BACKGROUND: THE DESCRIPTIVE-NORMATIVE DIVIDE

The descriptive-normative divide has long held a central place in ethical thought, notably shaped by David Hume’s ([1739–1740] Reference Hume1978) articulation of the “is-ought” problem, where he posited that normative statements—claims about what ought to be—cannot logically be derived from descriptive statements—claims about what is. This is-ought divide emphasizes a fundamental boundary between factual knowledge and moral claims, suggesting that no amount of factual description can directly yield an ethical prescription. G.E. Moore’s concept of the “naturalistic fallacy” (Reference Moore1903) builds on this, cautioning against deriving moral obligations from empirical facts alone, and insisting that ethical principles cannot be reduced to merely factual terms. These concepts reinforced a significant strand of philosophical thought that emphasized the separation of facts and values, often treating the former as belonging to an objective, neutral realm distinct from subjective value interpretations (e.g., Frederick, Reference Frederick1994; Rosenthal & Buchholz, Reference Rosenthal and Buchholz2000; Weaver & Treviño, Reference Weaver and Treviño1994). This tendency towards seeing values as purely subjective was particularly prominent in certain mid-twentieth-century movements, such as logical positivism and emotivism, where ethical statements were often characterized primarily as expressions of feeling rather than claims about the world (e.g., Ayer, [1936] Reference Ayer1946; Stevenson, Reference Stevenson1944).

Friedrich Nietzsche strengthened this perception with his assertion that “There are no moral phenomena at all, only moral interpretations of phenomena” (Nietzsche, [1886] Reference Nietzsche, Colli and Montinari1988: §108), reinforcing the notion that normative interpretations do not originate in the phenomena themselves but rather in the frameworks and perspectives we apply to them. This perspective has resonated across disciplines, particularly in the natural and social sciences, contributing to a widespread acceptance that empirical observation, free from moral judgment, offers a foundation distinct from value-laden perspectives. In this view, descriptive inquiries merely catalog “what is” without the normative imposition of “what should be,” a distinction upheld to preserve the objectivity and value neutrality of scientific inquiry.

The concept of science as an impartial, descriptive endeavor has been critiqued, particularly by scholars who argue that science is far more entwined with normative elements than it appears and that there is no view from nowhere (Nagel, Reference Nagel1986). Paul Feyerabend ([1975] Reference Feyerabend1976) argued that science cannot be fully disentangled from value judgments; implicit values and priorities shape what questions are asked, how experiments are designed, and which findings are prioritized. Likewise, Hilary Putnam (Reference Putnam2004) pointed out that scientific terms frequently carry both descriptive and evaluative meanings, as terms like “healthy” or “normal” imply normative ideals even while ostensibly describing factual states. From this angle, science is less value-neutral than it purports to be, shaped by human perspectives that color even the most objective-seeming facts (Weber, [1904] Reference Weber and Winckelmann1988).

In business ethics, a parallel debate about the separation between descriptive and normative perspectives has mainly unfolded in what is recognized as the “separation thesis.” While Donaldson (Reference Donaldson1994) defended the separation, Werhane (Reference Werhane1994) and Freeman (Reference Freeman1994) argued for the necessary interdependence of descriptive and normative methodologies. Other scholars, including Harris and Freeman (Reference Harris and Freeman2008) and Sandberg (Reference Sandberg2008), have continued to challenge the thesis in subsequent work. This thesis proposes that ethical evaluations of business practices are fundamentally distinct from the descriptive accounts of those practices, suggesting that while descriptions of business actions may be objective, assessments of those actions as ethical or unethical are inherently subjective. This divide has provided a framework to support the value neutrality of business practices, which ostensibly operate independently of ethical judgments.

Nevertheless, the separation theory has come under scrutiny within business ethics as well, with scholars questioning whether business can indeed remain free of normative implications. Critics argue that the practice of business is inherently evaluative, involving choices that reflect values and priorities beyond mere factual description. R. Edward Freeman’s stakeholder theory (Reference Freeman1984), for instance, emerged as a response to this critique, advocating for an approach that integrates ethical considerations directly into the practice of business by recognizing that the interests of various stakeholders—employees, customers, communities, and others—are legitimate parts of business decision-making (Freeman, Reference Freeman2000; Werhane & Freeman, Reference Werhane and Freeman1999). In this way, stakeholder theory challenges the sharp division between descriptive and normative perspectives, suggesting that business ethics must acknowledge the value-laden nature of real-world business activities.

Within the German literature on business ethics, scholars such as Peter Ulrich (Reference Ulrich2008) and Thomas Beschorner (Reference Beschorner2013) similarly advocate for a more integrated view, arguing that business cannot be fully separated from its normative dimensions. For these scholars, business practices involve implicit societal norms and values and gain their legitimacy from them. Business operates within a social context that shapes—and is shaped by—normative considerations. While these various critiques effectively challenge the separation thesis on practical, stakeholder-focused, or social-contextual grounds, the phenomenological perspectives explored later in this article offer a more fundamental, ontological critique, questioning the very possibility of separating description from normativity at the level of perception and understanding itself.

The growing interest in connecting empirical research with normative inquiry (Islam & Greenwood, Reference Islam and Greenwood2021; Risi, Reference Risi2020) reflects a broader momentum to reevaluate the traditional boundaries between the descriptive and the normative. The descriptive-normative divide may be more artificial than initially thought, as human perception and evaluation appear deeply intertwined. As this article will argue, integrating descriptive and normative perspectives offers a richer, more nuanced understanding of both ethics and business ethics, where norms are not merely imposed on facts but are part of the fabric of how we engage with and understand the world.

The debate surrounding the descriptive-normative relationship in business ethics often revolves around stances favoring separation, integration, or dissolution (cf. Weaver & Treviño, Reference Weaver and Treviño1994). While scholars like Werhane (Reference Werhane1994) argue for the interdependence and necessary integration of empirical and normative methodologies, cautioning against notions of purity, and pragmatists effectively dissolve the dichotomy by focusing on practical consequences and social justification (e.g., Rorty, Reference Rorty1979; Rosenthal & Buchholz, Reference Rosenthal and Buchholz2000), this article proposes a different perspective. Grounded in Wittgenstein and Heidegger, it argues for an ontological co-constitutivity where the descriptive and normative are not merely integrated post hoc or dissolved pragmatically, but are inherently intertwined in the structure of perception and understanding itself. This ontological claim suggests that even models of integration may implicitly start from a separation that, at a fundamental level, does not hold.

PERCEPTION AS INHERENTLY NORMATIVE: PERSPECTIVES FROM WITTGENSTEIN AND HEIDEGGER

In the subsequent section, I’ll briefly present two phenomenological perspectives that cast significant doubts on this separation on an ontological level and also offer a novel perspective on normativity itself. My motivation stems from the conviction that we have a foundational error in our understanding of the distinction between the descriptive and the normative. However, I believe that this thinking, along with other approaches to ethics and morality, is deeply rooted in a specific ontological framework that I aim to challenge and refute.

When writing about normativity using Heidegger and Wittgenstein, it is worth mentioning that both wrote surprisingly little explicitly about ethics (e.g. Heidegger, [1947] Reference Heidegger2010; Wittgenstein, [1930] Reference Wittgenstein and Schulte2012). However, both explicitly recognize the way ethics (Heidegger speaks of humanism) is thought. Both share the view that there seems to be an insufficient understanding of the human condition and consequently the metaphysical roots of ethics. “Every humanism is either based on a metaphysics or makes itself the foundation of one. Every determination of the essence of man that presupposes an interpretation of being without questioning the truth of being, whether with knowledge or without knowledge, is metaphysical. … Accordingly, all humanism remains metaphysical. In defining the humanity of man, humanism not only does not ask about the relation of being to the human condition. Humanism even prevents this question, since, due to its origin in metaphysics, it neither knows nor understands it” (Heidegger, [1947] Reference Heidegger2010: 13). Wittgenstein recognized the futility of wanting to evaluate human actions against something outside the human life form: “I felt the urge to run up against the limits of language, and I believe that this is the urge of all people who have tried to write or talk about ethics or religion. This running up against the walls of our cage is completely and utterly hopeless” (Wittgenstein, [1930] Reference Wittgenstein and Schulte2012: 19). While on the one side both share scepticism towards metaphysically grounded approaches to ethics, they also share views on what I would call a phenomenological approach towards normativity—norms/normativity understood in the most basic way: what makes us recognize, evaluate, and act. While Wittgenstein’s own relationship with the term “phenomenology” is complex and subject to debate (see Knabenschuh de Porta, Reference Knabenschuh de Porta and Padilla Gálvez2008), his exploration of “grammar” as revealing the structures of experience—explicitly stating “Phenomenology is Grammar” (Wittgenstein, [1933–1934] Reference Wittgenstein2000: §94)—can be understood as a perspective focused on articulating immediate experience (Knabenschuh de Porta, Reference Knabenschuh de Porta and Padilla Gálvez2008). It is in this sense of uncovering the grammatical structures that shape our recognition and evaluation that this article utilizes “phenomenological insights” from Wittgenstein.

Philosophical phenomenology, as proposed by Husserl ([1907] Reference Husserl1986), is a fundamental approach to thinking. It emphasizes the distinction between a sensually given experience and a perception of something as something (Krause, Reference Krause2019). For instance, the perception of a white wall with a shadow necessitates implicit or explicit knowledge of the concept of a shadow. Otherwise, the wall would not be perceived as white but as white with a grey area. This illustrates the idea that is also behind phenomenological approaches: trying to have as little conceptual over-coloring of phenomena as possible, aiming to make aspects more accessible that are otherwise concealed by our concepts (or language).

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE IS AND OUGHT

Understanding the world is inherently a normative process, meaning that descriptions of the world are always intertwined with normative aspects. From both Wittgenstein’s and Heidegger’s perspectives, any view from a supposed nowhere—a nonnormative description of reality—is untenable at an ontological level (see also Taylor, Reference Taylor and McGuinness1991). While they arrive at this conclusion through different approaches, both Wittgenstein’s grammar of lifeforms and Heidegger’s concept of das Man illustrate the inextricable connection between descriptive and normative elements. Through this, both thinkers reject attempts to reduce ethics to a set of metaphysical concepts, instead portraying normativity as a fundamental part of human experience and perception. Descriptions, therefore, are not only colored by norms but depend upon them; perception itself requires a normative framework.

This connection is foundational in both thinkers’ work. For Wittgenstein, descriptive statements are governed by the grammar of one’s life form, or the shared norms and practices of a cultural and linguistic community. Language doesn’t merely label objective facts; it shapes and gives meaning to what is perceived. For example, Wittgenstein’s famous “rabbit-duck” illustration and other optical illusions demonstrate how perception is shaped by concepts, or grammar, as our minds interpret what we see according to pre-established norms. In this way, even a seemingly simple observation—seeing a shadow on a white wall—relies on implicit knowledge of concepts such as light, shadow, and depth. This understanding follows the phenomenological approach of Husserl ([1907] Reference Husserl1986), which underscores that perception always involves interpreting something as something, meaning that what we recognize, evaluate, and act upon is filtered through our concepts—or norms.

Similarly, Heidegger’s concept of das Man emphasizes the social norms that shape Dasein (being-there or human existence) and, in turn, influence perception and understanding. For Heidegger, Dasein’s experience is always conditioned by being part of a social world structured by das Man, or the shared expectations and practices that “one” follows. This does not imply that individuals cannot act independently, but that such independence always still remains bound by a framework of social norms; the very meaning of “acting differently” presupposes reference to what “one normally does.” Consequently, das Man defines the possibilities of judgment and action, forming a social grammar that prescribes interpretation and behavior.

Both Wittgenstein’s and Heidegger’s views thus counter the notion of a purely objective description of the world, arguing instead that descriptions are constituted through normative frameworks. This perspective challenges traditional metaphysical approaches to grounding normativity, which often attempt to validate norms by appealing to universal principles or absolute values. Wittgenstein and Heidegger, however, maintain that norms do not require metaphysical justification; they are grounded in the shared grammar of life forms (Wittgenstein) or in the existential conditions of Dasein as part of das Man (Heidegger). Rather than requiring an external foundation, norms emerge through our situatedness within a community or life form. This perspective, shared by both thinkers, shifts the focus from seeking a justification outside of the lived world to understanding how norms function from within our everyday reality.

Norms, therefore, are constitutive of perception and thought, which in turn are the basis of description. To identify something as a particular object or situation, one must already understand it in a particular way; an understanding is shaped by norms that are already in place. For instance, perceiving something entirely new would be impossible if we had no conceptual framework to recognize it; we would have no norms or context through which to interpret it. Immanuel Kant captured this insight in his famous statement, “Intuitions without concepts are blind” (Kant, Reference Kant1787: B75). Our recognition of this new then depends on descriptions that establish initial understanding. These descriptions—the way we talk about or frame the new—allow it to become comprehensible within our life world, thereby forming the basis for future understanding. In this way, norms are inherently descriptive, shaping what and how we recognize and interpret as “real” or meaningful.

To understand a given situation, we rely on a grammar of perception shaped by language, culture, and social norms. This lifeworld, or set of pre-existing norms, is not fixed; it can vary significantly among individuals, cultures, and contexts, influencing not only how we perceive a given situation but also how we might evaluate it. Consequently, this variability shows that differing perceptions of the same event are possible, influenced by language, narrative, culture, social milieu, and environment.

This emphasis on the irreducible role of context aligns with insights from moral particularism (e.g., Dancy, Reference Dancy2004; McDowell, Reference McDowell1979). Particularism challenges the sufficiency of universal moral principles for ethical judgment, arguing instead that the moral relevance of features is determined by the specific configuration of the situation. From the perspective developed here, the “grammar” of the situation dictates which features are salient and how they contribute to meaning and normative assessment, resisting codification into context-independent rules. Furthermore, this variability enables the reshaping of perception through narration, persuasion, or contextual framing; an event can be understood differently if presented within an alternate normative framework that feels more meaningful or relevant to the individual.

From this perspective, the existence of alternative grammars means that different descriptions can convey different interpretations without implying that one description is more true than another. In Wittgenstein’s terms, grammar is constitutive of what we understand as real; there is no meta-perspective from which one can adjudicate between grammars as more or less “true.” Instead, grammar defines the boundaries of what is intelligible or meaningful. A meta-grammar, or universal perspective from which all grammars can be judged, would itself require justification within a particular grammar, thus leading to a regress. As Wittgenstein succinctly puts it, “the conventions of grammar cannot be justified by a description of what is represented. Any such description already presupposes the rules of grammar” (Wittgenstein, [1929–1930] Reference Wittgenstein1984b: §186). Heidegger similarly argues that das Man obscures the underlying interpretive framework that constitutes Dasein’s understanding of reality, making it difficult to see how social norms mediate what we perceive as true or real.

Therefore, recognizing or interpreting anything as “something” presupposes a normative framework, what Wittgenstein and Heidegger describe as grammar or das Man. This embedded normativity is essential for an ontologically grounded understanding of what we do when we identify, evaluate, or orient actions. Through this lens, normativity is not an added layer upon a neutral perception; it is integral to the act of perceiving itself.

This perspective also has implications for understanding the naturalistic fallacy. While it remains true in a certain sense that one cannot logically derive normative conclusions solely from descriptive statements, this view overlooks the inherent normativity that shapes the descriptive statements themselves. For instance, within a life form that recognizes “chairs” as a concept, one cannot deduce from the presence of blue chairs that only blue objects qualify as chairs. Yet this does not negate the normative framework that allows the recognition of “chair” as a concept in the first place. Some descriptions, like “furniture” or “objects,” serve as broader, more abstract categories but do not eliminate the normative element that makes recognition possible. Thus, rather than representing a divide, descriptive and normative elements are inextricably linked, rendering pure description impossible.

In summary, while it might make sense in certain contexts (see also Azola, Reference Azola2011; Weaver & Treviño, Reference Weaver and Treviño1994) from the perspective outlined, the descriptive and the normative cannot be separated on an ontological level. We experience the world through norms that constitute perception, interpretation, and action. This understanding of normativity rejects the traditional view of ethics as a system of metaphysical justifications, instead situating it within the life forms’ shared grammar. In this way, normative judgments are not grounded in abstract principles but in the fundamental structures of human experience. This approach does not lead to moral relativism, where “anything goes,” but to a perspectivism where norms are inherently contextual. The crucial distinction is that while multiple valid perspectives may exist, they are not limitless or arbitrary within a life form. Our shared grammar establishes boundaries, ruling out interpretations that are incomprehensible or nonsensical within a specific context. For instance, we can use the words “white horses are brown,” but they would be meaningless within our established grammar. Our shared way of understanding the world—shaped by lived experience—prevents such a statement from being a valid description. This demonstrates that radical moral relativism, where “anything goes,” does not logically follow from the perspectivist approach. While we can, and should, criticize our habits and norms, we need to provide reasons that are comprehensible within our life form. A simple statement that contradicts our shared grammar is not enough to change it (see also the argument against immoralism by Philippa Foot, [2001] Reference Foot and Zolyom2004).

Perception is shaped by grammar or das Man, such that different descriptions can offer various but equally coherent perspectives on a single phenomenon, without implying an objective standpoint. This ontologically grounded view of normativity opens new ways of understanding ethical discourse as an intrinsic aspect of human perception and interaction, rather than a separate, detached domain of evaluation. While this perspectivism, grounded in shared practices, avoids a simple “anything goes” relativism, it acknowledges the genuine challenge of navigating situations where conflicting “grammars” offer seemingly incommensurable interpretations, particularly in pluralistic global or organizational contexts. The framework suggests, however, that resolving such conflicts lies not in finding an external, neutral standpoint, but through engaged dialogue, mutual learning, and the difficult work of crafting richer descriptions or narratives capable of bridging or reframing the divergent perspectives within the specific situation.

Ultimately, grasping this inherent connection provides a more insightful lens on normativity. It allows us to understand the deep, existential hold of norms—grounded as they are in our very form of life and perception—without resorting to elusive external foundations or reducing them to arbitrary preferences.

IMPLICATIONS FOR APPROACHING BUSINESS ETHICS

Having established the ontological co-constitutivity of description and normativity, the following section explores the specific consequences of this understanding for the theory and practice of business ethics. This article is framed by the premise that ethics is inherently aimed at guiding and evaluating actions. Traditional approaches to ethics in business typically emphasize one of three main strategies (or a combination thereof): focusing on the motivation behind actions (such as duty-based ethics in Kant, Reference Kant1785; see also Bowie, Reference Bowie1999; Bowie & Reynolds, Reference Bowie and Reynolds2004), the consequences of actions (utilitarianism, e.g., Bentham, [1789] Reference Bentham2013; Mill, [1861] Reference Mill2009), or the virtues of the individual acting (virtue ethics, e.g., Hursthouse, Reference Hursthouse1999; MacIntyre, Reference MacIntyre and Köhler1997; Moore, Reference Moore2012). However, as Philippa Foot’s trolley problem famously illustrates, these approaches often yield ambiguity and conflict when applied to complex situations ([2001] Reference Foot and Zolyom2004; [2003] Reference Foot and Voorhoeve2009).

Despite the fact that we do take principles, outcomes as well as the person who acts into account—we accept them as reasons for an action in specific contexts—they individually fail when applied as general (normative) theories of “the good” when actions suggested by any one approach conflict with what we perceive as appropriate. Instead, what underpins and orients these strategies—and, more fundamentally, our actions—are the shared norms of the life form within which they arise.Footnote ¹

Consider the principle of free speech, which is often upheld as a fundamental right. While it is a guiding norm, it may not provide clear orientation in all situations. For instance, in certain contexts, open and unrestricted speech may be seen as inappropriate or harmful. In some cases, the principle of free speech may need to be balanced against other principles, such as respect for others’ privacy or the potential consequences of disclosure. This principle, taken alone, does not account for the situational norms and expectations that make an action meaningful or good in a given context. In other words: “the grammar of the situation” or “what one does here.” Highly complex but common situations that have a relatively fixed set of norms, will not be recognized as causing ethical problems exactly because they have a fixed set of norms—they are normal situations, it is clear what one does in such a situation. And because of normality being hidden, we don’t even consider the actual normative complexity of those situations. Consequently, what is commonly referred to as an “ethical conflict” can emerge only when these normative frameworks are disrupted or unclear. Ethical deliberation becomes a process of descriptive refinement and selection, navigating between competing or even new ways of framing the situation, each rooted in our shared life forms (grammar/das Man). The decision for a particular description constitutes the specific judgment in that context with its implications for how to act.

This can be illustrated by layoffs during a corporate restructuring. The action itself is a single event, but it can be described through multiple, conflicting normative frameworks. From one perspective, the layoff can coherently be framed as “downsizing” to “enhance shareholder value” and “improve efficiency.” This description is rooted in a certain grammar, where the action is a necessary and positive step for the company’s long-term health. However, from another perspective, the same action can be described as a “betrayal” or an act of “corporate greed.” Here, the action is viewed as unnecessary and negative.

These competing descriptions are not simply different labels; they represent fundamentally different normative perspectives on what constitutes a “good” or “just” action within the business context. Ethical judgment, in this case, is not about applying an abstract principle to a neutral fact. It is a process of navigating these divergent descriptions and committing to one as the most salient for the context. This example demonstrates how ethical evaluation emerges directly from our normatively structured engagement with the world, rather than being applied to neutral facts from an external standpoint.

This highlights the practical challenge of rule application in business. Even seemingly clear ethical codes or principles rely on an underlying, often implicit, shared understanding (“grammar”) for their interpretation and application in novel situations. Ethical conflicts often arise precisely where this shared grammar is lacking, ambiguous, or contested, making the mechanical application of rules impossible and underscoring the philosophical insights regarding rule-following limitations (Wittgenstein, [1945–1948] Reference Wittgenstein1984a; Kripke, Reference Kripke1982).

The lack of normative orientation can arise from two distinct possible causes: either there are no established norms for the situation, or there are conflicting sets of norms that apply. Both of these factors underscore the significance of providing a detailed description in shaping normativity.

Normative clarity in ambiguous business situations relies not only on principles but fundamentally on narratives, examples, and the descriptive work of framing the situation through potentially competing normative lenses or “grammars.” This addresses how the general normativity of perception connects to what we usually refer to as “ethical judgments”: deliberation involves navigating these different ways of seeing. For instance, whether firing employees is primarily understood as, for instance, “efficient restructuring” or “breaking trust” involves choosing between descriptions that highlight different aspects, consequences, and implicit obligations. The ethical judgment lies precisely in this commitment to a particular, inherently normative description as the most salient for the context. The commitment is typically influenced by other convictions, for example, about the role of a firm in society, the purpose of work, or the nature of social obligations—all of which contribute to a normative framework that guides a particular perspective.

The “is” inherently shapes the resulting “ought,” demonstrating that ethical evaluation emerges from within our normatively structured engagement with the world, rather than being applied externally to neutral facts. The reliance on a rich normative context also challenges critiques of moral relativism, which might suggest that if norms are context-dependent, “anything goes.” From the perspective presented, normativity itself sets the limits within which descriptions and interpretations make sense: While the number “6” can be interpreted as a “9” when seen from a different angle, it would be incomprehensible to describe it as “2” within our existing normative framework. The grammar of our lifeform—our shared ways of understanding—makes certain interpretations possible while ruling out others. This doesn’t imply an external, objective reality that constrains us, but rather that the rules of the grammar itself establish what is intelligible. Thus, a description that challenges the existing framework would need to offer a compelling normative perspective to be accepted as meaningful.

These perspectives suggest that business ethics requires an approach grounded in a sensitivity to the normative frameworks governing each situation. Traditional terminology such as “moral reasons” or “morally required/prohibited” is often ambiguous or unhelpful in business contexts because it fails to capture the behaviour that is normatively expected or refused. G.E.M. Anscombe (Reference Anscombe1958) argued that:

Norms within a life form provide a framework that is as concrete as it is flexible. Norms guide our perceptions, judgments, and evaluations, forming the basis for actions. From a phenomenological perspective, business ethics could be more about engaging with the specific normative “grammar” of business contexts. This involves recognizing where norms are missing, unclear, or contradicting from the perspectives of various actors or probing the taken-for-granted assumptions underlying current practices. Instead of the attempt of applying abstract principles to a certain context, support comes through narratives, examples, and other concrete normative expressions aimed at clarifying or evolving the shared understanding. Crucially, this highlights that because justification operates within the grammar of a life form and lacks an external arbiter of “correctness,” the normative weight of competing descriptions ultimately derives from their resonance and ability to compellingly guide action within that shared understanding.

For example, if a business seeks to navigate conflicting interests among stakeholders, the decision may hinge less on abstract principles than on how it aligns with the normative expectations of those stakeholders. In this sense, business ethics becomes an exercise in translating complex situations into meaningful, normatively rich descriptions that resonate within the business’s unique cultural and social context.

Cultivating this sensitivity in organizational decision-making, while challenging, might be aided by specific interpretive strategies and heuristic questions. Rather than evoking universal principles, managers can become more attuned to the operative normative frameworks by focusing on:

• • Analyzing different interpretations of contexts: Explicitly asking: What different interpretations (e.g., finance, engineering, marketing, community relations, environment, technical standards) are intersecting in this situation? What are the implicit rules, goals, and measures of success within each perspective? Where does the language used (such as “efficiency,” “risk,” or “value”) carry different meanings or normative weight depending on the interpretations?

• • Deep stakeholder perspective-taking: Moving beyond identifying stakeholder interests to actively attempting to articulate the situation from within their specific grammar or life form. How would they describe the problem, the stakes, and a “good” outcome? This requires more than empathy; it demands interpretive effort.

• • Deconstructing dominant narratives: Examining the prevailing stories or descriptions used to frame the situation. Who is telling the story? What metaphors or analogies are employed? What aspects are highlighted, and which are obscured? Actively exploring alternative narratives can expose the contingency of the dominant framing and the normative choices embedded within it (Hosking, Reference Hosking2011).

These interpretive strategies do not offer solutions but function as practical heuristics. They encourage a more reflective and dialogical approach, helping decision-makers diagnose normative ambiguities or conflicts and engage more effectively with the descriptive-normative complexity inherent in real-world ethical challenges.

Ultimately, the view presented here offers business ethics a model that embraces a practical, context-sensitive approach to normativity. In this model, business ethics does not strive for a universally valid moral judgment but rather seeks to cultivate sensitivity to the contextual norms that shape ethical understanding and guide actions. Such an approach values the subtleties of language, practice, and situation over the universality of abstract principles. By emphasizing the descriptive and normative interplay, business ethics can become a more dynamic and contextually responsive practice, oriented toward real-world ethical challenges rather than abstract moral problems.