Any attempt to evaluate China's achievements in industrialization during the past four decades must confront three crucial issues. They are: first, to what extent industrial success was gained at the expense of slower agricultural growth as a result of the Soviet-style, forced industrialization strategy. Secondly, whether in view of the perceived need to narrow the gap between the under-developed interior and the more advanced coastal areas, Chinese leaders have succeeded in correcting regional imbalances in industrial production. Thirdly, whether advances in the modern industrial sector have benefited traditional, small-scale industries. This last question is an important one in the light of the experience of other industrialized countries, highlighting the “spill-over” effects of technical change from modern to traditional sectors.

The main contrast between official discussions of China's rural economic development that took place nearly 40 years ago and those of the late 1980s is not to be found in the identification of the problems themselves, but in the policies proposed for their solution. Then, as now, stress was placed on the problems arising from the adverse man-land ratio; on the crucial importance for China's industrial development of securing adequate supplies of grain; on balancing the latter consideration with the need to supply the light industries with agricultural raw materials such as cotton; on developing the livestock sector of agriculture (particularly pigs) in the interests of consumption and of soil fertility; and on the investment requirements of agriculture, especially in the realm of water conservation and irrigation. These have been the constant factors in discussions throughout the past 40 years.

In 1989, after 40 years in power, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is faced with its worst crisis since the Cultural Revolution (1966–69) over the issue of reform of the Stalinist political system. Arguing that political reform was the necessary pre–condition for further change in China's economy, the reform wing of the CCP confronted conservatives who feared that the Party was losing its monopoly of Chinese politics. The result was that thousands of unarmed civilians in Central Beijing were killed by the army in the J early hours of 4 June 1989.

In its 40th year the People's Republic of China has achieved a position in its foreign relations to which its leaders had long aspired. For the first time they can now claim to operate in a relatively peaceful international environment that is conducive to the attainment of their domestic goals of economic development.

Judged by almost any standard, law and the legal system in China today form part of a growth industry. Although the pace has been uneven and has at times seemed to falter, the growth has been maintained for more than a decade, since the end of the Cultural Revolution and the inauguration of the Four Modernizations. The most easily visible aspect of this phenomenon is the volume of legislation, unprecedented in any other period since 1949. The output is difficult to monitor precisely, because although the major laws and regulations issued by the National People's Congress and the organs of the central government are now for the most part regularly published, the majority of regulations issued at the ministerial or lower levels of the central government are still not published in such a way as to be easily accessible, if they are published at all; and the amount of local legislation which filters out of the area in which it applies is still limited.

China in the 1980s is in the midst of a social revolution as far–reaching as either Land Reform or the early years of the Cultural Revolution. After four decades of championing the superiority of state monopolies and the evils of private ownership, the leaders of the Politburo have decollectivized agriculture, advocated commodification of land values, encouraged private trade and investment, and explicitly agreed that it is good if a few get rich first. Rural citizens in particular have responded with alacrity to this privatization of work and the retreat of the Party and the state from the daily management of agriculture. The household farm has become the basic unit of production for the first time since 1952, and private entrepreneurs have transformed the structure of rural commerce and manufacturing. Average incomes in rural areas trebled in the decade after 1977 and the economic gap between rural and urban citizens noticeably narrowed.

It would appear that many western observers of China, with some recent notable exceptions, have systematically underestimated the importance attached to S&T (science and technology) development by both the Maoist and post-Mao leadership. This article will argue that it is difficult to understand the complexities of Chinese affairs since 1949 within the political, economic and military spheres without direct reference to China's research and development (R&D) and education systems.

Professor Kenneth R. Walker died on 28 July 1989 at the age of 57. He was a pioneer of modern Chinese studies in Britain. His achievements were outstanding as a scholar, teacher, developer of the field and as a contributor to this journal.