EKRE: Formation process and ideological prerogatives

EKRE was founded in 2012 after a merger between the erstwhile (centre-right) People’s Union of Estonia/Eestimaa Rahvaliit and the more nationalistic pressure group Estonian Patriotic Movement/Eesti Rahvuslik Liikumine. In 2011, the remainder of the People’s Union commenced talks with the Estonian Patriotic Movement, which comprised EKRE’s current chairman, Martin Helme. By that time, Mart Helme’s (Martin’s father, EKRE’s founder, and chairman between 2013 and 2020) nationalist faction had taken over the People’s Union. EKRE’s “Konservatiivne Programm” (2015) pledges to enhance the institutional status of the Estonian language in the public sector and establish an adequate command of Estonian as a basic condition for election to the Riigikogu and the municipal bodies of administration (“Riik ja valitsemine” section).

Although regarding Estonia’s ethnic Russians as an essentially migrant community, EKRE subscribes to the state-sponsored integration strategy for ethnic Russians, with a non-regulated citizen status (“stateless persons”)Footnote ¹ who were born in the country. However, naturalized individuals must give up any previous nationality and possess only Estonian citizenship (“Kodanik ja Kodanikuühiskond” section). Meanwhile, EKRE has warned that “we are very sceptical towards the migration waves from Slavic countries (Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine) to Estonia … it might not be an exaggeration to assert that, in 30 years from now, the majority population in Estonia will be Russian speaking” (Interview with the chairman of EKRE, 12 October 2016, Tallinn).

EKRE’s prerogatives on citizenship have been structured in such a way as to interlink the question of the ethnic Russian minority in Estonia with the area of foreign policy — emphasizing the necessity to prolong the securitization of relations with the eastern neighbor. EKRE has been insisting that Estonia must upgrade its security status vis-à-vis Russia, and its leadership has demanded compensation from Russia for the damage inflicted under Soviet rule (“Konservatiivne Programm,” “Välis ja julgeolekupoliitika” section) (Petsinis and Wierenga Reference Petsinis and Wierenga2021, 5).

EKRE’s Euroscepticism interlinks the party’s commitment to the main premises of Estonian ethno-nationalism with geopolitics. The party argued that the core states within the EU have allegedly underestimated the security threat that Russia represents for the Baltic States. EKRE contended that membership of the EU did not enhance Estonia’s security status vis-à-vis Russia (Eurovalimiste Platvorm 2014). Moreover, it expressed its discontent towards Germany’s alleged apathy vis-à-vis Russia’s aggressive stance towards the Baltic States and the cooperation with Moscow in energy issues prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (Petsinis and Wierenga Reference Petsinis and Wierenga2021, 6).

Alongside commitment to ethno-nationalist prerogatives, EKRE has anchored its active policymaking in anti-establishment rhetoric and grassroots activism (Saarts Reference Saarts2024, 10–13). As early as 2012, the party judged that “the current state of political affairs in Estonia favours the interests of specific segments within the society in a one-sided manner” and that it is characterized by an “excessive, often undemocratic, centralization of power with no independent vision of development” (“Konservatiivne Manifest” 2012).

The pledge to combat “political corruption” forms an important component in EKRE’s rhetoric. The party aspired to develop a code of ethics for politicians and put politicians and political parties that are “harmful or dangerous to the state in the spotlight” (“Konservatiivne Programm” 2015: “Õigus ja Korrakaitse” section). In 2019, EKRE placed additional emphasis on “the right of popular initiative to hold binding referendums” and “direct instruments for making political decisions” (“Riigikogu 2019”). Therefore, as early as the mid and late 2010s, its leadership had succeeded in fashioning EKRE as a modern party of the European radical right that, alongside commitment to Estonian ethno-nationalism, was capable of castigating symptoms of corruption and capitalizing on nascent Euroscepticism (Braghiroli and Petsinis Reference Braghiroli and Petsinis2019, 437; Trumm Reference Trumm2018; Saarts et al. Reference Saarts, Jakobson and Kalev2021, 361–362).

NA: Formation process and ideological prerogatives

NA evolved out of the merger between TB/LNNK (“For Fatherland and Freedom”/“Latvian National Independent Movement”) and “All for Latvia!”/Visu Latviai! on 23 July 2011. NA, like EKRE, fits the prototype of a “cadre party” that came into being after the unification of two pre-existing entities.

Ethno-nationalism forms an essential pillar for NA. In the “Extensive Programme for the 13th Saeima (national assembly)” (2018), the party summarized its core values as “… the Latvian nation, language and culture, honour and remembrance of heroes, independence and growth of Latvia” (NA 2018a, 1). NA calls for the “… spiritual continuation of the Latvian people — strengthening the Latvian language, culture, collective memory and sense of belonging” (ibid.). The party underlines that “maintaining the national culture and Latvian language is a crucial priority for the country’s growth and an essential precondition for a cohesive society” (ibid., 110).

In a similar fashion to EKRE, NA has insisted on upgrading Latvia’s security status vis-à-vis Russia. To safeguard sovereignty, NA has pledged to: (a) prevent “pro-Russian forces” (namely, the party of Harmony) from entering the government; (b) upgrade the armed forces under the auspices of NATO (NA 2018a, 87–90; NA 2018b; Petsinis and Wierenga Reference Petsinis and Wierenga2021, 7–8). On the naturalization process of “stateless persons,” NA, throughout 2017, contested the Saeima’s proposal for the provision of Latvian citizenship to the children born to “stateless” families without the necessary assent of one of the two parents (Interview with a NA MEP, 13 October 2017, Riga).Footnote ² Along similar lines to EKRE, the party also holds that “the Russian-speaking migrant community in Latvia is self-sufficient … expanding the Russian-speaking migrant community by attracting new (Russian-speaking) migrants from the post-Soviet space cannot be supported” (NA 2018a, 22–23).

NA’s Euroscepticism, like that of EKRE, interlinks a commitment to the main premises of Latvian ethno-nationalism with geopolitics. NA voiced skepticism over the extent to which EU membership can enhance Latvia’s security status vis-à-vis Russia (Petsinis and Wierenga Reference Petsinis and Wierenga2021, 8–9). In particular, its leadership had stated in 2016 that “Germany may not like it, but we must protect our national interests. It is obvious that this project (Nord Stream II) threatens the security of Latvia and the Baltic States, therefore we must not remain silent about it.”Footnote ³

According to Auers and Kasekamp (Reference Auers, Kasekamp, Wodak and Khosravinik2013, 75), “All for Latvia!” “… ticks all the necessary boxes for a modern radical right populist party. It has followed the rhetorical master frame of the radical right and has a charismatic leader in Raivis Dzintars, the founder and driving force behind ‘All for Latvia!’.” Nevertheless, in contrast to EKRE, the anti-systemic tones in NA’s political engagement progressively eroded. For instance, although occasionally levying criticism at the media, the party’s affiliates have refrained from conceptualizing Latvia’s media-sphere as part of the “corrupt establishment” (Petsinis and Wierenga Reference Petsinis and Wierenga2021, 21).

Furthermore, although generally maintaining a sovereigntist stance on European politics, unlike EKRE (“Eurovalimiste 2019”; Points 1, 4, and 5), NA never hinted at the right of member states to leave the EU. NA’s “de-radicalization” and transformation into a party of the national conservative right have been subject to its continuous participation in four government coalitions: 2011, 2014, 2019, and the current one. This is indicative of the idiosyncratic particularities that characterize the Latvian party system vis-à-vis the Estonian one.

Before proceeding to an empirical discussion of the qualitative differences between the Estonian and Latvian party-systems and how they have impacted the political engagement of EKRE and NA, to enhance the reader’s understanding, it is essential to: (a) introduce the umbrella-concept of the “broader right” as a multifaceted notion whose internal boundaries are not fixed, but “porous,” and malleable; (b) provide a contextual overview of the fluidity and transformative trajectories among contemporary parties of the radical, national conservative, and extreme right across Europe.

Latvia: A state of continuity

Barring the party of Harmony from the government emerged as a necessity for several centrist and centre-right parties (for example, The Conservatives, “Development For!” and New Unity) across Latvia’s political spectrum. Launched on 10 February 2010, Harmony triggered the apprehension of the predominantly “Latvian” parties based on its: (a) largely ethnic Russian bases of support; (b) calls for a foreign policy of appeasement vis-à-vis Russia (Petsinis Reference Petsinis2022, 109).

Between 2010 and 2018, Harmony, in its own right, finished as the largest party in a sequence of parliamentary elections and joined the Socialists and Democrats at the European Parliament. Nevertheless, due to its lack of credibility among the majority of Latvia’s political forces, Harmony had been essentially treated as an “outcast” party (Braghiroli and Petsinis Reference Braghiroli and Petsinis2019, 438). The objective to keep Harmony away from power and the ensuing formation of heterogeneous, often fragile, coalition governments benefited the NA in certain ways.

NA was granted ample opportunity to promote its standpoints — especially those pertaining to “demographic issues” (ibid., 439). Between 2015 and 2018, the Saeima approved the party’s proposals for parental and dependent child benefits and incorporated them into the state’s legislation (NA 2018a, 43). Moreover, the Ministry of Welfare was assigned to NA in several governments. NA’s uninterrupted spell in government was a major catalyst that gradually alleviated its early anti-systemic speech, transforming it into a party of the national conservative right.

Estonia: “Situational adaptability”

As in Latvia, (a lesser degree of) fragmentation also resulted in the formation of a series of coalition governments since Estonia regained its independence. Whereas the Latvian party system hints at a continuity in its relations with “unreliable” political actors, a “situational adaptability” can be detected in Estonia since the mid-2010s. This “adaptability” has been subject to the impact of “pragmatic” decision making at a party leadership level amid lower levels of volatility in comparison to Latvia’s party system (Saarts and Sootla Reference Saarts, Sootla, Bergman, Ilonszki and Hellström2023).

For instance, the (centrist/centre-left) Centre Party/Eesti Keskerakond is a party that, in a comparable fashion to Harmony, has: (a) built a support base within Estonia’s ethnic Russian minority; (b) called for a foreign policy of appeasement vis-à-vis Russia. This generated a considerable level of apprehension vis-à-vis the Centre Party among powerful political actors within Estonia — for example, the (liberal, centre-right) Reform Party/Reformierakond. Nevertheless, in contrast to the cordon sanitaire around Harmony, the Centre Party was admitted into two coalitions during the 2000s (2002 and 2003 — together with the Reform Party) and into two more during the 2010s (2016Footnote ⁴ and 2019).

Moving to EKRE, this party’s anti-systemic tones were the main reason why EKRE was excluded from negotiations for the formation of government coalitions until November 2016. However, in March 2019, EKRE was accepted in a coalition together with the Centre Party and the (conservative/centre-right) Isamaa (“Fatherland”) as the third, smaller partner. Political pragmatism came into play through a mutual focus, by the leaderships of EKRE and the Centre Party, on those policymaking areas where a common ground could be detected while downplaying sources of friction.

Two areas where a common ground was found were: (a) the increase of child and family benefits and incentives for Estonians who emigrated abroad to return (Jakobson et al. Reference Jakobson, Saarts, Kalev, Kernalegenn and van Haute2020); (b) the shared objections of the Centre Party and EKRE to the European Commission’s refugee quotas (Petsinis Reference Petsinis2022, 114). EKRE’s inclusion in the government (2019–2021) granted the party an opportunity to promote its prerogatives. Unlike NA, though, this did not bring about an alleviation of EKRE’s anti-establishment rhetoric and patterns of policymaking.

“Hyper-securitization” in the Baltic States (2014–2022)

Russia’s invasion of Georgia (1–16 August 2008) generated shockwaves across the Baltic States. Nevertheless, it was Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Donbass (February–April 2014) that intensified the calls for increasing the securitization of bilateral relations with Russia. Andžāns (Reference Andžāns2023) argues that these developments resulted in a “hyper-securitization” of the relations between the Baltic States and Russia.

Securitization in Political Science and IR can be tentatively defined as “the inability to solve a problem as a part of normal political practice” (Buzan et al. Reference Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde1998, 29; Andžāns Reference Andžāns2023, 139). The principal agents that securitize a referent object (usually a given state or society) can be the state institutions, the political establishment, or interest groups with an influential status and role within a society (Andžāns and Sprūds Reference Andžāns and Sprūds2021, 192). In the traditional sense, securitization is conducted via a speech act (Buzan et al. Reference Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde1998, 29). The success of a securitizing project is measured by the extent to which the securitizing agents manage to convince their audience (usually the society at large) that the referent object (for example, a given state) is facing an existential threat (Buzan et al. Reference Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde1998, 21–42; Andžāns and Sprūds Reference Andžāns and Sprūds2021, 192). Of greater interest for the purposes of this piece is the concept of hyper-securitization.

Buzan conceptualized hyper-securitization as “a tendency both to exaggerate threats and to resort to excessive countermeasures arising from an exaggerated sense of insecurity and anticipation of a high level of security” (Buzan Reference Buzan2004, 172). In light of “hybrid” (for example, cybernetic) warfare and its increasing significance, Hanssen and Nissenbaum reconceptualized hyper-securitization no longer as an “exaggerated” but as an occasionally rational response to threats lurking within the continuously expanding web-sphere (Hanssen and Nissenbaum Reference Hanssen and Nissenbaum2009, 1164). Attention here is paid to Andžāns’ reformulation of hyper-securitization as “securitization processes advancing significantly beyond the previous levels of securitization in terms of securitization intensity and the number of securitizing actors” (Andžāns Reference Andžāns2023, 143).

This conceptualization is of direct relevance to Estonia and Latvia, where, since 2008, the post-Soviet space has been regarded by policymakers as a geopolitical whole — capable of generating developments that can exert immediate ramifications on domestic politics and societal stability in these two states. Of crucial significance have been anxieties over information and cyber warfare, emanating from Russian-based agencies, against Estonia and Latvia — especially following the “Bronze Soldier” riots (26–29 April 2007) in Estonia (Interview with a policy adviser at the Government Office of Estonia, 1 December 2017, Tallinn)Footnote ⁵ and the language referendum of 18 February 2012 in Latvia (Ijabs Reference Ijabs2016, 10–12).Footnote ⁶

Estonia: The peak-point of hyper-securitization

Annus (Reference Annus2020, 8–12, 18–19) argues that, in the 2010s, Estonian policymakers placed a more pronounced stress on novel imageries that visualized Estonia as a successful and globally outgoing “eco-digital” nation. Nevertheless, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine rendered Estonian ethno-nationalism, especially its “de-Sovietization” component (Annus Reference Annus2012; Peiker Reference Peiker2016, 114; Petsinis Reference Petsinis2022, 93–94), increasingly relevant again while bringing its geopolitical implications back to the fore. This manifested in both foreign and domestic politics. For the purposes of this article, in Estonia, the political “mainstream,” regarding stances on the war in Ukraine, can be schematically defined as comprising the three parties of the governing coalition (Reformierakond, the centre-left Social Democrats/SDE, and the centrist/neoliberal Eesti 200) together with Isamaa.

On 24 February 2022, the Riigikogu condemned the invasion and, in October 2022, voted to declare Russia a “terrorist state” (Riigikogu 2022; Jakobson and Kasekamp Reference Jakobson, Kasekamp, Ivaldi and Zankina2023, 118). When a proposal to declare Russia an international sponsor of terrorism appeared before the European Parliament, all Estonian deputies, including EKRE’s MEP Jaak Madison, granted their approval (Jakobson and Kasekamp Reference Jakobson, Kasekamp, Ivaldi and Zankina2023, 118). By February 2023, Estonia provided shelter to 123,000 Ukrainian refugees — being the largest recipient of Ukrainian refugees on a per capita basis globally (ibid., 119).

This decision resonated with the welcoming disposition among Estonians toward the accommodation of Ukrainian refugees (Turu-Uuringute AS Reference Turu-Uuringute2023, 11). Throughout 2024, Estonia increased its defence spending to 3 percent of its GDP and became one of the most generous supporters of Ukraine worldwide (Jakobson, Reference Jakobson, Ivaldi and Zankina2024, 140). Jakobson and Kasekamp (Reference Jakobson, Kasekamp, Ivaldi and Zankina2023, 119) argue that “…. in certain ways, the more liberal right-wing parties have begun to move into EKRE’s nationalist and authoritarian niche [after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022].” One characteristic example was a joint proposal, submitted to the Riigikogu by the Reform Party and Isamaa in 2022, to revoke the right of permanent residents who are citizens of Russia to vote in local elections (as recommended by EKRE in 2017) (Ibid.; Schulze and Pupcenoks Reference Schulze and Pupcenoks2025, 7–12).

Meanwhile, a series of Soviet-era war memorials were systematically removed from Tartu, Pärnu, Narva, Rakvere, and elsewhere (Sazonov and Yatsyk Reference Sazonov and Yatsyk2024, 1–2; Schulze and Pupcenoks Reference Schulze and Pupcenoks2025, 10–11). Minister of Interior, Lauri Läänemets from SDE, and other party representatives (for example, Eesti 200) approved this decision as a move towards the ultimate ‘de-Sovietization’ of the Estonian society and public space (for example, “monuments of the Soviet era glorify foreign domination” and “it is a high time to officially bid farewell to this [the Soviet] period”), (Sazonov and Yatsyk Reference Sazonov and Yatsyk2024, 4).

EKRE reacts: The domestic dimension

EKRE granted its assent to the removal of Soviet-era monuments. Martin Helme approved the project, adding that “… anyone who expresses support for Russian aggression in Estonia, whether they are marching with Russian flags and St. George ribbons on May 9^th or praising ‘de-Nazification’ on Facebook, must be immediately expelled from the country” (Raid Reference Raid2022). Other EKRE-affiliates underlined that “Red memorials are symbols of suffering” and reckoned that “it is high time to do so [that is, remove these memorials]” (Sazonov and Yatsyk Reference Sazonov and Yatsyk2024, 5–6).

One might argue that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine bolstered, by default, EKRE’s project for an intensive “de-Sovietization” of the society and a decisive break from any remaining Soviet vestiges. It also provided the party with another trajectory to construct a discursive bridge between the Soviet legacies in Estonia and Russia’s contemporary geopolitical objectives across the post-Soviet space. In this light, EKRE’s stance on the removal of the Soviet-era memorials represents a “linear” continuity with the party’s founding prerogatives for an ultimate “decolonization” from the Soviet era.

However, EKRE voiced certain objections to the accommodation of Ukrainian refugees in Estonia and proposed their repatriation when the war is over (Jakobson Reference Jakobson, Ivaldi and Zankina2024, 142). Amid allegations over the spread of HIV and prostitution,Footnote ⁷ EKRE’s leadership judged that the settlement of, largely Russian-speaking, migrants in Estonia can backfire and accelerate the “Russification” of the Estonian schools and the society at a time of demographic decline (Jakobson and Kasekamp Reference Jakobson, Kasekamp, Ivaldi and Zankina2023, 19). Here, one can discern one more continuity in EKRE’s rhetoric — regarding allegations over the perils of “East Slavic immigration,” Mart Helme’s opposition to “blue-collar” immigration from Ukraine (2019), and older endeavors to incorporate health-related concerns (for example, the spread of COVID-19 in 2020) into EKRE’s platform against immigration (Petsinis and Wierenga Reference Petsinis and Wierenga2021, 11–12). More on this issue is said later when placing EKRE’s anti-systemic disposition into context.

EKRE reacts: The international dimension

Nevertheless, it was the “external” dimension of the war in Ukraine that generated the greatest controversy. Although condemning the invasion, EKRE’s public statement (10 April 2022) reiterated that there exist limits to the military aid that Estonia can provide to Ukraine and the number of refugees that it can accommodate.Footnote ⁸ EKRE’s MP Leo Kunnas underlined that “the goal to assist Ukraine is noble … however, it should not be carried out at the expense of Estonia’s own defence capability” (1 October 2022).Footnote ⁹ On top of all, Mart Helme assessed that “the best solution would be a peace treaty, no matter how hard it would be for both sides … We are not on Russia’s side, and we are not on Ukraine’s side; we are on the side of peace” (27 October 2022).Footnote ¹⁰

At first glance, one might argue that Helme’s statement resonates with the “pro-peace” trend, which has been a regular occurrence among ideologically akin to EKRE, parties of the European “broader right” (for example, Hungary’s FIDESZ, France’s National Rally/RN, and the Alternative for Germany/AfD). This “pro-peace” stance generally stems from those parties’ proclaimed commitment to a foreign policy that prioritizes sovereignty and the national interest — irrespective of any alliances in global politics (Chryssogelos Reference Chryssogelos2021). In the case of EKRE, though, one should pay attention to the specificities of Estonian politics and this party’s pattern of anti-systemic engagement.

What does EKRE’s anti-systemic disposition have to do with it?

EKRE view themselves as the most “ideological” party in Estonia with regard to their devotion to founding principles and political values (Saarts et al. Reference Saarts, Jakobson and Kalev2021, 356 and 362). Moreover, EKRE’s policymakers pride themselves as “the party that stands for the average Estonian” (Interview with the chairman of EKRE, 12 October 2016, Tallinn). Russia’s invasion of Ukraine indirectly bolstered EKRE’s prerogatives for a definitive dissociation from any Soviet legacies. However, the Russian invasion simultaneously triggered a renewed commitment of the governing coalition (Reform Party, Eesti 200, and SDE) to Estonian ethno-nationalist principles.

Since 2022, this has brought about a complicated situation for EKRE. On the one hand, the party cannot revise its allegiance to the fundamental principles of Estonian ethno-nationalism or reassess its stance on the ramifications that geopolitical developments across the post-Soviet space can exert on domestic politics. On the other hand, though, it appears that EKRE’s policymakers do not want to create the impression that they “passively” align with the policies of Estonia’s governing coalition on the war in Ukraine, either.

The latter aspect is of great significance, considering that EKRE hosts an extensive infrastructure of mass mobilization (for example, Sinine Äratus and the party’s websites) that has assisted the party in communicating its anti-establishment rhetoric (Saarts Reference Saarts2024, 10 and 12). For instance, during the migrant crisis (2015–2016), EKRE not only accused the government of “lying to the public” about the EU’s refugee quotas (Petsinis Reference Petsinis2022, 116). It also mobilized its supporters through public protests against the settlement of migrants from MENA in Estonia (ibid.).

To demonstrate that it still “stands for the average Estonian,” EKRE, between 2022 and 2023, shifted its focus on inflationFootnote ¹¹ an the increase in electricity prices.Footnote ¹² This emphasis on the troubled economy, whether interlinking it with the impact of the war in Ukraine (for example, FIDESZ in Hungary) or purported governmental inefficiency (for example, Croatia’s Homeland Movement), emerged as a frequent practice among parties of the “broader right” during that period. Although blaming the increasing energy prices on the EU’s “Green Deal”Footnote ¹³ and not the war, EKRE kept defending its “pro-peace” stand on Ukraine as an indication of its commitment to the national interest.

At this point, one should keep in mind that this was not the first occasion, during recent years, when EKRE’s leadership caused controversy over questions pertaining to Ukraine in their attempts to promote the party’s nativist and anti-establishment principles. In September 2019, Mart Helme, as former Minister of Interior in the then governing coalition, issued a (rejected) proposal for the unilateral revocation of the visa-free regime for Ukrainian citizens along the lines that “… we are facing immigration pressure from the East, especially Ukraine …. the people who are coming here are not really Ukrainians, rather they are Russians from Eastern Ukraine, or Russified Ukrainians, or just Homos Sovieticus.”Footnote ¹⁴ On that occasion, Mart Helme made use of a perceived internal divide within Ukraine (for example, East “versus” West; Russian-speakers “versus” Ukrainian-speakers) to promote EKRE’s nativist prerogatives.

One should also consider that EKRE has recently been endeavoring to approach Estonia’s ethnic Russian minority more systematically. In 2021, the party appointed ethnic Russian candidates from the region of Ida-Virumaa (northeastern Estonia) and elsewhere for the municipal and local elections.Footnote ¹⁵ Of particular interest was EKRE’s attempt to engage the ethnic Russian minority along the lines of “shared conservative concerns” and over questions such as same-sex marriage (Braghiroli and Makarychev Reference Braghiroli and Makarychev2022; Ploom, Sazonov, and Foster Reference Ploom, Sazonov, Foster, Vladimir, Holger and Camelia2023). One might argue that EKRE’s engagement within the ethnic Russian community could have provided an additional incentive for the party’s adoption of a “pro-peace” line over the war in Ukraine. Nevertheless, there is evidence that EKRE’s highly (Estonian) ethnocentric agenda still puts off ethnic Russians from voting for it.Footnote ¹⁶ More importantly, this enquiry prioritizes a focus on the interaction among different actors in party politics, the “broader right” in particular.

In any case, the period between 2022 and 2024 witnessed a steady decline in EKRE’s popularity. In the European elections (2024), EKRE claimed 14.8 percent of the vote and finished fourth — after Isamaa, SDE, and the Reform Party.Footnote ¹⁷ More importantly, MEP Jaak Madison and other high-profile members departed from the party in June 2024. EKRE’s ambiguous stance vis-à-vis the war in Ukraine purportedly functioned as a major catalyst behind their decision.Footnote ¹⁸

Regarding its growing popularity, one might classify Isamaa as a party that is currently oscillating between the sub-categories of the mainstream conservative and the national conservative right. One might argue that this party’s ostensibly more “consistent” and stable programmatic standpoints on maintaining bilateral relations between Estonia and Russia securitized render Isamaa a more reliable option for the right-leaning electorate than EKRE — especially since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.Footnote ¹⁹ A relatively stable national conservative platform, combined with feeble anti-systemic stances, emerges as a common denominator between Isamaa in Estonia and NA in Latvia — the latter being a party with an uninterrupted presence in the halls of power.

Latvia: The peak-point of hyper-securitization

As in Estonia, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine rendered Latvian ethno-nationalism, especially its “de-Sovietization” component (Jirgens Reference Jirgens and Johansson-Cartee2006, 45; Veinberg Reference Veinberg2017, 3), increasingly relevant again — impacting foreign and domestic policy. On 24 February 2022, the Saeima issued a resolution that condemned “the military aggression of the Russian Federation and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine” (Andžāns Reference Andžāns2023, 144). President Egils Levits urged the international community to impose “the harshest possible sanctions to punish Russia and send it into isolation” (ibid.).

Between 2022 and 2023, Latvian envoys joined their Polish, Lithuanian, and Estonian counterparts in their calls for an increased securitization of relations with Russia on the part of international organizations. The Latvian deputies urged for an upgrade in military aid to Ukraine from NATOFootnote ²⁰ and the EU,Footnote ²¹ and Russia’s expulsion from the Council of Europe.Footnote ²² These stances resonated with the positive inclinations among Latvian citizens on the provision of military aid to Ukraine (second only to Estonia on the basis of GDP) and the acceptance of Ukrainian refugees in Latvia (Auers Reference Auers, Ivaldi and Zankina2023, 207, and Reference Auers, Ivaldi and Zankina2024, 257).

In April 2022, Latvia shut the Russian consulates in Liepāja and Daugavpils in an act of protest against the invasion and as a gesture of solidarity with Ukraine.Footnote ²³ Meanwhile, the systematic removal of Soviet-era memorials was put under way (Schulze and Pupcenoks Reference Schulze and Pupcenoks2025, 15–16). This project culminated with the dismantlement of the “Victory” monument from Riga on 25 August 2022 (Ricci Reference Ricci2024, 8–10). As in Estonia, political actors from across the centrist and centre-right spectrum (for example, the New Unity, The Conservatives, and the United List) greeted this decision as a move towards the ultimate “de-Sovietization” of the Latvian society and public space (ibid., 10–14). PM Kariņš (New Unity) underlined that “these relics of the occupation times can be regarded as a reminder of some sort that has no place in our country anymore” (Schulze and Pupcenoks Reference Schulze and Pupcenoks2025, 15).

NA reacts: Domestic and international dimensions

As with EKRE, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine bolstered, by default, NA’s project for an intensive “de-Sovietization” of the society. It equally provided the party with another trajectory to construct a discursive bridge between the Soviet legacies in Latvia and Russia’s contemporary geopolitical objectives across the post-Soviet space.

Correspondingly, NA applauded the dismantlement of “Victory,” which it dubbed “a pillar of shame” (Ricci Reference Ricci2024, 13). The party interlinked Latvia’s identity and memory politics under Soviet rule with Russia’s contemporary objectives by assessing that Soviet-era memorials represent “a daily reminder of our years of oppression and the aggressive policies of our eastern neighbor today” (ibid.). NA also advocated a securitization of domestic politics as a bulwark against lurking sympathizers of Vladimir Putin and the “Russian World/Russkiy Mir” (ibid.; Schulze and Pupcenoks Reference Schulze and Pupcenoks2025, 14).

According to Auers (Reference Auers, Ivaldi and Zankina2023, 208), the Russian invasion “shifted Latvia’s political centre to the right” and “mainstreamed” several of NA’s standpoints (for example, on the removal of Soviet-era monuments and the imposition of restrictions on the use of the Russian language in education and the public administration). Here, the term “mainstream” is employed to schematically categorize a multitude of political actors ranging from the centre/centre-right to the centre-left, inside as well as outside the governing coalition (for example, New Unity, The Conservatives, “Development For!,” and The Progressives/ Progresīvie) — regarding their stances vis-à-vis the war in Ukraine and from a wider perspective. Although some of these actors (for example, New Unity) have occasionally capitalized on the practice of “ethnic outbidding,” they did not oppose the institutional/public use of the Russian language or lobby for the removal of Soviet-era monuments to the same extent that NA did.

This “shifting process” emboldened NA to reiterate formerly “taboo” proposals such as the deportation of individuals (mainly foreign citizens) with “a proven pro-Kremlin record.”Footnote ²⁴ However, unlike EKRE, NA did not: (a) step out of line, in a confrontational manner, with its governmental partners; (b) oppose the accommodation of Ukrainian refugees in Latvia; (c) shift the focus on other policymaking areas (for example, the economy). Here, one might discern a “linear continuity,” regarding the party’s accommodating stances vis-à-vis its political partners, with other precedents from Latvia’s recent history (for example, the management of the migrant crisis of 2015–2016 and the COVID-19 emergency in 2020–2021) (Petsinis Reference Petsinis2022, 119–123).

NA did not step out of line with the government in the field of foreign policy, either. The party never adopted a “pro-peace” platform or opposed military aid to Ukraine along the lines of safeguarding the national interest. Instead, its affiliates advocated a tougher stance vis-à-vis Russia in the international organizations. Between 2023 and 2024, NA’s MEP Rihards Kols, in particular, issued a series of calls against disinformation campaigns emanating from RussiaFootnote ²⁵ and urged for Russia’s expulsion from major forums of international cooperation (for example, OSCE).Footnote ²⁶

What does NA’s accommodating stance have to do with it?

Here, one should pay attention to the contextual specificities of Latvia and NA’s accommodating pattern of engagement in domestic politics. NA’s “linear” participation in coalition governments since 2011 has concretized a strategy that consists of advancing the party’s main prerogatives (for example, on interethnic relations and “demographic issues”) from within the halls of power.

In contrast to EKRE, this accommodating tactic enabled NA to benefit from the “right-wing shift” among Latvia’s centrist and centre-right political forces after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This manifested through the removal of “Victory” and other Soviet-era monuments; the imposition of restrictions on Russian and Belarussian passport-holders who reside in Latvia (Schulze and Pupcenoks Reference Schulze and Pupcenoks2025, 13–14)Footnote ²⁷; the reconsideration of proposals for the establishment of a “unified and more viable” educational system and a (state-sponsored) media sphere with Latvian as the main language of instruction and broadcasting, respectively (ibid., 14–15).

NA’s programme for the 14^th Saeima reiterates the party’s standpoints for: (a) a ban on those media and the deportation of individuals that spread Kremlin’s propaganda; (b) the full transition to teaching in Latvian at all levels of public education; (c) the dismantlement of monuments that “glorify Soviet occupation” (NA 2024; “Safe Latvia” and “Latvian Latvia” sections). At the same time, NA insists on the: (a) provision of “family,” “demographic,” and other benefits (for example, to young couples and families with many children, pensioners, startup entrepreneurs, and small producers) with the objective to reverse demographic decline and reduce social inequalities; (b) revitalization of less developed regions along the eastern borderline (namely, Latgale), (ibid.; “Growing Latvia” section). This combination of ethno-nationalist and “pro-welfare” standpoints enabled the party to maintain a grip on its electorate in the ethnically more homogeneous (Latvian) constituencies in Vidzeme (northern Latvia), Zemgale (Central-Western Latvia), and Riga — especially those clustering in the lower middle class (Petsinis Reference Petsinis2022, 103).

In contrast to EKRE’s decline in popularity, the period between 2022 and 2024 witnessed an increase in electoral support for NA. In the European elections (2024), NA garnered 22.07 percent of the vote and finished second after the New Unity (25.09 percent).Footnote ²⁸ Harmony’s steady decline in popularity in the national (2022) and European elections was a catalyst that additionally invigorated NA’s status. For the first time in its history, Harmony did not elect a single deputy to the Saeima. Harmony’s underperformance was interpreted as a consequence of its ambiguous stance and initial reluctance to condemn the Russian invasion — as well as the emergence of intra-party dissent and splits (Schulze and Pupcenoks Reference Schulze and Pupcenoks2025, 13 and 17; Kascian Reference Kascian2024, 144 and 150; Auers Reference Auers, Ivaldi and Zankina2024, 251).Footnote ²⁹ Nevertheless, this is not to understate NA’s situationally adaptive engagement and the way that it enabled the party to capitalize on the turbulent state of domestic politics in Latvia amidst the external ramifications of the war in Ukraine.