A key aspect of Iran’s modernization process was the development of a modern police force. This process was a slow one, with several early efforts, such as Amir Kabir’s modest efforts in the mid-19th century, which primarily involved relatively minor changes such as stationing soldiers and other armed government personnel in guardhouses at key points in the city. Later efforts included the hiring of foreign officers such as the Italian Conte di Monteforte (1878–1889), whom Iranians generally referred to as “the Count,” and a group of Swedish officers headed by Gunnar Westdahl and Sven Bergdahl (1911–1916).Footnote 1 Finally, in 1935–1941, under Rezā Shāh Pahlavi’s government, the national and local police forces were restructured and expanded, leading to the police force that survived into later decades. During this later period, Rezā Shāh ordered the establishment of a series of police academies: some – such as Vakil and Takmili – trained students for between several months to a year, while others – such as the Dāneshgāh-e Polis (Police University) – provided higher-level education for higher-ranking officers.Footnote 2
There are numerous studies on both earlier and later patterns of policing in Tehran and Iran more broadly.Footnote 3 However, the period between roughly 1911–1935 is understudied, partly due to the difficulty of finding primary sources to assist in consistent analysis of this period, and further compounded by the inconsistent and decentralized nature of policing during this time. An important distinction needs to be made here between the various gendarmerie forces (such as the Cossack Brigade, the South Persian Rifles, or the Swedish-led Gendarmerie) and city police forces. For one thing, the gendarmerie forces have been studied much more, partly because they are far better documented and partly due to the fact that, at the time, both the Iranian state and foreign powers prioritized the gendarmerie forces. This prioritization resulted from the fact that the various gendarmerie forces, while carrying out some policing functions in rural areas and along roadways, were much more of a military and political force. These various gendarmerie forces have been studied by several scholars.Footnote 4 Additionally, one study even looks at the “Swedish Period” within the context of diplomatic relations between Sweden and Iran, mostly focusing on the Swedish-led gendarmerie with regard to policing.Footnote 5 While the developments that followed Rezā Shāh’s reforms in 1935–1941, including the massive expansion of police training and organization, have thus far not be studied extensively by Western scholars, these developments have been studied by scholars within Iran, most notably in Hoseyn Bakhtiyāri and Yusef Torābi’s monograph on the history of higher education for Iran’s police.Footnote 6 However, much work still needs to be done for the two and a half decades leading up to the Pahlavi reforms in the mid-1930s. This period, namely the 1910s and 1920s, is the focus of this article. Here, the aim is to consolidate a limited set of primary sources in an attempt to give a better sense of how policing was carried out and how this time period served as the starting point for the Pahlavi regime’s more ambitious, post-1935 transformations. Also, before diving into the topic, it is important to note that this article will not deal with the gendarmerie in Iran, as the police and gendarmerie were fundamentally different in their key characteristics, goals, and historical trajectories.
There are several key questions to be explored. How did the police fit in with nationalism, anti-imperialism, and the nation-building project? What strategies did the government pursue in the development of a national network of police forces for cities around the nation? How was the police force organized/reorganized? How were police officers recruited and trained, both rank-and-file and higher-ranking officers? How were they managed, supervised, and disciplined? How early, and in what ways, was instilling a sense of group identity, shared cultural values, and social solidarity among Iranian police officers enacted?
Local, national, and nationalist police
During this period, competition between foreign and nationalistic influences (i.e., of imperialism vs. anti-imperialism) around policing was a very sensitive issue, further complicated by several factors. Passionate disagreements raged over whether having foreign officers involved in modernizing the police force was a good idea at all. In previous decades, this path often led to reform efforts that were later aborted, only to be tried again years later. At this time, while modernizing nationalists did tend to believe that Western officers were well equipped to transform the police force, they also believed that foreign officers could never be trusted and should have as little influence as possible over any aspect of Iran’s affairs, particularly internal affairs. This distrust was the result of a series of recent political experiences realted to imperialist influence in Iran. Firstly, starting in 1905–1906, the Iranian Constitutional Revolution unleashed strong political forces that included nationalism, anti-imperialism, liberalism, and a particular interest in the rule of law. Secondly, following the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, the British and Russians divided Iran into spheres of influence, significantly compromising the sovereignty of the Iranian state. Thirdly, this situation was further exacerbated in 1914 by World War I, which in turn created further complications for the government and nationalists by creating all manner of crises and dilemmas more generally. The modernization of the police was directly affected by these forces, including both political and security issues and the ideological challenges posed by the contradictions between nationalism and imperialism. Finally, the rise of the Pahlavi regime under Rezā Shāh in the 1920s brought about a more fundamental restructuring of government, society, and, notably, policing.
In this time, a new style of law enforcement became a key new way to build the modern nation of Iran. Despite the overwhelming influence of nationalism, the process of developing a new police force was necessarily complex and nuanced, involving a delicate balancing of Westernization and nativist nationalism. For example, in these early years, it was inescapable that newly formed police forces around the country were the latest stage in a series of foreign, Western-led efforts to modernize Iranian law enforcement. On the other hand, nationalism was always “front and center” in all police activities. For example, a fiercely nationalistic tone is set in the first issue of Nazmiyeh, the professional journal for police published by the central police authorities. “There was a time in which the police of Iran were under the authority of foreign agents. During this time, not only did Iran not have police, but whatever it had was not for this nation!”Footnote 7 The issue goes on to discuss the need for strongly loyal and nationalistic police to take over the sacred responsibility of ensuring the safety and wellbeing of Iranian society.
The Iranian representative to the New York International Conference on policing in 1925, Abd Allāh Bahrāmi, is an excellent example of managing these two competing trends. At the conference, Bahrāmi began his lecture praising Iran’s glorious history, saying: “It is unnecessary for me to recount Iran’s political and civil institutions from ancient times, because you are totally aware that Iran is an ancient nation with cities and lands.” He then went on to stress that modern “international” policing is of a different nature than those developed by other civilizations throughout human history. It is particularly noteworthy here that he said “international,” not “Western” or “European.” This was the general trend of the time, that the terms Westernization or Europeanization were rarely used when speaking about the modernization of policing. Instead, the more universal and general term “international” was almost always preferred. As Bahrāmi said,
…new organizations [i.e., police] of the world of civilization differs completely from what existed in the past… As far as I know most nations have accepted the new [methods of policing] – and it has been a half century since Iran became familiar with these new principles, and the situation [in Iran] is totally different from what it was fifty years ago. In those days, the police forces were used for collecting taxes, and scaring the people, and forcing them to submit to the whims of oppressive rulers…which typically involved beatings with sticks, strangling, amputations, which were considered ordinary punishments.Footnote 8
At the same time, Bahrāmi expressed negative views of foreign advisors, specifically the Italian Count and Swedish officers involved in the early transformation of Iran’s police force.
…they introduced the standard practices of their home countries to Iran. However, because of lack of experience in the matters of the nation [Iran] and lack of knowledge of the language and character of the people, they were unsuccessful. Creation of Iran’s new police force is the product of Iranian thinking. They systematically searched the policing methods of Europe, and after taking over from the Swedish [advisors]. It is unnecessary for me to point out that the police of Iran is accepted as one of the best police forces in the world, in terms of its organization, facilities, and equipment, although it has still not reached the point we demand and what we are shooting for, and therefore we are striving very hard to complete our work by benefiting from the experiences of other police forces of the world.Footnote 9
This attitude goes back to the earliest efforts to restructure the police in the Qājār period. For example, “The reforms of the Conte di Monteforte, from the very first months, encountered opposition on the part of the city’s notables, elites, and ulama, saying that a Christian foreigner should not be in charge of Muslims.”Footnote 1013 Eventually, Nāser al-Din Shāh had no choice but to placate the ulama by removing the Count in the early 1890s. Similarly, in 1912, when Swedish officers were about to take over Tehran’s police force, several officers – including Qāsem Khān –resigned from the force, as they did not want to work for foreign officers.Footnote 11
Sven Bergdahl also wrote of the opposition the Swedish officers faced in starting their work with the Tehran police force.
It was said that the officers of the police force strove by any means necessary to delay the start of our work, and if possible, to stop us from entering the police. In this regard the head of the police noticeably worked at this, and met constantly with ministers, elite ulama, and leaders of corporatist association [asnāf], stressing that it is not acceptable to have people running the police who are totally different from us in religion, ideology, etc.Footnote 12
Bergdahl went on to say that, despite the pious and moral justifications put forth by such men, he believed the officers simply feared losing their jobs and were trying to preserve their positions. He also said that some members of the police accepted the Swedish officers, in no small part because their arrival meant that the Iranian police might start receiving the several months of pay they were owed. Things escalated quickly:
…on the nineteenth of March the situation changed completely. When the officer in charge of the uniformed police, who was the closest thing to a chief of police at the time, arrived at the central office, guards who had gathered in the square outside the building shot several bullets at him, although they all missed him.Footnote 13
The gendarmerie, which had been successfully established by the Swedish officers a year and a half prior to this, had to be brought in to maintain order and avert a larger crisis.
Later, this attitude further intensified, as Rezā Shāh had always been against the Swedish officers, or any foreign officers, being in charge of policing in Iran. Additionally, like most military men, the shah believed that the police, gendarmerie, and other security forces should all be run from within the department of war.Footnote 14 This view must have been at least partly informed by his first-hand experience in the Cossack Brigade, started by the Russians. When Rezā Shāh came to power, he expelled foreign advisors and began a long process of reform and restructuring of the military, gendarmerie, and police, beginning with nationalization, standardization, and the centralization of power.Footnote 15
One particularly interesting point to start our analysis happened a few years earlier, in 1913, in the form of the much-lauded course taught by Belgian instructor G. Demorgny at the Dār al-Fonun government school. While foreign advisors often had contempt for Iranians, sometimes viewing them as an inferior race, Demorgny represented a different, more successful category of advisors, remembered more positively by later generations of Iranians. Rather than stressing that modern policing in Iran was a break with local, Iranian, or Islamic traditions, Demorgny stressed the opposite. For example, at this time it was the norm to rely on the sayings of Imām Ali for both the ideals of law enforcement and symbolic legitimacy. In the first issue of the new police journal Nazmiyeh, the lead article on “Morality and Ideals” (Akhlāq va Afkār) began with a quote by the first imām, Ali Ibn Abi Tālib, to explain the police’s best rules of engagement, etiquette, and moral conduct in undertaking their “sacred” responsibility.Footnote 16
We see this clearly in Demorgny’s curriculum for the police officer training course he taught and supervised, and in which a variety of elite leaders and government officials participated as both speakers and students. Lectures from this course were published in several official Iranian publications and widely disseminated to law enforcement personnel and government officials more generally, thereby having tremendous influence on later courses on the subject. The course’s students consisted of nineteen employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, thirty-two employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, eleven students from the political science program, and an unstated number of advanced students from the St. Louis School and Ilyas French School.Footnote 17 Not surprisingly, many of the elite officers who appear later in this article participated in this or later iterations of this course, and throughout which Imām Ali’s ideas and sayings were frequently quoted.Footnote 18 In fact, the first page of the report was a quote from Imām Ali. Additionally, in the long discussion of how individual rights underpin virtually all aspects of law and law enforcement, Imām Ali was also quoted: “As has been transmitted in Hadith and Akhbār (al-nās musallatuna ‘ala amwālihim wa anfusihim)” (People are sovereign over their property and selves).Footnote 19 Similarly, the Qur’an (3:104) was used to justify the role of the police: “Let there be among you a community encouraging the right and forbidding the wrong. They are the ones who shall prosper.”Footnote 20
This course went much further in embedding modern-style training within indigenous traditions and distancing its teachings from earlier Western-led efforts to modernize the Iranian police. Demorgny stated explicitly that this was his goal.
I noticed very quickly that since young Iranians have innate intelligence and talent, and immediately familiarize themselves with any idea or principle, I can conform to some of the beliefs and local false impressions and cause them to reflect. They quickly were able to study and discern what is necessary; and they can understand and distinguish between old fashioned [outdated] ideals of the absolute authority of past Iranian rulers, on one hand, from the new ideals of the absolute authority of the law, individual rights, and constitutionalism. The sessions of the Ministry of Interior quickly became popular among Iranians, by means of selection of Islamic ideals and principles, and history was the best way to improved new teaching.Footnote 21
This approach is clear in the content of the lectures provided in Demorgny’s report. The course discussed how the police and gendarmerie were separate in medieval Andalusia and used Iran’s 14th-century Ilkhānid rulers to show examples of regulation, inspection of weights and measures, and how to deal with crime. These examples were quoted directly from Ikhānid ruler Ghāzān Khān’s decree on crime and law enforcement, which was also enforced by the 16th/17th-century Safavid ruler Shāh Abbās.Footnote 22 The course also drew on texts by Muslim scholars discussing the foundational ideas of law enforcement. In lesson eight on “commercial police,” there was a detailed discussion of the ideas of the Muslim scholar Rashid al-Din of Hamadān (d. 1319) on the enforcement of weights and measures.Footnote 23 Using the writings of another Muslim scholar from the Ilkhānid period, Monshi Hendu Shāh (d. 1376), the police chief was equated with the traditional Islamic idea of a mohtaseb.Footnote 24 The course continued with a more detailed discussion of the role of the mohtaseb under the Ayyubid leader Salāh al-Din (d. 1193).Footnote 25 In lesson nine, the teaching of Ibn Hishmat (date unknown) on the mohtaseb were covered.Footnote 26 And finally, the course concluded with the famous 11th-century Arab scholar Abd al-Rahman al-Shayzāri’s book on the mohtaseb, which consisted of forty chapters on methods of regulation and inspection, including categories such as: alleys and roads, weights and measures, merchants of flour and animal meats, bakers, medicines, perfumers, cloth sellers, etc.Footnote 27 Thus, in training these new officers, who would go on to lead the new police force, the role of the police chief was embedded within the centuries-old Islamic position of the mohtaseb, and the police force within the context of the ehtisābiyyeh. This is striking in that the focus was not on examples of legal theories, traditions, or institutions from Western police forces. Thus, Demorgny is one of the first and most effective advocates of indigenizing modern policing, placing it firmly within the traditions of Iran and Islam.
Structure and organization of the police
As previously stated, Rezā Shāh expelled foreign advisors when he came to power, starting a long process of reform and restructuring of the military, gendarmerie, and police, beginning with nationalization, standardization, and the centralization of power. Unlike earlier police reforms under the Count, Swedish officers, and others, policing ceased to be local and regional. Increasingly, all cities, villages, and provinces were becoming centrally controlled, or at least guided.Footnote 28 Beginning with the hiring of the Conte di Monteforte, a fundamental change started slowly taking place, followed two decades later by the Swedish officers and culminating in the new system that emerged in the 1920s. Tehran had traditionally been divided into neighborhoods (mahalleh), with law and order maintained by a leader of the quarter (kadkhodā) who reported to a city-wide supervisor (kalāntar), who was often further assisted by a dārugheh in matters of safety and security. Historically, there had often been other positions, such as the beyglerbeygi, gazmeh, and of course the market inspector (with the older Islamic title of mohtaseb), who also undertook many of these roles.Footnote 29 The parameters of neighborhoods changed over the decades and centuries, as did the specific titles and organizational functions of these positions. However, the process of change that began in the 1880s involved an unprecedented transformation.
The older system was characterized by mediation, with power and justice typically negotiated. Falzin Vejdani has already conducted a thorough study of the system of policing throughout the Qājār period, and this article takes his work as its starting point for analysis.Footnote 30 Police functions typically took two forms: security on roads and frontiers and security in cities. Road and frontier security was usually a combination of state forces and diplomacy with regional forces, such as nomadic or tribal groups, or regional strongmen. Road security was slowly taken over by the modern gendarmerie. In cities, towns, and villages, safety and security had always been decidedly locally, in terms of funding, organization, and personnel. Within large cities, such as Tehran, the same general patterns existed within the city’s quarters. While the governing elites connected to the ruler of the empire or governor of the province appointed the highest-level officials, the lower-level members came from local social and political groups. For example, a kalāndar or mohtaseb would be appointed by elites linked to the state, whereas the quarter head (kadkhoda) would typically come from the quarter and be someone invested with authority by residents of the quarter. Typically, it would be the richest or most respected member of the quarter who would work closely with other respected members to run affairs in the quarter. Furthermore, the head of the quarter would administer justice locally for all but the most serious crimes, or those with political implications for the state. Order, law, and justice were usually more like what we might call today “submitting to mediation,” in that the goal was typically to find a satisfactory outcome for the parties involved, who usually knew each other and, thus, it was most often a very personal affair. For example, the focus in cases of theft was often on returning stolen property to the victims; even in the case of violent crimes, such as assault or murder, the focus remained on satisfying the victim or the victim’s family through either punishment or compensation.Footnote 31 Instead of policemen or soldiers, the quarter would have their own local “muscle” (such as lutis, armed men from the neighborhood, or their own servants) to enforce authority.Footnote 32 Similarly, the state had its own enforcers, often soldiers, farrāshs (servants of the ruler/governor, also including “enforcers”), or various military or irregular cavalry (savār).
The flow of power was thus typically a two-way process of negotiation and mediation, rather than a one-way flow of power. As the state modernized, however, the system evolved into a more centralized structure in which power flowed primarily in one direction, from top to bottom and from the center outward. As this pattern was implemented, the intention was that enforcement would become more and more a matter of strengthening state authority through the enforcement of laws and regulations in more standard ways, with less negotiation, mediation, or compromise. This was a major conceptual, cultural, and institutional shift that continued to progress in future decades. While divisions or quarters within cities (komiseriyās) continued to be used, they were increasingly run directly by officials appointed by the state (i.e., the Ministry of the Interior or the city government), who usually had no direct connection with the neighborhoods in which they worked. Another big change was in the state’s efforts to integrate networks of police forces for cities, towns, and villages, which would then be similarly centralized to form one large nationwide network of police overseen by the national police force (Shahrbāni-ye koll-e keshvar).
As there were still not means of properly training police officers, even in the capital, and the gendarmerie was already very well established, an arrangement was made at the beginning of the Swedish period (1911) for the gendarmerie to train 300 police recruits for three months at a time until there were 1,000 trained officers. Within months, the police established their own school for recruits, which also trained recruits from other cities and areas. After that, a more specialized school for training higher-ranking officers was also established.Footnote 33 This education for police was focused solely on Tehran, with little ambitions to expand beyond that, and did not involve reorganization of police elsewhere. Still, this was an important (if small) step towards establishing better policing standards across Iran’s provinces. An additional change that occurred under the Swedish officers, with future repercussions, was the creation of eight specialized criminal investigative units that worked across the city’s various precincts: 1) political affairs; 2) fingerprinting, photography, etc.; 3) entertainment sector; 4) theft; 5) the bāzār; 6) major crimes such as murder and robbery; 7) counterfeiting and fraud; and 8) misdemeanors.Footnote 34 While most of the many changes inplemented by teh Swedes did not survive their removal from the police force, this experience informed the Iranian state’s later efforts and restructuring. Eventually, Tehran was expanded into twelve komiseriyās, including Shemirān and the city of Ray. Each had at last three ranking officers in charge, and police officers worked on twenty-four-hour shifts on alternating days. Therefore, for a typical komiseriyā with sixty officers, thirty would be on duty at any given time.Footnote 35
Recruitment, training, and supervision
A major aspect of this modernization program was, of course, how police personnel were recruited and trained. This period is of particular importance because it sets the stage for modernization efforts in later decades. Let us start with a top-down perspective, which is how it was conceived at the time. The hiring of higher-ranking officers (sāhebmansab) was of particular concern. For example, for the position of police chief, the ideal practice followed the below outline:
The chief of police must be a ranking official with higher education, who is serious and eager to take on the job. He must be familiar with all the trends and duties of the police…and have spent time serving in the branches and circles of public safety, because the duties of these two branches of policing are in so many ways close and intersecting that if the chief of police is not familiar with matters of public safety it would be impossible for these two branches to cooperate and mutually support each other.Footnote 36
Other higher-ranking officers who directly supervised uniformed police were also expected to have substantial education, knowledge, and experience in security services, with the ability to manage and discipline rank-and-file policemen, preferably graduates of government secondary schools with direct knowledge of policing. That said, graduating from security or military programs was not an absolute requirement during this period. In fact, promoting from within the ranks of regular policemen, regardless of formal education, was actually preferred.Footnote 37 This is consistent with international trends at the time, as articulated by Mr. Louwage – the Belgian representative to the New York Conference on Policing in 1926 – as part of a session translated into Persian for Iranian officers.Footnote 38
Police chiefs around the country were given detailed instructions on how to structure and organize policing locally, thus creating a national network with central planning and guidance but local implementation. Each city’s system had a variety of divisions and patterns of implementation. Firstly, there were vertical divisions: trainees or recruits (dāvtalab) with a probationary period of six to twelve months were at the bottom; uniformed policemen (ājhān, or agent) were the next step up; higher-ranking officers (sāhebmansab) and district commissioners (komiser) were the next level; and finally, the police chief (ra’is-e polis) sat at the top. There were also horizontal divisions between law enforcement and public safety, health, and civic order. These two halves of the system were complementary and overlapping. At the highest level of management, these two halves would be closest and overlap the most while, at the lower levels, they would interact in whatever ways higher-ranking officers determined as appropriate in a given place and situation. Thus, uniformed police officers supported and buttressed other public safety administrators.Footnote 39
Another major horizontal division related to geography and demographics. A typical city was divided into areas called commissions, with a ranking officer – a commissioner (komiser) – responsible for each area. In current American English terminology, these roughly corresponded to a precinct and a precinct head. Each precinct was selected based on population and type of neighborhood or quarter. For example, the bazar precinct, which had both a very high population density and very complex commercial activities, required a far higher degree of policing than a quiet residential neighborhood. Each precinct would work in relative isolation, but held vehicles and policemen in reserve to support other precincts as needed. Each precinct had its own internal structure, from the highest office (the precinct head) down to the “beat cops” and trainees.Footnote 40
Internally, there would still be a degree of horizontal division between uniformed policemen and their supervising (disciplining) officers, leaving the precinct head to take a broader view of the precinct as a whole, including other safety matters typically carried out by plain clothes officers and officials (not uniformed policemen). Interestingly, while uniformed policemen were expected to gain experience in the precinct of their assignment, higher-ranking, plain clothes officers were expected to spend no more than several weeks at each precinct, as they were most effective if they remained unrecognizable and unfamiliar to local criminals. This allowed cross-precinct training and experience for higher-ranking officers.Footnote 41
For rank-and-file policemen, the system of training included coursework, on-the-job training, and something akin to a supervised apprenticeship. In training these recruits, heads of police were instructed to carefully select those who were capable of being trained, alongside the below list of qualifications required of any trainee/recruit.Footnote 42 A trainee had to have or be:
1. [A] pious Muslim.
2. [An] Iranian citizen.
3. No convictions for rising-up or acting against the national government. No convictions for crimes or misdemeanors that required being banned from working for the government.
4. No convictions for corrupt beliefs, and no reputation for corrupt morals or debauchery. No bankruptcy and no drug addiction to opium, or contagious diseases.
5. Possession of certificate of sixth grade of middle level, or have passed an exam equivalent to sixth grade, and knowledge of a Western language (French, English, German).
6. Aged between 24 and 30.
7. Not shorter than 1.65 gāz.Footnote 43
8. Must have a strong constitution and be able to carry out police duties.
9. Must not have any sort of conviction of wrongdoing in the past two years.
10. People who have not been disciplined or punished in honorable service to the state (clarification: among those who have the above qualifications, those who are married are allowed to apply).Footnote 44
Instructions for selecting and training these recruits were disseminated in detail. The following is one representative sample.
Recruits who have previous experience as agents of the police or armed forces can be hired directly, provided they have no negative past behavior, are literate, and are not older than 25 years old. The probationary period for a recruit is set at a minimum of six months, and if his trainers feel that he is not well suited for the police, he should be expelled. During the trainee stage (six to twelve months), in addition to military and police training, he must attend police courses at least three times per week, to learn the nation’s laws, and police regulations. He must continue studying at this school as well as attending relevant conferences and workshops, until his education and training are satisfactorily completed. Once he begins to carry out his actual police duties, his supervising officers should continue to assess and monitor his conduct secretly, without his knowledge. During the first six months of being a police officer (ājhān), the focus should be on building his athletic ability, such as running and jumping, and he should be trained in how to use firearms, starting with small arms. During the first years of his service as a policeman those who are young should be stationed in places in which the vigor, speed, and strength of their youth is useful, and those who are older should be stationed in more congested areas, focused more on regular duties, like those related to traffic and pedestrians.Footnote 45
There were many components of this new training network for officers. For example, on the March 29, 1928, the establishment of a new police library containing local and foreign texts related to policing was announced. One of the aims of this library was to serve as a centralized repository of technical texts for police personnel from across the nation, not just in Tehran.Footnote 46 Perhaps more ambitiously, as a central part of this program to develop a national police network beyond Tehran, a professional journal entitled Nazmiyeh was created in 1925. Similar journals followed in later decades, including Nāmeh-ye Shahrbāni, Māhnāmeh-ye Shahrbāni, and Majalleh-ye jhāndārmeri. The Nazmiyeh journal had many functions, primarily education, training, guiding city police departments around the country from the center, and creating a new type of police officer.
The primary purpose of publishing this magazine is to facilitate the acquisition of knowledge and information that each agent [police officer] must know in accordance with their level and rank. This is because the level of education in our nation has not yet progressed to the point that all police personnel will have received the necessary scientific and technical education before starting their job…Footnote 47
In Nazmiyeh, there were numerous recurring articles that served as a means of continuous instruction and administrative guidance for high-ranking officers. In the first issue, in the recurring article “Rahbar-e polis” (Leader of Police, or Police Leadership), higher-ranking officers in other cities and provinces were instructed to use the articles to train the officers under their supervision.Footnote 48 These articles consisted of serialized textbooks, manuals, and instructional lectures. For example, Nazmiyeh reprinted a translation of a sample curriculum from a police academy in Paris.Footnote 49 The journal also included a series of long articles, both translated from Western texts and original articles by Iranian police educators, such as an article by Naqibzādeh Tabātabā’i, an instructor of inspection, crime, and policing in the central officer training program, which consisted of portions of his curriculum.Footnote 50 “Polis-e elmi” (Science-Based Police) was another recurring article, which served as serialized textbook of the technical aspects of police work.Footnote 51
These serialized articles included detailed instructions on fingerprinting, interrogation, identifying suspects, securing a crime scene, identifying shoe and tire tracks, criminal psychology, the use of firearms, police dogs, and photography. For example, Nazmiyeh’s first issue in 1928 included numerous articles on the following topics, themes, and forensic categories. The following is this issue’s table of contents:
1) Correctional Facilities (rehabilitation rather than punishment)
2) Footprints
3) Killing (murder and manslaughter)
4) Examining firearms and bullets
5) Hair
6) Science-Based Police
7) German Armored Police Vehicles
8) Police, Religion, and Conscience
9) Crime Scene
10) Fingerprints
11) Humor Section
12) Photography
13) Swimming
14) Manners and Behaviors of Police Personnel with the Public
15) Qualities of the Agents of the Police.Footnote 52
Nazmiyeh’s coverage of the topics was truly comprehensive. The journal also regularly published new legal statutes, police regulations, and instructions on a wide variety of specific situations taught to and implemented by police personnel.Footnote 53 There were also statistics on crime and criminal cases, along with summaries of actual police reports and criminal court cases thought to be instructive for police officers.Footnote 54 Nazmiyeh also kept police abreast of international trends by printing relevant speeches given at the annual international police conference in New York.Footnote 55
Great emphasis was placed on generating policemen with a particular character and social standing, as well as infusing such policemen with a group feeling that would continue into their future years of service. While these efforts were not nearly as ambitious as those seen from the 1930s onwards, this is the time when such efforts truly began to take shape. After accepting recruits, ranking officers were instructed to monitor these trainees’ personal lives, ensuring they did not socialize with people or go to places that might be suspicious and instilling close friendships amongst them, as trainees lived with or near each other and had access to a range of important social spaces, activities, and facilities. “The above-mentioned space should include a large eating salon, a reading room, and some facilities for recreation, games, gymnastics, and football, which incidentally will contribute to the development of their physical fitness.”Footnote 56 As such, trainees formed long-term bonds of friendship, becoming a social group or community. This environment was meant to serve as a sort of “secondary school,” including maintaining a healthy lifestyle devoid of promiscuity and the use of alcohol, opium, etc.Footnote 57
There was also an extreme emphasis on policemen serving as leaders and role models for the wider society, raising their status to a new level. Gone were the days of low status farrāshs or lutis implementing the law. The Iranian policeman was to become a new type of educated, honorable, professional, and respected citizen; someone to look up to.
The duty of the police is extremely sacred – responsibilities are not limited to standing guard, drilling, and pursuing criminals. Rather, all the details of society and moral character of society is sketched and written in his [the policeman’s] program…In order to carry out such duties the officers who run the police department must be people of wisdom, with love for their nation, who are models of righteous social behavior, and also have judgment and vision.Footnote 58
It goes on to emphasizethese points.
Today we must do our job in ways that are appropriate for the current social order. We must change the character, habits, and behavior of yesterday’s police by means of education, training, and conferences…we must strengthen within police personnel the spirit of justice, piety, honor, and moral character to such an extent that they will not be shaken by any event or crisis, nor any temptation or threat.
The article went on to argue that higher-ranking officers should serve as role models of piety and justice (diyānat va edālat) for the rank-and-file policemen, continuing:
we must have our moral foundation reach such a point that that educated youth, from the best classes of society, will choose police service with eagerness, passion, and love. Look at the periodicals in Europe and see the high status and importance police have there, and how the people view them with respect and courtesy.Footnote 59
Interestingly, religion (Islam) was brought up constantly, but only in abstract terms, such as the above-mentioned term diyānat (religious piety), which was often paired with edālat (justice) or vejdān (conscience). The presumption was that a pious Muslim was a good and moral person. However, details of specific Islamic doctrines, laws, rituals, or any aspect of orthopraxy were noticeably absent. For example, in one article in 1928, two points were made: that police must be held to a higher religious and moral standard than regular people and that their duty of saving lives was both religiously mandated (i.e., ending their own salat prayer to help someone) and morally mandated. They were to serve as leaders and role models in society.Footnote 60
Rank-and-file policemen, unsurprisingly, could also be held up as role models for their peers. In an article in 1927, after explaining that policeman Khayr Allāh had died in a traffic collision in the line of duty, deliberately putting himself in danger to save others, Nazmiyeh printed the police chief’s eulogy from the funeral alongside a photograph of the policeman in uniform. As the police chief said,
The death of this dutiful colleague has once again shown to society the willingness of policemen to sacrifice their lives…his name will not be forgotten by brave and dutiful officers…and I remind all high-ranking officers and police personnel that we must all have this same brave spirit and learn how to carry out our duty from this noble, departed [policeman].Footnote 61
Social, mental, and physical health were all critical to creating this new type of policeman, in both their work and personal lives. After stressing the critical importance of good health and a strong constitution to officers’ success in carrying out their duties, the article argued that this was not simply a job requirement; it was an overall lifestyle for a policeman, his family, and, by extension, Iranian society as a whole: “Officers who neglect their health prevent both themselves and their families from achieving happiness and cause them a variety of misfortunes.” The article went on to identify four primary causes of illness and weakness of the constitution, “1) alcohol, 2) opium, 3) Syphilis, 4) gonorrhea,” and promised that future issues would address these in greater detail. This article urged high-ranking officers to use Namaziyeh’s articles to guide their underlings and encouraged health officials to hold regular meetings and conferences to educate law enforcement personnel about such health issues.Footnote 62 An excellent example of a follow-up article on one of the four above-mentioned issues was entitled “Opium is Both a Medicine and a Poison,” which again advised officers to maintain a healthy household. After stressing that opium was particularly dangerous to the kidneys of both the elderly and very young, the article warned of a common practice: “Unfortunately in Iran, women in the family, for their own ease, feed babies opium to help them sleep, which causes their babies to have a variety of illnesses, ending in serious harm.”Footnote 63 The article then went on to argue that officers working with Rezā Shāh for Iran’s development and progress were role models, and that they needed to work together to stamp out this crisis “that is the primary source of the degeneration of the Iranian people [nejad-e Irani], and which causes weakness of the body and prevents the political progress of society.”Footnote 64
There were other sections of the journal that were not necessarily used for training or pedagogy, nor does it seem that they were specifically intended to create a sense of shared identity among policemen. Such sections were more typical of what one might find in other newspapers, magazine, and journals. However, whatever their intent may or may not have been, these sections did contribute to the shared experience of professional colleagues, thereby reenforcing a sense of identity nationwide. There are many examples, such as a poem composed by Mahmud Khān Tandāri, the police chief of Qom.Footnote 65 There were also occasional articles devoted to police-related humor, such as the following jokes:
Two Cops Chatting: The first one says, “In my opinion people who don’t chose to be married should be investigated and kept under surveillance, and they should be punished harshly. The second cop says, “In my opinion, the best punishment for them is to force them to get married.”
The Precinct Head and the Thief: The precinct head said to the thief, “Once again I have captured you. Get lost! I don’t want to ever see you again!” To which the thief said, “If this is really what you want, you need to request a transfer to another precinct.”
The Head of the Court and the Drunkard: The head of the court said, “Why do you drink so much wine? So far you have been arrested more than ten times for this crime. If this happens again, I will order much harsher fines for you!” The drunkard said, “It might be more financially sound [for me to become a regular subscribing member]. Can you please let me know what the subscription rate is?”Footnote 66
There were also numerous samples of crime fiction translated from the New York police journal, which both entertained and connected readers to a broader global culture of crime fiction and investigation.Footnote 67 There were also, of course, many competitions, quizzes, crosswords, etc. – some with prizes.Footnote 68 All of these combined to create shared group experiences of culture and entertainment, which can be understood as subtly helping to reenforce shared group identity. This is only the earliest stage in this trend, as in later police journals – such as Nāmeh-ye Shahrbāni and Mahnāmeh-ye Shahrbāni-ye Koll-e Keshvar – group identity is much more comprehensively and explicitly promoted.
Officers
So, who were these officers, how were they educated, and what career paths did they follow? As a comprehensive statistical survey is beyond the scope of this article, we use a relatively small sample of thirty-six high-ranking officers who, at some point during their careers, served as police chief.Footnote 69 While this is not a large enough sample to show comprehensive trends with extreme precision, it does show some general trends among these officers. It is important to note, however, that this sample does not include rank-and-file uniformed cops or low-ranking officers. These thirty-six officers are limited to those born between 1852–1918 and held the office of police chief between 1892–1973. Below, these officers are divided into three chronological groups of equal size (twelve officers in each) based on their dates of birth. Summary information is listed on Table 1 at the end of this article, while Table 2 provides some data points for analysis.
Table 1. Breif Career Summeries and data points for Selected Officers.
Table 2. Some Important Career Trends for Selected Officers.
As it regards education, twenty-seven of the officers were educated and trained in Iran while fourteen pursued higher education abroad (mostly in France, Turkey, and Russia), with five doing both. The officers who studied abroad mostly received a military education before returning to Iran. One officer, Mehdi Qoli Alavi Moqaddam (1901–1984), interestingly studied veterinary medicine and served in the military and gendarmerie in areas involving cavalry and four-legged transportation, before later becoming police chief. Another exception was Mahmud Khān Ansāri (1871–1961), who studied at the Harbiyeh military school in Turkey and then studied Islam and religious sciences in Najaf and Karbalā before returning to Iran to join the military. In the first and second groups (chronologically) similar numbers of officers trained in Turkey, France, or Russia. However, a clear shift happened by the third group, when Turkey was largely abandoned in favor of a major shift toward France: from one or two officers studying in France from the first two groups to five (out of six) in the third group. Most of the officers who studied in France attended École spéciale militaire de Saint-Cyr.
Domestically, the numbers roughly doubled over the course of the three groups, beginning with schools such as Dār al-Fonun, the Nezām school, and especially the various gendarmerie officer training programs for the first group. In the second and third groups, there was a decided shift away from some of these schools toward the Dāneshkadeh-ye Afsari in Tehran and, to a lesser extent, other government schools such as Dāneshgāh-e Jang. Study at the gendarmerie schools all but disappeared. The overall patterns of domestic study changed significantly while the patterns for study abroad are best characterized as “more of the same,” but with a shift toward France. Police education efforts during this article’s period of focus, 1911–1935, were characterized by strategies attempting to deal with the fact that, outside the gendarmerie schools, few options for educating police officers existed. After this period, this problem was resolved on the national level by the expansions undertaken by the Pahlavi regime, including the creation and expansion of schools such as Dāneshkadeh-ye Afsari and Dāneshgāh-e Jang.
The next question relates to these officers’ career trajectories and how they became officers in the police force. Among them, there were four main career paths: military, gendarmerie, police, and politics/government administration. Most of these senior officers moved back and forth between these career areas, so there are two ways of looking at this: what careers did they take part in and which of these was their “primary” career path. For example, if we list the career path numbers for this entire period, twenty-five of the officers took the military path, fourteen followed the gendarmerie path, seven became police, and seventeen undertook politics/government administration. Most had careers in the military and a significant number had careers in governance and the gendarmerie; police careers comprised a far smaller number. Thus, for this whole period, only seven were career police (aside from their term as police chief).
As previously stated, one of the policing ideals during this period was the promotion of police chiefs from within the current ranks of the police, in line with international ideals of policing at the time. The above numbers indicate, however, that they failed quite spectacularly in achieving this goal. In fact, the situation looks even worse if the data is broken down by time period. Over the three groups, military careers increased slightly (from eight to seven to ten), gendarmerie careers decreased (from five to six to three), police careers decreased dramatically (from four to three to none), and political/government administration careers declined (from seven to six to four). Over time, the floor metaphorically “fell out” from under the police career path.
Restricting these numbers to “primary career paths,” meaning their main path of promotion through the ranks, is even more telling. By looking at the numbers this way, the following trends emerge: officers with a primary military career dominated, with fourteen officers, and primary careers in politics/governance (nine), gendarmerie (seven), and police (five) followed in descending order. However, if we break these down over our three groups, the trends become more sharply defined. A career primarily in the military showed dramatic growth (from one to four to nine), careers primarily in the gendarmerie and police dropped dramatically (from two to four to one for the gendarmerie and three to two to none for the police), and those who were primarily politicians or government officers stayed roughly steady (from four to two to three). Thus, while professional police and gendarmerie officers were passed over, the police force was increasingly being put in the hands of military men or, to a lesser extent, politicians. We can therefore conclude that police chiefs were not the product of a professionalized police force that recruited, trained, and promoted from within its ranks.Footnote 70
Conclusion
While it is difficult to give a complete picture of the state of policing between 1911–1935, this article explored the chaotic, yet foundational nature of this period in the transformation of the police force in Tehran and Iran more broadly. While the most dramatic transformations began taking shape in the late 1930s, the nationalization of modern Iranian policing can be traced back to this previous period. This important transition period covers roughly one decade before and one decade after Rezā Shāh Pahlavi’s rise to power, and also fell right after the constitutional period, which, despite its successes and failures, helped to solidify the nationalist and anti-imperialist politics of the rest of the 20th century.
This article explored several questions, including how the police force was structured and restructured between 1911–1935, slowly laying the foundations for the modern, professionalized police force that later emerged. One interesting question is how this project fit with the growing influence of nationalism and anti-imperialism that dominated the politics of the time. While the expertise of Western officers was deemed useful, even necessary, it was also greatly feared, resulting in a complex process of Indigenizing modern policing concepts. The structure and process of policing underwent transformation, including in how police were recruited, trained, and deployed. There was a change from mediated patterns of policing, according to which the exercise of power within the realm of law enforcement had previously flowed in multiple directions, toward a more top-down, center-periphery power dynamic. While the educational infrastructure did not yet have the capacity to provide all the necessary training for the police force, there was a slow shift away from small-scale schools – such as officers schools within the gendarmeries – and a near-total reliance on foreign military education toward a centrally led and guided educational strategy. Over time, reliance on foreign educational institutions (especially in France) continued, but state-run officer education institutions increasingly became the norm. Another major change was seen in the deliberate cultivation of a nationally integrated police force to replace the decentralized/localized police forces of each city or province. While centralization was very weak during this period, there is no doubt that it was a major strategic goal and central concern of all policing plans. As part of this broad trend, the internationally accepted ideal of police officers being trained and promoted from within the ranks and led by one of their own, instead of by political or military personnel, was never realized in Iran. Finally, this period also saw the beginnings of the effort to create a new identity around the profession of policing, involving a sense of belonging, an ethos, a particular lifestyle, and a higher social status. This approach carried over into later decades, as this social identity group become firmly rooted in both the state-led nationalist project and Iranian society more broadly.
Disclosures
I have no competing or conflicting interests in relation to any part of this article.
Financial support
Financial support provided by the Research and Creative Grant, awarded by the Office of the Vice President for Research, University of Texas at Austin.
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