Democratic innovations: A genetic approach

The scholarly debate on the key features of citizen participation has been intense and long-standing in modern history. Some scholars have viewed with scepticism the implementation of practices beyond the election of representatives, which they regard as the primary mechanism for ensuring stable regimes (Schumpeter Reference Schumpeter1976). In contrast, participatory democrats have advocated for stronger democracies based on expanding citizen engagement beyond the ballot box, aiming to ensure more inclusive political participation (Barber Reference Barber1984). Building on similar assumptions, deliberative democrats have emphasised the value of fostering thoughtful citizen reflection on key public issues alongside state action, within settings characterised by equality, inclusivity, and mutual respect (Habermas Reference Habermas1992).

While participatory and deliberative democrats share a common concern with the role of citizens in the democratic system, their approaches have often diverged in operational terms, though they may at times be complementary. Participatory approaches typically promote broad engagement aimed at empowering social groups directly affected by specific issues (Pateman Reference Pateman1970). Deliberative approaches, by contrast, tend to involve smaller samples of participants, often randomly selected, with minipublics among the most well-known examples of this model (Bächtiger and Goldberg Reference Bächtiger and Goldberg2020). The diffusion of participatory and deliberative approaches has attracted increasing scholarly attention, culminating in Smith’s (Reference Smith2009) conceptualisation of democratic innovations as institutions that deepen the role of citizens in decision-making. More recently, Elstub and Escobar (Reference Elstub, Escobar, Elstub and Escobar2019) have argued that democratic innovations help to reimagine the role of citizens in democratic governance.

Democratic innovations are thought to enhance the overall quality of representative democracy and to help bridge the gap between institutions and citizens (Newton and Geißel Reference Newton and Geißel2012). This argument has gained traction in recent years, particularly in light of widely discussed trends of democratic backsliding, spurred by multiple, simultaneous crises and growing public disaffection with political institutions (Warren Reference Warren2017). In response, scholars have argued that democratic innovations may increase political trust and the legitimacy of decision-making by creating a positive feedback loop between institutions and their constituencies (Dryzek and Hendriks Reference Dryzek, Hendriks, Fischer and Gottweis2020). Indeed, such efforts hold the potential to transform power relations within society and to address long-standing injustices (Wright Reference Wright2010). This suggests that civil society organisations and movements can play a crucial role as partners of the state within democratic innovations, provided they have equitable access to decision-making on issues of public concern (della Porta and Felicetti Reference della Porta and Felicetti2022).

Innovative practices that bring together institutional and social actors around matters of public concern rest on the premise that democracy is far from monolithic and does not self-replicate through time. Therefore, innovation can be historically and contextually situated through Bourdieu’s genetic approach.

Bourdieu conceptualises the state as the exercise of symbolic imposition that shapes institutions and practices (Bourdieu Reference Bourdieu and Nice1977). State structures become naturalised within society and are embodied through individual habitus, which in turn shape and signify the structures themselves. Through genetic analysis, Bourdieu contends that the state – and everything that derives from it – can be understood as a historical construct, since we, along with our ways of thinking, are ‘inventions of the state’ (Bourdieu Reference Bourdieu, Champagne, Lenoir, Poupeau, Rivière and Fernbach2024, p. 115). By striving to free ourselves from preconstructed mental categories, the universal forms of the state within specific fields can be uncovered, and the logic of historical change made visible.

Within this framework, democratic innovations can be understood as embodiments of the state–society relation, underpinned and shaped by patterns of participation specific to different historical stages. In Bourdieu’s terms, democratic innovations can be seen as fields in which the state has acted according to specific rules – provided that these ‘games’ are capable of transforming the rules themselves through the action of society. This dynamic reveals the tension at the heart of democracy’s evolving nature, as democratic innovations – and state–society relations more broadly – simultaneously reflect and reshape that evolution. In a similar vein, Baiocchi (Reference Baiocchi2005) refers to ‘state–civil society regimes’ as the creation of specific logics that sustain practices of citizen engagement, redefining the balance of power and the role of the past in shaping the present.

Setting the scene: The Carnation Revolution

The dictatorial regime in Portugal maintained a combination of overt repression and ‘enforced apathy’ that – despite Caetano’s late attempt to introduce limited liberalising reforms – proved incapable of reforming itself and was ultimately overthrown on 25 April 1974 (Hammond Reference Hammond1988). Fascist ideology had deeply permeated state institutions, and the fall of the dictatorship is still widely regarded as the most significant event in the country’s modern history (Magalhães, Ramos, Madeira et al. Reference Magalhães, Ramos, Madeira, Raimundo, Flores, Santana Pereira, Heyne, Cabrita, Manucci and Vicente2024). Among the key drivers of the military coup that precipitated this collapse were enduring public discontent with forced labour and the immense economic and human costs of the colonial wars in Portugal’s former African territories (Varela, Simões de Paço, Alcântara et al. Reference Varela, Simões do Paço, Alcântara and Ferreira2015). As the Portuguese Empire disintegrated, calls for decolonisation were accompanied by demands for development and democratisation.

The military forces garnered extraordinary support from civil society during the transition to democracy, making this social revolution a key reference point for historians and political scientists alike (Ramos Pinto Reference Ramos Pinto2013). As Fishman (Reference Fishman2019) put it, ‘[f]rom its first moments, the revolution created new symbols, forms of discourse, understandings, meanings, and practices’ (ibid., p. 46). The revolution liberated people from (self-)imposed privacy and suspicion; outdated institutions were swiftly excluded from the process of change, and marginalised social groups were actively encouraged to take part in the moment of state (re)invention (Hammond Reference Hammond1988). The rapid and complex developments of the ensuing revolutionary period remain, to this day, at the centre of public debate.

Transitioning to democracy in the mid-1970s

The Armed Forces Movement (Movimento das Forças Armadas, MFA), composed of veteran captains from the wars in the African colonies, played a pivotal role in the Carnation Revolution. The MFA quickly evolved into the key political force that established the Revolutionary Ongoing Process (Processo Revolucionário em Curso, PREC) between 1974 and 1975. In tandem with the MFA, the Communist Party and far-left groups collaborated in the monumental effort to eliminate the authoritarian legacy from state and society. The introduction of a specific form of council socialism was intended to place civil society at the centre (Costa Pinto, de Sousa and Magalhães et al. Reference Costa Pinto, de Sousa and Magalhães2013). Society welcomed the MFA’s plan to restore civil liberties and implement an economic policy, alongside the nationalisation of banks, insurance companies, and industries. As Bermeo (Reference Bermeo, Collier and Berins Collier1997) observed, there was a strong focus on the working class, with mass mobilisation playing a significant role in the emancipation of society. Progressive urban movements, particularly those involving students (Accornero Reference Accornero2019) and the Catholic Church, also contributed to the democratic transition (Papadogiannis and Ramos Pinto Reference Papadogiannis and Ramos Pinto2023).

As granularly examined by Hammond (Reference Hammond1988), the appropriation of the revolution by civil society laid the basis for what the author calls the ‘popular power model’, one that aimed to expand and deepen political participation for the people. Likewise, García-Espín (Reference García-Espín2025) has recently examined how nonelitist public discussions have significantly influenced historical transitional moments in neighbouring Spain and other regions. The specific type of participatory culture or atmosphere established through targeted mobilisation demonstrates a clear effort to include underrepresented social groups. In Portugal, popular participation was based on the reestablishment of social ownership over neighbourhoods, workplaces, and land.

People self-organised spontaneously at the local level through neighbourhood commissions composed of volunteers and officials appointed by the Ministry of the Interior to manage administration and direct popular participation (Ramos Pinto Reference Ramos Pinto2013; de Almeida Reference Almeida2022). These commissions advocated for stronger social welfare and the collective management of facilities and services, sometimes evolving into formal organisations and housing cooperatives (Ramos Pinto Reference Ramos Pinto2013). By working side by side with the authorities, commissions played a pivotal role in defining housing, water distribution, sewerage, transportation, medical, and childcare support policies (Fernandes Reference Fernandes2014). In fact, these commissions were seen as a means of practising direct democracy within a new political system based on collective decision-making and the expansion of individual consciousness. Most commissions were constituted by a first interim group that announced a public meeting in the neighbourhood, followed by the election of members by all residents (Hammond Reference Hammond1988). Initially focussed on immediate necessities and the improvement of housing conditions, many commissions later called for new housing and, in some cases, supported occupations.

In parallel, a key role was played by labour movements, which had contributed to the crisis of state power during the final years of the dictatorial regime and immediately afterwards through strikes and mobilisations (Noronha Reference Noronha2023). During the transition to democracy, factories became key sites of struggle and occupation, supported by newly formed workers’ committees (Pérez Suárez Reference Pérez Suárez, Cabreira and Varela2020). Workers demanded wage increases and pay equalisation between men and women, while officers who had collaborated with the old regime were replaced by workers’ commissions, elected through assemblies that produced ‘notebooks of collective claims’ (cadernos reivindicativos) detailing workers’ grievances (Lima Santos, Pires de Lima and Matias Ferreira Reference Lima Santos, Pires de Lima and Matias Ferreira1977; Hammond Reference Hammond1988). Self-management essentially aimed to preserve jobs and, as Varela and colleagues (Reference Varela, Simões do Paço, Alcântara and Ferreira2015) describe, was tolerated by state actors as a means of supporting countercyclical measures and recovering profits amid the global economic crisis that began in the early 1970s. Above all, the state sought to prevent political unrest by facilitating meetings between workers, emerging unions, and the Ministry of Labour.

The democratic transition also had a profound impact on rural areas, particularly through a sweeping agrarian reform aimed at expropriating large estates and democratising land ownership, especially in the southern regions of the country (de Almeida Reference Almeida2013). In some cases, farmworkers occupied uncultivated land to maintain their employment, eventually leading to the formation of cooperatives managed by elected commissions composed of union members, occupiers, and smallholders (Hammond Reference Hammond1988). Additionally, the self-management of land within specific administrative districts was consolidated in the central and northern regions. The practice of the so-called baldios had largely been discontinued following the 1938 Forestry Population Law, which imposed afforestation on wastelands and ended the collective possession of land (Skulska, Pacheco, Colaço et al. Reference Skulska, Pacheco, Colaço, Sequeira, Rego and Acácio2023). However, in 1976, community lands were returned to local shareholders, encouraging a renewal of rural activities.Footnote ¹

Consolidating democracy in the 1980s and 1990s

The PREC was, and continues to be, a praised and contested phase in Portugal’s democratic history. Countermovements among small farmers in the centre and north of the country, along with the echoes of the global economic crisis and the lack of raw materials from former colonies, ultimately brought the revolutionary period to an end on 25 November 1975. This epilogue demonstrates that, while the main political and military forces were inclined towards the establishment of a socialist regime (O’Donnell and Schmitter Reference O’Donnell, Schmitter, O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead1986), a wide diversity of beliefs about the future of the Portuguese state persisted (Cerezales Reference Cerezales2017). With the suspension of all collective bargaining and the gradual disappearance of most base-level organisations, a Western liberal democracy was eventually established with the support of the Socialist and Social Democratic parties (Costa Pinto Reference Costa Pinto, de Sousa and Magalhães2013).

At this historical juncture, Portugal focussed its efforts on integration into the European Union, whose prospects played a key role in democratic consolidation alongside the adjustment of domestic political forces (Costa Lobo, Costa Pinto, Magalhães et al. Reference Costa Lobo, Costa Pinto and Magalhães2016). Approximately one-third of social welfare entities were established after the fall of the dictatorship in 1974, providing collective responses to the new state’s limited capacity through various cooperation programmes and funding schemes.Footnote ² The sector was significantly strengthened by the 1983 recognition of new public service providers under the Statute of Private Institutions of Social Solidarity, which formalised their relationship with the state.Footnote ³ According to Fishman (Reference Fishman2019), when the new political formation introduced a constitutional reform at the end of the 1980s, the reprivatisation of nationalised firms marked the definitive shift in the revolution’s social legacy from public ownership of enterprises to the consolidation of the welfare state.

Civil society organisations now emerged as essential interlocutors of the state within a rapidly changing international landscape, which facilitated knowledge transfer and access to funding. The pluralisation of these organisations and the expansion of the third sector were not driven solely by international factors but also by the capacity for civic action demonstrated during the democratic transition (Fernandes Reference Fernandes2014). Nevertheless, the repositioning of civil society as a ‘stakeholder’ represented a significant departure from the role it had played during the revolutionary period. Branco (Reference Branco2017) contends that state–private partnerships carry inherent risks, as the creation of privileged and parallel communication channels may increase the likelihood of civil society’s instrumentalisation.

During the 1990s, Portugal embraced the rising enthusiasm for new governance models that placed nonelected, organised actors at the centre of decision-making processes, aiming to reduce the burden on the state (EU 2001). Participation increasingly came to involve associated rather than individual citizens, in line with international trends of professionalisation among practitioners and the consolidation of networks in this field (see also Chilvers Reference Chilvers2008). Similar to neighbouring Spain, state–civil society ties in Portugal may have generated a ‘double asking effect‘, retrofitting benefits for decision-makers and associational members strategically positioned within participatory processes (Navarro and Font Reference Navarro, Font, Geißel and Joas2013).

Within the broader landscape of Western democracies, Portugal benefitted from the growing role of civil society organisations while also undergoing a significant transformation in its sociopolitical fabric. Public dissatisfaction with the political class, coupled with perceptions of widespread corruption, increased sharply (de Sousa, Magalhães and Amaral Reference de Sousa, Magalhães and Amaral2014; de Sousa and Maia Reference de Sousa, Maia, Ferrão and Delicado2017). Santos and Arriscado Nunes (Reference Santos and Arriscado Nunes2004) interpret this trend as a gradual erosion of the revolutionary legacy, which has slowly diminished the intensity of Portuguese democracy.

Expanding democracy from the 2000s onwards

In the last two decades, public perception of corruption has grown considerably, accompanied by increasing feelings that the democratic system is inefficient and unaccountable (Magalhães Reference Magalhães2005). Notwithstanding this, recent signs of increased satisfaction with democracy have revealed emerging trends in political participation, including a significant expansion of the party system on the right (Cancela and Magalhães Reference Cancela and Magalhães2024; Magalhães, Ramos, Madeira et al. Reference Magalhães, Ramos, Madeira, Raimundo, Flores, Santana Pereira, Heyne, Cabrita, Manucci and Vicente2024).

One reason why Portuguese citizens feel detached from political institutions and seek new forms of participation is rooted in deep socioeconomic cleavages, with disparities in public services between rural and urban areas, as well as between coastal regions and the interior (OECD 2023). Cabral (Reference Cabral, Cabral, Vala and Freire2000) argues that the decline in political participation stems from the growing distance between citizens and centres of power, entrenched in socioeconomic divisions and political alienation. On top of this, the 2010s were marked by a severe financial crisis that led Portugal to impose an economic adjustment programme and significant procyclical fiscal consolidation measures, which exacerbated social hardship and further fuelled disaffection with the political class. One consequence was that electoral abstention peaked among those with lower income and education levels (de Sousa and Maia Reference de Sousa, Maia, Ferrão and Delicado2017), while protests and square occupations increased in opposition to austerity measures (Baumgarten Reference Baumgarten2013).

According to Fishman (Reference Fishman2019), protests had positive effects on the political and economic system, demonstrating that openness to social pressure from below is a strong legacy of the revolution. The election of the Socialist Party in 2015, which expressed reluctance to accept external pressures to implement austerity, paved the way for a remarkable economic recovery, driven by booming real estate and tourism sectors in major cities and coastal areas. In recent years, however, serious concerns have emerged regarding the rising cost of living, which has sparked discontent and incentivised social activism around housing rights (Tulumello, Kühne, Frangella et al. Reference Tulumello, Kühne, Frangella, Silva and Falanga2023), as well as environmental and climate justice. In parallel, there has been an increase in the number of citizens reporting collaboration with civil society organisations (Lisi Reference Lisi2022), all of which demonstrates sustained efforts to expand democracy through multiple practices beyond the political party system.

Overall, while Portuguese democracy remains robust according to international evaluators,Footnote ⁵ the decline in political participation and citizen engagement raises concerns (Costa Lobo, Costa Pinto, Magalhães et al. Reference Costa Lobo, Costa Pinto and Magalhães2016). The OECD (2023) recently noted that a limited culture of participation and a persistent divide between citizens and public institutions may hinder efforts to sustain and diversify democratic innovations. To contrast these trends, some practices of community participation have drawn on the values of political inclusion that characterised popular engagement during the revolutionary period, alongside the role of civil society organisations that emerged during the 1980s and 1990s. In parallel, individual participation based on one-to-one interaction with public authorities has become dominant through participatory budgeting and is beginning to incorporate deliberative principles as citizens’ assemblies start to spread.

Concluding remarks

This paper aims to situate Portuguese democratic innovations within three main historical stages to explore the legacy of the revolution over time. The country provides a particularly valuable case study, offering an in-depth examination of the relatively short period from the establishment of democracy in the mid-1970s to the present. Accordingly, the main contributions of this paper can be summarised as follows:

First, it offers theoretical and empirical insights into the interconnected and evolving nature of democracy and democratic innovations. Neither democracy nor democratic innovations reproduce themselves unchanged over time; rather, they evolve in ways that can be better understood by situating specific fields of practice within their historical contexts.

Second, closely related to the first point, the changes observed through democratic innovations have been shaped by distinct patterns of participation, influenced by varying state–society relations. The interplay of international and domestic forces in the design and implementation of democratic innovations is a central aspect of their development.

Third, the context-specific nature of emerging patterns of participation allows for a longitudinal appreciation of democratic innovations, acknowledging the potential for learnings from the past to remain latent and reemerge at different times in history, thus requiring an examination beyond siloed frameworks.

The main limitation of this paper lies in the scarcity of documentation on democratic innovations in Portugal, which significantly hinders further in-depth investigation. Despite some efforts by public authorities and organisations to provide accessible information, future research would benefit from a more robust set of primary data. While this paper contributes to a critical reflection on democratic innovations in Portugal, several questions remain open and warrant further inquiry. Among other questions, data should offer a realistic picture of the contribution made by democratic innovations to mainstream mechanisms of representative democracy, as well as the magnitude and reach of participants within the electorate, to elucidate their actual role in promoting political inclusion. Therefore, it is hoped that the insights provided here will support continued exploration of the trajectories of democratic innovations in Portugal, and beyond.