¹ For a recent discussion, see Du, Ming, ‘WTO Regulation of Transnational Private Authority in Global Governance’, 67 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2018) 867CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Van Der Zee, Eva, ‘Disciplining Private Standards under the SPS and TBT Agreement: A Plea for Market-State Procedural Guidelines’, 52 Journal of World Trade (2018) 393Google Scholar; Mavroidis, Petros C. and Wolfe, Robert, ‘Private Standards and the WTO: Reclusive No More’, 16 World Trade Review (2017) 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Partiti, Enrico, ‘What Use is an Unloaded Gun? The Discipline of the WTO TBT Code of Good Practice and Its Application to Private Standards Pursuing Public Objectives’, 20 Journal of International Economic Law (2017) 829CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² See, Marx, Axel and Wouters, Jan, ‘Competition and Cooperation in the Market of Voluntary Sustainability Standards’, in Delimatsis, Panagiotis (ed.), The Law, Economics and Politics of International Standardisation (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 238Google Scholar; Marx, Axel, ‘Global Governance and the Certification Revolution: Types, Trends and Challenges’, in Levi-Faur, David (ed.), Handbook on the Politics of Regulation (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013) 599Google Scholar; Fransen, Luc, ‘The Politics of Meta-governance in Transnational Private Sustainability Governance’, 48 Policy Sciences (2015) 293CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 297.

³ SPS Committee, ‘Summary of the Meeting Held on 29–30 June’, G/SPS/R/37/Rev (18 August 2005).

⁴ Hachez, Nicolas and Wouters, Jan, ‘A Glimpse at the Democratic Legitimacy of Private Standards: Assessing the Public Accountability of GlobalG.A.P’, 14 Journal of International Economic Law (2011) 677CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Naiki, Yoshiko, ‘The Dynamics of Private Food Safety Standards: A Case Study on the Regulatory Diffusion of GLOBALG.A.P.’, 63 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2014) 137CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵ Green, Jessica F., Rethinking Private Authority: Agents and Entrepreneurs in Global Environmental Governance (Princeton University Press, 2014) 36Google Scholar.

⁶ Scott, Joanne, Smith, Tristan, Rehmatulla, Nishatabbas, and Milligan, Ben, ‘The Promise and Limits of Private Standards in Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Shipping’, 29 Journal of Environmental Law (2017) 231Google Scholar; Lin, Jolene, ‘Emergence of Transnational Environmental Law in the Anthropocene’, in Kotzé, Louis (ed.), Environmental Law and Governance for the Anthropocene (Hart Publishing, 2017) 331Google Scholar; Karavias, Markos, ‘Interactions between International Law and Private Fisheries Certification’, 7 Transnational Environmental Law (2018) 165CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Heyvaert, Veerle, Transnational Environmental Regulation and Governance: Purpose, Strategies and Principle (Cambridge University Press, 2018)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷ SPS Committee, Effects of SPS-Related Private Standards – Compilation of Replies, G/SPS/GEN/932/Rev.1 (10 December 2009), para. 27 (Question 11. Negative (trade inhibiting) effects of the private standard(s) on the exports of a product).

⁸ Ibid., para. 49 (Question 15. What is the main concern regarding private standard(s) faced by your export product(s)?).

⁹ While it is not easy to count the number of private standards, the ITC's Standards Map database currently lists up 197 private standards. See, ITC's website, infra note 101.

¹⁰ For the discussion of limited cooperation across competing private standards via equivalence or mutual recognition, see Marx and Wouters, supra note 2, at 233–237.

¹¹ Büthe, Tim and Mattli, Walter, The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy (Princeton University Press, 2011) 14Google Scholar.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ In the US–Tuna II (Mexico) case, the Appellate Body explained when standards could be recognized as international standards: a recognized international standard is an approved standard by an international standardizing body, that is, ‘a body that has recognized activities in standardization and whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members’. Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US–Tuna II (Mexico)), WT/DS381/AB/R (16 May 2012), para. 359. In other words, ‘the body's standardization activities are recognized, for example, if a large number of WTO Members participate in the development of the standard, and acknowledge the validity and legality of the standard’. Appellate Body Report, US–Tuna II (Mexico), para. 394.

¹⁴ Fransen, Luc and Conzelmann, Thomas, ‘Fragmented or Cohesive Transnational Private Regulation of Sustainability Standards? A Comparative Study’, 9 Regulation & Governance (2015) 259CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 260.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Schouten, Greetje and Bitzer, Verena, ‘The Emergence of Southern Standards in Agricultural Value Chains: A New Trend in Sustainability Governance?’, 120 Ecological Economics (2015) 175CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁷ Accordingly, the scope of standards operating in reality includes governmental standards as well as private initiatives. On this point, the term ‘voluntary sustainability standards (VSS)’, rather than ‘private standards’, has also been used in the literature. For discussions of VSS, see the United Nations Forum on Sustainability Standards (UNFSS), ‘UNFSS Objectives’, https://unfss.org/home/objective-of-unfss/ (accessed 17 September 2019).

¹⁸ Auld, Graeme, Constructing Private Governance: The Rise and Evolution of Forest, Coffee, and Fisheries Certification (Yale University Press, 2014)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁹ Young, Margaret A. (ed.), Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing Fragmentation (Cambridge University Press, 2012)Google Scholar; Raustiala, Kal, ‘Institutional Proliferation and the International Legal Order’, in Dunoff, Jeffrey L. and Pollack, Mark A. (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2012)Google Scholar.

²⁰ Abbott, Kenneth W., Green, Jessica F., and Keohane, Robert O., ‘Organizational Ecology and Organizational Diversity in Global Governance’, 70 International Organization (2016) 247CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 272.

²¹ Ibid., at 263.

²² Auld, supra note 18, at 14.

²³ Cafaggi, Fabrizio, ‘Transnational Private Regulation: Regulating Global Private Regulators’, in Cassese, Sabino (ed.), Research Handbook of Global Administrative Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016) 212Google Scholar, at 213.

²⁴ Fransen and Conzelmann, supra note 14, at 270.

²⁵ For various consequences generated from multiple private standards, see, e.g., Fransen, supra note 2, at 295.

²⁶ Grabosky, Peter, ‘Meta-regulation’, in Drahos, Peter (ed.), Regulatory Theory: Foundations and Applications (ANU Press, 2017)Google Scholar, at 149.

²⁷ Coglianese, Cary and Mendelson, Evan, ‘Meta-Regulation and Self-Regulation’, in Baldwin, Robert et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2010) 146Google Scholar, at 147.

²⁸ Cafaggi, supra note 23, at 219.

²⁹ Bartley, Tim, ‘Certification as a Mode of Social Regulation’, in Levi-Faur, David (ed.), Handbook on the Politics of Regulation (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013) 441Google Scholar, at 447.

³⁰ Coglianese and Mendelson, supra note 27, at 150.

³¹ Ibid., at 151.

³² Verbruggen, Paul and Havinga, Tetty, ‘Food Safety Meta-Controls in the Netherlands’, 4 European Journal of Risk Regulation (2015) 512CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 514.

³³ See, Verbruggen, Paul and Havinga, Tetty, ‘The Rise of Transnational Private Meta-Regulators’, 21 Tilburg Law Review (2016) 116CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 120–122.

³⁴ For instance, the UNFSS is one such platform, explained as ‘the only forum to provide information, analysis and discussions on Voluntary Sustainability Standards at the intergovernmental level’. See, UNFSS, supra note 17.

³⁵ Cafaggi, supra note 23, at 222.

³⁶ For a variety of meta-regulatory efforts by private actors, see, Fransen, supra note 2. This paper also categorizes the work of the ISO within the scope of private meta-regulatory activities, as the ISO is often described as ‘a private organization’ or one comprising ‘hybrid public–private bodies’. For the ISO's meta-regulatory activities, see Arcuri, Alessandra, ‘The TBT Agreement and Private Standards’, in Epps, Tracey and Trebilcock, Michael J. (eds.), Research Handbook on the WTO and Technical Barriers to Trade (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014) 485Google Scholar, at 496.

³⁷ See Fransen, supra note 2, at 297; Cafaggi, supra note 23, at 222; Marx and Wouters, supra note 2, at 239–240.

³⁸ ISEAL, View ISEAL full members, www.isealalliance.org/about-iseal/iseal-members (accessed 17 September 2019).

³⁹ For an overview of the GFSI, see Havinga, Tetty and Verbruggen, Paul, ‘The Global Safety Initiative and State Actors: Paving the Way for hybrid Food Safety Governance’, in Verbruggen, Paul and Havinga, Tetty (eds.), Hybridization of Food Governance: Trends, Types and Results (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017) 184–214Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ See GFSI, Benchmarking Overview, https://www.mygfsi.com/certification/benchmarking/benchmarking-overview.html (accessed 17 September 2019).

⁴¹ In 2015, another benchmarking system was launched in the seafood sector – the Global Sustainable Seafood Initiative (GSSI). There are seven recognized seafood certification schemes so far. See GSSI-recognized Seafood Certification Schemes, www.ourgssi.org/gssi-recognized-certifcation/ (accessed 17 September 2019).

⁴² See GFSI Recognised Schemes, www.mygfsi.com/certification/recognised-certification-programmes.html (accessed 17 September 2019).

⁴³ Havinga and Verbruggen, supra note 39, at 192.

⁴⁴ This paper does not address the work of the three sister organizations, i.e., Codex, IPPC, and OIE, as their activities in relation to private standards are already recognized and shared in the SPS Committee. See, the SPS Committee, ‘Review of the Operation and Implementation of the SPS Agreement, Draft Background Document, Note by the Secretariat’, G/SPS/GEN/1612 (4 May 2018), para. 14.10.

⁴⁵ Scholars have considered whether the SPS Agreement applies to private standards in light of the interpretation of Article 13 of the SPS Agreement. It provides that WTO Members shall take reasonable measures to ensure that ‘non-governmental entities’ within their territories comply with the Agreement. A specific question has been whether the term ‘non-governmental entities’ includes private standards-setting actors such as GLOBALG.A.P. The views of commentators have been negative. See, Prevost, Denise, ‘Private Sector Food-Safety Standards and the SPS Agreement: Challenges and Possibilities’, 33 South African Yearbook of International Law (2008) 1Google Scholar, at 19; Epps, Tracey, ‘Demanding Perfection: Private Food Standards and the SPS Agreement’, in Lewis, Meredith and Frankel, Susy (eds.), International Economic Law and National Autonomy (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 89Google Scholar; Scott, Joanne, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2007) 306Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ The SPS Committee, ‘Actions Regarding SPS-Related Private Standards (Decision of the Committee)’, G/SPS/55 (6 April 2011).

⁴⁷ The SPS Committee, ‘Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on SPS-Related Private Standards to the SPS Committee’, G/SPS/W/256 (3 March 2011), at 9.

⁴⁸ The SPS Committee Decision, supra note 46, at 1.

⁴⁹ While there was no official definition, several international organizations have used the term ‘non-governmental entity’, but not the term ‘private standards’. The SPS Committee, ‘Existing Definitions of Private Standards in Other International Organizations’, Note by the Secretariat, G/SPS/GEN/1334 (18 June 2014) and G/SPS/GEN/1334/Rev.1 (5 August 2014).

⁵⁰ SPS Committee, ‘Summary of the Meeting of 16–17 October 2013’, G/SPS/R/73 (15 January 2014), at 26, para. 11.7

⁵¹ SPS Committee, ‘Summary of the Meeting of 25–26 March 2014’, G/SPS/R/74 (6 June 2014), at 22, para. 11.6.

⁵² SPS Committee, ‘Report of the Co-Stewards of the Private Standards E-working Group on Action 1 (G/SPS/55)’, Submission by the Co-stewards of the E-working group on Private Standards, G/SPS/W/283 (17 March 2015), at 1, para. 2. This proposed text had a footnote: ‘This working definition is without prejudice to the rights and obligations of Members, or the views of Members on the scope of the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.’

⁵³ Ibid., paras. 10–11.

⁵⁴ Ibid., para. 9. The term ‘private body’ is found in Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the WTO's Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, which addresses a definition of subsidies.

⁵⁵ SPS Committee, ‘Summary of the Meeting of 26–27 March, 2015’, G/SPS/R/78, at 22, para. 11.5 (21 May 2015). See also, WTO news, 26 and 27 March 2015, ‘Food Safety Body Agrees to e-working Group “Time Out” on Definition of Private Standards’, www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/sps_26mar15_e.htm (accessed 17 September 2019). For a recent discussion in the SPS Committee on private standards, see, the SPS Committee, ‘Review of the Operation and Implementation of the SPS Agreement’, G/SPS/62, Section.14 ‘SPS-Related Private Standards’ (14 July 2017).

⁵⁶ TBT Committee, Decision of the Committee on Principles for the Development of International Standards, Guides and Recommendations with Relation to Articles 2, 5 and Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement, G/TBT/1/Rev.12, Annex 2 (Part 1), at 47–49 (21 January 2015).

⁵⁷ Appellate Body Report, US–Tuna II (Mexico), WT/DS381/AB/R (16 May 2012), paras. 371–372. A decision adopted by Members may qualify as a ‘subsequent agreement between the parties’ in light of two conditions: ‘(i) the decision is, in a temporal sense, adopted subsequent to the relevant covered agreement; and (ii) the terms and content of the decision express an agreement between Members on the interpretation or application of a provision of WTO law [emphasis original]’. Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes (US – Clove Cigarettes) WT/DS406/AB/R (4 April 2012), para. 262.

⁵⁸ Appellate Body Report, US–Tuna II (Mexico), WT/DS381/AB/R (16 May 2012), para. 372.

⁵⁹ Further ‘chilling effects’ on Committees’ work that may be generated from the US–Tuna II ruling have already prompted the concern of scholars. See, McDaniels, Devin, Molina, Ana Cristina, and Wijkström, Erik N., ‘A Closer Look At WTO's Third Pillar: How WTO Committees Influence Regional Trade Agreements’, 21 Journal of International Economic Law (2018) 815CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 830–831; Mavroidis, Petros C., The Regulation of International Trade: Volume 2 The WTO Agreements on Trade in Goods (MIT Press, 2016) 405Google Scholar; Shaffer, Gregory, ‘United States–Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products’, 107 American Journal of International Law (2013) 192CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 197 footnote 22.

⁶⁰ Mavroidis and Wolfe, supra note 1, at 18. For a similar concept of seeking a new type of agreement among groups of WTO Members, see Bernard Hoekman and Charles Sabel, ‘Open Plurilateral Agreements, International Regulatory Cooperation and the WTO’, EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2019/10 (2019).

⁶¹ Scott, supra note 45, at 303.

⁶² See, SPS Committee, ‘Private Standards and the SPS Agreement’, G/SPS/GEN/746 (24 January 2007), para. 18.

⁶³ SPS Committee, Report of the Ad hoc Working Group on SPS-Related Private Standards to the SPS Committee, ‘Annex IV Updates on Developments in Other WTO fora Regarding Private Standards’, G/SPS/W/256 (3 March 2011), at 18.

⁶⁴ TBT Committee, ‘Fifth Triennial Review of the Operation and Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade under Article 15.4’ (G/TBT/26) (13 November 2009), para. 26.

⁶⁵ TBT Committee, ‘Sixth Triennial Review of the Operation and Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade under Article 15.4’ (G/TBT/32) (29 November 2012), para. 7.

⁶⁶ Annex 3, paras. E and H of the TBT Agreement.

⁶⁷ Annex 3, paras. J, L, N, and Q of the TBT Agreement.

⁶⁸ Wouters, Jan and Geraets, Dylan, ‘Private Food Standards and the World Trade Organization: Some Legal Considerations’, 11 World Trade Review (2012) 479CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 486.

⁶⁹ For a related discussion under Article 13 of the SPS Agreement, see literature, supra note 45. Another question arises as to the scope of ‘reasonable measures’ available to WTO Members. See, Partiti, supra note 1, at 836–837.

⁷⁰ Partiti, supra note 1, at 836; Van Der Zee, supra note 1, at 410; Christian Vidal-León, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility, Human Rights, and the World Trade Organization’, 16 Journal of International Economic Law (2013) 893, at 905–906; Arcuri, supra note 36, at 505.

⁷¹ See text accompanied by footnote 46.

⁷² Lang, Andrew and Scott, Joanne, ‘The Hidden World of WTO Governance’, 20 European Journal of International Law (2009) 575CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷³ The comparative notions of ‘hierarchy’ and ‘delegation’ are drawn from Abbott et al., which presents four types of governance tools – hierarchy, delegation, collaboration and orchestration – that international organizations can utilize in general (not necessarily serve to meta-regulation). Kenneth Abbott et al. (eds.), International Organizations as Orchestrators (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 10. Note that those four types of governance tools are introduced in the volume in order to develop the concept of ‘orchestration’, which this paper does not address.

⁷⁴ See, Pelkmans, Jacques, ‘The New Approach to Technical Harmonization and Standardization’, 25 Journal of Common Market Studies (1987) 249CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 256.

⁷⁵ Scott et al., supra note 6, at 27; Lin, Jolene, ‘Governing Biofuels: A Principal-Agent Analysis of the European Union Biofuels Certification Regime and the Clean Development Mechanism’, 24 Journal of Environmental Law (2012) 43CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 53–59; Naiki, Yoshiko, ‘Bioenergy and Trade: Explaining and Assessing the Regime Complex for Sustainable Bioenergy’, 27 European Journal of International Law (2016) 129CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 147.

⁷⁶ Commission Directive 2009/28/EC, OJ 2009L 140/16.

⁷⁷ European Commission, ‘List of Approved Voluntary Schemes’, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/renewable-energy/biofuels/voluntary-schemes (accessed 17 September 2019).

⁷⁸ For a criticism of the European Commission's approval system on private schemes, Schleifer, Philip, ‘Orchestrating Sustainability: The Case of European Union Biofuel Governance’, 7 Regulation & Governance (2013) 533CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 542; Haugen, Hans Morten, ‘Coherence or Forum-shopping in Bioenergy Sustainability Schemes?’, 33 Nordic Journal of Human Rights (2015) 52CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 66–67.

⁷⁹ Commission Directive 2015/1513 amending Directive 98/70/EC and Directive 2009/28/EC, OJ 2015 L239/1. See, art.18 (6) subpara. 3, Consolidated version of the Directive, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02009L0028-20151005 (accessed 17 September 2019).

⁸⁰ Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L328/82.

⁸¹ Regulation (EU) No. 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 laying down the obligations of operators who place timber and timber products on the market [2010] OJ L/295/23.

⁸² European Commission, Timber Regulation, ‘What is due diligence?’, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/forests/timber_regulation.htm (accessed 17 September 2019).

⁸³ Regulation 995/2010, above n 81, art. 4(2) and (3).

⁸⁴ European Commission, Timber Regulation, ‘List of Recognized Monitoring Organisations’, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/forests/pdf/List%20of%20recognised%20MOs%20for%20web%20updated%2024MAY18.pdf (accessed 17 September 2019).

⁸⁵ Scott et al., supra note 6, at 28.

⁸⁶ Regulation (EU) 2015/757 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on the monitoring, reporting and verification of carbon dioxide emissions from maritime transport, and amending Directive 2009/16/EC, OJ L123/55.

⁸⁷ Ibid., arts. 13–16.

⁸⁸ Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/2071 of 22 September, OL L320/1.

⁸⁹ Commission Delegated Regulation, ibid., arts. 31–41.

⁹⁰ European Court of Auditors, ‘The EU Systems for the Certification of Sustainable Biofuels’, Special Report No. 18 (2016), paras. 51–52, https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocItem.aspx?did=37264 (accessed 17 September 2019).

⁹¹ For the importance of the Commission's monitoring capabilities in the context of delegation, see Lin, supra note 75, at 69–70.

⁹² For an overview of ‘regulation by information’, see Schneiberg, Marc and Bartley, Tim, ‘Organizations, Regulation, and Economic Behavior: Regulatory Dynamics and Forms from the Nineteenth to Twenty-First Century’, 4 Annual Review of Law and Social Science (2008) 31CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 43–45.

⁹³ See, Fung, Archon et al. , Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency (Cambridge University Press, 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁹⁶ Overdevest, Christine, ‘Comparing Forest Certification Schemes: The Case of Ratcheting Standards in the Forest Sector’, 8 Socio-Economic Review (2010) 47CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁹⁸ IUCN National Committee of the Netherlands, ‘Betting on Best Quality’, www.iucn.nl/files/publicaties/betting_on_best_quality.pdf (accessed 17 September 2019).

⁹⁹ NRDC, ‘Biofuel Sustainability Performance Guidelines’, www.nrdc.org/energy/files/biofuels-sustainability-certification-report.pdf (accessed 17 September 2019).

¹⁰⁰ State of Sustainability Initiatives, ‘SSI Reviews’, www.iisd.org/ssi/ssi-reviews/ (accessed 17 September 2019).

¹⁰¹ ITC Sustainability Map, Standards, www.sustainabilitymap.org/standards (accessed 17 September 2019).

¹⁰² Cafaggi, supra note 23, at 220.

¹⁰³ For a definition of soft law, see Kirton, John J. and Trebilcock, Michael J., ‘Introduction: Hard Choices and Soft Law in Sustainable Global Governance’, in Kirton, John J. and Trebilcock, Michael J. (eds.), Hard Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, Environment and Social Governance (Ashgate Publishing, 2004) 3Google Scholar, at 10.

¹⁰⁴ Schneiberg and Bartley, supra note 92, at 47.

¹⁰⁵ Scialabba, Nadia El-Hage, ‘Lessons from the Past and the Emergence of International Guidelines on Sustainability Assessment of Food and Agriculture Systems’, in Meybeck, Alexandre and Redfern, Suzanne (eds.), Voluntary Standards for Sustainable Food Systems: Challenges and Opportunities (FAO, 2014) 33Google Scholar, at 34.

¹⁰⁶ The SAFA Guidelines (version 3.0), at 6, www.fao.org/3/a-i3957e.pdf (accessed 17 September 2019).

¹⁰⁷ Schneiberg and Bartley, supra note 92, at 47.

¹⁰⁸ The SAFA Guidelines, supra note 106, ‘Preface’ at v.

¹⁰⁹ Interview by the author with Ms. Nadia El-Hage Scialabba, at the FAO in Rome, on 18 May 2015.

¹¹⁰ See Short history of SAFA, ‘Mapping sustainability indicators for the food sector (2010)’, www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/nr/sustainability_pathways/docs/SAFA_History10.9.14.pdf (accessed 17 September 2019).

¹¹¹ SAFA, Reflections on the 2012 E-forum (March 2012), at 4, www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/nr/sustainability_pathways/docs/Reflections_SAFA_E_Forum_2012_final.pdf (accessed 17 September 2019).

¹¹² See Short history of SAFA, supra note 104.

¹¹³ Black, Julia, ‘Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes’, 2 Regulation & Governance (2008) 137CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 148.

¹¹⁴ See the SAFA homepage, www.fao.org/nr/sustainability/sustainability-assessments-safa/en/ (accessed 17 September 2019).

¹¹⁵ See SAFA Tool ‘Free and Open Access SAFA Tool 2.2.40’, www.fao.org/nr/sustainability/sustainability-assessments-safa/safa-tool/en/ (accessed 17 September 2019).

¹¹⁶ See SAFA Usage ‘Examples of SAFA Applications’, www.fao.org/nr/sustainability/sustainability-assessments-safa/safa-usage/en/ (accessed 17 September 2019).

¹¹⁷ See SAFA Usage, ‘Assessments’ examples, ibid.

¹¹⁸ See SAFA Usage, ‘Tools’ and ‘Guidelines’ examples, ibid.

¹¹⁹ See SAFA Usage, ‘Reporting’ examples, ibid.

¹²⁰ Interview by the author with Ms. Nadia El-Hage Scialabba, at the FAO in Rome, on 13 March 2017.

¹²¹ ITC, ‘Our Solutions’ ‘Sustainability Standards’, www.sustainabilitymap.org/standards_intro (accessed 17 September 2019).

¹²² The SAFA Guidelines, supra note 106, ‘Preface’ at v.

¹²³ Lin, supra note 75, at 60.

¹²⁴ For the discussion of limited capacities of international organizations in relation with member states, Abbott et al., supra note 73, at 10–11.

¹²⁵ Eberlein, Burkard, Abbott, Kenneth W., Black, Julia, Meidinger, Errol, and Wood, Stepan, ‘Transnational Business Governance Interactions: Conceptualization and Framework for Analysis’, 8 Regulation & Governance (2014) 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 5. See also, Bartley, supra note 29, at 446–447; Fransen and Conzelman, supra note 2, 260.

¹²⁶ Schleifer, Philip, Fiorini, Matteo, and Auld, Graeme, ‘Transparency in Transnational Governance: The Determinants of Information Disclosure of Voluntary Sustainability Programs’, 13 Regulation & Governance (2019) 488CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹²⁷ Schneiberg and Bartley, supra note 92, at 44.

¹²⁸ Shaffer, Gregory and Pollack, Mark A., ‘Hard and Soft Law’, in Dunoff, Jeffrey L. and Pollack, Mark A. (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 197Google Scholar, at 204.

¹²⁹ Kirton and Trebilcock, supra note 103, at 4–5.

¹³⁰ Ibid., at 6.

¹³¹ Currently, the ITC's Sustainability Map project provides more than release of information. The T4SD team developed the ‘Virtual Network’ which can be used along with the Sustainability Standards Map. Because gaining comparative information via the Standards Map may not necessarily lead to a real business opportunity, the T4SD team, acting as a facilitator, helps ‘connecting businesses, support organization and practitioners along sustainable value chains’. See, ITC Sustainability Map, Virtual Network, www.sustainabilitymap.org/network_intro (accessed 17 September 2019).

¹³² The SAFA's governance by soft law can be improved if it adds some elements of ‘experimentalist’ governance. Space does not allow a detailed discussion of governance by experimentation. Briefly, experimentalist governance has five common features: (1) open participation; (2) a broadly agreed common problem; (3) lower-level implementation; (4) feedback, and reporting; and (5) peer review. de Búrca, Gráinne, Keohane, Robert O., and Sabel, Charles, ‘New Modes of Pluralist Global Governance’, 45 NYU Journal of International Law & Politics (2013) 723Google Scholar, at 739. Importantly, experimentalist systems ‘regularize and officialize’ the ‘occasional and ad hoc practice’ of exchanging views and experiences, thereby shifting to ‘systematic learning’. Ibid., at 740–741. More established ‘systems of discovery and learning’ make ‘experimentalist’ governance different from ‘soft law’ governance. Schneiberg and Bartley, supra note 92, at 49.

¹³³ For interactions between public and private authorities, see, e.g., Green, Jessica and Auld, Graeme, ‘Unbundling the Regime Complex: The Effects of Private Authority’, 6 Transnational Environmental Law (2017) 259CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Green, Jessica F., ‘Blurred Lines: Public-Private Interactions in Carbon Regulations’, 43 International Interactions (2017) 103CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹³⁴ For a discussion of legitimacy of private standards, see, e.g., Biermann, Frank and Gupta, Aarti, ‘Accountability and Legitimacy in Earth System Governance: A Research Framework’, 70 Ecological Economics (2011) 1856CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 1857.

¹³⁵ Bodansky, Daniel, ‘Legitimacy in International Law and International Relations’, in Dunoff, Jeffrey L. and Pollack, Mark A. (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 321Google Scholar, at 330.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid., at 327.

¹³⁸ Godzimirska, Zuzanna, ‘Delegitimation of Global Courts: Lessons from the Past’, in Kent, Avidan et al. (eds.), The Future of International Courts: Regional, Institutional and Procedural Challenges (Routledge, 2019) 123Google Scholar, at 124.

¹³⁹ Creamer, Cosette D. and Godzimirska, Zuzanna, ‘(De)Legitimition at the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism’, 49 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2016) 275Google Scholar, at 281 (citing Bodansky, Daniel, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?’ 93 American Journal International Law (1999) 596CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 602). See also, Bodansky, supra note 135, at 327 and 329 (arguing the importance of distinguishing ‘normative legitimacy’ and ‘descriptive/sociological legitimacy’, because we usually talk about an institution's normative legitimacy on the basis of normative criteria, such as ‘input legitimacy’, but this is different from ‘an institution's descriptive or sociological legitimacy – with whether its authority is accepted by relevant audiences, such as states and civil society groups’.).

¹⁴⁰ Schleifer, Philip, ‘Varieties of Multi-Stakeholder Governance: Selecting Legitimation Strategies in Transnational Sustainability Politics’, 16 Globalizations (2019) 50CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 52 (arguments based on Buchanan, Allen and Keohane, Robert O., ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’, 20 Ethics & International Affairs (2006) 405CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

¹⁴¹ For the importance of a focus on supply chains in the WTO negotiations, see Hoekman, Bernard M., Supply Chains, Mega-Regionals and Multilateralism: A Road Map for the WTO (CEPR Press, 2014), at 35–36Google Scholar.

¹⁴² Note that the early SPS Committee's documents in 2009 pointed out a few positive effects of private standards according to responses from WTO Members. See, SPS Committee, supra note 7, paras. 38–40 (Question 12. Positive (trade creating) effects of the private standard(s) on the exports of a product).

¹⁴³ For the need for research on ‘interplay and coevolution’ of multiple forms, see Schneiberg and Bartley, supra note 92, at 53.

¹⁴⁴ Alter, Karen J. and Raustiala, Kal, ‘The Rise of International Regime Complexity’, 14 Annual Review of Law and Social Science (2018) 329CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 345.

¹⁴⁵ For a discussion of such a non-interventionist approach, see Bernstein, Steven and Hannah, Erin, ‘Non-State Global Standard Setting and the WTO: Legitimacy and the Need for Regulatory Space’, 11 Journal of International Economic Law (2008) 575CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 606.

¹⁴⁶ Fransen and Conzelmann, supra note 14, at 260.