes
Population resettlement projects did not lead to intended outcomes. Instead, they turned the hilly regions into abandoned and depopulated areas, adding pressure on the land and natural resources of the Tarai region. Even the hilly people could not accrue the benefits of migration as expected. Settlements just enhanced spatial mobility for the hilly migrants without giving them any upward mobility (Shrestha Reference Shrestha1989). Population resettlement has ultimately changed the demographic structure of the Tarai region, which Table 1 indicates.
Demographic changes in the hilly and Tarai Region of Nepal

Source: Jnawali and Haklai Reference Jnawali and Haklai2025.
Nepal does not have exact data on the Madhesi and the Tharu population vis-à-vis the hilly population. This Table indicates the increasing trend of population in the Tarai and the decreasing one in the hilly areas. What was once started as an organized population resettlement project has now turned into a voluntary mass migration (Jnawali and Haklai Reference Jnawali and Haklai2025). The over pressure of population in Tarai areas and the dearth of people in the hilly region continue to create a demographic imbalance, which the government admitted (Karki Reference Karki2024). The government report acknowledged that productivity was reduced; the Tarai forests were mercilessly destroyed for employment and food, which left little scope for cultivable land development (National Planning Commission 1980). Population increases in Tarai were taking an ugly shape, making migration, land erosion, deforestation, and uncontrolled habitation a national problem (National Planning Commission 1985). The excess migration to Terai, rapid soil erosion, acute poverty, food shortage, and meager agricultural productivity have still been the major challenges for the inclusive development (National Planning Commission 2002). The government has reached the stage of needing to discourage migration from the hilly areas. In 2002, it announced the plan to “reduce the tendency of migration from the hills to the Terai through the development of appropriate technologies, income-generating occupations and transport in adjoining hilly areas” (National Planning Commission 2002, 4).
Population resettlement was intended to boost revenues, address development-related problems, and resolve population pressures in the hill areas (Shrestha Reference Shrestha1989). However, this objective led to several unintended consequences. The hilly people continue to migrate to the Tarai region in search of economic opportunities, leaving their settlements in the hills; the hill areas have been emptied and abandoned (Bhatta and Adhikari Reference Bhatta and Adhikari2022). The overall cultivable land shrank, increasing the risk of a food crisis. In addition, demographic change has posed a threat to social harmony between migrated hill-origin people and host population, increasing the risks of communal clashes (Thapa Reference Thapa2025). The government has thus sought policies that retain the people in the hilly regions.
Population resettlements did not achieve their objectives. The Madhesis and the Tharus were disproportionately affected, which the official narratives do not discuss.
Impacts on the Madhesi and the Tharu Indigenous Peoples
Population resettlements have impacted the Madhesis and the Tharu Indigenous Peoples in areas, including languages, cultures, natural resources, and identities. Upendra Yadav, a leader of the Madhes movement in 2007, characterizes such impacts as the “internal colonialism” which has kept Tarai under the hilly people’s hegemony (Thakur Reference Thakur2007). CK Raut, President of the Janamat Party, agrees with this assessment, further arguing that the Madhesis will soon end the colonial rule (Jha Reference Jha2016). Raj Kumar Lekhi, a central committee member of the Tharu Kalyankari Samiti, agreed that Tarai communities had been undergoing numerous historical grievances (Rai Reference Rai2015).
Internal colonialism implies the domination and exploitation of natives by natives themselves (Chaloult and Chaloult Reference Chaloult and Chaloult1979). It is a geography-based subordination of a differentiated population within a country, carried out through the state’s policies (Pinderhughes Reference Pinderhughes2011). The Madhesi and Tharu leaders associate the impacts in languages, cultures, natural resources, and recognition with the internal colony. Although the areas of impact are similar, the grievances of the Tharus and the Madhesis are different.
Madhesi Grievances
The Madhesis are mainly concerned with their i) loss of languages and cultures, ii) displacement, and iii) lack of unconditional acceptance as Nepali citizens, which they attribute to state-sponsored resettlement projects.
First, the resettlements impaired the Madheshi peoples’ ability to preserve their languages and cultures for future generations. Harish Chandra, a Madhesi teacher, stated, “we used to speak Maithili, Bhojpuri, Awadi, and Urdu languages. After the hilly population increased in the Tarai region, our children learned the Nepali language, forgetting our languages.” Population resettlements and language policy of the state worked together in hurting the Madhesi languages. The Panchayat regime (1961–1990) imposed Nepali as the official language, which was also continued in the democratic Constitution of 1991. This language policy ultimately hurt the Madhesi children’s right to education in their mother tongues. Prem added:
“Teachers use the Nepali language at school. Our children do not understand what their teachers say in the classroom. My five-year old son does not have academic skills, even as those of a two-year old of our neighbor from the Pahadi community.”
The Madhesi people fear that their languages will become extinct soon. Ram Chandra, a local politician, predicted that “no one will speak and understand Maithali, Bhojpuri, and Awadi languages in the next 30 years from now.”
Besides language, the demographic change has affected the Madhesi cultural practices. The Madhesis expressed concerns about the loss of their unique traditions to the hilly cultures. Harish Chandra described:
“Our parents used to wear a Dhoti and a Saari. Pahadis wear Suruwal and pants. The Madhesis also wear pants now. We adopted these clothing patterns from the hill people. The current settlement practices have been quite unfortunate for us in the Tarai.”
The other Madhesis also agreed that the hilly traditions and cultures had been imposed. Sanjaya, a local bank employee, added:
“Even the Madhesi culture has changed. For instance, Teej used to be celebrated Nirahaar (fasting even without drinking water). We do not eat meat during the fasting. Due to the influence of hilly people, the Madhesi women go to hotels, drink wine, and eat meat during their fasting.”
In short, the Madheshi participants highlighted that hilly people’s settlements increased the threats to the Madhesi languages and cultures.
Second, population resettlement has weakened the Madhesi control over lands and natural resources. Shiva, a local Madhesi teacher, stated, “The hilly people purchased our lands; they gave us money; we thought we got a good amount. Lately, we realized that we were being legally robbed.” Ram Chandra agreed with this observation:
“The Nepalese government loved the geography of the Tarai region, not the people. Therefore, it allowed the hill people to purchase as much land as they wanted. The Madhesis had land, not the money. The hill people took advantage of this situation and purchased our land at nominal prices, making us landless.”
Ram Chandra hinted that the Nepalese government wanted to develop the Tarai region and contribute to the economic growth, but this project displaced the Madhesi peoples. Shiva agreed that “the local people did not get the land for themselves to settle, while hilly settlers had it everywhere; lands were going out of the Madhesi hands.”
Third, the Madhesi displacement is closely related to the state’s hesitation to accept them as full Nepali citizens. The Madhesi participants agreed that the state considered them Indian immigrants, a mentality that emerged after the state-sponsored population resettlement projects. Indian immigrants were settled in the Tarai region after the mid-19th century, hoping to bring more land under cultivation (Regmi Reference Regmi1985; Ojha Reference Ojha1983; Gurung Reference Gurung1989). Nepal has been utilizing this migratory history to consider the Madhesis as Indians, hurting their access to citizenship, land, and natural resources. Rambali mentioned that “the Nepali state always suspects the nationality of the Madhesi people; therefore, it obstructs our just access to citizenship.” Prem stated that “the Madhesis need the citizenship to purchase land, but many of us do not have it.” Badkaiya, a local Madhesi teacher, mentioned:
“There was no reason to distrust the Madhesi commitment to the state. The Madhesis have been fighting with India when the border is encroached. They do not have citizenship, but they are fighting for border protection. Thousands of Madhesis are stateless.”
Despite this fact, they have been fighting to defend the Nepalese border against India. Sarad, a local Madhesi farmer, added that “the Madhesis fight for border protection; they are the citizens without citizenship.”
Ram Baran Yadav, a Madhesi leader of the Nepali Congress as well as the President of Nepal (2008–2015), associated this situation with the population resettlements carried out before and after the 1950s.
“Certainly, some people came from Hindustan (India). People were also brought to the Tarai from the hilly region. Tarai faced its impacts; the forest and water resources were destroyed. The Madhesis were defined as Indians. They were even denied citizenship. (Legislative Parliament Reference Parliament2007, 3150).”
The Madhesis shared the experience of being treated as Indian immigrants, which impaired their natural access to citizenship.
Tharu Grievances
The Tharu grievances are similar in some respects and distinct in others from those of the Madhesis. Their areas of concern include i) languages and cultures, ii) customary practices, and iii) access to natural resources. The Tharus are affected by the hilly settlements as the Madhesis; they are additionally affected by the Madhesi domination of their cultures.
First, all Tharu participants were concerned about their languages and cultures. Jitendra, a local teacher, said, “My grandmother used to speak the Tharu language. My parents spoke a bit. I really know too little of the Tharu language. Our children just use one or two words.” Tekram, another local teacher, agreed that the Tharu languages are becoming extinct. The Tharus do not know their language and mostly use Nepali in their conversation. Even if some Tharus know their languages, they are hesitant to use them. Chandra, a local Tharu farmer, said:
“My wife and I speak with each other in the Tharu language, but we do not speak our language with the children. Due to the increasing presence of the hilly settlements in our community, our children will need the Nepali language everywhere. The Tharu language is not going to help them.”
The hilly people are dominant in political, social, cultural, and economic spheres in the Tarai region; so is their language. Therefore, Nepali has, Sumita, a local activist, said, “been fully established as the prestige language. The Tharus are ashamed of speaking the Tharu language. If we speak Tharu language, the hilly people dominate us more.” Sumita shares an interesting story:
“My father was working as a health professional in the remote hilly areas. Once, he took me to his work village. He taught me the Nepali accent throughout our journey to make sure that I do not bring Ta Ta (the Tharu accent) in my Nepali and get fully accepted among the hilly families. I do the same with my children.”
Although some local governments have increasingly offered elementary education in mother tongues, e.g., Bardiya Municipality, the Tharu languages do not have social prestige and honor, which makes it difficult to preserve them for future generations.
Population resettlement has also impacted the Tharu cultures. Chandra mentioned that the Tharus have been building the Tharu Museum to showcase their cultures and traditions that are disappearing. Parichha, a local student, agrees that the Tharus have been losing their cultures. In the Tharu marriage, they have been doing all the rituals and traditions in the Hindu way. They do not have the caste system; they are adopting it from both hilly people and the Madhesis. Parichha stressed that the Tharus have adopted the Dahej, the dowry system in marriage, from the Madheshis. All Tharu participants condemned the Dahej system, characterizing it as “imported.”
The hilly migration has limited Indigenous cultures and practices to certain occasions. According to Jitendra, “the Tharus celebrate their cultures only on special occasions. They remember Tharu cultures only when the festivals come; this is just for show, not to practice.” Basanta, a local Bank employee, also agreed that the Tharu cultures were vanishing. In her words, “the Tharu women’s dress is a langa choliya and men’s dhoti. We have most contacts and relations with the hill people; therefore, we feel ashamed of wearing them. We wear them almost once a year just for the show.” Besides dresses, the Tharus have been forgetting their own festivals. Basanta further added, “We have begun to celebrate Teej, forgetting our own festivals such as Badka Adwaari, which is mainly celebrated by the Tharu men. Our festival has been sinking into oblivion.”
Second, population resettlements have impacted the Tharu Indigenous Peoples’ customary practices. Badhghar, Chaurasi, Bhalmansha, and Mukhiya are some notable customary practices used to resolve the local disputes. According to Gopal Dahit, a leader of the Tharuhat party, the Bhalmansha is a customary system, with unique judicial practices, which is also a part of the Tharu identity. However, this customary practice is disappearing (CA Secretariat Reference Secretariat2014, 846). Ganga Chaudhary, a leader of the Tharuhat Party, also said, “Our identity is in threat. Our status has been weakened, with the state’s excess favor for the hilly people”(CA Secretariat Reference Secretariat2014, 362). The conversations with the Tharu participants confirm these leaders’ claims regarding customary practices. Almost all participants were found unaware of customary practices, such as Bhalmansha and Badaghar, the Tharu methods of dispute settlements. Of the total nine Tharu participants, only two knew about them. Tekram narrated it in an interesting way:
“I know a lot about Bhalmansha. It’s a great customary practice. I read about it only when I had to prepare for the Teacher’s Service Commission’s exam. But I have never seen how it operates. I used my knowledge only to pass the teacher’s exams. About Badaghar, I did not even read during any of my exams.”
Jitendra mentioned being aware of it during his school days through the “quiz competition.” Both examples were evident that customary practices were disappearing.
Third, population resettlements also contributed to the Tharu displacement, even though the displacements have roots in the Rana regime (1846–1951). Prime Minister Janga Bahadur Rana issued the Muluki Ain, the first comprehensive legal code, in 1854, which categorized the Tharus as
, a group of alcoholics who can be enslaved and touched; this provision gave rise to the bonded labor system among the Tharus, and the subsequent regimes destroyed their villages in the name of establishing the national parks and conservation areas (THAKASA n.d.). The resettlements of the hilly people made the displacement intense. Sapana, a local grocer, described:
“We had lots of land; therefore, we used to be called the Dhartiputra, the Sons-of-the-Soil. Hilly people offered us money. We first sold our lands to the hilly people, then we became their Kamaiyas and Kamlaris, the bonded laborers in the immigrants’ houses.”
The Tharus’ land practices were different from those of the hilly people, which also became a reason for their displacement. Tekram stated:
“We did not have the practice of land registration. We had enough land, which we sold when they needed money. The hilly people were educated and informed about land rights and practices. They even tricked us into registering our lands into their own names, without giving us anything.”
The Tharus’ lands are not safe even in cases where they have been registered. Chandra, a Tharu teacher, shared an incident, “the lands are legally registered in the name of one Tharu male in my neighborhood. However, the hilly family has snatched it from him. The Tharu family does not complain, being afraid of retaliation.” When asked if it was a one-off incident, Chandra claimed such cases were frequent.
Access to other natural resources was also a matter of concern for participants belonging to the Tharu Indigenous Peoples. Sharada, a local activist, mentioned that there have been many community irrigation and forest management committees in the village. The hill people have become the leaders in most of them, who first use these resources for themselves. The Tharus get “such opportunities only when the hilly people do not need them anymore.” The Tharus were known as
the people of the jungle, which indicated their symbiotic relations with natural resources (THAKASA n.d.). Such relations were affected, not allowing them to make decisions in matters concerning the natural resources.
Rise of Autonomy Struggles: Outcome, Not Intended
States use population resettlements as an instrument to manage diversity. They seek to strengthen their territorial control over the contested territories by relocating the people whom they consider “loyal” to the government (Haklai Reference Haklai2022). Not all resettlement projects are meant to enhance territorial domination. Some projects are economic in objectives. States thus choose regions with vast productive potential as their target territory for settlement (Fearon and Laitin Reference Fearon and Laitin2011). Nepal’s objectives were economic, while the outcomes were political. Population resettlements turned into a project to strengthen what Hachhethu (Reference Hachhethu2023) calls “nation state.” In the “nation state” model, the focus is on creating a homogenous society and monocultural state, with one culture, one language, one religion, and one state, repressing diversity (Hachhethu Reference Hachhethu2023). Panchayat regime attractively packaged the nation–state model into the agendas of development and modernization and aggressively spread it across the country through its policies (Lawoti Reference Lawoti, eds. and Khosla2015). Population resettlements became one such policy that furthered the domination of upper-caste hill cultures, languages, and religions in the Tarai. The Madhesis and the Tharus responded to this domination by demanding autonomy and self-determination, an instrument to protect their languages, cultures, customary practices, and natural resources.
Ethnic demands aligned with Nepal’s international commitments to human rights and Indigenous Peoples’ rights. Nepal ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights along with the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1991, which stipulated that “all peoples have the right to self-determination” (General Assembly 1966). Nepal also ratified the ILO Convention 169, while voting in favor of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007, expressing commitments to the rights of Indigenous Peoples including self-determination. This normative environment also encouraged the Madhesis and the Tharus to pursue autonomy against the “historical grievances,” which they attributed to population resettlements.
Madhesi Politics for Autonomy
Through the Madhes movement of 2007, the Madhesis asked for the Ek Madhes Ek Pradesh, one homogenous province that brings all Tarai communities under a single administration (Asian Center for Peace 2011). The Madhesi demand for autonomy was not entirely new in 2007. Vedananda Jha formed the Tarai Congress in 1950 and raised the demand for regional autonomy as well as the proportionate inclusion in the governing structures (Basnet Reference Basnet2019; Gaige Reference Gaige1975). These demands were subdued during the Panchayat regime which imposed ethnic homogenization based on one language, one culture, and one costume (Jha Reference Jha2017). The democratic regime, restored in 1990, was more tolerant of ethnic differences but was unable to address nationalist aspirations. In 1996, the Maoists launched armed protests, utilizing ethnic discontent to their advantage; they promised regional autonomy to all the marginalized groups, including the Madhesis (SATP 2001). In 2006, the Maoists and the government signed a Comprehensive Peace Accord that determined restructuring of the unitary state as the political roadmap. The Interim Constitution of 2007 institutionalized this consensus, but it did not explain how restructuring would proceed.
The Madhesi political parties expected that restructuring would take the federal format and felt betrayed when it was not spelled out. Therefore, they launched mass protests, demanding autonomy within the federal system (Bose and Niroula Reference Bose and Niroula2015). However, they were not willing to federate the Tarai region. The Madhesi leaders demanded that Tarai should remain as one autonomous province; only other parts of the country are to be federated (CA Secretariat Reference Secretariat2014). Although the Madhesi demand was influenced by a constellation of various internal and external factors, population resettlement added to the nationalist resurgence.
Nepal encouraged population resettlements from both inside and outside the country. Its initial plan was to relocate the hilly people to the Tarai region, which was not successful due to the prevailing habitat conditions. The Nepalese government thus invited the Indian immigrants to settle in the Tarai region. The India-born immigrant population was less than 4% of the total population (Gurung Reference Gurung1989). Despite this fact, the Nepali state treated the entire Madhesi people as Indians.
In the CA, the Madhesi leaders condemned their treatment as Indians by the state. Surendra Prasad Chaudhary, a leader of the NC, said that Tarai was known by different names in history. While it was known as the Mithila in one historical period, it was called Simrangad, Baisali, and Kapilvastu at other times. The Madhesis existed throughout history; therefore, identifying them with the Indian immigrants is erroneous, Chaudhary reminded (CA Secretariat Reference Secretariat2015, 1168). This position was widely supported by the Madhesi leaders across the political parties. Most leaders urged the state not to treat the Madhesis as Indians. Mahendra Rai Yadav, a leader of the Tarai Madhes Sadbhabana Party, asked:
“Does Madhes not need the recognition? Are the Madhesis the Nepalis or not? The Madhes has a problem with citizenship. Can any country make its citizens stateless? This is the reason the Madhes has been seeking the right to self-determination. (CA Secretariat Reference Secretariat2015, 4063).”
Laxmi Kumari Chaudhary, a leader of the Sanghiya Samajbaadi Forum, suggested that the Madhesi grievances began specifically after King Mahendra (1955–1972) imposed the autocratic Panchayat system in 1961; the Madhesis were characterized as Indians after the hilly people were brought in (CA Secretariat Reference Secretariat2015, 4098).
The Madhesi participants agree with their leaders’ sentiments in this regard. Sanjaya thus said:
“There must a ban in the purchase of land in the Tarai region. However, the Pahadi-dominated government cannot make this decision; only the Madhesi government can take such a bold decision. So, we need autonomy with high power in areas, including immigration and citizenship.”
Shiva also stated that the Madhesis would not be able to protect their languages, cultures, and identities without autonomy. Jibesh, a Madhesi job seeker, added that by “the genuine autonomy can control the damages, incurred by the hilly settlements.”
The Madhesis wanted to offset the damages of population resettlements through autonomy. Their struggle has received partial success. The Constitution, released in 2015, formed a Madhesi province, which includes eight Tarai districts: Bara, Parsa, Rautahat, Sarlahi, Mahotari, Dhanusha, Siraha, and Saptari (Nepal Law Commission 2015). But this does not meet the Madhesi demands for Ek Madhes, with self-determination.
Tharu Politics for Autonomy
The Tharu Indigenous Peoples have mainly resided in Banke, Bardiya, Kailali, Kanchanpur, Dang, Rupandehi, Nawalparasi, and Kapilvastu districts of Western Tarai. The Tharus exercised self-determination with autonomy, self-governance, and collective custodianship of natural resources throughout their history. According to Raj Kumar Lekhi, the Tharus had their own federal states, which were subsequently encroached after the outsiders’ rules were imposed (Rai Reference Rai2015). Its best illustration was the Birta land tenure system during the Rana regime, which was a form of land tenure in which the land revenue was assigned to the individuals for their services to the government; the purpose of these land allocations was to enrich the members of the ruling class and retain their authority (Regmi Reference Regmi1965; Regmi Reference Regmi1994). This system of land tenure impaired the collective custodianship of lands by the Tharus.
The Tharus have actively resisted the state’s discriminatory practices since the late 1940s. Prashu Narayan Chaudhary, a Tharu leader of the Nepali Congress, established the Tharu Kalyankari Sabha (THAKASA) in 1948 to enhance the betterment of the Tharus. This organization initially focused on health, education, and social reforms (THAKASA n.d.). Its concern was with eliminating what the Tharus considered “bad habits,” such as child marriage, polygamy, alcohol use, excess spending on festivities, and adopting the habits of the upper-caste elites (Fujikura Reference Fujikura2023). Social reform and development were the dominant tropes that defined the Sabha’s activities.
During the Panchayat regime, the Tharus did not get the chance to fully advance their reform agendas as the Madhesis. In 1985, Dil Bahadur Chaudhary established Backward Society Education (BASE), which mainly focused on the issue of bonded labor and social reforms (BASE n.d.). After the advent of democracy in 1990, the Tharus participated in Kamaiya Mukti Aaandolan and Kamalari Mukti Aaandolan, the social movements for eliminating the bonded labor to which Tharu men and women were being subjected. Consequently, the government eliminated bonded labor through the Bonded Labour Prohibition Act, 2058 (2002) (Nepal Law Commission 2002).
Political endorsement to the Tharus came from the Maoists, who established a series of autonomous regions, including the Tharuwan Autonomous Region in Tarai (Fujikura Reference Fujikura2023). But the Maoists were not consistent in their support for the Tharuwan after they entered mainstream politics in 2006. The Tharus participated in Madhesi agitation in 2007, stood with the Madhesi political parties in their protest against upper-caste hill dominance in the state, and supported the demand for autonomy and federalism (Pandey Reference Pandey2017). In 2009, the Nepalese government issued an ordinance, including the Tharus as one of 92 Castes under the Madhesis, which became a turning point in Tharu politics. The Tharu leaders opposed the categorization of the Tharus as the Madhesis, rejected the idea of a single Madhesi province in Tarai, and demanded Tharu autonomy in the West (Guneratne Reference Guneratne2010; Pandey Reference Pandey2017). They realized a threat to their distinct identity from the increasing hegemony of the Madhesi parties and sought a distinct recognition for themselves (Pandey Reference Pandey2017). Between 2009 and 2015, the Tharus launched a series of protests, demanding autonomy.
The Tharus were concerned with the protection of languages, cultures, traditions, and natural resources, which were directly impacted by the population resettlement projects. Sohan Prasad Chaudhary, a Tharu leader of the CPN-UML, said that the Tharus lost their lands in different phases of Nepal’s political history; they were rich, but they were displaced using the loopholes of different legislations and migration practices. Therefore, it was important to grant them power to make decisions about their natural resources, lands, languages, and cultures (Legislative Parliament Reference Parliament2007). Prem agreed that the only way to defend the Tharu identity is to “provide special treatment to the Tharus. Whatever has been damaged, that cannot be undone. Still, it is possible to prevent further damage. The Tharu autonomy is a minimum requirement.”
Gauri Shankar Chaudhary, a Tharu leader of the Maoists, suggested that the Tharus inhabited the Tarai region when it was surrounded by dense forests and infested by Malaria; they made these areas habitable. The state brought hilly people from outside; the population density increased. Consequently, the Tharus lost their land and natural resources. These historical realities make the Tharu autonomy a necessity, Chaudhary claimed (CA Secretariat Reference Secretariat2015, 6023).
The Tharu leaders consistently associated the threats to their identity with the population resettlements. Rukmini Chaudhary, a Tharu leader, stated that “the government has not properly monitored the internal migration, which has been hurting identity, existence, representation, access, and the preferential rights of the Tharus” (CA Secretariat Reference Secretariat2015, 4398–4399). Ganga Chaudhary, another Tharu leader, suggested that hilly people came to the Tarai only after the region was made habitable by clearing forests, eradicating Malaria, and developing agricultural land. In contrast, the Tharus lived there at all conditions; therefore, they have a history and should get autonomy based on their history (CA Secretariat Reference Secretariat2015, 3040).
The Constitution (2015) did not address the Tharu demand for autonomy. The Tharus sought autonomy in Western Tarai districts, including Banke, Bardiya, Kailali, Kanchanpur, and Dang. These districts have been lumped with other provinces. Dang, Banke, and Bardiya have been placed within Lumbini province; Kailali and Kanchanpur are inside Sudurpachim province (Nepal Law Commission 2015). The Tharus have been dispersed in different provinces, which makes them a minority in their homelands.
Conclusion
Nepal sought to enhance its economic growth by relocating the hilly people to the Tarai region. However, the state-sponsored projects did not lead to the intended outcomes; they impaired the Madhesis and the Tharu Indigenous Peoples’ access to languages, cultures, customary practices, and natural resources. The Madhesis and the Tharus responded to these socio-cultural damages by advancing their demand for autonomy. Ethnic leaders project autonomy as a measure to prevent further damage, if not entirely undo it.
This analysis indicates that economically motivated resettlement projects also have political consequences. All depends on the nature and extent of impacts that ethnic groups and Indigenous Peoples encounter due to these projects. If threats to languages, cultures, customary practices, and natural resources heighten, nationalist resurgence may occur. Nationalist movements generally respond to threats coming from the state’s policies and projects. This finding may be applicable in cases where resettlement projects have been adopted for various purposes.
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback on my work. Their comments have strengthened the paper’s overall direction and development. I am equally thankful to Dr. Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics, for their comments on the overall design of my paper. Dr. Gonzalez O’Brien’s comments were immensely helpful to strengthen my method section.
Funding statement
This research has been generously supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council’s Post-Doctoral Fellowship (#756-2024-0044) in Canada.
Competing interests
None.
Hari Har Jnawali is a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Democracy and Diversity at Queen’s University, ON, Canada. He has a PhD in Global Governance from the Balsillie School of International Affairs at the University of Waterloo, with a specialization in Asian ethnicity and Comparative Politics. Dr. Jnawali is also a lecturer in the Department of Political Science and North American Studies at Wilfrid Laurier University, ON, Canada. Some of his most recent publications are as follows.
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i) Jnawali, H. H. (Reference Jnawali and Haklai2025). Does the interpretation of self-determination affect autonomy struggles in Asia? Ethnopolitics 24 (2), 219–240.
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ii) Jnawali, H. H. (2024). Democracy and ethnic autonomy: Allies or rivals in Nepal? Asian Ethnicity 25 (4), 695–718.
