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Legal actuation: how ex ante legal behavior drives inequality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 October 2024

Emily S. Taylor Poppe*
Affiliation:
School of Law, University of California, Irvine, CA, USA
Megan Doherty Bea
Affiliation:
Consumer Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, USA
*
Corresponding author: Emily S. Taylor Poppe; Email: etaylorpoppe@law.uci.edu
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Abstract

Individuals routinely engage in instrumental transactional legal behavior, from generating tax returns to signing leases to negotiating employment terms. While some individuals undertake these activities equipped with the skills, knowledge, and capacity to behave strategically, others do not. In this article, we introduce the concept of legal actuation to describe this legal behavior and theorize its role as a source of inequality under the law. Using estate planning as an empirical example, we consider how variation in legal actuation may serve to reproduce economic inequalities and investigate the role of legal socialization, knowledge, and capability as mechanisms of advantage. In doing so, we draw attention to an understudied dimension of everyday legal behavior that has important implications for equal justice and the relationship between law and inequality.

Information

Type
Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Law and Society Association.
Figure 0

Figure 1. Typology of civil legal behavior.

Figure 1

Table 1. Summary statistics, for the full sample and by estate planning instrument

Figure 2

Figure 2. Rate of estate planning by legal knowledge and wealth, for each instrument.

Figure 3

Figure 3. Rate of estate planning by legal socialization and wealth, for each instrument.

Figure 4

Figure 4. Average legal capability score by estate planning uptake and wealth, for each instrument.

Figure 5

Figure 5. Predicted probability of having a will, by actuation mechanisms.

Notes: Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Derived from Model 1b in Appendix 1.
Figure 6

Figure 6. Predicted probabilities of having a trust, powers of attorney, and full plan, by actuation mechanisms.

Notes: Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Derived from Models 2b (upper left panel), 3b (upper right panel), 4b (lower left panel), and 5b (lower right panel) in Appendix 1.
Figure 7

Table 2. Estimated coefficients and standard errors from models predicting probability of having a will, for each wealthcategory group

Figure 8

Appendix Table A1. Estimated coefficients and standard errors from logistic regression models predicting estate planning

Figure 9

Appendix Table A2. Estimated coefficients and standard errors from logistic regression models predicting estate planning, using alternate coding for legal knowledge