Introduction
Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha (1635-1676) is widely regarded as one of the most significant grand viziers in the history of the Ottoman Empire. His remarkable 15-year tenure from 1661 to 1676, stands as one of the longest in the empire's history. He assumed this prestigious position in October 1661, succeeding his father, Köprülü Mehmed Pasha (c. 1578-1661), who had served as grand vizier from 1656 until his sudden demise in 1661.Footnote 1 European sources from the time presented diverse speculations about why Sultan Mehmed IV (1642-1693, ruled 1648-1687) chose Fazıl Ahmed as his father's successor, noting that the appointment marked only the second instance in Ottoman history where a grand vizier's son assumed the same office.Footnote 2 English diplomat and historian Paul Rycaut (1629-1700), for instance, proposed in his publication The History of the Present State of the Ottoman Empire that while such a transfer of power from father to son was “a peculiar departure from the usual practice,” Köprülü Mehmed Pasha “had rendered such meritorious service to the Sultan and his entire realm, [. . .] that no honor could adequately be bestowed upon his memory except the appointment of his son to his position.”Footnote 3 Furthermore, it was widely assumed that Fazıl Ahmed would carry on the governance of the empire using the effective methods of his father, who had successfully quelled political unrest and ushered in a period of stability within the realm.Footnote 4 The sultan's emphasis on stability presented the Köprülü family with a unique opportunity to strengthen and ascend in influence. During his tenure, Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha orchestrated three significant military campaigns.Footnote 5 In 1663/64, he engaged in a conflict against the Habsburgs and their allies.Footnote 6 This war, marked by substantial casualties on both sides, concluded with the signing of the Peace Treaty of Vasvár (Eisenburg) in 1665.Footnote 7 Between 1666 and 1669, Fazıl Ahmed Pasha was stationed in Crete, where he successfully concluded the protracted siege of Venetian-held Candia.Footnote 8 Finally, between 1672 and 1674, he led military operations in Podolia.Footnote 9
While Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha implemented a range of military and administrative reforms and achieved significant victories over the Habsburgs, Venetians, and Poles, it is only in recent decades that historians have begun to give him the increased attention he deserves.Footnote 10 As grand vizier, his role encompassed a diverse array of responsibilities, spanning domestic and foreign political affairs,Footnote 11 and he drew keen scrutiny from foreign diplomats. He was a captivating and noteworthy figure. The observations of contemporaries often revealed a complex blend of admiration and trepidation. One such observer was Giovanni Battista Casanova (1623-1676), who assumed the role of imperial residentFootnote 12 at the Sublime Porte in 1665, by which time Fazıl Ahmed had already held office for four years. Casanova arrived in the Sublime Porte in the entourage of Grand Ambassador Walter Leslie (1607-1667), who had traveled to the Ottoman Empire to confirm the Treaty of Vasvár (Eisenburg).Footnote 13 Casanova assumed the role of imperial resident at the Sublime Porte in 1665, succeeding Simon Reniger von Renningen (d. 1668), who had held the position since 1649.Footnote 14 During his seven-year residency at the Sublime Porte from 1665 to 1672, Giovanni Battista Casanova made it his mission to gather as much information as possible about life and politics within the Ottoman Empire. He meticulously documented his findings in a series of 188 extensive dispatches, which he relayed to Emperor Leopold I and the Aulic War Council, sparing no detail of his acquired knowledge. Notably, grand vizier Fazıl Ahmed was a recurring figure in the majority of these reports.Footnote 15 Despite the fact that Casanova's residency coincided with only half of Fazıl Ahmed's time in office, his reports provide a rich and vivid portrayal of how the imperial resident perceived, analyzed, and assessed the grand vizier.
Relations Between Grand Vizier Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha and Sultan Mehmed IV
According to Casanova's observations, the relationship between grand vizier Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha and Sultan Mehmed IV was characterized by complex dynamics. While there was a fundamental mutual respect for each other's spheres of authority, their relationship also went through periods of tension and power struggles, notably during the years in which Fazıl Ahmed Pasha was in Crete to finish the prolonged war with Venice. Their relationship highlighted the intricate, and sometimes delicate, balance of power within the Ottoman Empire, where both the sultan and grand vizier sought to assert their authority and protect their interests, even as they recognized the need to coexist and collaborate in governing the empire.
The fluctuations in the relationship between Sultan Mehmed IV and grand vizier Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha are well-documented through numerous anecdotes recorded by Casanova in his letters. In September 1666, Casanova noted the sultan making unusual personal decisions, such as favoring an individual named Kuloglu and expressing a desire to arrange a marriage between Kuloglu and his widowed sister. Furthermore, the sultan spent increased time in the women's seraglio. Yet, despite this, he refrained from engaging in state affairs without the participation of the grand vizier.Footnote 16 However, during Fazıl Ahmed's personal oversight of the siege of Candia between late 1666 and 1669, tensions and distrust between the grand vizier and the sultan seemed to intensify.Footnote 17 Undoubtedly, the prolonged siege in Crete had stirred resentment among the sultan's subjects, resulting in growing dissatisfaction. Rumors swirled of assassination plans against the sultan, with speculation that one of his brothers was to ascend to the throne.Footnote 18 In reaction, Sultan Mehmed IV attempted to act against his brothers, but their lives were spared due to the intervention of their mother, Hatice Turhan, and the janissaries.Footnote 19
During this period of heightened tension, Casanova consistently reported events to Vienna. He interpreted signs of a “lingering misunderstanding” (schwebender Missverstand) between the sultan and grand vizier. One notable instance took place in August 1668 when Sultan Mehmed IV planned to winter in the town of Larissa, approximately 300 kilometers north of Athens in the Thessaly region. In a letter to the sultan, the grand vizier recommended postponing this journey, arguing that the Venetian ambassador, expected to conduct peace talks, had not yet arrived in Crete, and the Venetian fleet remained positioned near the shores along the route Mehmed intended to travel. However, the sultan rejected any delay of his plans.Footnote 20 In a similar event a year later, the sultan received counsel to vacate Larissa due to the outbreak of contagious disease and food shortage. The grand vizier further warned of the possibility of attack by a formidable Christian armada, advising the sultan to retreat to Gelibolu (Gallipoli) for safety. The sultan reacted in anger, tore up the letter, and, claiming to have heard similar predictions too many times before, decided to act contrary to the grand vizier's advice. Instead of withdrawing to Gelibolu, Sultan Mehmed traveled south to the island of Euboea (Negroponte).Footnote 21 Casanova's reports suggest the sultan intentionally disregarded the grand vizier's counsel. Yet, it is essential to note that the sultan's stay in Larissa from October 1668 to November 1669 positioned him closer to military activities and facilitated communication with the grand vizier. Additionally, Rhoads Murphey considers this a transition phase when the sultan's direct involvement in campaigns came to be seen as more and more appropriate, as he was no longer a minor.Footnote 22
Ultimately, on 6 September 1669, Venetian captain-general Francesco Morosini (1619-1694) surrendered Candia.Footnote 23 This event marked a significant turning point in the relationship between grand vizier Fazıl Ahmed Pasha and Sultan Mehmed IV. Upon the grand vizier's return from Crete, the imperial resident Casanova learned of his intention to advise the sultan to return to Istanbul due to growing concerns about the empire's administration. Sultan Mehmed IV's passion for hunting and frequent travels away from the capital were considered detrimental, causing restlessness in the royal household and hindering administrative efficiency. Fazıl Ahmed likely recognized the necessity of having the sultan return to the capital to address these concerns and ensure the empire's smooth operation.Footnote 24 However, Sultan Mehmed IV intentionally refrained from residing in Istanbul and, starting in 1657, opted to relocate the primary seat of the imperial family to Edirne (Adrianople).Footnote 25 Multiple historical sources offer insights into Mehmed IV's reasons for this decision.Footnote 26 Some attribute it to the tumultuous uprising during the initial years of his rule, leading to his unease about staying in the capital.Footnote 27 Others highlight the appeal of Edirne's proximity to vast hunting grounds.Footnote 28 Nonetheless, the sultan's choice to dwell in Edirne should be viewed not only as a retreat from active governance for leisure activities like hunting but rather as indicative of the shift in the latter half of the seventeenth century, signifying that the traditional responsibilities of the sultan included more direct involvement in provincial affairs.Footnote 29 Upon grand vizier Fazıl Ahmed's triumphant return from Crete, Sultan Mehmed IV, for at least a temporary period, heeded the grand vizier's counsel, distancing himself from his entourage and suspending his hunting pursuits. Nonetheless, he continued to reside in Edirne and did not return to Istanbul until 1676. Imperial resident Casanova was uncertain, however, whether the sultan's compliance was driven by a genuine appreciation of the grand vizier's counsel or by a sense of fear regarding Fazıl Ahmed's substantial influence, particularly considering the grand vizier's considerable support from the military following his achievements.Footnote 30
The sultan notably commenced daily visits to the grand vizier's residence, displaying a keen interest in being thoroughly informed about all aspects of the grand vizier's activities and decisions. This is an intriguing observation, considering that since the reign of Murad III (1546-1595, ruled 1574-1595), there had been a notable shift from direct, face-to-face contact between the grand vizier and the sultan to a system of written communication. This written form of interaction involved documents, known as telḫīṣ, issued by the grand vizier and presented to the sultan.Footnote 31 According to Casanova, Fazıl Ahmed, feeling burdened by the sultan's continuous inquiries and interventions, expressed his wish to resign due to health concerns, intending to embark on a pilgrimage to Mecca. However, Sultan Mehmed IV, recognizing the grand vizier's extensive military expertise, deemed him invaluable as an advisor as he himself planned to lead an imminent military campaign and saw the grand vizier's knowledge as essential for its success.Footnote 32 This plan was indeed extraordinary, as Ottoman sultans had typically resigned from personally participating in military campaigns since the accession of Selim II (1524-1574, ruled 1566-1574) to the throne in 1566.Footnote 33 The military campaign in Podolia (1672-1674) was thus unique as it marked the first and only instance of Sultan Mehmed IV directly leading such an endeavor.Footnote 34 The grand vizier supported the preparations for the upcoming war, arguing that it would be instructive for Sultan Mehmed IV to witness firsthand the difficulties and hardships that arise during a campaign.Footnote 35
Despite their differing views and occasional difficulties in getting along, Sultan Mehmed IV and grand vizier Fazıl Ahmed Pasha generally seem to have respected each other's spheres of authority and shared a common concern: they believed that the military should not remain idle for extended periods to prevent the troops from having the opportunity to revolt.Footnote 36 Imperial resident Casanova had already warned Emperor Leopold I before the grand vizier's return from his campaign in Crete that he might seize any opportunity to launch a new campaign;Footnote 37 Casanova was uncertain at the time whether the grand vizier's efforts would be directed toward Hungary, Poland, or Persia.Footnote 38 The sultan's and the grand vizier's shared commitment to maintaining military activity eventually led them both northward to the center of Podolia. However, the imperial resident Casanova, feeling exhausted and frustrated due to the extensive travels involved in his role at the Sublime Porte, opted not to accompany the sultan and the grand vizier on their military campaign and requested from Vienna to be relieved from his post. Emperor Leopold I accepted his request and appointed Johann Christoph Kindsberg (1636-1678) as the new resident,Footnote 39 who followed Sultan Mehmed IV and Fazıl Ahmed to the northern border of the Ottoman Empire.
Administrative Personnel and Dignitaries Nominated by Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha
Upon ascending to the position of grand vizier in 1661, Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha initiated a series of appointments within the administrative apparatus, wherein he strategically positioned individuals from his inner circle in crucial positions. This shift in the patronage system, which expanded the recruitment of personnel into state service beyond the exclusive domain of the sultan's householdFootnote 40 to include the households of viziers, among which the Köprülü family emerged as the preeminent one of the seventeenth century, has been astutely characterized by Cumhur Bekar as “The Rise of the Köprülü Household.”Footnote 41
The most influential figure in Fazıl Ahmed's tenure as grand vizier was his brother-in-law Kara Mustafa Pasha (1634-1683), who held several crucial positions.Footnote 42 Between 1661 and 1666 he assumed the role of grand admiral of the Ottoman fleet. When Fazıl Ahmed prepared for the campaign in Crete in 1666, he appointed Kara Mustafa Pasha as the kaymakam of Istanbul, a role he maintained until 1669.Footnote 43 In this position, he essentially served as a deputy to the grand vizier, ensuring governmental continuity in the grand vizier's absence. As reported by imperial resident Casanova, Fazıl Ahmed chose Kara Mustafa due to his trustworthiness and reliability, positioning him near the sultan to secure timely information about potential plots or conspiracies.Footnote 44 Moreover, Fazıl Ahmed needed to be certain of Kara Mustafa's unwavering loyalty, as previous deputies had exploited their positions to establish their own networks of power.Footnote 45 The court and state bureaucracy had three components during this period. The first component accompanied the grand vizier, who led the army in the field. The second component remained in Istanbul, where the grand vizier's chief deputy, the kaymakam of Istanbul, oversaw state affairs, including the financing of war and communications with the front. Consequently, the sultan's household was reduced to a minimum, comprising only his harem and a select group of palace attendants who could move freely without elaborate protocol. Additionally, when the sultan embarked on hunting expeditions or regular seasonal relocations, the royal household underwent further separation.Footnote 46
Casanova's reports provide valuable insights into Kara Mustafa's life before his ascent to the grand vizierate in 1676. He observed a “secret accord” between the kaymakam and the grand vizier.Footnote 47 In his eyes, Kara Mustafa was a loyal servant, who lacked independent authority. In numerous instances, Casanova highlights Kara Mustafa's obligation to report, write, or send inquiries, petitions, and relevant documents to the grand vizier.Footnote 48 He could not take any action without the explicit order of the grand vizierFootnote 49 and communicated only in accordance with the latter's instructions. Furthermore, Kara Mustafa refrained from making any major decisions without prior approval of the grand vizier. This procedural approach was cumbersome and time-consuming, causing significant delays in the resolution of matters. On occasion, an overwhelmed Kara Mustafa advised petitioners who were complaining about delays to travel to Crete themselves and attempt to speak with the grand vizier in person if they were so inclined.Footnote 50 French agents, in particular, sought to capitalize on the grand vizier's absence to engage in negotiations concerning the renewal and modification of their capitulations (known as ʿahdnames)Footnote 51 with the kaymakam. However, their efforts proved unsuccessful.Footnote 52
Kara Mustafa and Casanova maintained communication through written correspondence and intermediaries such as dragomans. They also had several in-person meetings, with Casanova reporting eight formal audiencesFootnote 53 and one informal meeting with Kara Mustafa. Notably, during the latter part of 1667 and the first half of 1668, Casanova observed a shift in Kara Mustafa's attitude toward him. On 26 December 1667, he received a surprise visit from Kara Mustafa, marked by an unusually friendly tone. However, Casanova couldn't discern the exact purpose or benefit of this reverence. This left him with the impression that Turkish politicians were quite skilled at diplomacy, and he was reminded of the old adage, “the more they flatter, the less they can be trusted” (ie mehr sie schmeichlen, ie weniger ihnen zu thrauen).Footnote 54 Later on, Casanova's detailed report of his official audience with Kara Mustafa in April 1668 provided a glimpse into the reasons behind the kaymakam's unusual friendliness. Presented as a dialogue, this meeting revealed Kara Mustafa's keen interest in obtaining comprehensive information about the borders between the Habsburgs, Poland, and Russia, along with the possibility of alliance between them. Kara Mustafa explicitly expressed concerns about the stability of the Vasvár Peace Treaty, fueled by rumors of military recruitment. These concerns indicated growing apprehension about the potential emergence of a second front, while Candia was reaching a critical phase.Footnote 55 Thus, Casanova's dispatch shed light on the limitations of Kara Mustafa's position within the Ottoman political hierarchy during this period. The constraints imposed on him, particularly by the returning grand vizier, restricted any substantial expansion of his role.Footnote 56
Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha's policy of favoring close associates and family as appointees to key offices extended beyond Kara Mustafa Pasha. One of these appointments involved his second brother-in-law, Kaplan Mustafa Pasha (d. 1681),Footnote 57 who was named grand admiral in 1666,Footnote 58 replacing Kara Mustafa Pasha. Kaplan Mustafa retained this position until 1672 when he assumed the role of governor of Aleppo during the Kamaniecz campaign. He wielded significant influence in all military endeavors of the era and can be considered the principal advisor to Fazıl Ahmed Pasha on military matters. Furthermore, Fazıl Ahmed appointed Seydi Mehmed Pasha, presumably another brother-in-law, as the new Ottoman governor (beylerbeyi) of Nové Zámky (Neuhäusel), however his appointment proved problematic,Footnote 59 as complaints surfaced regarding his alleged failure to effectively address cross-border incidents, violations, and robberies, accompanied by allegations of a lax and negligent approach to his responsibilities. Casanova sought to discuss these complaints face-to-face with grand vizier Fazıl Ahmed Pasha, who insisted on the submission of written complaints for further review, implying an avoidance of public confrontation, especially since the matter involved a family member. Casanova suspected that the demand for written complaints was a deliberate tactic. He noted that despite the consensus among many courtiers regarding what they saw as the governor's unsuitability and harmful behavior, the governor was protected by his close relationship with the grand vizier, illustrating the complex dynamics of power and loyalty. Casanova advised Emperor Leopold I to intervene if the governor persisted in his unacceptable behavior, mentioning that the grand vizier had already been warned several times.Footnote 60 Complaints about misconduct in the border region remained a recurring topic in Casanova's correspondence with Vienna. He diligently monitored the removals and new appointments in the Ottoman border administration, providing the Viennese Court with his personal assessments. The appointment of a new governor of Buda (Ofen) was found to be especially important. Generally, the beylerbeyis of Buda held an esteemed position among the provincial governors of the Ottoman Empire. They carried the title of vizier and, like many other Ottoman dignitaries in border regions, wielded substantial authority, particularly in the realm of borderland diplomacy. Up-to-date information about such appointments was thus particularly important to the Habsburgs.Footnote 61 In 1666, Casanova expressed concerns about the potential successor to the deceased governor of Buda, Hasan Pasha, fearing that the new governor might not be as sympathetic to the Habsburgs as his predecessor had been.Footnote 62
These strategic appointments underscore the grand vizier's efforts to consolidate his influence and maintain control over key administrative positions. As Bekar has emphasized,Footnote 63 Fazıl Ahmed Pasha's brothers-in-law played vital roles in upholding the power of the vizierial household.Footnote 64 Each of them held distinct responsibilities, with Kara Mustafa Pasha taking the critical and sensitive position as deputy of the grand vizier during his absence. Although lacking significant individual authority, his role allowed for close collaboration with the sultan, which enabled him to build his own influential household and succeed to the grand vizierate after Fazıl Ahmed's passing.
Interactions and Communication: Imperial Resident Casanova and Grand Vizier Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha's Information Exchange and Network
Giovanni Battista Casanova had limited direct and personal interactions with grand vizier Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha. After his official introduction at the Sublime Porte in 1665,Footnote 65 Casanova had a single brief audience with the grand vizier on 29 March 1666,Footnote 66 just before Fazıl Ahmed departed for the Cretan campaign. Following Fazıl Ahmed Pasha's return from Crete, they had four additional audiences in 1671, on 27 April, 1 July, 12 August, and 29 August.Footnote 67 During Fazıl Ahmed's absence, Casanova primarily communicated with various key figures who acted as intermediaries with the grand vizier. The first was Fazıl Ahmed's deputy and kaymakam of Istanbul, Kara Mustafa Pasha. Another was the Orthodox Greek dragomanFootnote 68 Panagiotis Nikousios (1621-1673), who had entered imperial service in 1645. A renowned polyglot, proficient in Greek, Turkish, Persian, Arabic, Latin, and Italian, Nikousios was a highly skilled individual. A vast personal network aided his diplomatic initiatives. Initially summoned by the Sublime Porte in 1650 for translations, Nikousios was eventually appointed “Chief Dragoman” (baş tercüman) by Fazıl Ahmed, a role he held until his death in October 1673. Despite his high-ranking position inside the Ottoman court, Nikousios regularly received payments from Vienna, and consistently informed the imperial resident ambassadors about the developments in the Ottoman capital; he reported even confidential Ottoman state matters to Vienna.Footnote 69 As a close confidant of grand vizier Fazıl Ahmed he joined the Cretan campaign from 1666 and 1670. Throughout this period, he was in regular contact with the imperial resident Casanova, sending at least 40 letters that furnished vital updates about the ongoing siege. The letters, which Casanova diligently attached in full or in excerpts to his routine reports to Vienna,Footnote 70 leave little doubt about Nikousios's prominent and influential role in Ottoman foreign policy.Footnote 71 Johann Philipp Beris (d. 1671), the imperial extraordinary internuncio at the Sublime Porte, had high praise for Panagiotis Nikousios, stating:
Panaioti is everything at the court; he governs not only the Sultan and the Vizier but the whole Turkish Empire. He directs all Christian interests, serves as the highest councilor and secretary, and nothing occurs at court that does not pass through his hands. He must be especially observed and treated with courtesy, so that he does no harm.Footnote 72
During Nikousios Panagiotis’ stay in Crete, Casanova had to reorganize his information network to find a source close to the sultan and the kaymakam of Istanbul, Kara Mustafa Pasha.Footnote 73 This new source was a highly skilled interpreter named Ali Bey (einen in vill sprachen erfahrnen türckhen, nahmens Ali Beg),Footnote 74 who was appointed by Sultan Mehmed IV in May 1668. This dragoman was Ali Ufki Bey (born Wojciech Bobowski, c. 1610-1675), a Polish renegade and accomplished scholar who had previously worked for various diplomats, including English and Dutch ambassadors at the Sublime Porte, as well as for the Ottoman court itself. Ali Ufki Bey was celebrated not only for his role as a collector and translator of significant works but also for his musical talents and compositions.Footnote 75 After assuming his post, Ali Ufki Bey immediately paid a visit to Casanova, who praised in his letters to Vienna Ali Ufki's proficiency in several languages including German, and the deep respect and unwavering loyalty he displayed toward Emperor Leopold I. True to his word, Ali Ufki Bey fulfilled this commitment in the subsequent years. He reported in detail about various audiences and provided copies of documents that he had translated.Footnote 76 In return for his services, Ali Ufki Bey quickly requested an annual salary, a proposition that Casanova rejected. He held reservations, speculating that Ali Ufki Bey's role might be temporary, and his significance and position could diminish upon Panagiotis Nikousios’ return from Crete.Footnote 77 Instead of an annual salary, Casanova delivered to Ali Ufki Bey 20 ducats as a token of goodwill. In 1668, 1669, and 1670, Ali Ufki Bey received a total sum of 110 ducats for his services.Footnote 78 Casanova's assessment proved accurate. After the return of Nikousios Panagiotis, Casanova observed that a new era, “a new world” (ein neüe weldt) had begun. His informants, particularly the dragoman Ali Ufki Bey, who had acted as significant sources for the past three years, suddenly found themselves largely irrelevant overnight.Footnote 79 Nikousios Panagiotis, who was at the peak of his career due to his prominent role in peace negotiations with the Venetians, was again at the center of “everything at the court.”
Thus, the exchanges between Giovanni Battista Casanova and the Ottoman authorities heavily relied on key intermediaries. While Casanova's direct contact with grand vizier Köprülü Fazil Ahmed was minimal, his main sources of information included the Orthodox Greek dragoman, Panagitois Nikousios, or the Polish renegade Ali Ufki Bey. Casanova heavily relied on these informants in order to regularly inform Emperor Leopold I and the Viennese Aulic War Council about Ottoman developments and the possibilities of new campaigns into Central Europe. Casanova diligently reported to the Viennese court, sometimes completing it with his personal opinions and assessments. Indeed, in the period before 1683, when the Ottomans maintained an upper hand in the Habsburg-Ottoman relationship, this information network played a pivotal role in molding diplomatic interactions and decisions between these two influential powers.Footnote 80
Release of Prisoners of War
Giovanni Battista Casanova's role in the Ottoman Empire extended beyond information-gathering and included specific instructions from Emperor Leopold I and the Viennese War Council to personally negotiate vital matters. For example, one such mission involved obtaining permission for the reconstruction of six Catholic churches in Galata, which had suffered extensive damage in a 1660 fire.Footnote 81 Furthermore, Casanova frequently presented complaints of Habsburg subjects in the border regions as well as those of Ottoman subjects to the Viennese Court, as daily conflicts, minor warfare (Kleinkrieg), and provocations from both sides were commonplace.Footnote 82 A focal point of Casanova's diplomatic efforts was securing the freedom of prisoners of war, especially Christian captives held in the infamous Yedikule prison (Eng.: Seven Towers; German: Sieben Türme), especially just before the establishment of the Order of the Trinitarians in the Habsburg Monarchy in 1688-89. As demonstrated by Elisabeth Watzka-Pauly's research, the establishment of this order in the Habsburg Monarchy ushered in a new era in the liberation of Habsburg subjects until the order's dissolution in 1783, where Habsburg prisoners were freed through so-called redemption missions.Footnote 83
We gain a comprehensive understanding of this topic through the personal account of the prisoner Johann Ferdinand Auer, a lieutenant in the Pozsony regiment who was detained in the Seven Towers. In 1664, he wrote a detailed narrative in German of the events leading to his enslavement and subsequent imprisonment.Footnote 84 During the battle of Esztergom (Gran) in July 1663, Austrian and Hungarian forces encountered a considerably stronger Ottoman contingent than anticipated. Retreating Habsburg forces were pursued by Ottoman cavalry all the way to Érsekújvár, where a substantial number of soldiers were captured, with some sources estimating up to 1,700 prisoners. Among them was Johann Ferdinand Auer. While Auer claimed in his memoirs that he concealed his noble status, it is reasonable to assume the Ottomans were aware of it.Footnote 85 The military hierarchy typically determined the fate of captives, with common soldiers often facing mass executions.Footnote 86 Auer and approximately 20 other “elite” prisoners, including individuals such as Leonhard Rublandt, a captain who later corresponded with Casanova during his captivity,Footnote 87 were transferred to the Seven Towers in Istanbul. Their arrival in January 1664 marked the beginning of a decade-long confinement within the walls of this fortress.Footnote 88
The transfer of prisoners to the Seven Towers reflected an extended period of confinement due to their higher value. The Sultan typically rejected monetary offers for their release but instead sought the exchange of Ottoman captives of comparable rank in prisoner swaps. These exchanges frequently occurred during the signing of peace treaties or after visits by “grand ambassadors.”Footnote 89 In this instance, Grand Ambassador Walter Leslie arrived in Istanbul in September 1665, and one of Emperor Leopold I's instructions was to secure the release of prisoners captured in the previous war. Despite Leslie's efforts, only prisoners from the imperial arsenal (known in Italian as Bagno, in Turkish as Baba Cafer zindanı)Footnote 90 were freed. Negotiations for the release of the elite captives at the Seven Towers faltered and Leslie departed, leaving the newly appointed imperial resident, Giovanni Battista Casanova, with 700 ducats to address this unresolved matter.Footnote 91
From the beginning of his assignment, Casanova harbored skepticism about the likelihood of convincing the Sublime Porte to release the prisoners in the Seven Towers. Despite Casanova's persistent inquiries, kaymakam Kara Mustafa Pasha stressed that only the grand vizier could decide such matters. He advised Casanova to be patient and wait for the grand vizier's return from the battlefield.Footnote 92 In abeyance of any decisions, Casanova took measures to improve the conditions of captivity. In March 1666, he sent the prisoners 60 thalers to help alleviate their suffering by “freeing them from iron” (von eysen ledig worden),Footnote 93 followed by an additional 107 ducats in November of the same year. When some of the Seven Towers inmates shared part of this money with prisoners in the Bagno – apparently some Hungarian prisoners were still there – Casanova felt slightly unsettled. He assured Emperor Leopold I that he would only support the captives in the Bagno upon explicit orders, especially since he lacked information about the circumstances of their imprisonment.Footnote 94 In April 1668, Casanova sent another 95 gold ducats to assist the prisoners and requested additional funds from the emperor, as he saw slim prospects for their release in the near future.Footnote 95
Negotiations were complicated by several factors and differing perspectives. For example, Casanova had to negotiate for the release of different types of prisoners. The Hungarian prisoners held in the Bagno claimed to have been captured during the time of the grand embassy of Walter Leslie in 1665, a period of peace, while grand vizier Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha and kaymakam Kara Mustafa Pasha considered them prisoners of war.Footnote 96 Despite Casanova's criticism of taking prisoners during peacetime and demands for compulsory release, the Ottomans refused to budge.Footnote 97 Furthermore, Emperor Leopold I had no Ottoman prisoners to offer in exchange for these men. These factors hindered negotiations.Footnote 98 Hence, the likelihood of their release was extremely low. After nearly three years of fruitless efforts, Casanova reluctantly admitted that the Ottomans were intentionally delaying the prisoners’ release. He pointed out that his persistence had only been a response to the emperor's explicit orders conveyed through numerous letters. Casanova expressed his deep frustration, bemoaning the entire situation and the absence of a clear resolution of the matter in the Treaty of Vasvár.Footnote 99 Unable to negotiate any solution with the grand vizier, Casanova made a daring proposal to the emperor: he suggested bypassing the grand vizier and directly presenting the issue to the sultan. However, he acknowledged the risks associated with this approach, including the potential anger of both the grand vizier and the kaymakam, which could have adverse effects on ongoing and future negotiations. Ultimately, the emperor agreed, deeming the plan too risky to pursue.Footnote 100
Another year passed, and Casanova continued to reassure the emperor that he had not forgotten the matter. However, he expressed frustration that neither gifts nor other means had succeeded in making progress on this issue.Footnote 101 As the grand vizier repeatedly demanded a list of names of Muslim prisoners – which the imperial resident could not provide, because purportedly there were no Muslim prisoners held in the Habsburg lands – Casanova began to fear his task of releasing the prisoners would be impossible during Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha's tenure as grand vizier.Footnote 102 The grand vizier questioned the rationale behind releasing Habsburg prisoners solely out of goodwill, pointing out that he received daily correspondence from Turkish prisoners who had secured their freedom by paying a ransom. He was not swayed by the argument that the ransomed prisoners in those cases had been held by private individuals.Footnote 103 Casanova's plea to at least treat the prisoners more humanely, especially after a French Knight Hospitaller had escaped, and the remaining inmates had been placed in irons in a dark tower and subjected to brutal treatment, was likewise brusquely rejected by Fazıl Ahmed.Footnote 104 Nevertheless, he tried to bribe the prison wardens to secure privileges for the captured officers.Footnote 105 Shortly before his recall from his position as resident, Casanova reported with astonishment in a dispatch dated 1 June 1672 that thirteen prisoners had been unexpectedly moved from Istanbul to Edirne. The grand vizier had apparently been informed by a certain Hüseyin Agha, a formerly imprisoned Turk, that more than 30 captives were being held in Hungary, and he demanded their release in exchange.Footnote 106 In the final days of Casanova's tenure, there was a glimmer of hope for the freedom of Christian prisoners, providing a much-needed sense of relief after years of stagnation in this pursuit.
Conclusion
The 188 reports that Giovanni Battista Casanova dispatched to Emperor Leopold I and the Viennese Aulic War Council from 1665 to 1672 provide a wealth of information about Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha, one of the longest-serving Ottoman grand viziers. Tasked with gathering and relaying accurate information to the Viennese court, Casanova often relied on intermediaries to communicate with the sultan, grand vizier, or grand vizier's deputy. Among these, the Greek Orthodox dragoman Panagiotis Nikousios and the Polish convert Ali Ufki Bey were instrumental, providing Casanova access to Ottoman dignitaries and enabling him to fulfill his reporting duties effectively.
Throughout his tenure, Casanova regularly documented significant developments in the Ottoman Empire. He discerned the foundation of mutual respect between Sultan Mehmed IV and grand vizier Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha, a rapport briefly strained as the sultan contended with pressure from his subjects due to the prolonged war in Crete. Fazıl Ahmed's influence within the Ottoman Empire notably solidified after his triumphant return from the Candia campaign. Moreover, Casanova observed the “rise of the Köprülü household,” a phenomenon that started in 1656 with the elder Köprülü's appointment to grand vizierate and continued with his son's subsequent succession. This period marked the Köprülü family's deeper integration into the state fabric, highlighting the critical roles of loyalty, patronage, and strategic appointments within the Ottoman administrative structure. It is true, Casanova primarily had to deal with everyday affairs during his time at the Sublime Porte including submitting complaints about incidents at the Habsburg-Ottoman border or attempting to secure the release of captive Christians. Indeed, his tenure was characterized more by collecting information and other daily routines and less by extraordinary events or major accomplishments. Nevertheless, Casanova's reports were essential for Emperor Leopold I and the Viennese Aulic War Council. Staying constantly informed about the (changing) power dynamics and key figures in the Ottoman Empire was crucial in correctly assessing and evaluating the likelihood of a renewed outbreak of war. The detailed investigation of Giovanni Battista Casanova's dispatches provides a nuanced understanding of a transformative period in Ottoman history. Casanova's observations transcend mere historical documentation; they provide a glimpse into the complex interplay of power, loyalty, and strategy that characterized the Ottoman Empire in the seventeenth century.
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