Background

Debate over Reparations in the United States. A common means of righting historical wrongs is government-provided reparation to compensate for harm done. When provided in a comprehensive manner, reparations serve as a formal acknowledgment of injustices and provide tangible compensation to the affected groups, aiming to redress the economic, social, and psychological damages inflicted. These reparations do more than address past grievances but also seek to restore the dignity of victims and their descendants, promoting societal healing and reconciliation. There are many examples of government-paid reparations programs, both in the United States and in other countries (Mullen & Darity Reference Mullen, Darity, William, Darity, Kirsten and Lucas2023; Posner & Vermeule Reference Posner and Vermeule2003). Well-known examples include reparations paid to Japanese Americans who were forced into internment camps during World War II and for victims of the Holocaust in the form of pension payments (Henry Reference Henry2003).

International standards for reparations are based on human rights frameworks and transitional justice practices (United Nations 2005); they emphasize the need for a multi-pronged approach to address both material and symbolic aspects of redress. In contrast, most reparations proposals put forth in the current U.S. context adopt one or two of four broadly defined approaches: (1) individual monetary payment, (2) in-kind benefits to individuals, (3) community level/structural changes, or (4) symbolic restitution.

Many activists, academics, and public intellectuals adopt the first conceptualization of reparations and focus on proposals to grant substantial cash payments from the federal government to most Black Americans in order to reduce the black-white chasm in wealth (e.g., Darity & Mullen Reference Darity and Mullen2020; Hannah-Jones Reference Hannah-Jones2020; Logan Reference Logan2023). In contrast, the handful of reparations programs enacted at the state or local level tend to adopt the second approach providing smaller in-kind benefits such as housing grants. For example, in 2019, Evanston, Illinois enacted one of the first reparations programs, which provides housing grants of around $25,000. However, only 16 grants were made in the first few years (with 100 others on a waiting list). Critics of this local grant approach characterize it as “grossly insufficient for this population’s needs” (Darity & Mullen, Reference Darity, Mullen, William, Darity, Kirsten and Lucas2023, p. 210) and argue that in-kind programs would need to be established at the federal level to reach the scale necessary to reduce the Black-white wealth gap.

Other advocates conceptualize reparations more broadly with less focus on individual-level benefits. Such proposals emphasize access and opportunity and focus on addressing the consequences of systemic racism through substantial policy changes in the areas of housing, education, and income to increase social, economic, and political parity (e.g., Black Lives Matter proposal, as well as proposal advanced by the National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America (N’COBRA). Supporters of this approach argue that systemic change is needed to address the systemic inequities perpetuated by slavery and its aftermath. The final approach provides symbolic restitution (e.g., apologies, memorials, and educational programs) that seek to address the moral restitution goal. To date, most of these efforts have occurred alongside of (but not named as part of) the reparations debate, such as the legislatures that have enacted a formal apology for slavery. Although opinions on this vary, we view each of these four approaches to represent valid—if incomplete—forms that slavery reparations could take in the United States, with each offering important advantages and limitations. Our research does not aim to compare or evaluate these different approaches but to call attention to how few of the policymakers supporting reparations have taken a position on which approach or approaches should be pursued.

One factor distinguishing these different approaches to reparations is the level of public support and opposition for each. In general, scholars have demonstrated how support for reparations falls along racial lines and is heavily influenced by views of deservingness and identity (Craemer Reference Craemer2009; Dawson & Popoff Reference Dawson and Popoff2004; Reichelmann et al. Reference Reichelmann, Roos and Hughes2022; Reichelmann & Hunt Reference Reichelmann and Hunt2022). But, a closer look at these data indicates that much of the public opposition focuses on the first approach: providing reparations as individual-level cash payments (Craemer Reference Craemer2009; Reichelmann & Hunt Reference Reichelmann and Hunt2022; Zulu Reference Zulu2016), while more support is found for other approaches to reparations. Zulu (Reference Zulu2016) characterizes these results as indicating that the public may support some form of compensation for slavery, but not the financial compensation typically central to a reparation policy—at least not at this time.Footnote ² A strategic policymaker who supports cash reparations may capitalize on this lack of consensus and the numerous interpretations of this policy issue (Jones, Baumgartner, & Talbert Reference Jones, Baumgartner and Talbert1993; Zahariadis Reference Zahariadis2003, Reference Zahariadis, Paul Sabatier and Christopher2014). Expressing ambiguous support for reparations allows a policymaker to satisfy advocates for reparations while reducing backlash and avoiding accountability for unpopular policy decisions (Bergquist Reference Bergquist2020; Schneider and Ingram Reference Schneider and Ingram2019). This approach is consistent with broader use of ambiguity in politics to enable negotiation of ideological conflicts, build broader coalitions, and overcome gridlock (Alesina & Cukierman Reference Alesina and Cukierman1990; Bräuninger & Giger Reference Bräuninger and Giger2018; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith Reference Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith1993; Matland Reference Matland1995).

Reparations Commissions. Within this context, it is not surprising that Democratic policymakers tend to avoid proposing specific reparations proposals. Instead, the more common proposal (among policymakers who support reparations) is legislation to establish a reparations commission to study the issue and propose remedies—side-stepping any need to specify the scope or form (if any) a reparations program would take. A clear example of this approach is the federal reparations bill (H.R. 40), which (despite its name) would not provide cash payments or any other form of reparations to Black Americans. When this bill was first introduced in 1989, its commission design mirrored that of other successful reparations programs, most notably reparations for Japanese Americans interned during World War II, but also more recently for families of 9/11 victims. However, legislation enacting those previous commissions was enacted soon after the bill was first introduced and their recommendations were enacted soon after that (Henry Reference Henry2003). In sharp contrast, H.R. 40 (even without providing any reparations program directly) remains controversial enough to have stalled out at the introduction or committee stage in each congress—leaving proponents of reparations pessimistic about future policy success, with 82 percent of Black adults stating that reparations are unlikely to occur in their lifetime (Cox & Edwards Reference Cox and Edwards2022).

Three states (and a handful of cities) have enacted reparations commissions. The first of these, in California, completed its work in 2023 resulting in a report with potential to move the debate forward by documenting the state’s contribution to the racial wealth gap and providing a detailed methodology for calculating cash reparations. However, the political feasibility of the commission’s recommendations is undermined by its substantial cost and broad focus on more than 100 policy recommendations specified in its more than 1000 page report.Footnote ³

In the 2024 California legislative session—the first since the commission issued its report—a package of 14 reparations proposals was introduced by the California Legislative Black Caucus. Six of these bills were enacted, with the most notable bill providing a formal apology for slavery. The other enacted bills were smaller provisions (i.e., protections for athletes wearing natural hairstyles, requiring advanced notification for grocery or pharmacy closing in underserved communities, etc.). Provisions that failed to make it through the legislative process included bans on solitary confinement, funding for violence reduction, financial assistance for homeowners, and programs to increase health and well-being outcomes for particular groups, as well as a program addressing misuse of eminent domain and changes to state food assistance which were both passed by legislature but vetoed by the governor (Alfonseca Reference Alfonseca2024). Most notably, this package did not include a proposal for direct cash payments (Fry Reference Fry2024).

To challenge the omission of a cash reparations bill by the California Legislative Black Caucus, a legislator who had served on the Reparations Commission introduced two more bills—one to establish a state agency focused on reparations and another to provide initial funds to implement the commission’s recommendations. Neither of these bills were enacted, yet the legislative debate on these bills continued through the last day of the legislative session—mobilizing opposition to reparations and highlighting a fractured group of reparations proponents who seemed to be fighting one another. And ironically, in an attempt to avoid the need to decide whether to sign or veto these bills if passed, the same Governor who established the first-in-the nation reparations commission now proposed amending the bill establishing a state Freedmen Affairs agency to instead authorize a state university to study the issue further (Fry, Koseff & Kamal Reference Fry, Koseff and Kamal2024).

Beyond the issue of reparations, delegation of authority to expert panels or commissions is a common strategy used by policymakers to signal to voters that they are addressing complex and technical policy issues that require specialized knowledge—while remaining at arms’ length from any controversial policy recommendations that emerge (Campbell Reference Campbell1998; Hunter & Boswell Reference Hunter and Boswell2014; Krent Reference Krent1990; Straus Reference Straus2017). Of course, there are other reasons to support establishment of expert commissions. Delegation to experts may help build public trust since consultation can be viewed as more credible and transparent than the political process itself (Stiglitz Reference Stiglitz2018). In fact, Bertsou (Reference Bertsou2022) finds that despite theoretical concerns about unaccountable and the non-transparent nature of expert-based governance, the public generally prefers independent experts over national elected representatives. If this is the case for reparations policy, these reparations commissions may serve as productive tools for building political support and moving a controversial and complex issue forward on the political agenda (Zahariadis Reference Zahariadis2003).

Whether Democratic policymakers’ support for reparations commissions will serve any of these productive functions or not is an open question—one that will be shaped by the design of enacted reparations commissions. For example, the scope, powers, and authority granted to a commission are vital to its impact. Tama (Reference Tama2014) found that a well-defined charge helped blue ribbon commissions drive policy change by focusing on critical issues. Similarly, Zegart (Reference Zegart2004) noted that presidential commissions with clear mandates were more effective in avoiding mission drift. Research on truth commissions shows that those with greater statutory powers, like subpoena authority, were better at navigating political obstacles and supporting policy change (Bakiner Reference Bakiner2014). In addition, successful commissions are typically embedded within robust institutional structures with adequate resources tend to perform better, ideally situated within agencies with closely aligned missions and priorities (Carrigan Reference Carrigan2018; Schinkel et al. Reference Schinkel, Tóth and Tuinstra2015). Integration with existing government structures is another key factor, particularly commissions closely linked to the legislature were more successful in translating their recommendations into policy actions (Dancy & Thoms Reference Dancy and Thoms2021; Tama Reference Tama2014).

Research Questions & Expectations

At this agenda-setting stage, we cannot measure the impact a reparations commission would have on future enactment of a reparations program. But the policy studies and policy process literature allow us to develop a conceptual model (see Figure 1) linking enactment of reparations commissions to later establishment of actual systems of reparations as a two-stage process. The first phase is building initial support for reparations among policymakers and the public. If this is much easier to do for the more ambiguous reparations commissions than other approaches to reparations, reparations commissions may help move reparations onto the governing agenda and increase the odds of a near-term incremental policy success. This possibility fits the case of California where ambiguous support for reparations from policymakers and the public facilitated enactment of a reparations commission. However, if there is no more support for a commission than for reparations themselves, pursuing reparations commissions may serve as a distraction that diverts advocacy effort that could be focused elsewhere. We assess support for commissions among legislators by examining bills introduced in Congress and state legislatures. For the public, we draw on a unique study that not only asks respondents about support for different approaches to reparations, but includes the first question on reparations commissions asked of a nationally representative sample. We use these data to address our first two questions.

• • RQ 1. How dominant is support for reparations commissions among Democratic policymakers? What proportion of bills addressing reparations propose commissions rather than actual programs of reparations: cash payments, in-kind benefits, community investment/change, or symbolic retribution? Has this changed over time?

• • RQ 2. Is the public more supportive of reparations commissions than they are of the actual approaches to providing reparations? How does this vary for Democrats, Republicans, and Independents?

Figure 1.

Conceptual framework: Reparations commissions & policy change.

The second phase in our conceptual framework considers the policy feedback effects likely to emerge from the reparations commission itself, which is crucial for anticipating how the policy may shape the political context that will determine its future trajectory, effectiveness, and legitimacy. At the heart of policy feedback theory is the notion that policies can structure subsequent political processes in ways that can either reinforce or undermine the initial policy goals (e.g., Mettler & SoRelle Reference Mettler, SoRelle, Weible and Sabatier2018). Positive feedback effects emerge when a policy mobilizes beneficiaries, creates new interest groups or coalitions, and establishes institutional arrangements or norms that align with the policy’s objectives and lead policymakers to propose similar policies in the future (Campbell Reference Campbell2002; Patashnik Reference Patashnik, Lindquist, Vincent and Wanna2011; Pierson Reference Pierson2000). Conversely, negative feedback effects occur when the policy designs disempower affected groups, induce public skepticism, mobilize opposition, or fragment governmental authority for the policy issue at hand (Baumgartner & Jones Reference Baumgartner and Jones2010; Michener Reference Michener2018, Reference Michener2019).

Policy feedback effects are impacted by key policy design elements; in this case, we focus on three that are highlighted in policy feedback theory, as well as empirical work on other forms of government commissions. First, the charge, powers, and authority granted to the commission, which shapes the scope of its work (Bakiner Reference Bakiner2014; Tama Reference Tama2014; Zegart Reference Zegart2004); (2) the institutional and organizational structure of the commission, which shapes its sustainability (Carrigan Reference Carrigan2018; Patashnik Reference Patashnik, Lindquist, Vincent and Wanna2011); and (3) the integration of the commission with the legislature, which promotes credibility and influence Dancy & Thoms Reference Dancy and Thoms2021; Tama Reference Tama2014). We expect that enactment of a reparations commission with authority to determine and grant actual reparations, institutionalizing the provision of reparations within the federal/state government, and whose work is closely linked with the legislature would be more likely to produce positive feedback efforts that would advance and sustain a reparations policy over the long term. In contrast, a reparations commission with non-binding advisory powers, no institutional structure or supports, and with loose ties to the legislators who will receive their recommendations, is not likely to produce the positive feedback effects needed for later policy action. This line of inquiry leads to our final research question:

• • RQ 3. How do proposed and enacted reparations commissions vary in terms of commission charge and authority, institutional structure, and integration with the legislature? Which reparations commission proposals seem most likely to produce positive policy feedback effects?

By investigating these three questions, we aim to better understand the dynamics surrounding political support for reparations, as well as the role of strategic ambiguity and policy design in the policymaking process.

Empirical Strategy & Results

We undertake this analysis in three parts focusing on each of our research questions in turn.

Inquiry 1: Policymakers Use of Reparations Commissions

In our first empirical study, we focused on the specific policy designs of bill referring to slavery reparations introduced at the federal and state levels. The advantage of using legislative text to identify reparations policy designs is that (by necessity) the process of introducing a bill requires a policymaker to provide details about what the proposal would do and how. Further, analysis of introduced legislation can provide important insights into the priorities of lawmakers that shape later stages of the policymaking process (Jones, Baumgartner, & Talbert Reference Jones, Baumgartner and Talbert1993; Flavin & Franko Reference Flavin and Franko2017; Schneider & Ingram Reference Schneider and Ingram2019). We examined the content of the proposed bills and their policy designs to assess the frequency with which policymakers proposed legislation related to reparations commissions compared to legislation that would provide actual reparations.

Methodology: Identifying Policy Proposal. To identify policy proposals in introduced legislation, we used the NexisUni database of statutes and legislation. We limited the search to full bill text that included the terms “slavery” and “reparations.” To exclude other bills that commonly use both terms, we excluded bills that included the phrase “crime victim” or “trafficking.” This search returned 262 entries across 27 jurisdictions (24 states, D.C., and the U.S. Congress). The earliest bill identified was introduced in 1998 and we included all introductions through the end of 2023. All 262 entries were reviewed for relevance. We excluded redundant entries stemming from companion bills and duplicate hits in the database. We also omitted a handful of bills that were not directly related to the study or provision of reparations for slavery.Footnote ⁴

Key Findings. We focus on the remaining 99 introduced bills; 47 were newly introduced bills, while 52 were re-introductions of previously introduced bills in the same state (as is common for bills that were not enacted; Rawat and Morris Reference Rawat and Morris2016). As shown in Figure 2, at least one bill was introduced at some point in this time period in 21 states (shown in the map below), as well as D.C. and the U.S. Congress.

Figure 2.

Number of introduced reparations bills, by state (1998-2023).

In general, these bills are “messaging bills,” which rarely advance past the bill introduction stage but play an important role in longer-term agenda-setting by signaling priorities, uniting party members, and influencing public and legislative discussions on key issues (Gelman Reference Gelman2020; Kingdon Reference Kingdon1984; Schiller Reference Schiller1995). Five of the bills have been enacted—with three states (CA, IL, and NY) establishing reparations commissions and California enacting two smaller provisions in 1999 and 2023, respectively.Footnote ⁵ We also note that in 2020, Virginia enacted legislation (2020 VA HB 1519) that created a Commission to Study Slavery and Subsequent Discrimination Against African Americans, which did not explicitly mention reparations. Like other bills not referencing the terms reparations and slavery, it is not included in our analysis.

Policymakers’ Preference for Commissions. To assess the degree to which policymakers rely on reparations commissions as a preferred policy design, we code the content of each introduced bill into two major categories: (1) commission-related and (2) other bills. As shown in Table 1, the majority of introduced bills in our sample (N=83) were commission-related—with 62 of these bills capturing re-introductions of the same reparations commission proposal session after session. Whether you look at the full set of bills or just the new introductions, the general pattern is similar. About 22 percent are resolutions calling on Congress or the state congressional delegation to pass the H.R. 40 bill to create a federal reparations commission. Between 40 and 59 percent of bills introduced are seeking to establish a reparations commission, and another few bills address issues of commission implementation in California.

Table 1.

Categorization of introduced reparation bills

Only 16 of the bills mentioning reparations and slavery were not focused on a reparations commission policy. Ten of these bills were resolutions expressing support for reparations in general or for a particular advocacy group (rather than expressing support for a commission, which were coded as commission-related bills).

Proposed Reparations Programs. The final six introduced bills put forth proposals for reparations programs that did not rely on a commission-based policy design. Although a small set, these bills can help identify alternative policy designs that could otherwise be overlooked in the push for reparations commissions. The first of these proposals was enacted in California in 1999 and focuses on the third approach to reparations (community/system-level reform). This bill required analysis of state insurance claim data to identify enslaved individuals whose descendants would have legal standing to seek compensation or other remedies. The other five proposals have all been introduced more recently (since 2019), and none of these have been enacted. Notably, these bills represent a range of approaches to establish a reparations program.

• • At the federal level, H.R. 9437 (introduced in 2022) would require issuers covered by the Security and Exchange Commission to carry out a racial equity audit of their practice every two years and establish within the Department of Treasury an Office of Reparations programs to provide grants for startup capital and funded savings programs for Black communities, as well as other programs in furtherance of racial equity [Approach 3: community/system change]

• • The District of Columbia’s B. 152 (introduced in 2019 and reintroduced in 2020) would establish a slavery era database of records relating to slaveholding, as well as establish the Reparations Foundation Fund to provide funds for reparations that may be distributed to certain District residents. [Approach 1: individual payments and Approach 3: community/system change]

• • Massachusetts’ S.B. 1050 (introduced in 2023) would impose excise tax on educational institutions, as well as fund a Reparations for Descendants of American Slavery Fund (monthly direct monetary reparations to descendants of enslaved African and Indigenous people). [Approach 1: individual payments]

• • Oregon’s S.B. 618 and 619 (introduced in 2021) would direct the Department of Administrative Services to study methods of providing reparations for slavery and direct the Department of Revenue to pay annual annuities to adult Black Oregonians who can demonstrate heritage in slavery. [Approach 1: Individual payments]

• • Vermont’s H.B. 273 (introduced in 2021) would establish the Vermont Land Access & Opportunity Fund to promote racial and social equity in land and property ownership through grants for purposes including the following: the purchase of home, land, or farm, or to fund mutual aid programs, and other financial education, wealth management, and regenerative natural resource programs led by and focused on groups historically discriminated against or denied access. [Approach 2: In-kind benefits]

Trends. The likelihood of a policymaker introducing any bill related to reparations as well as a bill focused on reparations commissions has varied over time. Figure 3 presents the number of proposals introduced in each two-year period (e.g., 2001–2002), which totals 99 introductions or re-introductions. Other than the consistent introduction of the federal H.R. 40 commission bill throughout the time period, legislative attention to reparations has generally been low—with increased salience during two time periods. The first time period was 2001–2004, which coincides with a period of heightened global interest in addressing historical injustices and promoting human rights. This focus extended to the issue of slavery reparations, including a significant 2001 summit at the United Nationals on the topic (Campo, Mastin, & Frazer Reference Campo, Mastin and Frazer2004); it was also during this time (in 2000) that the NAACP first endorsed the federal reparations bills and the issue garnered greater support than ever before among members of the Congressional Black Caucus (Michelson Reference Michelson2002). The second legislative period was 2019–2022, which coincided with broad public attention to racial inequality after the murder of George Floyd by police and Black Lives Matter protests across the nation (Burch et al. Reference Burch, Cai, Gianordoli, McCarthy and Patel2020; Drakulich & Denver Reference Drakulich and Denver2022). Regardless of the overall level of legislative activity, each year the majority of introduced bills employed a commission-based policy design. Although notably, in recent years when the number of commission-focused bills is at its peak, we also see the introduction of more bills focused on the actual provision of reparations using one approach or another.

Figure 3.

Number of reparations bills introduced, by year.

Summary of Bill Introduction Findings. This first empirical inquiry addressed our first research question regarding the dominance of the reparations commission proposals (as opposed to proposals to provide reparations). We find support for our expectation that Democratic policymakers are more and increasingly likely to introduce a commission-focused reparations bill rather than a bill establishing reparations (cash benefits, in-kind, community level, or symbolic). In fact, only six percent of the bills introduced established reparations in any form (16 percent were focused on any aspect of reparations other than commissions). This suggests that it has been easier to secure support from policymakers for reparations commission proposals, which provide a policy design that allows the legislator to support particular legislation without specifying which approaches to reparations they support or oppose. As a result, it is not clear whether legislators who support a commission would support a less ambiguous reparations bill.

Inquiry 2: Public Support for Reparations Commissions

In our second empirical study, we turn our attention to public opinion, specifically the degree to which the American public (like their policymakers) prefers the creation of a reparations commission to proposals for actual reparations. Despite multiple surveys and polls comparing support for different approaches to reparations (e.g., an apology, cash payments), we identified no estimates of public support for enactment of a reparations commission in a systematic review of the iPoll and Gallup databases, as well as the public opinion work published by the Pew Charitable Trust.Footnote ⁶ After we fielded our survey, in 2023, a state-specific public opinion survey found 43 percent of Californians hold a favorable view of the California reparations commission that just completed its work (54 percent were unfavorable and only 3 percent did not know; Public Policy Institute of California 2023). Favorability was higher among Democrats (58 percent) and Black Americans (65 percent), but for all groups, support for a commission fell below support for an apology (the only one of the recommendations tested in this survey).Footnote ⁷

Methodology: Understanding Public Support for Reparations. To develop a broader picture of national support for a reparations commission, we developed a survey module embedded in the 2020 GW Politics Poll, a nationally representativeFootnote ⁸ public opinion poll covering an array of social and political topics. The questions in our module were focused on ascertaining respondents’ support for or opposition to reparations commissions versus specific forms of reparations programs. These questions were asked across two cross-sectional survey waves—the first in a period of relative normalcy in terms of public attention to the topic of reparations in February 2020 (n = 1,200) and the second in June 2020 (n = 1,200), a time in which reparations had become a salient policy issue with emerging protests following the murder of George Floyd by a Minneapolis police officer.

Public Support for Reparations Commission. Respondents were told: “Members of Congress are considering a bill that would establish a commission to study the lingering effects of slavery on African Americans today, as well as consider different ways of providing reparations to African Americans” They were then asked: “Do you support or oppose this bill?” with the following response options: strongly support, support, neither support nor oppose, oppose, strongly oppose, or don’t know. Six respondents declined to provide a response, so those were dropped from the analysis, resulting in a total sample size of 2,394.

Figure 4 presents partisan differences in support for a reparations commission. As expected, Republicans were quite united in terms of opposition with 72% expressing strong opposition to the commission. Among Democratic respondents—the primary constituency for Democratic policymakers (Lax, Phillips & Zelizer, Reference Lax, Phillips and Zelizer2019; Maks-Solomon & Rigby Reference Maks-Solomon and Rigby2020)—we found majority support for the commission, with approximately 58% in favor and 15% percent in opposition. A non-negligible proportion of the Democratic sample expressed more tentative positions of being neutral (20%) or unsure (7%) about the commission. Independents were more opposed than supportive—but also significant proportions expressed being neutral (21%) or unsure (20%).

Figure 4.

Commission support, by party.

Since these response options were non-linear (e.g., many respondents expressing they were neutral or unsure) and the response options were not mutually exclusive (e.g., strongly oppose versus oppose), we created a dichotomous measure of support for the commission with 34 percent of respondents coded one after responding that they support or strongly support the commission. All other responses were coded zero. This support for the commission was significantly higher in June 2020 (39%) compared to February 2020 (29%). We consider this 29 to 39 percent range of support to represent a likely lower- and upper-bound estimate of support for the commission in the near-term climate as salience of the issue ebbs and flows. In this analysis, we average across the two waves for all descriptive statistics and control for survey wave in our multivariate analyses.

Who Supports a Reparations Commission? To better understand this public support for reparations commissions, we estimated a logistic regression model with variables commonly found to predict support for different approaches to reparations. Our estimates reflect odds ratios indicating the likelihood of support (coded one) versus non-support (coded zero).

Identity and Demographics. Due to the centrality of race in the discussion of reparations and existing research suggesting a racial gap in support for these policies between Black and non-Black populations (Campo, Mastin, & Frazer Reference Campo, Mastin and Frazer2004; Nteta Reference Nteta2021), we included a measure of race in our analyses. Approximately 12% of the sample self-identified as Black or African American, 64% White, and 24% other races. Additionally, women comprised approximately 52% of the sample, and the average age of respondents was 49 years old (sd = 17.49). Education was measured on a 6-point scale with higher values denoting higher educational achievement. The options ranged from less than a high school education (education = 1) to completion of a post-graduate degree (education = 6) with a mean of 3.38 (sd = 1.50). Similarly, income was measured on a scale 1 to 16 scale with higher values corresponding to higher levels of yearly household income (mean = 6.23, sd = 3.33). To estimate missing income data for those who declined to provide estimates of their annual income (n = 310), we imputed predicted values based on their race, gender, age, and education.

Partisanship, Ideology, and Beliefs. To capture the impact of partisanship, we used a three-category measure: respondents were coded as being either Democrat (41%), Republican (36%), or Independent (23%). Respondents who said they leaned toward one party or the other were coded with the applicable party, while others are considered Independent for the purposes of our analyses. We also controlled for ideology on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (very conservative) to 5 (very liberal), with the center point representing the moderate/unsure option. The mean ideology was 2.92 with standard deviation of 1.12. Lastly, we wanted to gauge respondents’ recognition of the enduring legacy of slavery and its impact on the daily lives of Black Americans. To do so, we asked the following component of the standard racial resentment measure: “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class” (Kinder & Sanders, Reference Kinder and Sanders1996). Similar to the ideology measure, the variable was coded on a scale from 1 to 5, with higher values denoting greater belief in the existence of disparities stemming from slavery, and a midpoint value of 3 representing the “unsure” option. The mean value was 3.04 (sd = 1.52).Footnote ⁹

Logistic Regression Models . We began by estimating the odds of supporting a reparations commission based on these independent variables. The results are presented in Table 2. Consistent with findings for public opinion studies comparing specific forms of reparations, we found Black respondents to be nearly three times (2.91) as supportive of establishing a reparations commission as white respondents were. Similar, albeit smaller, results emerge when comparing non-Black people of color to white respondents (1.56). Age and education were also significant predictors, with those who were younger (.99), and those with higher levels of education (1.20) more likely to support the commission.

Table 2.

Logistic regression results

Notes: ¹Dependent variable is support for reparations commission; ²Shading denotes significance at 5% level (p<0.05); ³White is the base category.

In terms of the political predictors, we find greater support for the commission among more liberal respondents (1.57) and those who recognize the lasting impact of slavery and discrimination (2.43). Interestingly, since these variables were both measured on a 5-point scale, we can compare the size of the odds ratio to see that recognition of these lasting impacts is a stronger predictor of support for the commission than political ideology. This suggests the potential for increased support for commissions as an understanding of the lasting effects of slavery is more widely accepted. Notably, although support for a commission varied significantly by party (see earlier Figure 4), the odds ratio for party is not statistically significant in this multivariate model. This suggests that the partisan gap is driven by the demographic and ideological differences between Democrats and Republicans, not by party identification itself. This deviates from what is typically found in public opinion polls estimating support for different approaches to reparations.

Does support of a commission reflect support for reparations? Next, we explored what public support for (or opposition to) a reparations commission means in terms of support for specific approaches to reparations that the commission may recommend. We included an example of each of the four approaches identified earlier: (1) cash payments to Black descendants of enslaved peoples (supported by 20% of respondents);Footnote ¹⁰ (2) targeted financial aid and scholarships for Black college students (supported by 39%); (3) investment in schools and community resources in predominantly Black neighborhoods (supported by 62%); and (4) a formal apology for slavery offered by the U.S. government (supported by 41%). Respondents’ positions were coded as dichotomous variables with 1 denoting support (capturing respondents who responded that they strongly support or support the commission) and 0 denoting opposition or uncertainty.

Figure 5 shows the proportion of respondents who supported (including those who strongly supported) the reparations commission who also supported each of the reparations policies. These estimates of support are provided for five groups of respondents: all supporters, Democrats only, white respondents, Black respondents, and respondents of another race (shown left to right). In general, those who support the commission also support enactment of reparations, especially in the form of community investment, followed by a formal apology or financial aid and scholarships. Cash reparations received the least support—except for Black supporters of the commission who also support cash payments at the same high level they support other approaches to reparation.

Figure 5.

Support for reparations (commission supporters).

Most importantly, support for the commission did not translate into total support for all forms of reparations with many respondents who supported the commission expressing opposition to one reparations proposal or another. This is most clear for cash reparations, which only receives support from about half of the non-Black supporters of the commission. There is also a smaller difference in support for reparations in the form of financial aid and scholarships—with Black respondents expressing more support and other non-white respondents showing less support for this approach to reparations.

Figure 6 provides the same estimates, but for the respondents who expressed opposition (including strong opposition) to creation of a reparations commission. Not surprisingly, we see much less support for all the approaches to reparations suggesting that support for a reparations commission is closely tied to support for actual reparations. However, almost half of those who expressed opposition to reparations commission still expressed support for reparations in the form of community investment in Black communities. There was also some support among these commission opponents for other approaches to reparations; a little over a quarter of Democratic opponents still supported reparations in the form of financial aid and scholarships or a formal apology. Black respondents who opposed the reparations commission (a very small segment of the sample; n = 29) still expressed some support for reparations in the form of a formal apology (46 percent) and cash payments (24 percent). Notably, we find that opposition to the establishment of a reparations commission does not necessarily mean opposition to all approaches to reparations.

Figure 6.

Support for reparations (commission opponents).

Summary of Public Opinion Findings. Among survey respondents, 34 percent expressed support for a reparations commission, with this proportion rising to 58 percent among Democrats. We also note the presence of a group of potentially persuadable Independents expressing uncertainty or neutrality on commissions. Most importantly, we found respondents’ support for a reparations commission did not guarantee support for all approaches to reparations, nor did opposition lead to opposing all reparations approaches. Therefore, assessing public support for a reparations commission versus for actual reparations requires specifying the form reparations would take—with commissions more popular than cash payments, but less popular than reparations in the form of community investment.

We find that public support for reparations commissions operates a little differently than other forms of reparations. We identified sizable proportions of non-Black respondents who support the commission but do not support the traditional notion of cash reparations, as well as opponents of the commission who do favor community-based or in-kind reparations programs. A factor particularly important for predicting support for the commission is recognition of the legacy of slavery and discrimination, which is a factor that may be shaped by information campaigns, as well as by the work of the commission itself. Notably, these public opinion findings do not mirror the pattern seen among policymakers who seem to far prefer commissions to proposals that would establish actual reparations programs. Reparations commissions are broadly popular among even the Democratic public the way they are among Democratic policymakers who have an electoral incentive to use strategic ambiguity and delay the harder debate over what form of reparations this country owes to Black Americans.

Inquiry 3: Reparations Commission Design & Potential Feedback Effects

This final empirical inquiry is more exploratory, as we focus on the second phase in our conceptual framework: policy feedback effects that may shape later policymaking. Like other policies, the design of reparations commissions matters in ways that can produce positive or negative feedback effects (Béland, Campbell, & Weaver Reference Béland, Campbell and Weaver2022; Mettler & SoRelle Reference Mettler, SoRelle, Weible and Sabatier2018; Michener Reference Michener2018, Reference Michener2019). We focus on the following design elements in particular: the composition of the commission, powers the commission holds, and the institutional structure of the commission. Together these design factors shape the degree to which a reparations commission helps maintain a long-lasting coalition in support of direct reparations, increases pressure on policymakers to take further action, and institutionalizes attention to and authority over the issue of reparations within the government.

Methodology: For this inquiry, we go back to the bill introductions data used earlier. Yet, instead of comparing all 99 introductions, we focus on the 18 bills (15 introduced, 3 enacted) that establish reparations commissions. Many of these commission bills have been introduced multiple times. In those cases, we coded the 2023 (or most recently introduced) commission bill text since some details do change between introductions. In addition, two states introduced new commission bills in early 2024, so we include Tennessee and Nebraska’s newly introduced legislation in this content analysis as well for a total of 20 bills.

For each bill, we coded the commission specified in the legislative text to identify the following factors: name of commission; commission charge and powers; where commission is institutionalized; and the power of the legislature to appoint the commission. We acknowledge that implementation decisions not specified in the legislative text also determine the degree to which these commissions spur action toward later policy enactment or stall out after making recommendations, but those are beyond the scope of this analysis.

Findings: Commission Charge. The 20 bills we analyzed are presented in Table 3 with the three enacted bills shaded. Considering the charge of each commission, the most common commission bill (16 of 20 bills) established a time-limited commission tasked with studying the issue of slavery and later discrimination and making recommendations for later policy change. These commissions do not have authority to shape reparations policy beyond these recommendations. This design reflects that of H.R 40—the first reparations commission bill that was introduced by Congressional Democrats in 1989 and has diffused (with small adaptations) to 16 states. The heavy use of this policy design is aligned with our expectation that ambiguous policy designs are a means by which policymakers can balance responsiveness on the issue while maintaining strategic ambiguity for as long as possible. It also highlights the serious concerns that reparations commissions will generate recommendations without holding any of the power needed to enact these changes once their report is submitted.

Table 3.

Enacted and introduced bills creating reparations commissions

Note: As of May 2024, only the highlighted bills have been enacted.

Four states have established (IL) or proposed (MA, MD, MN) longer-term commissions with broader powers to administer reparations programs and/or determine and grant reparations payments. In Illinois, the enacted commission is charged with conducting public education and given authority over many state functions to ensure equity, equality, and parity. The earlier 2003 Massachusetts bill proposed establishing a commission with the power to directly administer and determine reparations payments and benefits, including setting the amounts and criteria for eligibility. But, this is not a model pursued by any other state in the last twenty years nor even the current legislative proposal introduced in the state. In Maryland, the commission would be responsible for administering in-kind programs and is granted authority to establish a cash reparations program. Minnesota was the one state that combined these two approaches—creating a study commission that is also tasked with identifying by name public and private entities that benefited from slavery and anti-Blackness, and setting eligibility and award grants. We expect that this approach to establish a study commission to develop a long-term ambitious proposal and with appropriate funds and authority to develop and implement smaller ongoing programs in the short term is a promising model for producing positive feedback effects.

Findings: Institutional Structure. We considered commissions’ institutional structure as another policy design feature that varies across reparations commissions and can produce positive or negative feedback effects (Patashnik Reference Patashnik, Lindquist, Vincent and Wanna2011). Figure 7 categorizes the institutional structure of the 20 bills into five categories: not specified (N = 2), established as independent entity (N = 4), established within legislative branch (N = 4), established within a general-purpose agency (N = 5), and established within a mission-aligned agency (N = 5). A second institutional factor that may impact the ultimate influence of the commission on later policy outcomes is whether the legislation specifies operational staff or funding for the commission itself and/or grants the commission with authority to hire staff and procure other expertise. We indicate in bold font the bills that included an explicit statement about staff or operational support.

Figure 7.

Institutional structure specified for proposed reparations commissions.

Considering the dire shortage of attention to a wide range of critical issues within government institutions, a reparations commission that establishes sustained attention to the issue is likely to produce positive policy feedback effects. We expect that commissions established within a mission-aligned agency and granted their own right to staff and operational support, such as Michigan’s H.B. 5483 situated within their Department of Civil Rights and Vermont’s H.B. 432 situated within the state Human Rights Commission would do the most to institutionalize and sustain attention to the reparations policy agenda over time.

Findings: Integration with Legislature. Among the 20 commission bills, two did not specify composition of the commission (CT 1 and MA 1). Figure 8 below shows the size of the other 18 commissions (height of the bar), as well as the proportion of the commission appointed by the legislature (black segment of bar). The most common pattern is for the legislature to appoint four to eight commissioners (among seven to eleven member commissions). Yet, two bills would establish a commission more closely integrated with the legislature; GA 2 and TN 1 both propose a legislative study commission in which the reparations commission is entirely made up of legislators. This design seems like it could generate more politically feasible proposals that are more likely to be taken up by the legislature as a whole as opposed to study commissions viewed as advisory only. In contrast, Nebraska has a commission appointed entirely by the governor but requires legislative approval of all commission members. On the other end of the spectrum, a handful of bills (including the federal HR 40) propose larger commissions with fewer members appointed by the legislature, which may have advantages in terms of engagement and representation of diverse perspectives but reinforces the notion that the commission is an outside advisory group rather than a policymaking body.

Figure 8.

Composition of commission, by type of appointee.

Summary of Legislative Text Analysis. The most common commission design, which mirrors the federal H.R. 40 legislation is establishment of a time-limited study commission tasked with making recommendations only. This modal commission is likely to be established as an independent agency with staff and operational funding or situated within the legislative branch drawing on their resources. Finally, reparations commissioners tend to be selected by a range of elected officials with about a third to half of the commissioners selected by the legislature. Despite the common use of this model, reparations commissions have been proposed that are designed in ways more likely to facilitate later policy enactment. In particular, we explored three strategies likely to produce more positive policy feedback effects: providing ongoing authority to the commission to design and administer programs; establishing the commission in a mission-aligned agency with staff and operational funding; and creating a legislative study commission made up of only legislations that would produce recommendations (by design) with built-in support and legitimacy among a portion of the legislature that would need to enact those recommendations.