The Biden administration has undertaken to reset U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia, making early moves to break with the Trump administration's policy toward the country on several key fronts. White House officials have shifted the locus of diplomatic contact between the two countries from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who enjoyed a close relationship with the Trump administration, to his father, King Salman. U.S. officials publicly released an intelligence report accusing Prince Mohammed of ordering the 2018 killing of Saudi dissident and Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi and levied travel sanctions against seventy-six Saudi nationals in the crown prince's orbit. President Biden has also taken steps to end U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen's civil war, revoking the terrorist designation assigned to the Houthi rebels in the final days of the Trump administration and initiating a review of U.S. arms sales.
The shift away from diplomatic engagement with Prince Mohammed represents a change from the close relationship he enjoyed with Trump administration officials, including President Trump's son-in-law and senior adviser, Jared Kushner.Footnote 1 Kushner and the crown prince built a close relationship that at times tested both U.S. diplomatic protocols and Saudi palace hierarchies,Footnote 2 as they worked together on a shared vision to reshape the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East.Footnote 3 The relationship was tested in October 2018, with the killing of prominent regime critic and Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.Footnote 4 Media reports revealed that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) prepared a report in the weeks after the attack that assessed with “high confidence” that Prince Mohammed ordered the killing, citing intercepts of communications between members of the kill team and the crown prince's aides.Footnote 5 President Trump, however, cast doubt on the assessment, arguing that the world “may never know all of the facts” and reiterating the U.S. commitment to “remain a steadfast partner of Saudi Arabia to ensure the interests of our country, Israel and all other partners in the region.”Footnote 6
While the State Department levied sanctions in 2018 against alleged participants in the killing,Footnote 7 members of both parties in Congress criticized the Trump administration's refusal to accept the CIA's findings or take direct action against Prince Mohammed.Footnote 8 The crown prince and the White House maintained a close relationship for the remainder of President Trump's term, working behind the scenes to rally support for the Abraham Accords, which came to define the Trump administration's attempted Middle East realignment.Footnote 9
President Biden expressed a contrasting vision of Saudi Arabia on the campaign trail, vowing to treat the kingdom's leaders like “the pariah[s] that they are” for their human rights record in the region.Footnote 10 Biden criticized the Trump administration's approach and called for “a reassessment of our relationship with Saudi Arabia,” arguing:
It is past time to restore a sense of balance, perspective, and fidelity to our values in our relationships in the Middle East. President Trump has issued Saudi Arabia a dangerous blank check. . . . Among the most shameful moments of this presidency came after the brutal Saudi murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, as Trump defended not the slain U.S. resident but his killers. America's priorities in the Middle East should be set in Washington, not Riyadh. . . .
We will make clear that America will never again check its principles at the door just to buy oil or sell weapons. We should recognize the value of cooperation on counterterrorism and deterring Iran. But America needs to insist on responsible Saudi actions and impose consequences for reckless ones.Footnote 11
In the first days of the Biden administration, House Intelligence Committee Chairman Adam Schiff (D-CA) pressed newly confirmed Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines to release the CIA's report into Khashoggi's killing “without delay,” pointing to Trump's obstruction of Congress and Biden's promise to pursue accountability on behalf of Khashoggi and his family.Footnote 12 Reversing the Trump administration's judgment that the report could not be made public, the Biden administration arranged a diplomatic call with Saudi Arabia on February 25 to prepare them for the report's release.Footnote 13 The call was notable in excluding Prince Mohammed. White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki had previously explained the shift by announcing the Biden administration's desire to return to “counterpart to counterpart” engagement, and clarifying that “[t]he President's counterpart is King Salman.”Footnote 14 Psaki also affirmed the administration's intention “to recalibrate our relationship with Saudi Arabia,” pledging to maintain close cooperation “even as we make clear areas where we have disagreements and where we have concerns.”Footnote 15
The Biden administration released the unclassified annex to the report on February 26. Although the report did not reveal new facts, it represented the first official acknowledgement by the U.S. government that Prince Mohammed ordered Khashoggi's killing.Footnote 16 The report based its assessment “on the Crown Prince's control of decision making in the Kingdom since 2017, the direct involvement of a key adviser and members of Muhammad bin Salman's protective detail in the operation, and the Crown Prince's support for using violent measures to silence dissidents abroad, including Khashoggi.”Footnote 17 The report also named with “high confidence” eighteen Saudi nationals who “participated in, ordered, or were otherwise complicit in or responsible for the death of Jamal Khashoggi on behalf of Muhammad bin Salman.”Footnote 18
The same day, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken announced “Khashoggi Ban” visa sanctions on “76 Saudi individuals believed to have been engaged in threatening dissidents overseas, including but not limited to the Khashoggi killing.”Footnote 19 Citing Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,Footnote 20 Blinken cast the Khashoggi Ban as
a new visa restriction policy . . . [which] allows the State Department to impose visa restrictions on individuals who, acting on behalf of a foreign government, are believed to have been directly engaged in serious, extraterritorial counter-dissident activities, including those that suppress, harass, surveil, threaten, or harm journalists, activists, or other persons perceived to be dissidents for their work.Footnote 21
Reaction to the announcement was mixed even within Biden's Democratic Party, in part because the United States declined to sanction Prince Mohammed directly.Footnote 22 Rep. Schiff criticized the sanctions as a half-measure, saying “[t]here are ways to bring about more personal repercussions without completely rupturing the relationship,” but he added that the report was “very powerful,” casting it as “an official U.S. government statement that the crown prince of Saudi Arabia has blood on his hands, and that blood belongs to an American resident and journalist.”Footnote 23 Senator Mark Warner (D-VA), chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, welcomed the sanctions as a first step, but suggested that the administration should “keep open additional sanctions against [Prince Mohammed] if we don't see a change in behavior.”Footnote 24
In conversations with reporters, White House officials said they had concluded that levying travel sanctions, asset freezes, and criminal charges directly against Prince Mohammed would cause irreparable damage to U.S.-Saudi relations and undermine U.S. interests in fighting terrorism and countering Iran.Footnote 25 White House sources also cited the difficulties of designating which of the kingdom's copious assets around the globe could be attributed to the crown prince's control, and the realization that the situation would become even more difficult if and when Prince Mohammed ascends to the throne.Footnote 26
The Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement “completely reject[ing] the negative, false and unacceptable assessment in the report pertaining to the Kingdom's leadership,” and “reject[ing] any measure that infringes upon its … sovereignty.”Footnote 27
The relatively muted Saudi response may be due at least in part to Prince Mohammed's desire for assistance from the State Department with two pending civil suits against him—one by Hatice Cengiz, Khashoggi's fiancée, for violations of the Alien Tort Statute and Torture Victim Protection Act related to Khashoggi's death;Footnote 28 and another by Saad Aljabri, a former Saudi intelligence officer who accused the crown prince of plotting to target him in a capture-or-kill operation similar to the one against Khashoggi.Footnote 29 The crown prince has moved to dismiss both cases on a variety of grounds, including that he is entitled to status-based head-of-state immunity, based on his family relationship to the king, role as the designated successor, and current high-level government positions and role in running the country.Footnote 30 In Aljabri, the crown prince also argues that he is entitled to conduct-based immunity for official actions and that the court should not recognize a jus cogens exception to such immunity.Footnote 31 The Saudi government’s request to the U.S. State Department for a suggestion of immunity “remains under consideration,”Footnote 32 but analysts speculate that the Biden administration's shifting posture toward Prince Mohammed could signal trouble for the crown prince's chances of evading both suits.Footnote 33
In parallel to the change in relations with the Saudi royal family and the release of the Khashoggi report, the Biden administration has taken several steps to reverse Trump administration policy and withdraw U.S. support for the Saudi-led campaign against the Houthi rebels in Yemen.Footnote 34 In Biden's first week in office, State Department officials announced a temporary pause in sales of precision munitions to Saudi Arabia and fighter planes to the United Arab Emirates.Footnote 35 Blinken downplayed the significance of the move, calling it “typical at the start of an administration to review any pending sales to make sure that those that are being considered is something that advances our strategic objectives and advances our foreign policy.”Footnote 36 But the deals had been approved in the waning days of the Trump administration despite a heated back-and-forth with Congress over previous rounds of arms sales to the Saudi-led coalition, sparking hope among some congressional Democrats that Biden would permanently cancel the sales.Footnote 37
A week later, in his first foreign policy address, Biden announced a major shift in U.S. posture toward the war in Yemen, which he called a “humanitarian and strategic catastrophe”:
We're also stepping up our diplomacy to end the war in Yemen. . . . I've asked my Middle East team to ensure our support for the United Nations-led initiative to impose a ceasefire, open humanitarian channels, and restore long-dormant peace talks.
This morning, Secretary Blinken appointed Tim Lenderking, a career foreign policy officer, as our special envoy to the Yemen conflict. . . . Tim's diplomacy will be bolstered by … USAID, working to ensure that humanitarian aid is reaching the Yemeni people who are suffering . . . unendurable devastation. This war has to end.
And to underscore our commitment, we are ending all American support for offensive operations in the war in Yemen, including relevant arms sales.
At the same time, Saudi Arabia faces missile attacks, [unmanned aerial vehicle] strikes, and other threats from Iranian-supplied forces in multiple countries. We're going to continue to support and help Saudi Arabia defend its sovereignty and its territorial integrity and its people.Footnote 38
Some analysts expressed optimism at the administration's renewed emphasis on multilateral diplomacy to end the conflict and alleviate suffering, and especially for the appointment of Lenderking, a career foreign service officer and former Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh.Footnote 39 However, other observers suggested that the move was “symbolic in a lot of ways,” given the dire conditions on the ground in Yemen and numerous strategic challenges that will make ending the war difficult.Footnote 40
One of those strategic challenges is the complicated U.S. posture toward the Houthi rebel group, officially known as Ansarallah, that occupies much of Yemen. On February 5, Biden notified Congress of his intent to lift the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation of Ansarallah that went into effect the day before the Trump administration left office.Footnote 41 Secretary Blinken cast the reversal as a response to concerns that that the designation would prevent international aid groups from operating in Yemen, explaining:
This decision is a recognition of the dire humanitarian situation in Yemen. We have listened to warnings from the United Nations, humanitarian groups, and bipartisan members of Congress, among others, that the designations could have a devastating impact on Yemenis’ access to basic commodities like food and fuel. The revocations are intended to ensure that relevant U.S. policies do not impede assistance to those already suffering what has been called the world's worst humanitarian crisis. By focusing on alleviating the humanitarian situation in Yemen, we hope the Yemeni parties can also focus on engaging in dialogue.Footnote 42
Despite removing the FTO designation, the United States left in place sanctions on senior Houthi leaders. Noting that the United States is “actively identifying additional targets for designation,” Blinken explained:
The United States remains clear-eyed about Ansarallah's malign actions, and aggression, including taking control of large areas of Yemen by force, attacking U.S. partners in the Gulf, kidnapping and torturing citizens of the United States and many of our allies, diverting humanitarian aid, brutally repressing Yemenis in areas they control, and the deadly attack on December 30, 2020 in Aden against the cabinet of the legitimate government of Yemen.Footnote 43
The administration has continued to condemn Houthi attacks on civilian populations in Saudi Arabia and Yemen,Footnote 44 and on March 2, the United States imposed new sanctions on two Houthi militants, accusing them of receiving weapons and support from Iran and attacking civilians “to advance the Iranian regime's destabilizing agenda” in Yemen.Footnote 45
In response to the removal of the FTO designation, a senior Houthi leader said that the “American administration backing down from this designation is a positive thing,” because it “would have affected the Yemeni people,” rather than Ansarallah fighters who “don't have money accounts outside, and . . . don't have relations outside.”Footnote 46
It remains to be seen how the Biden administration's efforts will change the strategic calculus for the parties involved in the Yemen conflict. In the weeks after the FTO designation was lifted, Houthi rebels launched an offensive to consolidate territorial gains in the northern Marib province, a final holdout of Yemeni government forces and a safe haven for hundreds of thousands of refugees.Footnote 47 In March, Saudi Arabia announced its willingness to lift a partial air-and-sea blockade that has prevented fuel, food, and medicine from reaching Yemeni civilians, on the condition that the Houthis endorse a UN-brokered ceasefire.Footnote 48 Although Houthi fighters rejected the deal, saying they “do not accept any military or political conditions for receiving” humanitarian aid, Yemen's internationally recognized government eased the logjam in humanitarian aid delivery when it approved the docking of four fuel ships at the port of Hodeidah on March 24.Footnote 49
In early April, the Biden administration notified Congress of its intent to approve the previously paused sale of $23 billion in weapons to the United Arab Emirates, while simultaneously moving to block many planned sales of weapons to Saudi Arabia.Footnote 50 The administration's review assessed the sales’ ability to meet President Biden's February 4 commitment to end “all American support for offensive operations in the war in Yemen, including relevant arms sales.”Footnote 51 While planned sales to both countries included fixed-wing aircraft and armed attack drones, executive officials determined that many of the weapons sought by Saudi Arabia bore an unacceptable risk of being used in offensive operations or to target civilians.Footnote 52
Sporadic violence in the conflict has continued, with Houthi fighters launching three drone strikes in mid-April on targets in Saudi Arabia.Footnote 53 The State Department “strongly condemn[ed]” the strikes, highlighting the diplomacy of Lenderking and UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths and accusing the Houthis of “prolonging the suffering of the Yemeni people and jeopardizing these efforts at a moment when there is a commitment from the international community to end the conflict now.”Footnote 54 After Lenderking made another trip to the region, the State Department again accused the Houthis of worsening the humanitarian situation in Yemen, noting that “[t]here is a fair deal on the table that will bring immediate relief to the Yemeni people” and asserting that the Houthis “passed up a major opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to peace and to make progress on this proposal by refusing to meet with UN Special Envoy Griffiths.”Footnote 55 In May, Lenderking noted that the United States is “troubled by the fact that the Houthis continue to fight in Marib,” where they are “putting a great deal of stress on an already fragile humanitarian situation,” and the United States announced additional sanctions on two Houthi military leaders involved in the offensive against Marib.Footnote 56
