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Red lines versus negotiables: how exposure to wartime violence influences support for peace settlements in Ukraine

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 December 2025

Anna Getmansky
Affiliation:
Department of International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK
Anton Grushetsky
Affiliation:
Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, Kyiv, Ukraine
Nadiya Kostyuk
Affiliation:
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Tolga Sinmazdemir
Affiliation:
Department of Politics and International Studies, SOAS University of London, London, UK
Austin Wright
Affiliation:
Division of the Social Sciences, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA
Thomas Zeitzoff*
Affiliation:
School of Public Affairs, American University, Washington, DC, USA
*
Corresponding author: Thomas Zeitzoff; Email: zeitzoff@american.edu
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Abstract

What shapes attitudes toward wartime negotiation? Does exposure to violence lead citizens to take a hard-line approach to any peace settlements? Or does it make them more open to peace to make the violence stop? To answer these questions, we conducted a series of surveys and survey experiments in Ukraine in July 2022 and May 2023. First, using a series of survey experiments, we show that Ukrainians are flexible on certain issues, but others are considered red lines and not up for negotiation. Second, in the short-term, we find that exposure to violence does not turn Ukrainians against negotiations with Russia, in some cases, it makes them more amenable. Finally, over a longer duration of the war, we find that support for a negotiated solution drops. Our evidence suggests this drop is linked to exposure to violence and to beliefs about the war’s future course.

Information

Type
Original Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of EPS Academic Ltd.
Figure 0

Figure 1. Telephone wave 1 map.

Figure 1

Figure 2. Online panel map.

Figure 2

Figure 3. Telephone wave 3 map.

Figure 3

Table 1. Comparison of survey waves

Figure 4

Figure 4. Experimental primes influence public support for settlements.

Notes: Baseline condition is observed for all respondents in the first online wave and telephone sample (Wave 1) and in the second telephone sample (Wave 3). Experimental arms split each pool into four randomized conditions with balanced group sizes. Mean and 95% confidence interval are reported for all conditions.
Figure 5

Figure 5. Percentage change in support for an agreement relative to the baseline.

Notes: This figure shows the mean percentage change in baseline support following the different poison pills and across the three samples and the 95% confidence interval.
Figure 6

Figure 6. First-difference estimates of relationship between violence exposure and attitudes, online panel. (a) Negotiating principles. (b) Peace terms.

Notes: Coefficient plots show relationship between the change in violence exposure between waves (first differences) and the change in respondent attitudes toward different principles of negotiation (Figure 6(a)) and peace terms (Figure 6(b)). Violence exposure is measured using the principal components (first) of self-reported exposure to violence. Principal components (first) of negotiation principles and peace terms are the outcomes of the first coefficient in the first and the second figure, respectively. Other coefficients show the relationship between principal component of violence exposure and different principles of negotiation and peace terms. Oblast-level fixed effects are included in each regression. These effects capture within-respondent, within-region variation (Correia, 2016). Standard errors are clustered by oblast. All variables are rescaled to lie between 0 and 1.
Figure 7

Figure 7. First-difference estimates of relationship between violence exposure and attitudes, online panel. (a) Strategic to keep negotiating. (b) Independent DNR/LNR.

Notes: Coefficient plots show relationship between change in violence between waves (first differences) and the change in respondent attitudes toward whether it is strategically smart to negotiate with Russia (Figure 7(a)) and independent DNR/LNR (Figure 7(b)). Principal components (first) of self-reported violence exposure is the first coefficient. Oblast-level fixed effects are included in each regression. These effects capture within-respondent, within-region variation (Correia, 2016). Standard errors are clustered by oblast. All variables are rescaled to lie between 0 and 1.
Figure 8

Figure 8. First-difference estimates of relationship between violence exposure and attitudes, online panel. (a) Reduce UKR army size. (b) UKR reject joining EU.

Notes: Coefficient plots show relationship between change in violence between waves (first differences) and the change in respondent attitudes toward Ukraine reducing its army size (Figure 8(a)) and Ukraine rejecting to join EU (Figure 8(b)). Principal components (first) of self-reported violence exposure is the first coefficient. Oblast-level fixed effects are included in each regression. These effects capture within-respondent, within-region variation (Correia, 2016). Standard errors are clustered by oblast. All variables are rescaled to lie between 0 and 1.
Figure 9

Figure 9. Exposure to violence and level of support for an agreement (May 2023 survey).

Notes: These are coefficient plots (95% confidence interval) based on a linear regression of support for an agreement with Russia on self-reported indicator of exposure to violence, controlling for age and fixed effects of respondent characteristics (gender, education, knowledge of Russian, and province dummy).
Figure 10

Figure 10. Military optimism and support for an agreement.

Notes: These are coefficient plots (95% confidence interval) based on a linear regression of support for an agreement with Russia on a binary indicator of being above the median of military optimism. The baseline model has no controls, whereas the saturated model controls for PC of violence exposure, age, and fixed effects of respondent characteristics (gender, education, knowledge of Russian, and province dummy).
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