12.1 Introduction: The Need for Information Resilience
In the intricate web of European Union (EU) media policies, a convergence of diverse policy interests and narratives takes place. Balancing the need for unified regulations across the Union with the autonomy of Member States to govern their national media landscapes is a key focal point. Moreover, while traditional legacy media sectors such as audiovisual media are subject to EU regulation, the modern media landscape has expanded to include a plethora of digital formats such as text, audio, and user-generated content.
When it comes to public service broadcasting (PSB) and its multimedia counterpart, public service media (PSM),Footnote 1 the EU showcases a tapestry of diverse policy narratives that shape the perception of these media entities within national media landscapes and across the continent. A PSB organisation – a publicly funded but, in theory, independent national broadcaster – is supposed to offer a wide array of programming accessible to all. The Amsterdam Protocol on Public Service BroadcastingFootnote 2 serves as the cornerstone policy framework for PSB in EU Member States. This protocol acknowledges PSB organisations as vital promoters of pluralism that fulfil societal needs; the protocol also addresses concerns of market distortion due to their public funding.
In the past few decades there has been a notable shift towards ‘public service broadcasting beyond broadcasting’,Footnote 3 as public broadcasters increasingly leverage digital technologies to deliver content and services. This evolution has seen many PSB organisations rebrand themselves as public service media,Footnote 4 with a strong presence online and through mobile apps. The term has even made its way into the EU’s policy discussions and, in 2024, into regulation.Footnote 5
In the ever-evolving landscape of media, the advent of digitisation has opened up a world of possibilities for public broadcasters. However, this technological shift has also posed a significant threat to the traditional business models of national commercial media, with advertising revenue increasingly flowing towards global online platforms. Across Europe, commercial competitors have long viewed public service broadcasters as competitors in the national market, emphasising a market-driven perspective on PSM. The difficulties with forging digital business models has only exacerbated the standoff between commercial media and publicly funded PSM.Footnote 6
As national media players battle it out with global platforms for viewership and digital advertising funds, a new and pressing concern has come to the forefront. What began as worries over ‘fake news’ during election campaigns has evolved into a debate about the growing problem of misinformation online. The result is a series of ‘information disorders’Footnote 7 in which conspiracies, hoaxes, false news, and hate speech proliferate on digital platforms worldwide. The EU and its Member States have responded with a series of measures to counter such misinformation, which has the potential to undermine trust in democratic institutions and polarise societies.Footnote 8
Moreover, the spread across several EU countries of the phenomenon of media capture, where governments along with associated or supportive businesses take control of national media outlets including PSM organisations,Footnote 9 adds a new layer of threats to democratic communication in those regions. These captured outlets are mostly used to spread disinformation and propaganda, further undermining the integrity of public discourse.Footnote 10
In the midst of such a rapidly changing media environment, national PSM organisations find themselves navigating uncertain waters. For years, experts have highlighted the lack of a clear policy mandate for PSB organisations in the digital age and warned of the damages that this lack of vision could cause to public-interest-oriented media. PSM advocates have drawn up proposals for policies for a future-oriented PSM mandate and charted propositions for a multimedia presence of PSM in their countries.Footnote 11
After decades of neglect, the EU has changed gear and recently adopted the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), according to which PSM organisations have a key role to play in upholding European democracy.Footnote 12 The EMFA highlights the significance of PSM as a key pillar of democracy within the EU. The Act emphasises the need for the independence and adequate funding of PSM organisations, which have been longstanding concerns pertaining to the objectivity and public interest orientation of those institutions.
Yet the task of implementing the EMFA’s provisions on PSM organisations, including defining their mandate and responsibilities and deciding on their funding and governing models, rests with individual Member States, with the EU having no concrete role in those processes. This presents a delicate policy conundrum for the EU, as Member States retain autonomy over their respective media landscapes, including the scope of their operations. Early research on PSM policy shows that critics of public media have been pushing for precise delineations of its functions to impede these organisations’ adaptability in an ever-evolving technological and media landscape.Footnote 13 In contrast, PSM organisations in numerous EU Member States have long been entrusted with unique responsibilities, such as delivering educational content and serving minority language communities. Could the EU not provide guidelines for PSM to promote a more specific, potentially EU-wide, mandate that steers these institutions towards bolstering European information resilience, a concept that encompasses societies’ capacity to protect their democratic foundations and fend off misinformation and anti-democratic forces?Footnote 14
Public media is just one piece of the puzzle of how to shield democracy from harm. Information resilience is a multifaceted concept, encompassing societal structures (macro-level), knowledge institutions (meso-level), and individual trust in social and media systems (micro-level). This chapter argues that PSM organisations stand out for their ability to deliver credible and pertinent information to the public, free from political and commercial influences and backed by a strong policy mandate. While the EMFA stipulates that Member States must ensure that their PSM organisations are editorially and functionally independent, the role of PSM can be directly connected to all policies addressing European information resilience.
Section 12.2 of this chapter discusses the current landscape of EU PSM policies, which reveals a nuanced interplay between the lofty ideals of public media’s democratic value and the practical realities of addressing market distortions. Section 12.3 discusses the contrasting scenarios in Finland, a country with a robust PSM environment, and Hungary, where the public broadcaster’s independence has been compromised, to shed light on what the impact of PSM on information resilience can amount to. The chapter concludes with a set of actionable policy recommendations (Section 12.4) aimed at strengthening the role of PSM in improving both European and national information resilience.
12.2 PSM Policy Approaches: Toward Information Resilience?
Media policies within the EU are rooted in a variety of principles and regulations, with PSM being no exception. These policies are primarily influenced by the fundamental ideals outlined in the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), including the safeguarding of human dignity and rights, the advancement of democracy, and the promotion of pluralism.Footnote 15 Additionally, there is a strong emphasis on creating a well-functioning internal market.Footnote 16 The regulations specific to broadcasting reflect these core principles and have a long history within the EU. The key steps in the EU’s audiovisual media policy are the 1989 Television without Frontiers Directive,Footnote 17 which was transformed into the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD)Footnote 18 in 2010 and underwent revisions in 2018 to adapt to shifting market and audience dynamics.
An examination of the EU’s current audiovisual policy unveils three distinct policy narratives guiding the sector: securing a well-functioning internal market, promoting technological process, and protecting media pluralism and cultural diversity.Footnote 19 It is thus evident that Member States have different media systems, allowing them to establish specific regulations for their audiovisual sector within the framework of EU legislation.
To begin with, the Amsterdam Protocol on Public Service BroadcastingFootnote 20 focuses solely on the market mandates that public funding may be allocated to broadcasting organisations provided that the concept of PSB is clearly defined within the national framework. Furthermore, broadcasters must adhere to a specific public service mandate. While the EU has the competence to enforce EU state aid rules, including in the field of public service media, EU Member States ought to define the PSM mandate and corresponding funding in conformity with the EU’s state aid guidance. In other words, national public media entities are ultimately determined by individual Member States.Footnote 21
However, media regulation has become increasingly intricate in the age of digitisation. A recent study of legislative acts highlights the proliferation of legal instruments that now cover companies in the media and communications sectors; the convergence of technology has further blurred the lines between traditional media platforms and digital outlets, with many organisations operating across multiple mediums. This shift has posed a challenge for both the EU and national policymakers, who often struggle to address the multifaceted nature of modern media within existing regulatory frameworks. The current state of affairs has been aptly named ‘the European communication (dis)order’ by the authors of the study, underscoring the complexity of the regulatory environment in this ever-evolving industry.Footnote 22
In the midst of this complex landscape, PSM organisations arguably grapple with several severe challenges: ever-evolving technology; the ever-increasing power of global platforms in national markets; and political polarisation and citizens’ diminishing trust in democracy, including democratic communication. The intertwined market and technology challenges are compounded by political and broader obstacles to democratic communication within Member States and across the EU. These hurdles collectively hinder the ability of PSM organisations to improve national information resilience, with far-reaching implications for the EU as a whole.
12.2.1 Market Concerns Meet Ambiguous Approaches to Technology
The longstanding debate surrounding the alleged stifling of domestic commercial competitors by PSB and, more recently, PSM reached new heights with the advent of digitisation.Footnote 23 Despite this, the EU has yet to provide concrete guidelines on how PSM organisations should navigate the digital landscape. Member States have adopted varying approaches to digital development, with some embracing and promoting digital innovation in the provision of PSM, while others initially restricted public media’s online footprint. Furthermore, an amendment to the EU’s state aid regulations in 2009 has raised concerns about the online presence of public media, requiring a comprehensive assessment of their new digital services:
Member States shall assess, based on the outcome of the open consultation, the overall impact of a new service on the market by comparing the situation in the presence and in the absence of the planned new service. In assessing the impact on the market, relevant aspects include, for example, the existence of similar or substitutable offers, editorial competition, market structure, market position of the public service broadcaster, level of competition and potential impact on private initiatives. This impact needs to be balanced with the value of the services in question for society.Footnote 24
The impact of this required assessment on EU Member States’ policies regarding new digital services provided by their PSM has been debated in academic literature. Some scholars have noted the varying approaches to evaluating the impact of new public service activities across different countries,Footnote 25 emphasising the importance of national decision-making in shaping the role of PSM in the digital age. Others argue that these evaluations underscore the influence of private broadcasters and publishers on EU policy.Footnote 26 Nevertheless, debates surrounding PSM and the market are often centred on technology, with some claiming that the internet renders a broad PSM mandate unnecessary, while others warn that PSM may distort the national news industry in a highly competitive digital landscape.Footnote 27 These arguments, which in some cases have not remained only national but have resulted in complaints to the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition, suggest a push for establishing limits on the digital presence of PSM in order to avoid potential conflicts with EU state aid rules.Footnote 28
12.2.2 Responses to Political and Democratic Challenges
Debates on the alleged ‘crowding out’ of domestic commercial competitors by PSB organisationsFootnote 29 are often intertwined with narratives of squandered public financing, potentially serving as a rallying cry for broader ideological agendas. Public media entities, ideally pillars of journalistic integrity, find themselves under fire from populist factions. Countries with a long tradition of PSB, such as Italy, Denmark, and Finland, have in the past decades faced opposition, especially from populist political actors. Countries such as Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia have faced serious attempts at political media capture of PSM organisations.Footnote 30
Concurrently, many countries within the EU, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, have struggled to reform their state media into independent PSB organisations. These endeavours have faced numerous setbacks where government interference has run rampant in the appointment of key people at the helm of public media organisations and in financial controls.Footnote 31 In an alarming trend, public media outlets are increasingly falling victim to media capture,Footnote 32 being transformed into mouthpieces for state propaganda. Where this has been accomplished, public media organisations are no longer public-service-oriented but serve as tools in a larger state-controlled communication machine, amplifying government agendas with alarming efficiency.Footnote 33
Although the main debates about the role of PSB have traditionally revolved around their impact on national media landscapes, both at the national and the EU level, public media policies extend far beyond addressing the transition of legacy media to digital platforms in increasingly competitive media markets. Recently, EU policy documents discussing public media have emphasised their role in enriching the democratic life of the societies within the Union.
The political challenges within the EU, especially those developments that fundamentally threaten democratic debate and decision-making, have not gone unnoticed in the Union’s policies. Enter, for instance, the European Democracy Action Plan (EDAP, 2020)Footnote 34 and its in-depth companion, the Defence of Democracy Package (2023).Footnote 35 These strategic frameworks address a range of challenges, from the surge of extremism to election meddling, the dissemination of misleading information, and escalating attacks on press freedom. While rooted in traditional policy foundations such as the single market and European values, these initiatives emphasise the role of media freedom and the need to combat misinformation.Footnote 36
The introduction of the EMFA was an important move to protect media pluralism and journalistic freedom within the (legacy) media sector. This Act, agreed upon by the EU’s Parliament, Council, and the European Commission in December 2023 and adopted by the Council in March 2024,Footnote 37 mentions the importance of independent PSM. By shifting the focus from broadcasting to PSM, the Act acknowledges the diverse platforms used by these organisations, highlighting that their governance bodies should be free from political influence and that ‘adequate’ funding should be provided to them.Footnote 38 The European Commission’s Rule of Law Report of 2022, citing the Amsterdam Protocol and the 2009 Communication, further reinforces this stance, noting that ‘rules on the independent governance and editorial independence of public service media are key to preventing political interference in this important media sector’.Footnote 39 However, how the EMFA will be implemented at the national level remains an open question, as the EU has limited power to intervene. On the other hand, the EMFA could have presented an opportunity for PSM protection as described in Section 12.2.3.
12.2.3 The Opportunity: PSM and Information Resilience
The essence of the EMFA lies in bolstering information resilience. Drawing on the updated AVMSD and the Strengthened Code of Practice on Disinformation,Footnote 40 it joins a series of regulatory initiatives, including the Digital Services Act package,Footnote 41 in addressing the market and democratic challenges of the digital age. The goal is to create a safe and just information environment for the EU.
In a bid to combat the spread of disinformation and strengthen information resilience in the region, the Union has implemented a series of targeted measures. These include the establishment of EU vs Disinfo,Footnote 42 a platform dedicated to identifying and countering disinformation campaigns that pose a threat to the stability of the Union and its Member States; a set of recommendations designed to protect the integrity and fairness of European elections; and an Action Plan against Disinformation that aligns with national defence and security strategies. The EU has also championed the adoption of the (Strengthened) Code of Practice on Disinformation,Footnote 43 originally conceived as a self-regulatory tool for tech platforms, the online advertising industry, and the fact-checking community, which has since influenced the development of the new Digital Services Act. Furthermore, the EU has spearheaded the creation of the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO)Footnote 44 to promote closer collaboration among fact-checking organisations, academia, media professionals, and media literacy experts, in conjunction with tech firms and national authorities.
Amidst the plethora of policy instruments crafted by the EU to increase its resilience against foreign information interference and other forms of information manipulation, the absence of a specifically recognised role for PSM in this critical effort is curious. Instead, the policy narrative around independent public media continues to hover at a general level, anchored by its broader cultural and societal importance for the preservation of democracy.
This may be a missed opportunity. The findings from an analysis conducted on national resilience to online disinformation in sixteen countries indicate that a robust PSM system can serve as a crucial bridge between society and the media, effectively reducing audience fragmentation.Footnote 45 Moreover, PSM news commands the highest level of trust,Footnote 46 irrespective of viewership numbers, and the significance of public service media in society is universally recognised, even by those who typically do not consume PSM news content.Footnote 47
Another recent study, assessing PSM in Czechia, Finland, Spain, and the UK,Footnote 48 has underscored the key role played by PSM organisations in combatting disinformation. Despite variations in their roles within national media systems, similarities were found in their programming and services aimed at tackling misinformation, with quality journalism and educational programming emerging as key pillars in each case. The study also revealed a shared expectation across all countries that PSB should actively combat information disorder, despite differences in these organisations’ legacies and roles. It concludes that while only a limited number of specific actions may be transferable between these broadcasters, they can serve as useful tools in the fight against information disorder if adequately supported.
12.3 Missed Chances? Two Country Studies
The pursuit of information resilience provides an appropriate approach to establishing a unified EU-wide role for public media within national media systems. At the same time, information resilience acts as a cornerstone of democracy. Yet the grand declarations within the Amsterdam Protocol regarding the distinct role of PSM, and calls for independence and adequate funding under the EMFA, fall short in guaranteeing the stronghold of public media. The following case studies of two highly different societies and media systems, in Finland and in Hungary, provide insights into the clash between EU regulations and domestic circumstances, as political and commercial entities vie to shape the scope and support of public broadcasting.
12.3.1 Finland: Challenges of a Strong PSM
Finland has earned the title of a ‘media welfare state’,Footnote 49 renowned for its robust editorial independence and commitment to providing universal access to information. At the forefront of upholding these values is the Finnish Broadcasting Company (Yle). As a leader in digital innovation, Finland has secured the top spot in the EU’s Digital Economy and Society Index for 2022,Footnote 50 with Yle spearheading the digital transformation of broadcasting on both local and global scales.Footnote 51
Societal trust is considered a central element in information resilience, supporting and supported by trust in knowledge institutions and interpersonal trust.Footnote 52 According to a 2022 Eurobarometer, 68 per cent of Finns trust their government.Footnote 53 This remarkably high level of trust, compared to the EU average of 34 per cent, is often attributed to both press freedom and Finland’s commendable standing in media literacy.Footnote 54 However, it is noteworthy that Finland’s position in the Reporters without Borders (RSF) World Press Freedom Index declined from the top spot to the fifth in 2024.Footnote 55 This may be due to a number of incidents that have posed challenges to journalistic freedom. Furthermore, societal trust has also experienced a temporary decline. In 2023, the newly formed right-wing government, particularly the populist Finns Party, faced significant criticism during its initial weeks in office; the party’s supporters blamed the mainstream media for biased reporting and accused them of intentionally fabricating scandals surrounding the party.Footnote 56
Yle plays a crucial role in the Finnish media system. While public media organisations have been under commercial and political pressure in many European countries for some time,Footnote 57 Finland stands out as a resilient and mature PSM nation. Yle enjoys a high audience reach and level of trust and receives broad political support from the main parliamentary parties, excluding the populist Finns Party. During the first year of the COVID-19 crisis, Yle garnered exceptionally high levels of trust, with over 90 per cent of Finns considering it a reliable information source.Footnote 58 In a study assessing the significance of PSM for individuals and society, Finland was the top-ranked country among nineteen, highlighting the immense value that audiences place on Yle for both personal and national interests.Footnote 59
Due to its prominence, Yle has frequently faced allegations from private media companies regarding its unfair competitive advantage. In recent years, there have been requests to investigate Yle’s novel digital audio services and their right to personalise content and services.Footnote 60 The most notable development in attempts to curb Yle’s activities can be traced back to 2017, when the Finnish Media Federation, an advocacy organisation representing private companies in the media and printing sectors, filed a complaint with the European Commission.Footnote 61 Their claim centred around Yle’s text-based online content, which they argued violated EU state aid regulations. Subsequently, in 2020, the government contemplated amending the Act on Yleisradio after conducting undisclosed discussions with the Commission’s competition department. This amendment sought to restrict Yle’s mandate to provide text-based web content not directly linked to audiovisual material. An online consultation was conducted during the summer of 2020 to gather public input. Numerous objections to the proposal were raised by professional and civil society organisations, researchers, and individual citizens. A recurring concern expressed in the majority of these statements was that the amendment would curtail freedom of speech and widen disparities in news accessibility.Footnote 62
Despite dissenting opinions, the amendment (159/2022)Footnote 63 was passed. Later, a Finland-based media conglomerate, with operations elsewhere in northern Europe, lodged (and retracted) a complaint regarding Yle’s streaming service with the European Commission. In 2023, a legal counsellor involved in the earlier complaint by the Finnish Media Federation published a book on EU state aid and public broadcasting that concluded with a manifesto about the necessity of amending and limiting Yle’s operations.Footnote 64 These are recent examples of how the market-centric narrative concerning Finnish PSB remains prevalent.
In contrast, public and policy discussions on Yle’s role in national resilience have been notably absent, despite significant events such as the pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and the Finnish membership process to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The lack of such considerations is not because Finland is free from information disorder. Following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Finnish government recognised foreign disinformation as a problem. More recently, false narratives regarding Finland’s actions against Russia concerning the NATO membership process have emerged.Footnote 65 Nevertheless, despite Finland’s complex geopolitical relationship with Russia, it has not recently experienced extensive foreign disinformation campaigns. Certain global disinformation narratives, such as QAnon and COVID-19-related anti-vaccine and anti-establishment disinformation, have been observed – many of which are literal ‘translations’ from US-based conspiracies also observed elsewhere in Europe.Footnote 66 Furthermore, NORDIS, a hub of the EDMO, has documented similar Nordic disinformation campaigns across multiple countries.Footnote 67
A report on the state of disinformation in Finland highlights that official responses to disinformation have been limited until recently. While there have been recommendations for regulatory measures against disinformation, the Media Policy ProgrammeFootnote 68 has primarily employed a strategy focused on reliable information grounded in media self-regulation, trustworthy news delivery practices, and the provision of services in various languages.Footnote 69 In terms of resilience, the government programme (2023) focuses on cybersecurity technology and training. It reiterates the importance of media literacy and content in different languages in one paragraph,Footnote 70 without addressing the significance of a democratic, diverse, and independent media system as a source of security and resilience. Furthermore, Yle faces new threats, as two government parties (National Coalition Party and Finns Party) proposed a significant decrease, by roughly a quarter, in Yle’s funding.Footnote 71 The leader of the populist right-wing Finns Party, who is also the Speaker of the Parliament, demanded that Yle’s funding be cut partly because of its ‘left-leaning, biased content’.Footnote 72
Additionally, the report on disinformation highlights Yle as a critical stakeholder in Finland. The broadcaster actively combats disinformation through the production of regular news, fact-checking initiatives, and the initiation of other journalistic projects. Yle also assumes significant responsibilities in terms of media coordination, particularly in response to hybrid and information warfare.Footnote 73 Moreover, it is recognised as one of the main long-term stakeholders in the development and provision of media literacy education.Footnote 74
The conclusion is that Finnish PSM organisations are engaged in significant activities that build information resilience without a specific mandate to do so. However, ongoing challenges, including discursive wars that politicians and commercial competitors wage in media publicity against Yle,Footnote 75 as well as concrete policy initiatives, keep eroding the function of Yle.
12.3.2 Hungary: A State Propaganda Media Project
In the past decade, Hungary has experienced significant challenges to press freedom, to the extent that the country is said to showcase ‘a lesson in media control’.Footnote 76 Such development has largely been attributed to the targeted efforts of Fidesz, the political party led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, to undermine independent media. Since its return to power in 2010, Fidesz has methodically consolidated its influence over the country’s media landscape. This began with the adoption of a controversial new media law and media constitution in 2010,Footnote 77 which gave the government significant powers to distort the Hungarian media system through control of the media regulator and public service media. This was followed by purges within the public broadcaster and Hungarian media regulator, and then by the redirection of public funds towards media outlets supporting the government.Footnote 78 Additionally, Fidesz has gradually acquired numerous privately owned media companies through a network of oligarchs closely connected to the ruling authorities.
This process has resulted in Hungary being widely regarded as a prime illustration of media capture,Footnote 79 wherein the scope for independent media outlets is significantly diminished, leading to Hungary’s decline to the lowest ranks in media freedom. In 2023, the country’s ranking plummeted to seventy-second place, marking a substantial decline from its relatively respectable twenty-third position in 2010, since when Fidesz has not experienced any electoral losses.
By 2023 there was a significant increase in the acquisition of media companies, which was accompanied by a series of attacks against media outlets and journalists refusing to conform. After the 2018 elections, once again won by Fidesz, a significant consolidation of media assets had occurred. Over 500 media outlets previously controlled by Fidesz oligarchs were transferred to the Central European Press and Media Foundation (KESMA), established and operated by Fidesz’s allies to oversee their media operations.Footnote 80 This level of media centralisation has not been witnessed since the era of communism in Eastern Europe.Footnote 81
Unlike in other European countries, the primary origin of disinformation and propaganda in Hungary lies within the government. In this regard, PSM organisations have been instrumental in facilitating Orbán’s propaganda project. In accordance with the legal revisions implemented in 2010, all Hungarian public media entities, including television and radio channels, as well as the state news agency were amalgamated into a new establishment referred to as MTVA. That year, a significant number of MTVA’s critical journalists were fired.Footnote 82
Since then, with substantial financial injections from the state budget, MTVA has expanded to become the nation’s largest and most influential media conglomerate, propagating an overtly pro-government agenda.Footnote 83 This institution’s editorial direction is closely overseen by the prime minister’s office, which explicitly dictates the manner in which news coverage should be presented. A significant portion of the material produced by MTVA is subsequently disseminated to numerous media outlets aligned with the government to be incorporated into their news broadcasts and digital platforms. In the context of the 2022 electoral campaign, MTVA delivered news coverage that was deemed ‘unbalanced’ and lacking professionalism, with the broadcaster being widely acknowledged for uncritically ‘amplifying Fidesz’s messaging’.Footnote 84
The state broadcaster in Hungary, acting as a conduit for governmental messaging, aligns its foreign policy stance with that of the government. Consequently, in light of the overt friendship between Orbán and Vladimir Putin, the Russian president, the station was transformed into a pro-Russian propaganda outlet following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.Footnote 85 MTVA management has compiled an editorial blacklist with media that should be covered critically,Footnote 86 mostly international non-governmental human rights organisations. Additionally, the government directed its editors to refrain from using content from international news agencies, including Reuters and the Associated Press.Footnote 87 In its role as a government-backed propaganda platform, MTVA operates without the constraints that are faced by public service media outlets in other European nations, such as limitations on their online written content.
However, despite the systematic erosion of democratic institutions by Orbán and Fidesz, the level of social perception and satisfaction with democracy in Hungary does not significantly deviate from that of other EU Member States, which presents a perplexing conundrum, as highlighted in a report by the Bertelsmann Foundation.Footnote 88 According to the Eurobarometer survey conducted in the summer of 2022, trust in the national government has remained relatively steady, at 48 per cent, compared to the autumn of 2019 (48 per cent) and spring of 2020 (46 per cent).Footnote 89 However, when it comes to trust in PSM, Hungary is one of only two nations in Europe (Poland is the other one) where the national PSM organisation is not the most trusted source of news (friends on social media rank first in Hungary).Footnote 90
In general, the European Commission reacted rather late and ineffectively, considering the potential scope of its powers, in addressing media capture in Hungary, failing for example to tie the release of EU funds to respecting media freedom.Footnote 91 It is unlikely that the EMFA will yield significant outcomes in this context.Footnote 92
In summary, PSM in Hungary play a crucial role in the propagation of misinformation. With many private media outlets also under government control, there is a notable absence of opposition to the preferential treatment afforded to Hungarian PSM, a dynamic unparalleled in the European landscape.
12.4 Why and How: Designing PSM Policy for Information Resilience
The EU’s media policies, particularly those concerning public media, lack specific guidelines for the roles and responsibilities of PSB or PSM. This ambiguity is understandable, given the sovereignty of the Member States and the diverse nature of their unique media landscape; consider the contrasting cases of Finland and Hungary presented in this chapter.
Finland exhibits a high level of trust in society and media, particularly in Yle, and upholds freedom of expression. Yet there are underlying issues of polarisation and scepticism among the Finnish population. Despite their high level of media literacy and confidence in their ability to identify disinformation, Finns express doubts in their fellow citizens’ ability to navigate the complexities of digital media. Even young people experience information exhaustion and seek more curated and reliable news sources.Footnote 93 Additionally, political affiliations further exacerbate distrust in the media, particularly among supporters of the Finns Party, who tend to reject mainstream outlets.Footnote 94
In Hungary, the country’s media landscape lacks freedom of expression, positioning it as one of the European laggards in this regard. The government significantly controls most of the media outlets, with the public broadcaster MTVA serving as a propaganda platform. MTVA’s news is disseminated through its raft of radio and television channels as well as the Hungarian national news agency, which falls under the umbrella of MTVA. Hungary’s media landscape presents an intriguing dynamic in terms of its impact on public trust and political behaviour. On the one hand, Fidesz’s continuous electoral success since 2010 appears to be closely linked to the party’s overall control of the media. The government’s propaganda is so potent that Hungarians tend to place their trust in the government and are disinclined to penalise or even recognise its anti-democratic practices. On the other hand, it is perplexing that both Fidesz supporters and opposition voters exhibit low levels of trust in the media, with the former being particularly convinced that an independent press does not exist.Footnote 95
Although the two cases reveal notable differences in terms of press freedom, media trust, and the role of public media within the national media system, both of them show the significant role that these media organisations play in shaping political discourses and informing media policy decisions in Europe. Particularly during times of economic and political instability, when there is a heightened demand for independent and well-funded media outlets, PSM organisations often encounter major challenges. Thus far, the prevailing market-oriented policy discourse and related actions have contributed to the diminishing influence of PSB organisations. The issue of media trust encompasses not only content credibility but also the media institution’s reliability and integrity, such as the PSM organisation in this particular context.Footnote 96
To be sure, the EMFA is a significant departure in the discourse surrounding the recognition of the role of PSM in facilitating democratic communication. The Act duly acknowledges these broadcasters as creators and disseminators of unbiased information, while also acknowledging their vulnerability due to governance structures and funding mechanisms that are susceptible to political influence. As noted, it takes into account market considerations. Still, the level of abstraction can easily make such statements meaningless. The only real power that the EU has had to influence national public media has so far been related to state aid, as seen in the case of Finland. In contrast, the EU has not directly addressed media capture in Hungary, as it has limited powers to do so.
Still, even in such diverse circumstances as in Finland and in Hungary, specific guidelines would not be an aberration but would rather be akin to the responsibilities outlined for platforms and other signatories of the Strengthened Code of Practice on Disinformation.Footnote 97 The Strengthened Code is now referenced in the Digital Services Act (DSA) as one example of the co-regulation of how to assess and mitigate risks by online service providers in the EU.Footnote 98 The Strengthened Code’s activities encompass a wide range of responsibilities, ranging from concrete measures regarding advertising and disinformation, to improving data for researchers, to empowering users’ ability to report disinformation and encouraging their general media literacy, and pursuing collaborations with independent fact-checkers.
Many of the elements of the existing Code – for instance, transparency in the use of AI, literacy efforts, collaborations with other stakeholders – could be included in a similar, voluntary code for PSM organisations in the Member States. While only the Member States could formally designate that PSM include such tasks, this type of ‘checklist’ could prompt Member States to incorporate PSM in their national resilience policies in a comprehensive manner. The EU, or EU-affiliate organisations such as EDMO, could also monitor how PSM organisations are implementing said activities, as has been the case with the Code of Practice on Disinformation.Footnote 99 The monitoring would not and could not result in formal sanctions, but it could inform the EU as well as facilitate knowledge exchange and innovation between PSM organisations in the Member States. The EU’s approach to State Aid and disinformation could even facilitate national investments for PSM to innovate measures to strengthen information resilience, as suggested by the European Commission:
Quality news media – including public media – and journalism play an important role in providing high quality and diverse information and in uncovering, counterbalancing, and diluting disinformation.
Accordingly, there is a need to invest in high quality journalism, to reinforce trust in the key societal and democratic role of quality journalism, and to encourage quality news media to explore innovative forms of journalism.
In that context, State aid may contribute, among other initiatives described in the Communication, to the support of quality journalism, media, and, in particular, public service media as an essential element of a democratic society.Footnote 100
One example of proposed concrete actions already exists in a Resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe calling on its member governments to support PSM while also urging PSM organisations to make countering disinformation a priority. The actions proposed in the Resolution include quality and innovative communication practices by PSM, especially regarding news and current affairs; specialised programmes containing analysis and comments regarding disinformation; programming that stimulates critical thinking among audiences; targeted online communication with young people; and projects and collaborations that address information disorder with other PSM organisations and national stakeholders.Footnote 101 The special role of PSM as a standard-setter is also strongly emphasised in the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council on quality journalism.Footnote 102
Finally, public value tests, a common practice in Europe, have traditionally evaluated the relevance and position of these broadcasters from a market-oriented perspective: they have been used as a mechanism to assess the impact of new services or significant changes to existing services offered, to ensure that PSM organisations fulfil their public service mandate in a way that provides value to society while balancing market considerations. A recent reconsideration has proposed the adoption of more nuanced, multidimensional assessments based on these broadcasters’ ‘dynamic public value’ in relation to society, the media industry, and individuals.Footnote 103 The establishment of quality criteria centred around information resilience would elucidate these broadcasters’ role in supporting and fortifying democracy within the EU.
12.5 Conclusion
The EU’s lack of vision for PSB and for its multimedia reiteration, PSM, has treated public media as a state aid anomaly and not as an important building block of information resilience. The EU is now starting to recognise this omission and is becoming more vocal about the positive role a well-functioning and independent public media system can play. Stifling PSB’s digital transformation to PSM by limiting its remit to reducing outdated television and broadcasting formats, for instance by offering commercial competitors opportunities to challenge the role of PSM in online text-based news production, does not bode well for the important role of public media in the information disorder.
It has been argued that another narrative for the media field is gaining ground, stemming from the human rights and democracy principles of the Union and supported by, among others, the Council of Europe’s views on the central importance of PSM to democracyFootnote 104 – and that curbing information disorder is essential for democratic communication. Indeed, the holistic approach the EU has set in place in its EDAP, with specific EU-wide legislation (e.g., the DSA Package), proposed support for national media systems (EMFA), and guidelines (the Strengthened Code of Practice), coupled with legislation on artificial intelligence (AI),Footnote 105 is an unparallelled undertaking in scope and scale. However, at the time of writing this chapter (September 2024), it is still unclear how these initiatives, especially the DSA, align with the revised AVSMD – and what the roles, responsibilities, and resources for implementation in individual Member States will be.
The EU would be well advised to rethink its approach and try to embrace the expansion to online and text-based content, and further digital innovations, wherever this is in fulfilment of the public service remit. In the EMFA, the calls for independence and adequate funding are vague markers; concrete action points or tasks for information resilience could create more incentives.
I heard from many sides: there cannot be any common law for media at the European level because there is no media single market. We have 27 separate markets. But the truth is that if the media fail as the protectors of democracy in one, two, three countries, we will have horrible trouble at the European level.Footnote 106
This quote from the Vice-President of the European Commission, Věra Jourová, does not address public media alone, but in the light of the contrasting examples of Finland and Hungary, it could be addressing the status of public media in the EU. To be sure, PSB or PSM alone cannot solve the information disorder problem and restore trust in society, in knowledge institutions, or between individuals and different social groups.
Indeed, it can be argued that the implementation of measures against information disorder may be impeded by national economic and political trends. It is also apparent that trust in public media may not be recoverable in environments where capture is prevalent. Nonetheless, the PSM system remains a potentially valuable tool in most EU countries and warrants support, particularly in the current global communication landscape characterised by independent media outlets’ decline in Europe and beyond,Footnote 107 as well as considering concerns about the increasing influence of AI: among other things, AI can make the process of disseminating disinformation more efficient, widespread, and difficult to detect.Footnote 108 Consequently, public media are actively adopting AI and have the potential to be forerunners in ethical industry standards.Footnote 109
The challenges of AI have been subject to extensive debate in academic discussions.Footnote 110 At present, European societies find themselves at a critical juncture concerning public communication and trust. Despite the immense advances in communications technology, societies with diverse political, economic, and cultural contexts are confronted with emerging disparities in digitally enabled capabilities as well as a decline in the availability of reliable and verified information.Footnote 111 This situation is also applicable to PSM in the EU. PSM organisations can either serve as valuable instruments for European democracies or contribute to the erosion of public trust. To ensure the desired outcome, public media need to be fully integrated into the policy narrative of resilience.
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