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Rethinking the theory of quiet politics: bad corporate behavior and the failure of quiet politics in the east coast gas crisis in Australia, 2022

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 October 2024

Stephen Bell  and
Andrew Hindmoor Open the ORCID record for Andrew Hindmoor [Opens in a new window]
Stephen Bell
Affiliation:
School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia
Andrew Hindmoor*
Affiliation:
Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
*
Corresponding author: Andrew Hindmoor; Email: A.Hindmoor@sheffield.ac.uk
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Abstract

The theory of quiet politics has two propositions; first, that business interests prefer to engage with governments in ‘quiet’ arenas shielded from the media and the day-to-day political fray, and second that business interests exert power over governments in quiet politics. We counter the second proposition, arguing that business generally exercises influence rather than power in quiet politics. One precondition for the successful exercise of influence is the acceptance by business of certain protocols of behavior in interactions with governments. In this paper we underline the importance of such protocols by exploring the dynamics of a conflict between the east coast gas industry and the federal government in Australia amidst steep rises in domestic gas prices and supply restrictions in 2022. The gas industry behaved badly in the economy and in politics and did not abide by the relevant protocols of engagement with the government. The government responded aggressively and quiet politics failed. The paper underlines the importance of the behavioral pre-conditions for business influence in quiet politics and what can go wrong if this fails.

Keywords

Structural powerQuiet politicsAustralian public policy

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Business and Politics , Volume 26 , Issue 4 , December 2024 , pp. 649 - 664
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Vinod K. Aggarwal

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