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Navigating norms and invisible rules: Explaining the case of business influence in international shipping regulation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 January 2022

Christian Hendriksen Open the ORCID record for Christian Hendriksen [Opens in a new window]
Christian Hendriksen*
Affiliation:
Copenhagen Business School, Department of Operations Management, Solbjerg Plads 3, Frederiksberg, 2000 Denmark
*
*Corresponding author: Christian Hendriksen, Email: che.om@cbs.dk
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Abstract

This article develops a micro-level theoretical perspective of business influence in international negotiations. By drawing on organizational institutional theory, the article proposes that site-specific institutionalized norms can structure the nature and extent of business power. The article illustrates the value of this perspective through an illustrative case study of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) through interviews and participant observation of on-site dynamics during negotiations on environmental shipping regulation. The article shows how, in the case of the IMO, specific institutionalized norms and beliefs structure private actors’ possible influence and their claims to authority. In particular, strongly held beliefs about the nature of political deliberation in the IMO both constrain and enable business interests, sometimes overriding the general structural power of the shipping industry. This research implies that future scholarship of business power and lobbying should be attentive to specific institutionalized ideas structuring business actors’ range of legitimate activities, in particular in international institutions where individual negotiation sites can develop idiosyncratic norms and beliefs about the legitimacy of private actor participation.

Keywords

lobbyingbusiness powershippinginstitutional theoryauthority
Type
Research Article
Information
Business and Politics , Volume 24 , Issue 1 , March 2022 , pp. 79 - 95
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of V.K. Aggarwal

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