The Political Attitudes and Behaviour of LGBTQ+ Individuals

The study of LGBTQ+ politics has been marginalized in political science for a long time (Sherrill, Somerville, and Bailey Reference Sherrill, Somerville and Bailey1992; Mucciaroni Reference Mucciaroni2011; Ayoub Reference Ayoub2022). Recently, a growing number of studies have investigated the political attitudes and behaviour of LGBTQ+ individuals, but this work remains limited. A 2021 meta-analysis found that only 1 out of 245 articles on public opinion in the US published between 2009 and 2019 in the American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, and Public Opinion Quarterly included LGBT identities as an independent variable in quantitative analyses (Jones Reference Jones2021). Another analysis found that LGBTQ+ research accounted for only 0.55% of published research in political science’s “top” six journals between 2017-2023 (Piscopo Reference Piscopo2025). Data limitations often dictated this choice, as national surveys only recently began to collect information on sexual orientation and gender identity (beyond a binary sex or gender question). When this information was available, standard-size samples often yielded too small of a number of respondents openly identifying as LGBTQ+, which posed significant challenges to quantitative analyses.

Despite these limitations, prior research has produced some key findings. First, lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) voters are more likely to identify as Democrats and to vote for Democratic candidates. Exit polls in the 1990s revealed that LGB voters strongly embraced Democratic candidates (Hertzog Reference Hertzog1996), a voting pattern that continued in the 2000s and 2010s (Egan, Edelman and Sherrill Reference Egan, Edelman and Sherrill2008; McThomas and Buchanan Reference McThomas and Buchanan2012). A vast majority of LGB voters supported Al Gore in 2000 (Lewis, Rogers, and Sherrill Reference Lewis, Rogers and Sherrill2011), Barack Obama in 2008 (Egan Reference Egan2012), and Hillary Clinton in 2016 (Swank Reference Swank2018). In 2020, the strong LGB support for Joe Biden helped the Democratic candidate secure a victory (Flores, Magni, and Reynolds Reference Flores, Magni and Reynolds2020). In 2024, Kamala Harris secured a share of the LGBTQ+ vote, higher than any Democratic presidential candidate since 2008.Footnote ⁶

Second, LGB voters hold more liberal views than the average American. Early work in the 1990s based on exit polling found that LGB voters were more liberal (Hertzog Reference Hertzog1996). Later research showed that the liberalism of LGB voters applied to the rights of sexual minorities as well as to issues unrelated to LGBTQ+ rights, including income redistribution, foreign policy, and the environment (Egan, Edelman and Sherrill Reference Egan, Edelman and Sherrill2008; Egan Reference Egan2012). More recent work has corroborated such findings, confirming that LGBT Americans are distinctively more liberal than non-LGBT Americans with regard to ideology, vote choice, and policy preferences on issues unrelated to LGBTQ+ populations (Schnabel Reference Schnabel2018; Jones Reference Jones2021; Magni and Reynolds Reference Magni and Reynolds2024b). Several explanations may help account for why LGB voters are more liberal, including selection effects (Egan Reference Egan2012), group mobilization, social embeddedness (Hertzog Reference Hertzog1996; Sherrill Reference Sherrill1996; Bailey Reference Bailey1999), and the conversion effects spurred by the transformative experience of coming out (Egan, Edelman and Sherrill Reference Egan, Edelman and Sherrill2008; Swank Reference Swank2018).

Third, some evidence suggests that LGB people engage more in politics. The first academic survey on the political behaviour of LGB adults based on a nationally representative sample in 2007 found that LGB individuals were more interested and engaged in politics than the general population (Egan, Edelman, and Sherrill Reference Egan, Edelman and Sherrill2008). Various factors help explain the ‘electoral activism’ of gays and lesbians, including educational levels, experiences with hate crimes, and political group membership (Swank and Fahs Reference Swank and Fahs2013).

More recent studies have examined political diversity within the LGBTQ+ community, disaggregating along sexual orientations and gender identities. Cisgender gay men and lesbian women tend to be more liberal than bisexual and transgender Americans. At the same time, bisexual women tend to be more liberal than bisexual men (Jones Reference Jones2021; see also Swank Reference Swank2018). Although both male and female LGB individuals have more progressive gender views than heterosexual men, lesbian and bisexual women are most aware of gender inequality (Grollman Reference Grollman2019).

We still know little about how race and sexual orientation interact to shape political preferences. However, the intersection of Americans’ race, gender, and sexuality affected vote choice in the 2016 election, when Black lesbian women were especially supportive of Hillary Clinton (Strolovitch, Wong and Proctor Reference Strolovitch, Wong and Proctor2017; see also Cassese and Barnes Reference Cassese and Barns2019). A study focused on LGBTQ+ Latinos in a southwestern state found that LGBTQ+ individuals at the intersection of multiple minoritized identities had lower levels of political engagement (Bergersen, Klar, and Schmitt Reference Bergersen, Klar and Schmitt2018). Similarly, Reference Flores and SherrillFlores and Sherrill (n.d.) found that Black LGBT individuals participated less in the 2012 election than White LGBT individuals. We therefore build on scholarship on LGBTQ+ political behaviour to examine how LGBTQ+ linked fate impacts the political preferences of LGBTQ+ individuals. To do so, the next section first reviews the literature on linked fate.

Setting Precedent for the Group-basis of Political Behaviour

Scholarship on the political behaviour of minoritized communities in the US has long noted that its origins are largely group-centred. This means that the propensity for participating in political activities of the marginalized tends to be motivated by considerations such as the degree of group identity and perceptions of group solidarity (see McClain et al. Reference McClain, Johnson Carew, Walton and Watts2009 for a comprehensive review). Minorities often prioritize issues related to groups they belong to and identify with over individual considerations, which, much of the time, has consequences for political behaviour.

Early on, Michael Dawson’s (Reference Dawson1995) foundational work, ‘Behind the Mule’, developed the concept of linked fate. The perception of linked fate is defined as the extent to which one thinks their individual life chances are essentially connected to the fate of others within their racial group. Scholarly work has shown that increases in the sense of group-based solidarity or linked fate among Black Americans shape public opinion and political participation (Miller et al. Reference Miller, Gurin, Gurin and Malanchuk1981; Shingles Reference Shingles1981; Chong and Rogers Reference Chong and Rogers2005; Austin, Middleton, and Yon Reference Austin, Middleton and Yon2012; Smith et al. Reference Smith, Clemons, Krishnamurthy, Martinez, McLauren and White2024). Other group-based factors related to, but separate from, linked fate, such as racialized social pressure, also influence political outcomes (White and Laird Reference White and Laird2020). Scholars of racial and ethnic politics have noted a stronger sense of group solidarity and a more consistent link between such solidarity and political behaviour among Black Americans because of their unique experiences with oppression and discrimination (Masuoka and Junn Reference Masuoka and Junn2013). Nonetheless, this group-centred approach has also been applied to other racial and ethnic minorities. With careful consideration, research has considered the indicators of Latino identity and linked fate, or what some scholars have called the ‘Brown Utility Heuristic’ (Masuoka Reference Masuoka2006; Beltran Reference Beltrán2010; Sanchez and Masuoka Reference Sanchez and Masuoka2010; Garcia-Rios, Pedraza, and Wilcox-Archuleta Reference Garcia-Rios, Pedraza and Wilcox-Archuleta2019). Latinos who perceive a stronger sense of linked fate are more likely to hold political opinions that benefit their racial group and participate in a plethora of political activities (Sanchez Reference Sanchez2006; Masuoka Reference Masuoka2008; Bowler and Segura Reference Bowler and Segura2011; Ocampo, Garcia-Rios, and Gutierrez Reference Ocampo, Garcia-Rios and Gutierrez2021; Gutierrez Reference Gutierrez2024).

Researchers have also demonstrated that this link between group centrality and political behaviour can be relevant for Asian Americans. ‘Group-based resources’ via group consciousness or linked fate can mobilize certain forms of political participation among Asian Americans (Wong, Lien, and Conway Reference Wong, Lien and Conway2005; Wong et al. Reference Wong, Ramakrishnan, Lee and Junn2011), even though the relationship between group-based considerations and political behaviour is contingent upon specific political contexts (Junn and Masuoka Reference Junn and Masuoka2008; Chan, Nguy, and Masuoka Reference Chan, Nguy and Masuoka2024). Additionally, a recent paper by Jones-Kerwin and Peterson (Reference Jones-Kerwin and Peterson2023) assesses group consciousness and linked fate among American Indians and finds that such perceptions are related to higher rates of voter turnout. This research is complemented by a growing recognition of a politicized ‘people of color’ identity (Perez Reference Perez2021; Chan and Jasso Reference Chan and Jasso2023).

The group-based nature of politics has also been explored with regard to social identities apart from race and ethnicity. For example, researchers have assessed degrees of gender consciousness and linked fate among women (Gurin Reference Gurin1985; Harnois Reference Harnois2015; Stout, Kretschmer, and Ruppanner Reference Stout, Kretschmer and Ruppanner2017; Ruppanner et al. Reference Ruppanner, Mikołajczak, Kretschmer and Stout2019; Jenkins, Poloni-Staudinger, and Strachan Reference Jenkins, Poloni-Staudinger and Strachan2023) as well as linked fate based on class (Gay, Hochschild, and White Reference Gay, Hochschild and White2016). Existing scholarship has also considered how group consciousness among religious minorities like Muslims mobilizes their political participation (Jamal Reference Jamal2005; Ocampo, Dana, and Barreto Reference Ocampo, Dana and Barreto2018).

By contrast, the concept of linked fate has not been fully explored with regard to LGBTQ+ people. We are aware of only two studies that have started to examine how LGBTQ+ group consciousness and linked fate may influence the political preferences and behaviour of LGBTQ+ individuals. An unpublished paper reported that, in 2012, LGBTQ+ individuals with higher group consciousness were more likely to be Democrats, support Barack Obama, and support same-sex marriage (Reference Flores and SherrillFlores and Sherrill n.d., 2). A second study on LGBTQ+ Latinx individuals found that LGBTQ+ linked fate increased participation among both LGBTQ+ and non-LGBTQ+ Latinxs (Moreau, Nuño-Pérez, and Sanchez Reference Moreau, Nuño-Pérez and Sanchez2019). While a good starting point, this work does not fully account for why and how LGBTQ+ linked fate produces these political outcomes.

Toward a Comprehensive Group-Centric Theory of LGBTQ+ Political Behaviour

We must first establish the premise for which the group-based framework of linked fate is applicable to the study of LGBTQ+ political behaviour. Research notes that external threats to social groups foster the link between identity and politics (Tajfel and Turner Reference Tajfel, Turner, Austin and Worchel1986; Klandermans Reference Klandermans1997; Huddy Reference Huddy, Huddy, Sears and Levy2013; Huddy Reference Huddy2001). In particular, the continued discrimination against minoritized communities makes their in-group identity salient for political behaviour (Perez Reference Perez2015a; White Reference White2016).

Despite progress in recent decades, LGBTQ+ people still face severe marginalization. From an economic standpoint, LGBTQ+ people on average earn significantly lower wages than straight, cisgender individualsFootnote ⁷ and are more likely to live below the poverty line.Footnote ⁸ In terms of legal discrimination, in dozens of states, no explicit prohibitions exist for discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity regarding housing, public accommodations, credit, and lending. As of 2024, twenty-six states had no law providing LGBTQ+ inclusive insurance protections and about a third of the LGBTQ+ population lived in states that explicitly excluded gender-affirming care from state employee health benefits. Even though superseded by the 2015 Supreme Court’s ruling that made marriage equality the law of the country, state bans against same-sex marriage remain on the book in about half of the states.Footnote ⁹ And, in 2023, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of a Christian web designer who refused to provide services for same-sex weddings.Footnote ¹⁰

LGBTQ+ people also often confront prejudice and violence in society. Data from 2017–2019 revealed that LGBT people experienced 6.6 violent hate crime victimizations per 1,000 persons, compared to 0.6 per 1,000 persons for non-LGBT people (Flores et al., Reference Flores, Stotzer, Meyer and Langton2022). A 2023 report from the Anti-Defamation League and GLAAD counted more than 350 incidents of harassment, vandalism, or assault against LGBTQ+ people from June 2022 to April 2023.Footnote ¹¹

Recent years have also witnessed an exponential increase in the number of legislative bills against LGBTQ+ people and their rights. In 2024, almost 600 anti-LGBTQ+ bills were introduced in state legislatures around the country.Footnote ¹² The introduction of anti-LGBTQ+ bills has often been accompanied by anti-LGBTQ rhetoric. Conservative politicians, religious leaders, and Republican lawmakers have increasingly resorted to the old trope that depicts LGBTQ+ people as ‘groomers’’ to justify the need for anti-LGBTQ+ legislation. Republican governors Greg Abbott from Texas and Ron DeSantis from Florida have also threatened to send child protective services against parents of transgender kids and parents taking their kids to drag shows. In October 2023, the election of Rep. Mike Johnson to the Speaker of the House, with his history of extreme anti-LGBTQ+ positions and his work with Alliance Defending Freedom – classified as an anti-LGBTQ+ hate group by the Southern Poverty Law Center – has brought a leader and symbol of anti-LGBTQ+ discrimination to the forefront of American politics. In the 2024 election cycle, Donald Trump and Republican candidates spent a record $65 million on anti-trans television ads.Footnote ¹³ This negative rhetoric from political elites can further spur the link between identity and political behaviour (Barreto and Woods Reference Barreto, Woods, Segura and Bowler2005; Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura Reference Bowler, Nicholson and Segura2006; Perez Reference Pérez2015b).

Theorizing the Determinants of LGBTQ+ Linked fate

The consistent marginalization of LGBTQ+ people likely makes this community aware of their subordinate positioning in American social life. It is because of this context and treatment that group-based heuristics such as LGBTQ+ linked fate are likely to shape the political attitudes and behaviour of LGBTQ+ people. However, discrimination against LGBTQ+ individuals may operate differently than racial discrimination. Indeed, a key feature of LGBTQ+ identity is that this is a chosen group identity, rather than inherited from parents (Egan Reference Egan2012).

As Sherrill noted, LGBTQ+ people are ‘born as if into a diaspora – probably randomly distributed about the population at birth’ (Sherrill Reference Sherrill1996, 469). As a result, an LGBTQ+ individual is sometimes the only one in the family to be potentially subjected to discrimination because of their LGBTQ+ identity, unlike the case for racial minorities, where most family members are to some extent potentially exposed to racial discrimination. LGBTQ+ individuals who are marginalized in society may therefore be incentivized to build a community with other chosen LGBTQ+ people because that community is often not readily available in the family.

The extent to which this possibility of community outside the family is available to LGBTQ+ individuals often varies depending on sexual, gender, and racial identities. This implies that, while societal marginalization is often a necessary step for LGBTQ+ linked fate to develop, it may not be a sufficient condition. In particular, over time, white gay men and to some extent lesbian women have occupied a more privileged position in the LGBTQ+ community, often shaping the priorities of the movement (Murib Reference Murib2023).

By contrast, other minorities have faced marginalization within the LGBTQ+ community. Bisexual individuals were initially regarded with suspicion by gay and lesbian activists in the years following Stonewall and consequently marginalized in the movement (Weeks Reference Weeks2011, 13–16; see also Murib Reference Murib2023). Moreover, some bisexual individuals who are in relationships with opposite-sex partners may feel less pressure to come out and may feel less connected to the community. Transgender individuals were also quickly marginalized in the years following Stonewall and in subsequent decades. The decision to focus on assimilation strategies made gays and lesbians more palatable to lawmakers and the wider society but, as a result, often marginalized transgender people (Murib Reference Murib2023). Indeed, the focus on marriage equality and the decision to pursue incremental gains emphasizing the similarity of gays and lesbians with a straight, cisgender majority often led to the isolation of transgender individuals in the LGBTQ+ movement.

A community was also less readily available to LGBTQ+ people of colour than to white LGBTQ+ people. Long-standing racism in the LGBTQ+ community has often generated barriers to the creation of a community between the white LGBTQ+ majority and LGBTQ+ Black, Latino, and Asian individuals. It has also challenged a feeling of connection to the LGBTQ+ community among non-white LGBTQ+ people (Felipe, Garrett-Walker, and Montagno Reference Felipe, Garrett-Walker and Montagno2022). More broadly, the marginalization of non-white LGBTQ+ people has also been a consequence of the strategic decision of LGBTQ+ leaders to prioritize the fight for white middle-class issues, such as marriage, rather than issues more central to LGBTQ+ communities of colour (Proctor Reference Proctor2022; Murib Reference Murib2023).

All of this implies that not all LGBTQ+ people may have the same degree of connection to the LGBTQ+ community. In particular, we expect cisgender gay and lesbian individuals to have stronger LGBTQ+ linked fate than bisexual and transgender individuals, and we anticipate that white LGBTQ+ people have stronger LGBTQ+ linked fate than LGBTQ+ people of colour.

There is another key point that differentiates LGBTQ+ people and racial minorities with regard to identity salience and potential discrimination. Unlike most racial minorities, some LGBTQ+ individuals have a certain degree of control over the decision and the extent to which they can or want to be out. Many LGBTQ+ individuals go through the unique process of coming out (or deciding not to). Coming out often increases the salience of one’s LGBTQ+ identity, as the identity becomes known in interactions where it was previously unknown or not discussed, such as in relationships with family members, friends, and co-workers.

Even after coming out, the salience of LGBTQ+ identity may vary among LGBTQ+ individuals. Some LGBTQ+ people may be more immersed in LGBTQ+ networks; for instance, by having more LGBTQ+ friends, living in areas with greater LGBTQ+ communities, or becoming more involved in LGBTQ+ activism. While the degree of visibility often strengthens one’s own ties to the LGBTQ+ community, it might also elicit experiences of homophobia and transphobia. In turn, experiences of discrimination that target individuals for being LGBTQ+ may further intensify the salience of one’s LGBTQ+ identity.Footnote ¹⁴

LGBTQ+ Linked Fate, Political Preferences, and Voting Behaviour

This section develops our theoretical expectations about the group-centred political behaviour of LGBTQ+ individuals by bringing together scholarly work on linked fate with theories on social embeddedness and LGBTQ+ political behaviour. Social identity theory emphasizes a natural tendency for individuals to classify themselves into groups (Tajfel and Turner Reference Tajfel, Turner, Austin and Worchel1979; Turner et al. Reference Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell1987). This is especially the case for individuals who experience marginalization due to identification with particular social groups (Huddy Reference Huddy, Huddy, Sears and Levy2013; Perez Reference Perez2015a). Strongly identified group members seek to elevate the status of their subordinate group they are attached to, which often leads to group-centred political behaviour in the form of pursuing policies to improve the lives of said marginalized social group (Tajfel and Turner Reference Tajfel, Turner, Austin and Worchel1979; Brewer Reference Brewer1999; Doosje et al. Reference Doosje, Spears and Ellemers2002; Leach et al. Reference Leach, Rodriguez Mosquera, Vliek and Hirt2010; Mason Reference Mason2018).

Consistent expectations were suggested in the 1990s by scholars of LGBTQ+ politics. These scholars advanced explanations for LGBTQ+ political distinctiveness based on social embeddedness theories. For instance, to explain gay political distinctiveness, Hertzog (Reference Hertzog1996) proposed the concept of gay group consciousness. Bailey (Reference Bailey1999) emphasized the importance of the gay subculture that developed in American cities, where networks and social ties emerged. Sherrill (Reference Sherrill1996) focused on group consciousness, which required a shared sense of conditions and grievances most likely to develop in American cities and college towns. These scholars, therefore, speculated – without fully testing – that LGBTQ+ individuals who interact in the LGBTQ+ community develop social ties, experience acculturation, and acquire group consciousness. This, in turn, would make gay identity salient and lead LGBTQ+ individuals to perceive their fate as tied, which then would explain the political distinctiveness of LGBTQ+ voters. Bringing together these streams in previous scholarship, we expect that LGBTQ+ people who perceive greater LGBTQ+ linked fate will more likely hold political positions consistent with improving the conditions of this marginalized group. We also expect LGBTQ+ linked fate to spur political behaviours that improve the status of LGBTQ+ individuals.

First, LGBTQ+ linked fate should be positively related to increased electoral political participation. LGBTQ+ people who see their life as tied to that of other LGBTQ+ individuals should behave not just as a function of individual self-interests but also to benefit other group members. Politics is often the setting that can bring change benefiting one’s community at large, and to participate in politics is a step that can promote change for their group beyond the individual. In recent years, this argument has been made with regard to voting, especially in presidential elections. Following Trump’s appointment of conservative justices to the Supreme Court, Democrats have highlighted the importance of presidential elections to determine future judicial appointees who would determine the fate of women’s and minorities’ rights.

LGBTQ+ voters are likely especially sensitive to this argument since progress on LGBTQ+ rights – from decriminalization of homosexuality to marriage equality to bans on employment discrimination – has often happened through the Supreme Court. More recently, threats of reversal of gains on LGBTQ+ rights have also come from the Court. LGBTQ+ individuals who see their life chances connected to other LGBTQ+ people are therefore expected to be more politically engaged and are more likely to turn out to vote to ensure positive outcomes for their community. Hence:

Second, we expect LGBTQ+ linked fate to be positively associated with more liberal ideological views. As discussed above, LGBTQ+ individuals tend to be more liberal on a wide set of issues that go beyond LGBTQ+ rights. Ideology often provides a lens that helps individuals make sense of their standing in the political world. Hence, LGBTQ+ individuals who feel their interests are tightly connected to other LGBTQ+ people and see other LGBTQ+ people leaning liberal should be more likely to adopt similarly liberal positions. Considering that other LGBTQ+ people may have adopted such positions because they are in their own interest, LGBTQ+ people with stronger LGBTQ+ linked fate should also be more likely to embrace similar positions considered in the interest of the LGBTQ+ community to which they feel connected. Hence, we expect that:

LGBTQ+ linked fate should, lastly, be associated with stronger identification with and support for political parties and candidates that advocate for LGBTQ-affirming policies. In the US, this translates into greater support for the Democratic Party. In the past, mobilization for gay rights was for some time relatively bipartisan. However, the alliance between Republicans and the Christian Right has solidified the framing of gay rights as a civil rights issue. In turn, this has led to a strong association between LGBTQ+ rights and the Democratic Party (Proctor Reference Proctor2022; for a broader discussion on the partisan transformation of civil rights, see Baylor Reference Baylor2013). Democrats and Republicans have then grown further divided on gay rights. This followed a change in party positions that occurred almost entirely within the Democratic Party in recent decades when many elected officials have become substantially more supportive of LGBTQ+ rights (Karol Reference Karol2012).

Data from the Williams Institute consistently shows that, compared to LGB Democrats, LGB Republicans are less likely to feel part of the LGBTQ+ community, consider participation in the community positive, and believe it is important to be politically active in the LGBTQ+ community. LGB Republicans are also significantly less likely to consider their LGB identity an important aspect of their life (Meyer and Choi Reference Meyer and Choi2020). For all these reasons, we expect LGBTQ+ individuals with stronger LGBTQ+ linked fate to be attached to and stronger supporters of the Democratic Party.

Data and Methodology

To test our hypotheses, we rely on an oversample of 1,968 LGBTQ+ Americans collected within the 2020 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey – hereafter CMPS (Frasure et al. 2021). The online survey was administered between April and October 2021. The survey, as well as the invitation to participate in the study, was made available in a variety of languages. The data collection effort started with a large sample of registered voters from online sources that were pre-matched to the voter file during the 2020 election but also comprised samples of non-registered adults, including non-citizens.Footnote ¹⁵ The CMPS has sought to collect the most diverse samples of Americans across various social groups and has been utilized heavily in research on marginalized populations in the US. To date and to the authors’ best knowledge, this is one of the largest samples of LGBTQ+ Americans in political science.

The LGBTQ+ sample was identified through demographic questions on sexual orientation, transgender identity, and gender identity. For sexual orientation, the 2020 CMPS asked: ‘Which of the following best represents how you think of yourself?’ Respondents were included in the analysis if they answered: Gay or Lesbian; Bisexual; or Something Else. The questionnaire also asked: ‘Some people describe themselves as transgender when they experience a different gender identity from their sex at birth. For example, a person born into a male body, but feels female or lives as a woman would be transgender. A transgender person may be of any sexual orientation – straight, gay, lesbian, or bisexual. Are you transgender?’. Those who selected yes were included in this analysis. LGBTQ+ respondents were asked about their gender identity. The response options included: Man, Woman, Non-Binary, or Something Else. We provide further information about the 2020 CMPS LGBTQ+ oversample in the appendix. Table A displays the number of respondents by sexual orientation and gender identity. Table B displays the number of respondents by sexual orientation and transgender identity.

We utilize survey weights constructed by Frasure et al. (Reference Frasure, Wong, Barreto and Vargas2021) that are recommended for descriptive and multivariate analysis. For groups that cannot draw directly on in-depth demographic information from the U.S. Census Bureau, Frasure et al. (2021) relied on extant literature and social group-specific research centres such as the Pew Research Center and the Williams Institute, which specializes in research on LGBTQ+ populations. The provided survey weights for the LGBTQ+ oversample therefore is an approximation based on the best-known estimates from publicly available demographic information about this community.

Variables and Models

Our main variable is LGBTQ+ linked fate. To operationalize this concept, we draw from existing measures of linked fate that originated with Dawson (Reference Dawson1995) that have been used to gauge both the group basis of racial/ethnic and non-racial/ethnic minorities’ political behaviour. We used a survey question that asked respondents to choose among the following five options: ‘‘What happens to LGBTQ people will have … Nothing to do with what happens in my life (0); A little to do with what happens in my life (0.25); Something to do with what happens in my life (0.5); A lot to do with what happens in my life (0.75); A huge amount to do with what happens in my life (1).’’

Hypotheses 1–3 treat LGBTQ+ linked fate as the dependent variable. In these multivariate models where we examine what predicts LGBTQ+ linked fate, we control for standard socio-demographic indicators such as age, gender, education, income, religious attendance, sexual orientation, whether the respondent identified as transgender, and race/ethnicity.Footnote ¹⁶ Model 2 in Table 1 on the correlates of LGBTQ+ linked fate also controls for political interest. Model 2 also includes a list of variables related to the life experiences of LGBTQ+ people such as coming out; the share of LGBTQ+ family, friends and co-workers; and perceived and experienced LGBTQ+ discrimination.

Table 1.

Determinants of LGBTQ+ Linked Fate

Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. For categorical variables, the following are the reference categories: women are in comparison to men; racial/ethnic groups are compared to whites; for sexual orientation, lesbian and gay are the referent categories; and transgender individuals are compared to cisgender individuals.

Hypotheses 4–6 treat LGBTQ+ linked fate as the main independent variable. In these hypotheses, we analyze political preferences and behaviour with several dependent variables. To measure electoral participation (Hypothesis 4), we rely on respondents’ self-reported voter turnout in the 2020 election. The variable is coded 1 for respondents who reported voting and 0 for those who reported not voting.Footnote ¹⁷ We capture ideological preferences (Hypothesis 5) on a five-point scale ranging from very conservative (0) to very liberal (1). We measure the strength of Democratic party identification (Hypothesis 6) with a standard measure of partisanship. The variable is continuously scaled so that 0 indicates individuals who identify as Strong Republicans and 1 as individuals who identify as Strong Democrats. Pure Independents are at the middle of the scale. Moreover, we further measure party support with a variable on vote choice, which is coded 1 for respondents who voted for the Democratic presidential ticket and 0 for respondents who voted for the Republican or another ticket in the 2020 presidential election.Footnote ¹⁸

The models analyzing the association between LGBTQ+ linked fate and political behaviour (Hypotheses 4–6) include the socio-demographic controls described in the previous paragraph. Additionally, the robustness check for the model on voter turnout (Table 2, model 3) includes political controls for the strength of partisan identity,Footnote ¹⁹ interest in politics, and whether or not the respondent was asked/recruited to participate in the last general election. The robustness check for the model on political ideology (Table 3, model 3) includes additional controls for partisanship,Footnote ²⁰ political interest, and racial attitudes. The robustness tests for the model on partisanship (Appendix Table G, models 2 and 3) also controls for ideology, political interest, and racial attitudes. Finally, the robustness tests for the model on presidential vote choice (Appendix Table H, models 2 and 3) add controls for partisanship, ideology, political interest, and racial attitudes. We included the specific wording of the new LGBTQ-related questions, along with the minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation of these variables in Appendix Table C and Table D.

Table 2.

LGBTQ+ Linked Fate and Voter Turnout

Note: Logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table 3.

LGBTQ+ Linked Fate and Liberal Ideology

Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.