As the medical profession becomes more and more of a commercial enterprise, commentators are subjecting conflicts of interest in medicine to increasing scrutiny. However, one critical area of conflict has largely escaped discussion—the conflicts of interest raised by the advertising policies of medical journals. Moreover, when these conflicts are discussed, they are examined almost exclusively in terms of the concerns that they pose for journal editors. Yet, there is a second critical concern with journal advertising policies. The policies also create serious conflicts of interest for the professional societies that own medical journals.

In this article, we will discuss the conflicts of interest that are raised for journal editors and professional societies by journal advertising policies, and we will conclude that the policies are exactly backward. Currently, medical journals rely on advertisements from pharmaceutical companies and other health-related businesses and avoid—indeed exclude—advertisements from consumer-oriented companies, like producers of automobiles, golf equipment, or jewelry. We submit that the medical journals, the medical profession, and the public would be better served if consumeroriented advertisement were preferred over health-related advertising.

This article details the results of a national survey conducted in 1999 of statewide laws and protocols providing for the creation and recognition of donot- resuscitate (DNR) orders effective in nonhospital settings. Applicable primarily to emergency medical services (EMS) personnel, most of these laws and protocols have been in existence for less than ten years, and there is little current comparative information on them. Such policies are commonly called out-of-hospital or prehospital DNR orders, although one state-Virginia-recently amended its DNR law to establish a durable DNR order applicable to all health care providers and all settings. I will refer to the laws and policies examined here interchangeably as out-of hospital DNR protocols or EMS-DNR protocols. The survey produced a descriptive snapshot of such laws and protocols in effect on a statewide basis as of March 1999.

It is inevitable that some inmates in large state prison systems will suffer from terminal conditions and die while incarcerated. But how those inmates experience that event is primarily controlled by correctional policies and by the prison medical and correctional staff assigned to their care. Compassion for inmates who are dying cannot be legislated or mandated, but humane and compassionate care for the dying can be facilitated or thwarted by legislative and correctional policies, and by the manner in which correctional personnel interpret those policies.

Death in New York State prisons is a frequent event, occurring at a rate substantially higher than that in most other states. With a prison population that has risen to 70,000 inmates and with the nation’s highest rate of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection, more than 2,817 inmates died in New York prisons during the period 1990-1998. In April 1992, in the face of an ever-increasing death rate in its prisons, the New York State legislature passed the Medical Parole Law, a measure designed to permit dying inmates to be released on parole prior to their normal release eligibility date.

Health care decision making has changed profoundly during the past several decades. Advances in scientific knowledge, technology, and professional skill enable medical providers to extend and enhance life by increasing the ability to cure disease, manage disability, and palliate suffering. Ironically, the same interventions can prolong painful existence and protract the dying process. Recognizing that medical interventions, especially lifesustaining measures, are not always medically appropriate or even desired by a patient or family, health care professionals endeavor to determine who should make health care decisions and according to what standards. The importance that Western culture places on individual rights and self-determination is reflected in the growing advocacy for patient autonomy and the discrediting of physician paternalism. However, the question of autonomy becomes more complex when patients lack the capacity to decide for themselves.

Advance directives represent one response to the dilemma of decision making for incapacitated patients. The original advance directive, the living will, is a written list of instructions reflecting the individual's wishes about care, usually at the end of life.

In 1785, George Washington described a “knowing farmer” as “one who can convert every thing he touches into manure, as the first transmutation towards Gold.” With these words, Washington linked the “knowing farmer” to the alchemist who endeavored to transform base metals into gold with the aid of a philosopher's stone. In each instance, the challenge was to convert raw materials into something new and precious.

Today, the “knowing bioethicist” is in a similar position. American bioethics harbors a variety of ethical methods that emphasize different ethical factors, including principles, circumstances, character, interpersonal needs, and personal meaning. Each method reflects an important aspect of ethical experience, adds to the others, and enriches the ethical imagination.

The family of a patient who is unconscious and respirator-dependent has made a decision to discontinue medical treatment. The patient had signed a donor card. The family wants to respect this decision, and agrees to non-heart-beating organ donation. Consequently, as the patient is weaned from the ventilator, he is prepped for organ explantation. Two minutes after the patient goes into cardiac arrest, he is declared dead and the transplant team arrives to begin organ procurement. At the time retrieval begins, it is not certain that the patient's brain is dead or that cardiac function cannot be restored. Procurement follows uneventfully, and two transplantable kidneys are retrieved.

Many people now consider such cases of non-heart-beating organ donation to be ethically permissible. However, widespread disagreement persists as to how such practices are to be justified and whether such practices are compatible with the Uniform Declaration of Death Act (UDDA). In this paper, I argue that non-heart-beating organ donation can be ethically justified, that in the justified cases the patients are in fact dead, and that the early declarations of death required for such donation do comply with the UDDA.

Philosophically, the most interesting objection to the reliance on advance directives to guide treatment decisions for formerly competent patients is the argument from the loss of personal identity. Starting with a psychological continuity theory of personal identity, the argument concludes that the very conditions that bring an advance directive into play may destroy the conditions necessary for personal identity, and so undercut the authority of the directive. In this article, I concede that if the purpose of a theory of personal identity is to provide an answer to the question What is it for a person to persist over time?, then reflection on personal identity poses a potentially serious threat to the moral authority of advance directives. However, as Marya Schechtman observes, questions about how a single person persists through change are not what most of us are interested in when we think about who a person is. Rather, we are interested in what it means to say that a particular set of actions, experiences, and characteristics is that of a given person rather than someone else.

In “Bioethics and the Whole: Pluralism, Consensus, and the Transmutation of Bioethical Methods into Gold,” Patricia Martin identifies themes common to three emerging approaches to clinical bioethics--clinical pragmatism, ethics facilitation, and mediation-in order to develop an “ethical consensus method” that can serve as a “practical, step-by-step guide” for decision making She is to be applauded both for her identification of themes common to these three approaches and for her contribution to what we hope will be a growing literature on practical methods for problem solving in clinical bioethics that take seriously the ideal of consensus. After a few preliminary remarks concerning Martin's working model, we focus the majority of our commentary on the notion of “consensus,” which is at the heart of her “ethical consensus method,” and the three approaches from which it is drawn.

New technologies are changing our lives radically and quickly. New biotechnologies are moving to commercial uses faster than government regulators or private citizens can monitor. This tension manifests itself in the current debates over xenotransplantation technologies in medicine. The possibility of removing cells, tissues, and organs from animals and transplanting them into human beings is startling and unnerving. Natural immunesystem barriers between species, and even between individuals within a species, are formidable. Typically, transplantation results in violent rejection and death of the grafted organ. But despite the natural barriers to transplantation, xenotransplantation aims specifically to overcome them.

In this paper, I will discuss applications of xenograft technology, which raises clinical risks, ethical concerns, and policy issues. I conclude with a set of specific recommendations. As a recent letter to the journal Nature puts it, there is a “split between those who want to get it right, and those who want to get it right now.” No one knows what all the risks, benefits, and unintended consequences of xenotransplantation will be.

In the summer of 1998, the Wisconsin State legislature amended its child protection laws. Under new child abuse provisions, Wisconsin judges can confine pregnant women who abuse alcohol or drugs for the duration of their pregnancies. South Dakota enacted similar legislation almost simultaneously. The South Dakota statute requires mandatory drug and alcohol treatment for pregnant women who abuse those substances and classifies such activity as child abuse. In addition, the South Dakota legislation gives relatives the power to commit pregnant women involuntarily for two days; a court order can place the pregnant women in custody for up to nine months. These recent legislative “successes” follow scores of failed attempts by legislators in other states to establish fetal protection laws aimed at women who use and abuse drugs and alcohol during pregnancy.