¹ OHCHR, The Core International Human Rights Instruments and Their Monitoring Bodies, at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx.

² Cosette D. Creamer & Beth A. Simmons, Do Self-Reporting Regimes Matter? Evidence from the Convention Against Torture, Int'l Stud. Q. (forthcoming); Creamer, Cosette D. & Simmons, Beth A., The Dynamic Impact of Periodic Review on Women's Rights, 81 L. & Contemp. Probs. 31 (2018)Google Scholar.

³ UN GAOR, 44th Sess. Effective Implementation of International Instruments on Human Rights, Including Reporting Obligations Under International Instruments on Human Rights, UN Doc. A/44/668 (Nov. 8, 1989).

⁴ UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Strengthening the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body System, UN Doc. A/66/860 (2012).

⁵ UN GAOR, 68th Sess., Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 9 April 2014, Strengthening and Enhancing the Effective Functioning of the Human Rights Treaty Body System, UN Doc. A/RES/68/268 (Apr. 21, 2014).

⁶ Kathryn Sikkink, Evidence for Hope: Making Human Rights Work in the 21st Century (2017); Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (2009); Fariss, Christopher J., The Changing Standard of Accountability and the Positive Relationship Between Human Rights Treaty Ratification and Compliance, 48 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 239 (2018)Google Scholar; Cope, Kevin L. & Creamer, Cosette D., Disaggregating the Human Rights Treaty Regime, 56 Va. J. Int'l L. (2016)Google Scholar; Dai, Xinyuan, The Conditional Effects of International Human Rights Institutions, 36 Hum. Rts. Q. 569 (2014)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Some researchers argue that international treaties have contributed little to improved rights enjoyment, citing weak enforcement. Hathaway, Oona, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? 111 Yale L.J. 1935 (2002)Google Scholar; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Making Human Rights a Reality (2013).

⁷ Creamer & Simmons, The Dynamic Impact of Periodic Review on Women's Rights, supra note 2; Creamer & Simmons, Do Self-Reporting Regimes Matter?, supra note 2.

⁸ Department of Defense Voluntary Disclosure Program, in Department Of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual (USAM), Title 9: Criminal Resource Manual (CRM), § 931, at http://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-931-department-defense-voluntary-disclosure-program.

⁹ The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) “encourages self-reports of possible violations, and in many cases, self-reported violations have resulted in closure of the matter without sanctions.” See FERC, Self Reports, at http://www.ferc.gov/enforcement/self-reports.asp.

¹⁰ The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) relies on “several self-disclosure processes that can be used to report potential fraud in Department of Health and Human Services (HSS) Programs.” See OIG, Self-Disclosure Information, at http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/self-disclosure-info.

¹¹ Åse Gornitzka & Ulf Sverdrup, Access of Experts: Information and EU Decision-Making, 34 W. Eur. Pol. 48 (2011).

¹² See Changing European Employment and Welfare Regimes: The Influence of the Open Method of Coordination on National Reforms (Martin Heidenreich & Jonathan Zeitlin eds., 2009).

¹³ Ruiter, Rik de, Full Disclosure? The Open Method of Coordination, Parliamentary Debates and Media Coverage, 14 Eur. Union Pol. 95 (2013)Google Scholar; Heidbreder, Eva G., Governance in the European Union: A Policy Analysis of the Attempts to Raise Legitimacy Through Civil Society Participation, 17 J. Comp. Pol'y Analysis 359 (2015)Google Scholar.

¹⁴ See Livernois, John & McKenna, C. J., Truth or Consequences: Enforcing Pollution Standards with Self-Reporting, 71 J. Pub. Econ. 415 (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Clifford S. Russell, Winston Harrington & William J. Vaughn, Enforcing Pollution Control Laws (2011); Cropper, Maureen L. & Oates, Wallace E., Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30 J. Econ. Lit. 675 (1992)Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Malik, Arun S., Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution, 24 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 241 (1993)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Robert Innes, Remediation and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement, 72 J. Pub. Econ. 379 (1999).

¹⁷ Toffel, Michael W. & Short, Jodi L., Coming Clean and Cleaning Up: Does Voluntary Self-Reporting Indicate Effective Self-Policing?, 54 J. L. & Econ. 609 (2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁸ Arlen, Jennifer, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. Legal Stud. 833 (1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁹ Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124, § 929-Z, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o).

²⁰ Kim, Yong H. & Davis, Gerald F., Challenges for Global Supply Chain Sustainability: Evidence from Conflict Minerals Reports, 59 Acad. Mgmt. J. 1896 (2016)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (finding that the more decentralized and dispersed the vertical supply chains, the less likely firms were to certify that their supplies were “conflict free”).

²¹ Timmer, Stephane & Kaufmann, Lutz, Conflict Minerals Traceability – a Fuzzy Set Analysis, 47 Int'l J. Physical Distribution & Logistics Mgmt. 344 (2017)Google Scholar; Hofmann, Hannes, Schleper, Martin C. & Blome, Constantin, Conflict Minerals and Supply Chain Due Diligence: An Exploratory Study of Multi-tier Supply Chains, 147 J. Bus. Ethics 115 (2108)Google Scholar (finding that a supply-chain wide management and accountability approach renders traceability more feasible than a firm-by-firm approach).

²² Jeff Schwartz, The Conflict Minerals Experiment, 6 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 129 (2016). See also Jomo Sankara, Deborah L. Lindberg & Khalid A. Razaki, Conflict Minerals Disclosures: Reporting Requirements and Implications for Auditing, 10 Current Issues in Auditing A1 (2016) (noting the increase in auditing triggered by reputational pressures).

²³ The Enough Project, Progress and Challenges on Conflict Minerals: Facts on Dodd-Frank 1502, at https://enoughproject.org/special-topics/progress-and-challenges-conflict-minerals-facts-dodd-frank-1502.

²⁴ Differential punishments are useful if actors can expect to escape harsher punishments or more intensive scrutiny by reporting than if wrongs are discovered independently. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior, 102 J. Pol. Econ. 583 (1994).

²⁵ Lana Friesen & Lata Gangadharan, Designing Self-Reporting Regimes to Encourage Truth Telling: An Experimental Study, 94 J. Econ. Behavior & Org. 90 (2013).

²⁶ This finding is consistent with findings in the context of international human rights regimes. See Cosette D. Creamer & Beth A. Simmons, Ratification, Reporting and Rights: Quality of Participation in the Convention Against Torture, 37 Hum. Rts. Q. 579 (2015) (finding that the quality of reporting to the Committee Against Torture has improved overtime for those states that submit reports).

²⁷ Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 Econ. & Polit. 1 (1990); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (1984).

²⁸ James D. Fearon, Rationalist Explanations for War, 49 Int'l Org. 379 (1995); Michaela Mattes & Burcu Savun, Information, Agreement Design, and the Durability of Civil War Settlements, 54 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 511 (2010); Dan Lindley, Promoting Peace with Information: Transparency as a Tool of Security Regime (2007); Power and Conflict in the Age of Transparency (Bernard I. Finel & Kristin M. Lord eds., 2002).

²⁹ Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, in International Regimes 141 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983).

³⁰ Ann Florini, The Evolution of International Norms, 40 Int'l Stud. Q. 363, 381 (1996).

³¹ Barbara Koremenos, The Continent of International Law 261–62 (2016).

³² Jane Vaynman, Enemies in Agreement: Domestic Politics, Uncertainty, and Cooperation Between Adversaries, ch. 3 (July 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University), available at https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/13070027.

³³ Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Art. IX.2, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 UNTS 45; 32 ILM 800 (1993).

³⁴ Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 165 (1984).

³⁵ Xinyuan Dai, Information Systems in Treaty Regimes, 54 World Pol. 405 (2002).

³⁶ See, e.g., James McCall Smith, The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts, 54 Int'l Org. 137 (2000).

³⁷ Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization), Art. III & Annex III:A(ii), The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 4 (1999), 1867 UNTS 154, 33 ILM 1144 (1994.

³⁸ Roderick Abbott, GATT and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism: Further Reflections on Earlier Reflections, 27 J. World Trade 117 (1993); Richard Blackhurst, Strengthening GATT Surveillance of Trade-Related Policies, in The New GATT Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Legal and Economic Aspects 123 (Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1988); Julien Chaisse & Mitsuo Matsushita, Maintaining the WTO's Supremacy in the International Trade Order: A Proposal to Refine and Revise the Role of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, 16 J. Int'l Econ. L. 9 (2013).

³⁹ Joseph E. Aldy, Policy Surveillance in the G-20 Fossil Fuel Subsidies Agreement: Lessons for Climate Policy (Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, Discussion Paper 15-70, 2015), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/dp70_aldy.pdf.

⁴⁰ David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala & Eugene B. Skolnikoff, Introduction and Overview, in The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments: Theory and Practice 1, 3 (David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala & Eugene B. Skolnikoff eds., 1998).

⁴¹ Id. at 11.

⁴² Improving Compliance with International Environmental Law 29–47 (Jacob Werksman, James Cameron & Peter Roderick eds., 1996).

⁴³ Koremenos, supra note 31, at 261–62.

⁴⁴ Dai, supra note 35, at 405.

⁴⁵ Victor, Raustiala & Skolnikoff, supra note 40, at 24. Transnational criminal law may be a partial exception to this trend, as few treaties in this area provide for a monitoring body or state self-reporting. The two exceptions are the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). For a discussion of the controversy surrounding the creation of the UNTOC review mechanism, see Cecily Rose, The Creation of a Review Mechanism for the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and Its Protocols, 114 AJIL 51 (2020).

⁴⁶ Sir Malcolm Delevingne, The Pre-war History of International Labor Legislation, in The Origins of the International Labor Organization, Vol. One: History 3, 29–39 (James T. Shotwell ed., 1934).

⁴⁷ Charles Picquenard, The Preliminaries of the Peace Conference, in The Origins of the International Labor Organization, Vol. One: History, supra note 46, at 88.

⁴⁸ Edward J. Phelan, The Commission of International Labor Legislation, in The Origins of the International Labor Organization, Vol. One: History, supra note 46, at 159.

⁴⁹ Treaty of Peace at Versailles, Art. 408, June 28, 1919, 225 Parry 188, 2 Bevans 235, 13 AJIL Supp. 151, 385 (1919).

⁵⁰ Covenant of the League of Nations, Art. 22, June 28, 1919; Charter of the United Nations, Arts. 73(e), 83, 87(a), 88 (1945).

⁵¹ International Agreement for the Suppression of the “White Slave Traffic,” May 18, 1904, 35 Stat. 1979, 1 LNTS 83 (entered into force 18 July 1905); International Convention for the Suppression of the “White Slave Traffic,” May 4, 1910, 211 Consol. TS 45, 1912 GR. Brit. TS No. 20, as amended by Protocol Amending the International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, and Amending the International Convention for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, May 4, 1949, 2 UST 1999, 30 UNTS 23 (entered into force June 21, 1951). 103 BFSP 244 (1910).

⁵² See Henry Wilson Harris, Human Merchandise: A Study of the International Traffic in Women 27 (1928).

⁵³ International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children, concluded at Geneva on Sept. 30 1921, as amended by the Protocol Signed at Lake Success, New York, on Nov. 12, 1947, 9 LNTS 415 (entered into force June 15, 1922); Harris, supra note 52, at 27.

⁵⁴ Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Art. VII, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, 2191, 60 LNTS 253, 263, as amended by Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention Signed at Geneva on Sept. 25, 1926, New York on Dec. 7, 1953, 7 UST 479, 182 UNTS 51.

⁵⁵ Kathryn Zoglin, United Nations Action Against Slavery: A Critical Evaluation, 8 Hum. Rts. Q. 306 (1986).

⁵⁶ Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, at New York on Mar. 21, 1950, 96 UNTS 271.

⁵⁷ Simmons, supra note 6, at 23–42.

⁵⁸ Jacob Katz Cogan, The Regulatory Turn in International Law, 52 Harv. Int'l L.J. 321 (2011).

⁵⁹ State reporting was built into a broad range of UN activities and areas of responsibility. For example, UNESCO’s constitution provided that members report on “laws, regulations and statistics relating to educational, scientific and cultural life and institutions.” Constitution of the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, Art. VII, Nov. 16, 1945, 4 UNTS 275.

⁶⁰ For example, Economic and Social Council Res. 934 (XXXV) urged governments to inform the secretary-general of any new developments in law and practice regarding capital punishment and requested the secretary-general to prepare a report based on information received. UN GAOR 3d Comm., 18th Sess., UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1252 (Nov. 4, 1963).

⁶¹ See, e.g., UNESCO General Conference, 12th Sess., Protocol Instituting a Conciliation and Good Offices Commission to be Responsible for Seeking the Settlement of Any Disputes which May Arise Between States Parties to the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, Art. 16 (Dec. 10, 1962).

⁶² Implementation of Recommendations on Economic and Social Matters (1947) UNGA 15; A/RES/119 (II) (Oct. 31, 1947).

⁶³ John Humphrey, Report of the Rapporteur of the International Committee on Human Rights, in Report of the Fifty-Third Conference [of the International Law Association] Held at Buenos aires, Argentina, August 25th to August 31st, 1968, at 439 (1969).

⁶⁴ ECOSOC Res. 624 B(XXII), para. 12, UN ESCOR, 22d Sess., Supp. No. 1, UN Doc. E/2929 (Aug. 17, 1956).

⁶⁵ Humphrey, supra note 63.

⁶⁶ ECOSOC Res. 888B (XXXIV), para. 21, UN ESCOR, 18th Sess., UN Doc. E/3676 (July 24, 1962).

⁶⁷ ECOSOC Res. 1074C (XXXIX), paras. 24–25, UN ESCOR, 21st Sess., UN Doc. E/4100 (July 28, 1965).

⁶⁸ Humphrey, supra note 63.

⁶⁹ Id. at 438–39.

⁷⁰ Marc J. Bossuyt, Guide to the “travaux préparatoires” of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 615 (1987).

⁷¹ Id.

⁷² Id. at 617.

⁷³ While there was a desire to make the ICESCR and ICCPR as similar as possible, the prevailing view was that they ought not be identical. Even liberal democracies voiced hesitancy about equating the two agreements for reporting purposes. Id. at 619.

⁷⁴ For example, this point was made by Pakistan. Id.

⁷⁵ See the comments of the United Kingdom and Belgium. Id. at 620.

⁷⁶ See the comments of Tunisia. Id. at 621.

⁷⁷ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 40(3), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].

⁷⁸ Steven L. B. Jensen, The Making of International Human Rights: The 1960s, Decolonization, and the Reconstruction of Global Values 102 (2016); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Art. 9(1), Dec. 21, 1965, 660 UNTS 195, 216 [hereinafter CERD].

⁷⁹ Jensen, supra note 78, at 103.

⁸⁰ Id. at 111 (noting that thirteen states commented on race relations in the United States during the 1963 debate).

⁸¹ Id. at 22.

⁸² ECOSOC, Report on the Commission of Human Rights: Manifestations of Racial Prejudice and National and Religious Intolerance, UN Doc. E/RES/826 (XXXII) (July 27, 1961); UN GAOR 3d Comm., paras. 5–6, 24, 17th Sess., UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1167 (Oct. 30, 1962); UN GAOR 3d Comm., 17th Sess., para. 2, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1171 (Nov. 2, 1962).

⁸³ UN GAOR 3d Comm., para. 8, 18th Sess., UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1217 (Oct. 1, 1963).

⁸⁴ A Philippine proposal called for all three: submission of state reports, establishment of UN Good Offices, and a mechanism for petition by individuals or groups alleging violation (Art. 16). See “Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: Philippines: Articles Relating to Measures of Implementation to be Added to the Provisions of the Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination Adopted by the Commission on Human Rights (A/5921, annex),” UN GAOR 3d Comm., 20th Sess., UN Doc. A/C.3/L.1221 (Oct. 11, 1965).

⁸⁵ Id.; UN GAOR 3d Comm., 20th Sess., Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: Ghana: Revised Amendments to the Articles Relating to Measures of Implementation Submitted by the Philippines (A/C.3/L.1221), UN Doc. A/C.3/L.1274/Rev.l (Nov.12, 1965).

⁸⁶ UN GAOR 3d Comm., 20th Sess., Official Records, 1344th Mtg., Nov. 16 1965, New York, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1344 (Nov. 16, 1965).

⁸⁷ UN GAOR 3d Comm., 20th Sess., Costa Rica: Amendment to the Draft Resolution (826B(XXXII)) Submitted by the Economic and Social Council to the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C.3/L.1008 (Oct. 29, 1965).

⁸⁸ UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1344, supra note 86, para. 63.

⁸⁹ Id., paras. 46, 48.

⁹⁰ UN GAOR 3d Comm., para. 39, 17th Sess., Official Records, 1170th mtg., Nov. 1, 1962, New York, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1170 (Nov. 1, 1962).

⁹¹ UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1344, supra note 86, para. 58.

⁹² Comments to this effect include those of Mexico and Jordan. Several countries, including Sweden, the Netherlands, and France, saw state reporting as meaningless without an individual right to petition. See UN GAOR 3d Comm., 20th Sess., Official Records, 1345th mtg., Nov. 17, 1965, New York, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1345 (Nov. 17, 1965).

⁹³ UN GAOR 3d Comm., 20th Sess., para. 45, Official Records, 1346th mtg., Nov. 17, 1965, New York, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1346 (Nov. 17, 1965).

⁹⁴ CERD, supra note 78, Art.12.

⁹⁵ Id. Art. 9.

⁹⁶ Id. Art. 14.

⁹⁷ UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1344, supra note 86, para. 62.

⁹⁸ The ICESCR initially required reports to be submitted to ECOSOC, but later moved to review by a separate treaty body in 1985. ECOSOC E/RES/1985/17 (May 28, 1985).

⁹⁹ Convention on Consent to Marriage, Nov. 2, 1962, 521 UNTS 231; Convention on the Political Rights of Women, Mar. 31, 1953, 193 UNTS 135; Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, Jan. 29, 1957, 309 UNTS 65. Until CEDAW, no treaty on women's rights or issues contained an obligation for parties to self-report. However, several ILO labor conventions aim to protect female workers from discrimination and have a reporting requirement. These include: Equal Remuneration Convention (ILO No.100), June 29, 1951, 165 UNTS 303; Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (ILO No.111), June 25, 1958, 362 UNTS 31; Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention (ILO No. 156), June 23, 1981, 1331 UNTS 295; Maternity Protection Convention (ILO No. 183), June 15, 2000, 2181 UNTS 253.

¹⁰⁰ UN GAOR General Assembly Resolution: Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, A/RES/2263(XXII) (Nov. 7, 1967).

¹⁰¹ Lars Adam Rehof, Guide to the travaux préparatoires of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 7 (1993).

¹⁰² ECOSOC, Working Group on a New Instrument or Instruments of International law to Eliminate Discrimination Against Women, Working Paper Submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, draft Art. 22, UN Doc. E/CN.6/AC.1/L.2. (Jan. 7, 1974).

¹⁰³ ECOSOC, Commission on the Status of Women, 24th Sess., International Instruments and National Standards Relating to the Status of Women: Study of Provisions in Existing Conventions that Relate to the Status of Women, para. 236, UN Doc. E/CN.6/552 (Jan. 21, 1972); ECOSOC, Commission on the Status of Women, 25th Sess., International Instruments and National Standards Relating to the Status of Women: Consideration of Proposals Concerning a New Instrument of Instruments of International Law to Eliminate Discrimination Against Women, paras. 103, 106, UN Doc. E/CN.6/573 (Nov. 6, 1973).

¹⁰⁴ UN Doc. E/CN.6/573, supra note 103, para.105.

¹⁰⁵ Id., para.104.

¹⁰⁶ These included Austria, Brazil, and Canada. Id., paras. 108–10.

¹⁰⁷ Commission on the Status of Women, 26th Sess., Statement Submitted by the International Alliance of Women et al., para. 4, UN Doc. E/CN.6/NGO/259 (Aug. 26, 1976).

¹⁰⁸ ECOSOC, Working Group on a New Instrument or Instruments of International law to Eliminate Discrimination Against Women, Nigeria and Zaire: Draft Proposals Concerning the Measures of Implementation of the Draft Convention, UN Doc. E/CN.6/AC.1/L.5 (Jan. 9, 1974).

¹⁰⁹ The nine core international human rights treaties identified by the OHCHR consist of: CERD, supra note 78; ICCPR, supra note 77; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 UNTS 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 UNTS 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 [hereinafter CAT]; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 [hereinafter CRC]; International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 UNTS 3 [hereinafter CMW]; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 UNTS 3 [hereinafter CRPD]; and International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, Dec. 20, 2006, 2716 UNTS 3 [hereinafter CED]. Ten treaty-monitoring bodies exist today, one for each of the nine core treaties in addition to the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture, established by the Optional Protocol to CAT. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is not technically a treaty body, since it was not established directly under the terms of the Covenant but was created later by ECOSOC Res. 1985/17 (May 28, 1985).

¹¹⁰ With the exception of CED, which requires an initial report but does not have a periodic reporting procedure. See CED, supra note 109, Art. 29.

¹¹¹ Ann Kent, China, the United Nations, and Human Rights: The Limits of Compliance 236 (1999).

¹¹² UN GA, Report of the Secretary-General, Status of the Human Rights Treaty Body System, Supplementary Information), para. 11, UN Doc. A/73/309, Annexes (Aug. 6, 2018).

¹¹³ CERD's practice of allowing, and later inviting, state representatives to Geneva to participate in review of their report was only adopted following a 1971 General Assembly recommendation. UN GA, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc. A/RES/2783 (XXVI) (Dec. 6, 1971); see also Rüdigerr Wolfrum, The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 3 Max Planck UN Y.B. 490, 506 (1999).

¹¹⁴ CERD did not move to a procedure of appointing Country Rapporteurs until 1988, with the first proposal for doing so advanced in 1974 and subsequently in 1986. Wolfrum, supra note 113, at 507.

¹¹⁵ UN International Human Rights Instruments, Report on the Working Methods of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies Relating to the State Party Reporting Process: Note by the Secretariat, para. 7, UN Doc. HRI/MC/2005/4 (May 25, 2005).

¹¹⁶ UN GAOR, 35th Sess., Report of the Human Rights Committee, para. 378, UN Doc. A/35/40 (Supp.) (Sept. 18, 1980).

¹¹⁷ Id., paras. 380–81.

¹¹⁸ Thomas Buergenthal, The U.N. Human Rights Committee, 5 Max Planck UN Y.B. 341, 350 (2001).

¹¹⁹ Michael O'Flaherty, The Concluding Observations of United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 6 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 27, 36 (2006).

¹²⁰ Id.

¹²¹ The Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights now publishes all state reports on its website, at https://tbinternet.ohchr.org.

¹²² Machiko Kanetake, UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring Bodies Before Domestic Courts, 67 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 201 (2018); Gerald L. Neuman, Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 19 Eur. J. Int'l L. 101 (2008).

¹²³ See Andrew Clapham, Creating the High Commissioner for Human Rights: The Outside Story, 5 Eur. J. Int'l L. 556 (1994).

¹²⁴ Current OHCHR training resources can be found at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Library/Pages/Training.aspx.

¹²⁵ Fionnuala Ni Aoláin, Looking Ahead: Strategic Priorities and Challenges for the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 35 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 469 (2003).

¹²⁶ UN GA, Effective Implementation of International Instruments on Human Rights, Including Reporting Obligations on Human Rights, UN Doc. A/RES/ 52/118 (Dec. 12, 1997); UN GA, Effective Implementation of International Instruments on Human Rights, Including Reporting Obligations on Human Rights, UN Doc. A/RES/53/138 (Dec. 9, 1998); International Human Rights Instruments, Compilation of Guidelines on the Form and Content of Reports to Be Submitted by States Parties to the International Human Rights Treaties, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/2 (and subsequent revisions) (Apr. 14, 2000); International Human Rights Instruments, Harmonized Guidelines on Reporting Under the International Human Rights Treaties, Including Guidelines on a Common Core Document and Treaty-Specific Documents: Report of the Inter-Committee Technical Working Group, UN Doc. HRI/MC/2006/3 (May 10, 2006).

¹²⁷ UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Human Rights Committee, 99th Sess., Focused Reports Based on Replies to Lists of Issues Prior to Reporting (LOIPR): Implementation of the New Optional Reporting Procedure (LOIPR procedure), UN Doc. CCPR/C/99/4 (Sept. 29, 2010).

¹²⁸ UN GA, 68th Sess., Strengthening and Enhancing the Effective Functioning of the Human Rights Treaty Body System, UN Doc. A/RES/68/268 (Apr. 9, 2014).

¹²⁹ See International Human Rights Instruments, 30th Mtg. of Chairs of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies, Identifying Progress Achieved in Aligning the Working Methods and Practices of the Treaty Bodies: Note by the Secretariat, UN Doc. HRI/MC/2018/3 (Mar. 23, 2018).

¹³⁰ The 2014 General Assembly resolution on treaty body strengthening also requested the OHCHR to “support States parties in building the capacity to implement their treaty obligations and to provide in this regard advisory services, technical assistance and capacity-building,” including “[f]acilitating the sharing of best practices among States parties.” UN Doc. A/RES/68/268, supra note 128, para. 17.

¹³¹ UN GAOR, 71st Sess., Status of the Human Rights Treaty Body System: Report of the Secretary-General, paras. 9–16, UN Doc. A /71/118 (July 18, 2016).

¹³² OHCHR, National Mechanisms for Reporting and Follow-up: A Practical Guide to Effective State Engagement with International Human Rights Mechanisms, UN Doc. HR/PUB/16/1 (2016).

¹³³ NHRIs are called upon to cooperate with international human rights mechanisms, as articulated in Part A.3. of the Paris Principles. See OHCHR and NHRIs, at https://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/nhri/pages/nhrimain.aspx.

¹³⁴ International Human Rights Instruments, 29th Mtg. of Chairs of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies, Common Approaches to Engagement with National Human Rights Institutions, paras. 18–24, UN Doc. HRI/MC/2017/3 (June 9, 2017).

¹³⁵ OHCHR, Working with the United Nations Human Rights Programme: A Handbook for Civil Society, UN Doc. HR/PUB/06/10/Rev.1 (2008).

¹³⁶ Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local Justice 87 (2006).

¹³⁷ Dai, supra note 6, at 584–88.

¹³⁸ C.H. Heyns & Frans Viljoen, The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the Domestic Level, 23 Hum. Rts. Q. 483, 512 (2001).

¹³⁹ Philip Alston, Beyond “Them” and “Us”: Putting Treaty Body Reform into Perspective, in The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring 505–06 (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000); Andrew C. Byrnes & Marsha Freeman, The Impact of the CEDAW Convention: Paths to Equality, at 51 (UNSW Law Research Paper No. 2012-7, 2012), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2011655##.

¹⁴⁰ James Crawford, The UN Human Rights Treaty System: A System in Crisis?, in The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring 1, 3 (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000). See also Anne F. Bayefsky, The UN Human Rights Treaty System: Universality at the Crossroads (2001) (providing a comprehensive but critical evaluation of the treaty body system's operation).

¹⁴¹ For overdue reporting status, see the UN Treaty Body Database, at https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/LateReporting.aspx.

¹⁴² See Creamer & Simmons, Ratification, Reporting and Rights, supra note 26.

¹⁴³ Heyns & Viljoen, supra note 138, at 509.

¹⁴⁴ Benjamin Mason Meier & Yuna Kim, Human Rights Accountability Through Treaty Bodies: Examining Human Rights Treaty Monitoring for Water and Sanitation, 26 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 139 (2015).

¹⁴⁵ Morten Kjærum, State Reports, in International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms: Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. Möller 17, 20 (Gudmundur Alfredsson, Jonas Grimheden, Bertrand G. Ramcharan & Alfred Zayas eds., 2d rev. ed. 2009).

¹⁴⁶ Ronagh McQuigg, How Effective Is the United Nations Committee Against Torture?, 22 Eur. J. Int'l L. 813 (2011); Jasper Krommendijk, The Domestic Impact and Effectiveness of the Process of State Reporting Under UN Human Rights Treaties in the Netherlands, New Zealand and Finland: Paper-Pushing or Policy Prompting? 389 (2014).

¹⁴⁷ Creamer & Simmons, The Dynamic Impact of Periodic Review on Women's Rights, supra note 2; Creamer & Simmons, Ratification, Reporting and Rights, supra note 26, at 597, 604. See also Lawrence J. LeBlanc, Ada Huibregetse & Timothy Meister, Compliance with the Reporting Requirements of Human Rights Conventions, 14 Int'l J. Hum. Rts. 789, 804 (2010) (finding a strong association between measures of government effectiveness and reporting under CERD, CEDAW, CAT, and CRC).

¹⁴⁸ On the role of NHRI's information provision and transparency-enhancing functions, see Cosette Creamer & Beth A. Simmons, Transparency at Home: How Well Do Governments Share Human Rights Information with Citizens?, in Transparency in International Law 239 (Andrea Bianchi & Anne Peters eds., 2013). See also Richard Carver, A New Answer to an Old Question: National Human Rights Institutions and the Domestication of International Law, 10 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 1 (2010); Kjærum, supra note 145, at 17, 22 (noting that “it is difficult to envisage such dialogues happening today without the involvement of … national human rights institutions”).

¹⁴⁹ Creamer & Simmons, The Dynamic Impact of Periodic Review on Women's Rights, supra note 2; Creamer & Simmons, Ratification, Reporting and Rights, supra note 26; LeBlanc, Huibregetse & Meister, supra note 147.

¹⁵⁰ Hafner-Burton,supra note 6, at 102.

¹⁵¹ Bayefsky,supra note 140, at 108. See also Scott Leckie, The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Catalyst for Change in a System Needing Reform, in The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring 129, 131 (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000).

¹⁵² Krommendijk, supra note 146, at 15.

¹⁵³ Robert Jackson, The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, in The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal 461 (Philip Alston ed., 1992); Roland Bank, Country-Orientated Procedures Under the Convention Against Torture: Towards a New Dynamism, in The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring 145, 151 (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000).

¹⁵⁴ Yvonne Donders & Vincent Vleugel, Universality, Diversity and Legal Certainty: Cultural Diversity in the Dialogue Between CEDAW and States Parties, in The Rule of Law at the National & International Levels: Contestations and Deference 321 (Machiko Kanetake & André Nollkaemper eds., 2016).

¹⁵⁵ See, e.g., OHCHR, Individual Submissions of the Russian Federation and China in the Context of the Treaty Body Strengthening Process, at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRTD/Pages/StatesPartiesSubmissions.aspx; OHCHR, Response by Cuba to the Questionnaire on Implementation of GA UN Doc. A/RES/68/268, at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/TB/HRTD/3rdBiennial/States/Cuba.doc.

¹⁵⁶ See, e.g., UN ECOSOC, Commission on Human Rights, 53rd Sess., Effective Functioning of Bodies Established Pursuant to United Nations Human Rights Instruments: Final Report on Enhancing the Long-Term Effectiveness of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty System, para. 7, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/74 (Mar. 27, 1997); Bayefsky, supra note 140, at 17.

¹⁵⁷ Nick Cumming-Bruce, Budget Cuts May Undercut the U.N.’s Human Rights Committees, N.Y. Times (May 24, 2019); UN Secretary-General, Note to Correspondents: Secretary-General's Meeting with Chairs of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies (June 25, 2019), at https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-correspondents/2019-06-25/note-correspondents-%E2%80%93-secretary-general%E2%80%99s-meeting-chairs-of-the-human-rights-treaty-bodies.

¹⁵⁸ Françoise J. Hampson, An Overview of the Reform of the UN Human Rights Machinery, 7 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 7, 13–14 (2007).

¹⁵⁹ International Human Rights Instruments, 29th Mtg. of Chairs of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies, Procedures of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies for Following Up on Concluding Observations, Decisions and Views, UN Doc. HRI/MC/2017/4 (May 8, 2017); International Human Rights Instruments, 30th Mtg. of Chairs of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies, Procedures of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies for Following Up on Concluding Observations, Decisions and Views, paras. 3, 9, UN Doc. HRI/MC/2018/4 (Mar. 19, 2018) (noting “the resource constraints of OHCHR to attend to the additional workload generated by the follow-up procedures”).

¹⁶⁰ Evelyne Schmid, Socio-Economic and Cultural Rights and Wrongs After Armed Conflicts: Using the State Reporting Procedure Before the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights More Effectively, 31 Netherlands Q. Hum. Rts. 241 (2013).

¹⁶¹ Krommendijk, supra note 146, at 20–21. Much greater attention focuses on assessing the implementation of recommendations under Universal Periodic Review. See UPR Info, Beyond Promises: The Impact of the UPR on the Ground (2014), at http://www.upr-info.org.

¹⁶² See, e.g., Claudio Grossman, Implementing Human Rights in Closed Environments Through the United Nations Convention Against Torture, 31 L. Context 125 (2014).

¹⁶³ Hafner-Burton,supra note 6, at 100.

¹⁶⁴ Creamer & Simmons, The Dynamic Impact of Periodic Review on Women's Rights, supra note 2; Creamer & Simmons, Do Self-Reporting Regimes Matter?, supra note 2.

¹⁶⁵ Id.

¹⁶⁶ Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights 171–73 (3d ed. 2010).

¹⁶⁷ All supplementary material for this article is available at https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2019.70 in the Supplementary materials tab.

¹⁶⁸ Alastair Iain Johnston, Treating International Institutions as Social Environments, 45 Int'l Stud. Q. 487 (2001).

¹⁶⁹ Shelly Chaiken & Durairaj Maheswaran, Heuristic Processing Can Bias Systematic Processing: Effects of Source Credibility, Argument Ambiguity, and Task Importance on Attitude Judgment, 66 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 460 (1994).

¹⁷⁰ Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations, 53 Int'l Org. 699 (1999); Jeffrey T. Checkel, International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework, 59 Int'l Org. 801 (2005); Thomas Risse, “Let's Argue!” Communicative Action in World Politics, 54 Int'l Org. 1 (2000).

¹⁷¹ Erin Bradner & Gloria Mark, Why Distance Matters: Effects on Cooperation, Persuasion & Deception (2002), available at https://www.ics.uci.edu/~gmark/CSCW2002.pdf.

¹⁷² Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (1995).

¹⁷³ Johnston, supra note 168, at 499; Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights Through International Law 27–28 (2013); Jeffrey T. Checkel, Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change, 55 Int'l Org. 553, 569 (2001).

¹⁷⁴ On the use of naming and shaming, see, for example, Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem, 62 Int'l Org. 689 (2008); Jacqueline H.R. DeMeritt, International Organizations and Government Killing: Does Naming and Shaming Save Lives?, 38 Int'l Interactions 597 (2012); Matthew Krain, J'accuse! Does Naming and Shaming Perpetrators Reduce the Severity of Genocides or Politicides?, 56 Int'l Stud Q. 574 (2012); Amanda M. Murdie & David R. Davis, Shaming and Blaming: Using Events Data to Assess the Impact of Human Rights INGOs, 56 Int'l Stud. Q. 1 (2012).

¹⁷⁵ Felice D. Gaer, A Voice Not an Echo: Universal Periodic Review and the UN Treaty Body System, 7 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 109, 117 (2007).

¹⁷⁶ Goodman & Jinks, supra note 173, at 130.

¹⁷⁷ On the roles of publicity and reputation in elite socialization processes, see id.; Andrew T. Guzman, International Law: A Compliance Based Theory, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1823 (2002); Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 Harvard Int'l L.J. 487 (1997); Thomas Risse & Stephen C. Ropp, International Human Rights Norms and Domestic Change: Conclusions, in The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change 234 (Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink eds., 1999).

¹⁷⁸ Christine Min Wotipka & Francisco O. Ramirez, World Society and Human Rights: An Event History Analysis of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, in The Global Diffusion of Markets & Democracy 303 (Beth A. Simmons, Frank Dobbin & Geoffrey Garrett eds., 2007).

¹⁷⁹ A significant body of psychological literature points to the importance of tone and emotional state in persuasion. See Richard E. Petty & Pablo Briñol, Attitude Change, in Advanced Social Psychology: The State of the Science 217 (Roy F. Baumeister & Eli J. Finkel eds., 2010).

¹⁸⁰ Jean-Baptiste Légal, Julien Chappé, Viviane Coiffard & Audrey Villard-Forest, Don't You Know that You Want to Trust Me? Subliminal Goal Priming and Persuasion, 48 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 1 (2012) (arguing that talk that primes for trust likely influences information processing and persuasion).

¹⁸¹ Ramon J. Rhine & Laurence J. Severance, Ego-Involvement, Discrepancy, Source Credibility, and Attitude Change, 16 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 175 (1970); Alice H. Eagly & Shelly Chaiken, The Psychology of Attitudes (1993); Robert B. Cialdini & Noah J. Goldstein, Social Influence: Compliance and Conformity, 55 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 591 (2004).

¹⁸² Buergenthal, supra note 118, at 355.

¹⁸³ Such an approach is consistent with the use of “injunctive norms,” or information about acceptable social behavior, which has been found to be especially effective as social persuasion. See Robert B. Cialdini, Linda J. Demaine, Brad J. Sagarin, Daniel W. Barrett, Kelton Rhoads & Patricia L. Winter, Managing Social Norms for Persuasive Im pact, 1 Soc. Influence 3, 4 (2006).

¹⁸⁴ Human Rights Committee, Tenth Sess.: Summary Record of the 221st Mtg. (July 15, 1980), paras. 31, 34, UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR.221 (July 17, 1980).

¹⁸⁵ See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, Sixth Sess.: Summary Record of the 128th Mtg. (Apr. 11, 1979), paras. 4, 13, UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR.128 (Apr. 16, 1979).

¹⁸⁶ Committee Against Torture, Seventeenth Sess.: Summary Record of the First Part (Public) of the 274th Mtg. (Nov. 19, 1996), para. 15, UN Doc. CAT/C/SR.274 (Nov. 22, 1996).

¹⁸⁷ Id., para. 23.

¹⁸⁸ Committee Against Torture, Ninth Sess.: Summary Record of the 122nd Mtg. (Nov. 11, 1992) ), paras. 58, 79, UN Doc. CAT/C/SR.122 (Nov. 17, 1992).

¹⁸⁹ Id., para. 61.

¹⁹⁰ Goodman & Jinks, supra note 173, at 25.

¹⁹¹ See, e.g., Committee Against Torture, Sixtieth Sess.: Summary Record of the 1517th Mtg. (Apr. 26, 2017), paras. 34, 40, 47, UN Doc. CAT/C/SR.1517 (Apr. 28, 2017); Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Seventy-Second Sess.: Summary Record of the 1661st Mtg. (Feb. 19, 2019), para. 54, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/SR.1661 (Feb. 26, 2019); Human Rights Committee, 118th Sess.: Summary Record of the 3314th Mtg. (Oct. 20, 2016), para. 41, UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR.3314 (Oct. 28, 2016).

¹⁹² See, e.g., Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Sixty-fourth Sess.: Summary Record of the 1418th Mtg. (July 14, 2016), para. 10, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/SR.1418 (July 20, 2016); Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Seventieth Sess.: Summary Record of the 1608th Mtg. (July 6, 2018), para. 51, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/SR.1608 (July 13, 2018); Committee on the Rights of the Child, Sixty-Eighth Sess.: Summary Record of the 1952nd (Chamber B) Mtg. (Jan. 19, 2015), para. 11, UN Doc. CRC/C/SR.1952 (Jan. 22, 2015).

¹⁹³ Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Sixty-Ninth Sess.: Summary Record of the 1574th Mtg. (Feb. 21, 2018), para. 27, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/SR.1574 (Feb. 26, 2018).

¹⁹⁴ Committee Against Torture, Fifty-fourth Sess.: Summary Record of the 1309th Mtg. (May 1, 2015), para. 50, UN Doc. CAT/C/SR.1309 (May 6, 2015).

¹⁹⁵ Committee Against Torture, Sixty-Sixth Sess.: Summary Record of the 1724th Mtg. (Apr. 25, 2019), para. 22, UN Doc. CAT/C/SR.1724 (May 1, 2019).

¹⁹⁶ See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, 118th Sess.: Summary Record of the 3314th Mtg. (Oct. 20, 2016), para. 2, UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR.3314 (Oct. 28, 2016).

¹⁹⁷ UN Doc. CAT/C/SR.1517, supra note 191, para. 22.

¹⁹⁸ OHCHR, Response by the Group of Small States to the Questionnaire on Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 68/268, at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/TB/HRTD/3rdBiennial/States/Group%20of%20Small%20States.docx.

¹⁹⁹ OHCHR, Response by Spain to the Questionnaire on Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 68/268, at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/TB/HRTD/3rdBiennial/States/Spain.docx.

²⁰⁰ See, e.g., Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Eighteenth Sess.: Summary Record of the 376th Mtg. (Jan. 30, 1998), para. 20, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/SR.376 (June 15, 1998).

²⁰¹ See reforms discussed in note 127 supra and corresponding text.

²⁰² UN Doc. CAT/C/SR.274, supra note 186, para. 2.

²⁰³ Committee Against Torture, Sixtieth Sess.: Summary Record of the 1519th Mtg. (Apr. 27, 2017), para. 31, UN Doc. CAT/C/SR.1519 (May 3, 2017).

²⁰⁴ Committee on the Rights of the Child, Fifty-Fourth Sess.: Summary Record of the 1524th (Chamber B) Mtg. (June 2, 2010), para. 72, UN Doc. CRC/C/SR.1524 (Mar. 25, 2011).

²⁰⁵ Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Thirty-Sixth Sess.: Summary Record of the 752nd Mtg. (Chamber B) (Aug. 17, 2006), paras. 11–21, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/SR.752 (B) (Sept. 13, 2006).

²⁰⁶ UN Doc. CEDAW/C/SR.1608, supra note 192, para. 13.

²⁰⁷ Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Thirty-First Sess.: Summary Record of the 660th Mtg. (July 16, 2004), para. 37, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/SR.660 (Aug. 5, 2004).

²⁰⁸ Human Rights Committee, Sixth Sess.: Summary Record of the 130th Mtg. (Apr. 12, 1979), para. 2, UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR.130 (Apr. 18, 1979).

²⁰⁹ Petty & Briñol, supra note 179 (citing interaction with experts, positive tone, and repetition as all favorable to persuasion).

²¹⁰ Berhard Graefrath, Reporting and Complaint Systems in Universal Human Rights Treaties, in Human Rights in a Changing East-West Perspective 290, 301–02 (Allan Rosas & Donna Gomien eds., 1990) (noting that states were concerned during negotiations that the reporting system not be converted into a quasi-judicial inquiry).

²¹¹ Karolina M. Milewicz & Robert E. Goodin, Deliberative Capacity Building Through International Organizations: The Case of Universal Periodic Review of Human Rights, 48 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 513, 514–16 (2016).

²¹² See, e.g., Alan S. Gerber & Donald P. Green, The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment, 94 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 653 (2000) (finding that learning how and where to vote affects the likelihood of voting).

²¹³ This is one theme developed in the literature on “meta-regulation” which refers to ways in which regulatory oversight induces targets to develop their own internal, self-regulatory responses. See Cary Coglianese & Evan Mendelson, Meta-Regulation and Self-Regulation, in The Oxford Handbook of Regulation 146 (Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave & Martin Lodge eds., 2010). Meta-regulation contributes to the diffusion of regulatory capacity through learning processes. See Colin Scott, Reflexive Governance, Regulation and Meta-Regulation: Control or Learning?, in Reflexive Governance: Redefining the Public Interest in a Pluralistic World 43 (Olivier de Schutter & Jacques Lenoble eds., 2010).

²¹⁴ Covadonga Meseguer, Policy Learning, Policy Diffusion, and the Making of a New Order, 598 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 67 (2005); Diane Stone, Transfer Agents and Global Networks in the “Transnationalization” of Policy, 11 J. Eur. Pub. Policy 546 (2004).

²¹⁵ Meseguer, supra note 214, at 73.

²¹⁶ O'Flaherty, supra note 119, at 46–47, 51; Robert O. Keohane, Stephen Macedo & Andrew Moravcsik, Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism, 63 Int'l Org. 1, 36 (2009).

²¹⁷ Gráinne de Búrca, Robert O. Keohane & Charles Sabel, Global Experimentalist Governance, 44 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 477 (2014). See also Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Experimentalism in the EU: Common Ground and Persistent Differences, 6 Reg. & Gov. 410, 411 (2012); Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a New Architecture (Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin eds., 2010).

²¹⁸ See Vicki C. Jackson, Feminisms, Pluralisms and Transnationalism: On CEDAW and National Constitutions, in The Public Law of Gender: From the Local to the Global 437 (Kim Rubenstein & Katharine G. Young eds., 2016). We fielded a brief survey to current and past treaty body members via Qualtrics, asking whether they (dis)agree that reporting helped them learn about common deficiencies and best practices among reporting states. 70% of respondents (out of twenty-six total) indicated they agreed or strongly agreed with that statement; 30% of respondents somewhat agreed or neither agreed/disagreed.

²¹⁹ Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 Int'l Org. 175, 303 (1993). See also Ronald B. Mitchell, Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in International Regimes, 42 Int'l Stud. Q. 109, 113 (1998); Jutta M. Joachim, Bob Reinalda & Bertjan Verbeek, International Organizations and Implementation: Pieces of the Puzzle, in International Organizations and Implementation: Enforcers, Managers, Authorities? 3, 11 (Jutta M. Joachim, Bob Reinalda & Bertjan Verbeek eds., 2008).

²²⁰ Helen Keller & Leena Grover, General Comments of the Human Rights Committee and their Legitimacy, in U.N. Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy 116, 121 (Helen Keller & Geir Ulfstein eds., 2012).

²²¹ OHCHR, Manual on Human Rights Reporting Under Six Major International Human Rights Instruments, para. 262, UN Doc. HR/PUB/91/1 (Rev.1) (1997) (noting that “[t]he main function of the Committee is … to make available to [States Parties] the experience the Committee has acquired in its examination of other reports”).

²²² Keohane, Macedo & Moravcsik, supra note 216, at 18.

²²³ However, one study of human rights periodic review based on interviews in three wealthy democracies concludes that officials are generally unwilling to learn much from the process. See Krommendijk, supra note 146, at 376–77.

²²⁴ UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR.128, supra note 185, para. 36.

²²⁵ UN Doc. CEDAW/C/SR.1574, supra note 193, para. 64.

²²⁶ Response by the Group of Small States, supra note 198.

²²⁷ OHCHR, Response by Australia to the Questionnaire on Implementation of GA Res. 68/268, at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/TB/HRTD/3rdBiennial/States/Australiae.DOCX.

²²⁸ Philip Alston, The Historical Origins of the Concept of “General Comments” in Human Rights Law, in The International Legal System in Quest of Equity and Universality: Liber Amicorum, Georges Abi-Saab 763, 775, n. 49 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Vera Gowlland-Debbas eds., 2001).

²²⁹ Human Rights Committee, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1 (May 19, 1989).

²³⁰ Keller & Grover, supra note 220, at 125.

²³¹ Id.; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011).

²³² See Philip H. Winne & Nancy E. Perry, Measuring Self-Regulated Learning, in Handbook of Self-Regulation 531(Monique Boekaerts, Moshe Zeidner & Paul R. Pintrich eds., 1999).

²³³ See Betsi Beem, Leaders in Thinking, Laggards in Attention? Bureaucratic Engagement in International Arenas, 37 Pol'y Stud. J. 497 (2009); Diane Stone, Global Public Policy, Transnational Policy Communities, and Their Networks, 36 Pol'y Stud. J. 19 (2008).

²³⁴ Walter Kälin, Examination of State Reports, in UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy, supra note 220, at 16, 39.

²³⁵ Keohane, Macedo & Moravcsik, supra note 216, at 18.

²³⁶ The United Nations sees detecting shortcomings as one of periodic review's major purposes. See International Human Rights Instruments, Compilation of Guidelines on the Form and Content of Reports to Be Submitted by States Parties to the International Human Rights Treaties, para. 5, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/2/Rev.6 (June 3, 2006).

²³⁷ The international community adopted specific norms about using indicators to measure progress in human rights in 1993, though only in the area of economic, social, and cultural rights. World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Art. 98, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993).

²³⁸ Unfortunately, there is no way to know whether the data are accurate, so we cannot make claims about quality. See Online Appendix A for data collection and coding procedures for all four treaties.

²³⁹ John D. Huber & Nolan McCarty, Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, & Political Reform, 98 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 481 (2004).

²⁴⁰ Human Rights Council, 27th Sess., Report of the OHCHR: Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building Options for Integrating Human Rights into National Policies, para. 44, UN Doc. A/HRC/27/41 (July 24, 2014); OHCHR, Human Rights Indicators: A Guide to Measurement and Implementation, UN Doc. HR/PUB/12/5 (2012).

²⁴¹ Human Rights Council, 35th Sess., Report of the OHCHR: Progress and Challenges Encountered in the Main Activities Aimed at Enhancing Technical Cooperation and Capacity-Building Undertaken Since the Establishment of the Human Rights Council, para. 51, UN Doc. A/HRC/35/20 (May 3, 2017).

²⁴² Human Rights Committee, 80th Sess., General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, para. 7, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (adopted Mar. 29, 2004).

²⁴³ Xinyuan Dai, International Institutions and National Policies (2007).

²⁴⁴ Simmons,supra note 6; Adam S. Chilton, The Laws of War and Public Opinion: An Experimental Study, 171 J. Inst'l & Theoretical Econ. 181 (2015); Sarah E. Kreps & Geoffrey P.R. Wallace, International Law, Military Effectiveness, and Public Support for Drone Strikes, 53 J. Peace Res. 830 (2016); Geoffrey P.R. Wallace, International Law and Public Attitudes Toward Torture: An Experimental Study, 67 Int'l Org. 105 (2013).

²⁴⁵ Tyler Johnson & Victoria Rickard, United Nations, Uniting Nations: International Support Cues and American Attitudes on Environmental Sustainability, 98 Soc. Sci. Q. 876 (2017).

²⁴⁶ See Oona A. Hathaway, Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?, 51 J. Conflict Resol. 588 (2007); James Raymond Vreeland, Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture, 62 Int'l Org. 65 (2008).

²⁴⁷ James D. Morrow, Order Within Anarchy: The Laws of War as an International Institution 17 (2014).

²⁴⁸ See, e.g., Committee Against Torture, 36th Sess., Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture: United States, para. 13, UN Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006).

²⁴⁹ Jacqui True, Mainstreaming Gender in Global Public Policy, 5 Int'l Feminist J. Pol. 368 (2003) (stressing the importance of treaties as focal points for women's groups lobbying).

²⁵⁰ See The Cambodian NGO Committee on CEDAW, About Us, at http://ngocedaw.org/?page_id=7.

²⁵¹ See the work of Partners for Law in Development at http://cedawsouthasia.org.

²⁵² See, e.g., International Federation for Human Rights, The Nigeria NGO Coalition Shadow Report to the CEDAW Committee (July 31, 2008), at http://www.refworld.org/docid/48a0007a2.html.

²⁵³ By “domestic CSOs” we mean organizations based in-country that take primary responsibility for compiling the report, even if assisted by an international nongovernmental organization. By contrast, “international CSOs” operate on a (near-)global scale.

²⁵⁴ Joint CSO Submission, Women's Human Rights: Argentine State Pending Debts, Alternative Report from Civil Society Organizations in Connection with the Submission of the Sixth Periodic Report of the States Parties (CEDAW/C/ARG/6) to the Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 46th Period of Sessions (Argentina, 2010), available at https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/ARG/INT_CEDAW_NGO_ARG_46_7960_E.pdf.

²⁵⁵ Committee Against Torture, Forty-fifth Sess., Summary Record of the 966th Mtg. (Nov. 9, 2010), para. 65, UN Doc. CAT/C/SR.966 (Nov. 16, 2010).

²⁵⁶ Committee Against Torture, 45th Sess., Concluding Observations of the Committee Against Torture: Ecuador, para. 16, UN Doc. CAT/C/ECU/CO/4-6 (Dec. 7, 2010).

²⁵⁷ See, e.g., OHCHR, Reply of the Republic of Armenia to the OHCHR Questionnaire on Implementation of GA Resolution 68/268, at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/TB/HRTD/3rdBiennial/States/Armenia.docx; OHCHR, Response by China to the Questionnaire on Implementation of GA Resolution 68/268, at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/TB/HRTD/3rdBiennial/States/China.doc; OHCHR, Submission from Singapore to the Questionnaire in Relation to General Assembly Resolution 68/268 on “Strengthening and Enhancing the Effective Functioning of the Human Rights Treaty Body System,” at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/TB/HRTD/3rdBiennial/States/Singapore.docx; OHCHR, Thailand's Submission for the Questionnaire in Relation to General Assembly Resolution 68/268, at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/TB/HRTD/3rdBiennial/States/Thailand.docx.

²⁵⁸ OHCHR, Contribution by the Government of Bulgaria to Questionnaire in Relation to General Assembly Resolution 68/268, at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/TB/HRTD/3rdBiennial/States/Bulgaria.doc.

²⁵⁹ Légal, Chappé, Coiffard & Villard-Forest, supra note 180 and corresponding text.

²⁶⁰ See Online Appendix B for details on the coding scheme and data collection process.

²⁶¹ Creamer & Simmons, The Dynamic Impact of Periodic Review on Women's Rights, supra note 2, at 57–60; Creamer & Simmons, Do Self-Reporting Regimes Matter?, supra note 2.

²⁶² Pammela Quinn Saunders, The Integrated Enforcement of Human Rights, 45 NYU J. Int'l L. & Pol. 97 (2012).

²⁶³ UN Doc. A/C.3/SR.1344, supra note 86.

²⁶⁴ Although individual communication decisions are not formally binding as a matter of international law, some domestic courts and national laws have sought to make specific orders/reparations enforceable domestically. See Koldo Casla, Supreme Court of Spain: UN Treaty Body Individual Decisions Are Legally Binding, EJIL:Talk! (Aug. 1, 2018), at https://www.ejiltalk.org/supreme-court-of-spain-un-treaty-body-individual-decisions-are-legally-binding.

²⁶⁵ Creamer & Simmons, Ratification, Reporting and Rights, supra note 26, at 596.

²⁶⁶ Saunders, supra note 262.

²⁶⁷ See, e.g., Angelika Nußberger, The ECtHR's Use of Decisions of International Courts and Quasi-judicial Bodies, in Judicial Dialogue and Human Rights 419, 430 (Amrei Müller ed., 2017).

²⁶⁸ Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2009-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 273, para. 55.

²⁶⁹ See, e.g., Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 1; Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, Joined by Judge Vučinić, De Souza Ribeiro v. France, 2012-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 139; Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges de Gaetano, Pinto de Albuquerque, Wojtyczek and Dedov, Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy, 2017 Eur. Ct. H.R. 54.

²⁷⁰ Stoll v. Switzerland, 2007-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 205.

²⁷¹ Id., para. 54; Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: United Kingdom, para. 21, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/73/UK (Dec. 6, 2001).

²⁷² Maslov v. Austria, 2008-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 301, para. 82.

²⁷³ Neuman, supra note 122, at 111 (arguing that this may undermine the legitimacy of the Court, by relying on legal interpretations to which states in the Americas have not explicitly agreed).

²⁷⁴ Artavia Murillo et al. (“In vitro fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, para. 226, n. 355 (Nov. 28, 2012).

²⁷⁵ Id., para. 228.

²⁷⁶ Johanna B. Fine, Katherine Mayall & Lilian Sepulveda, The Role of International Human Rights Norms in the Liberalization of Abortion Laws Globally, 19 Health & Hum. Rts. 69 (2017).

²⁷⁷ Gelman v. Uruguay, Merits and Reparations, Judgment Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 221, para. 28 (Feb. 24, 2011) (holding that Uruguay's 1986 amnesty law violated the Convention).

²⁷⁸ Cabrera Garcia and Montiel Flores v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 220, para. 86 (Nov. 26, 2009) (holding that military jurisdiction is not appropriate to investigate any form of human rights violation).

²⁷⁹ Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 251, para. 170 (Oct. 24, 2012).

²⁸⁰ Norín Catrimán et al. (Leaders, Members and Activist of the Indigenous Mapuche People) v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 279, paras. 165, 218 (May 29, 2014).

²⁸¹ Pacheco Teruel et al. v. Honduras, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 241, para. 98(a) (Apr. 27, 2012).

²⁸² Laura Salvadego, The Notion of Organised Crime and the American Convention on Human Rights, in Redefining Organised Crime: A Challenge for the European Union? 145, 152 (Stefania Carnevale, Serena Forlati & Orsetta Giolo eds., 2017).

²⁸³ Darren Hawkins & Wade Jacoby, Partial Compliance: A Comparison of the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights, 6 J. Int'l L & Int'l Rels. 35 (2010).

²⁸⁴ Par Engstrom, Rethinking the Impact of the Inter-American Human Rights System, in The Inter-American Human Rights System: Impact Beyond Compliance 1 (Par Engstrom ed., 2019).

²⁸⁵ Courtney Hillebrecht, Domestic Politics and International Human Rights Tribunals: The Problem of Compliance (2014).

²⁸⁶ Creamer & Simmons, The Dynamic Impact of Periodic Review on Women's Rights, supra note 2.

²⁸⁷ Creamer & Simmons, Do Self-Reporting Regimes Matter?, supra note 2.

²⁸⁸ Hafner-Burton,supra note 6, at 99; Eric A. Posner, The Twilight of Human Rights Law 26, 40–43, 93, 138 (2014).

²⁸⁹ Malcolm D. Evans, Challenging Conventional Assumptions: The Case for a Preventive Approach to the Protection of the Freedom of Religion or Belief, in Changing Nature of Religious Rights Under International Law 25, 39 (Malcolm Evans, Peter Petkoff & Julian Rivers eds., 2015).

²⁹⁰ John Morijn, New Discussions on UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring Reform: Using the Momentum While Acknowledging Financial and Political Realities, EJIL:Talk! (Jan. 5, 2012), at http://www.ejiltalk.org/new-discussions-on-un-human-rights-treaty-monitoring-reform-using-the-momentum-while-acknowledging-financial-and-political-realities. See also Julie Mertus, The United Nations and Human Rights: A Guide for a New Era 64 (2009); Rachael Lorna Johnstone, Cynical Savings or Reasonable Reform? Reflections on a Single Unified UN Human Rights Treaty Body, 7 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 173, 179–84 (2007); Hanna Beate Schöpp-Schilling, Treaty Body Reform: The Case of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 7 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 201 (2007).

²⁹¹ Creamer & Simmons, Do Self-Reporting Regimes Matter?, supra note 2; Creamer & Simmons, Ratification, Reporting and Rights, supra note 26.

²⁹² Id.

²⁹³ See reforms discussed in note 127 supra and corresponding text.

²⁹⁴ UN Doc. A/44/668, supra note 3, paras. 31–33.

²⁹⁵ Hilary Charlesworth & Emma Larking, Introduction: The Regulatory Power of the Universal Periodic Review, in Human Rights and the Universal Periodic Review: Rituals and Ritualism 1, 7–8 (Hilary Charlesworth & Emma Larking eds., 2014).

²⁹⁶ For a similar argument about the Human Rights Council and Universal Periodic Review, see Heather Collister, Rituals and Implementation in the Universal Periodic Review and the Human Rights Treaty Bodies, in Human Rights and the Universal Periodic Review: Rituals and Ritualism, supra note 295, at 109.

²⁹⁷ Creamer & Simmons, The Dynamic Impact of Periodic Review on Women's Rights, supra note 2; Creamer & Simmons, Do Self-Reporting Regimes Matter?, supra note 2.

²⁹⁸ Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Taking Responsive Regulation Transnational: Strategies for International Organizations, 7 Reg. & Gov. 95 (2013).

²⁹⁹ Creamer & Simmons, The Dynamic Impact of Periodic Review on Women's Rights, supra note 2; Creamer & Simmons, Do Self-Reporting Regimes Matter?, supra note 2.

³⁰⁰ Response by the Group of Small States, supra note 198.

³⁰¹ Bradner & Mark, supra note 171 and corresponding text.

³⁰² Response by the Group of Small States, supra note 198.

³⁰³ OHCHR, Non-paper on 2020 Review of the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies System Submitted by Costa Rica and 43 Other States (June 20, 2019), at https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=INT/CHAIRPERSONS/CHR/31/28571&Lang=en.

³⁰⁴ Id.

³⁰⁵ Judith G. Kelley & Beth A. Simmons, Introduction: The Power of Global Performance Indicators, 73 Int'l Org. 491 (2019).

³⁰⁶ The treaty body chairs have discussed, in the context of a common aligned procedure for follow-up to concluding observations, employing a grading system to evaluate state implementation of prioritized recommendations. See UN Doc. HRI/MC/2018/4, supra note 159, at 11(h).

³⁰⁷ See UNGA, 67th Sess., Guidelines on the Independence and Impartiality of Members of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies (“Addis Ababa Guidelines”), UN Doc. A/67/222, Annex I (Aug. 2, 2012).

³⁰⁸ See, e.g., Response by Cuba, supra note 155; OHCHR, Comments from Germany to the Questionnaire on Implementation of GA Res. 68/268, available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/TB/HRTD/3rdBiennial/States/Germany.pdf (expressing concern that, in light of current pushback regarding human rights, the reform process “could be mis-used to further weaken the UN human rights system”).

³⁰⁹ UN Doc. A/66/860, supra note 4, at 75; Geneva Academy, Optimizing the UN Treaty Body System: Academic Platform Report on the 2020 Review, 38–39 (May 2018), available at https://www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-files/Optimizing%20UN%20Treaty%20Bodies.pdf.

³¹⁰ Finnemore, Martha, International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy, 47 Int'l Org. 565 (1993)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Johnston, supra note 168.

³¹¹ See Non-paper on 2020 review, supra note 303; OHCHR, Responses by Australia, Estonia, Finland, Honduras, and Japan to the Questionnaire on Implementation of GA Res. 68/268, at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRTD/Pages/3rdBiennialReportbySG.aspx; UN Doc. HRI/MC/2018/4, supra note 159.

³¹² OHCHR, Response by the Government of Finland to the Questionnaire on Implementation of GA Res. 68/268, at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/TB/HRTD/3rdBiennial/States/Finland.docx.

³¹³ Christof Heyns & Willem Gravett, Bringing the UN Treaty Body System Closer to the People, Universal Rts. Group Blog (Aug. 14, 2017), at https://www.universal-rights.org/blog/bringing-un-treaty-body.

³¹⁴ Id.

³¹⁵ Non-paper on 2020 review, supra note 303; OHCHR, Responses by Estonia, France, and Honduras to the Questionnaire on Implementation of GA Res. 68/268, at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRTD/Pages/3rdBiennialReportbySG.aspx.

³¹⁶ Geneva Academy, supra note 309, at 16–24.

³¹⁷ Creamer & Simmons, The Dynamic Impact of Periodic Review on Women's Rights, supra note 2; Creamer & Simmons, Do Self-Reporting Regimes Matter?, supra note 2.

³¹⁸ See OHCHR, Response of Israel to the Questionnaire on Implementation of GA Res. 68/268, at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/TB/HRTD/3rdBiennial/States/Israel.docx.

³¹⁹ Comments from Germany, supra note 308; OHCHR, Submission from the Center for Reproductive Rights to the Questionnaire on Implementation of GA Res. 68/268, at https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=INT/CHAIRPERSONS/IFS/8938&Lang=en.

³²⁰ Committees recognize the centrality of the legislature to ensuring treaty compliance. See, e.g. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 46th Sess., Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Argentina, para. 10, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/ARG/CO/6 (July 13, 2010).

³²¹ Connie de la Vega, Kokeb Zeleke & Esther Wilch, The Promotion of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights of Vulnerable Groups in Africa Pursuant to Treaty Obligations: CRC, CEDAW, CERD & CRPD, 14 Wash. U. Glob. Stud. L. Rev. 213, 217, 238–39 (2015).

³²² See, e.g., Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Comments of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Chile, paras 21–22, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/CHI/CO/4 (Aug. 16, 2006); República de Chile, Diario de Sesiones de la Camara de Diputados, Legislatura 355a, Sesión 59 (Aug. 2, 2007); República de Chile, Diario de Sesiones de la Camara de Diputados, Legislatura 362a, Sesión 113 (Jan. 13, 2015).

³²³ Ley General de Accesso de las Mujeres a una Vida Libre de Violencia, Nueva Ley Publicada en el Diario Oficial de la Federación el 1 de Febrero de 2007 (Reformada 20 Enero 2009), Última Reforma Publicada en el Diario Oficial de la Federación 17 Deciembre 2015.

³²⁴ La Cámara de Senadores del Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Versiones Estenográficas, Legislatura LXII, Año III, Sesión Ordinaria (24 Junio 2015); La Cámara de Diputados del Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Diario de los Debates, Legislatura LXIII, Año I, Primer Período Ordinario, Número de Diario 13 (8 Octubre 2015).

³²⁵ República Argentina, Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, Dirección de Taquígrafos, Periodo 132, 51a. Reunión, 1a. Sesión Ordinaria de Prórroga (Especial), 74 (4 Deciembre 2014).

³²⁶ Creamer & Simmons, The Dynamic Impact of Periodic Review on Women's Rights, supra note 2, at 60–70; Creamer & Simmons, Do Self-Reporting Regimes Matter?, supra note 2.

^* Figure 1 has been corrected since original publication. An erratum notice detailing this change has also been published (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2020.8).

^* Figure 2 has been corrected since original publication. An erratum notice detailing this change has also been published (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2020.8).

^* Figure 3 has been corrected since original publication. An erratum notice detailing this change has also been published (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2020.8).