Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Long 1950s as a Policy Era
- 3 Regulation, Litigation, and Reform
- 4 Courts and Agencies in the American Civil Rights State
- 5 The Politics of Labor Policy Reform
- 6 Teachers Unions and American Education Reform
- 7 Progressive Federalism and the Contested Implementation of Obama’s Health Reform
- 8 Federalism and the Politics of Immigration Reform
- 9 Trade Politics and Reform
- 10 The Politics of Intelligence Reform
- 11 Follow the Leader
- 12 Conclusion: Madison Upside Down
- Index
- References
10 - The Politics of Intelligence Reform
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 November 2014
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Long 1950s as a Policy Era
- 3 Regulation, Litigation, and Reform
- 4 Courts and Agencies in the American Civil Rights State
- 5 The Politics of Labor Policy Reform
- 6 Teachers Unions and American Education Reform
- 7 Progressive Federalism and the Contested Implementation of Obama’s Health Reform
- 8 Federalism and the Politics of Immigration Reform
- 9 Trade Politics and Reform
- 10 The Politics of Intelligence Reform
- 11 Follow the Leader
- 12 Conclusion: Madison Upside Down
- Index
- References
Summary
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) is “the most dramatic reform of our nation’s intelligence capabilities since President Harry S. Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947,” remarked President George W. Bush when signing the legislation on December 17, 2004. He was right. Although the effectiveness of IRTPA remains to be determined, the legislation’s intent was ambitious and far-reaching.
Bush left unmentioned that most of IRTPA’s initiatives had been proposed previously – and repeatedly. Intelligence reform has been a recurrent theme on Capitol Hill since the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) at the outset of the Cold War. Over the subsequent sixty-five years, approximately twenty commissions, committees, and panels recommended improvements to the structure, mission, and operations of the CIA and other components of the intelligence community (IC). Prescriptions to strengthen community management in order to enhance coordination and integration among the disparate elements, a linchpin of IRPTA, which a historian in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence described as the “unfinished business of 1947,” were common and frequent. So, too, were proposals to promote information sharing and eliminate stovepipes, fortify congressional oversight, redistribute the budget and make it more transparent, improve the relationship between intelligence producers and consumers at all levels and between the foreign and law enforcement communities, and address other fundamental problems. These proposals received serious attention and often the support of experts and veteran officials. In almost all cases until 2004, nevertheless, those with the capacity to enact or institute major reforms either rejected the recommendations or gravely diluted them. Even the impact of IRTPA, contemporary evidence suggests, will be less transformative than its proponents intended, and many close observers of and commentators on America’s national security architecture argue is necessary.
Information
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Politics of Major Policy Reform in Postwar America , pp. 227 - 252Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2014
References
, Creating the Secret State: The Origins of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1943–1947 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2000), 5Google Scholar
, Intelligence and U. S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform (NY: Columbia, 2011), 179Google Scholar
, Donovan and the CIA (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1981), 23–70Google Scholar
’s memorandum to FDR of November 18, 1944, in , Donovan and the CIA, 445–47
, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 175Google Scholar
, The Intelligence Establishment (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 60CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, History of the Central Intelligence Agency, in The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents, ed. (University, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1984), 20–21Google Scholar
to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, January 22, 1946, in , Central Intelligence Agency, 126–27
Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution, ed. (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2001), 2
memorandum for the Assistant Director for Special Operations [David Galloway], “Functions of the Office of Special Operations,” October 25, 1946, in The CIA under Harry Truman, ed. (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994), 87Google Scholar
, The CIA and Congress: The Untold Story from Truman to Kennedy (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2005), 21Google Scholar
, The Old Boys: American Elite and the Origins of the CIA (NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1992)Google Scholar
, The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996)Google Scholar
, Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage (NY: Free Press, 2011), 304–12Google Scholar
and , “History of the Interagency Process for Foreign Relations in the United States: Murphy’s Law?” in The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth, ed., and (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 20Google Scholar
to the , September 25, 1947, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment (Washington, DC: GOP, 1996): 622–23Google Scholar
United States Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities [Church Committee Report], Book IV (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976), 31
with , Ike’s Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981), 187–88Google Scholar
, Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community, 1947–1989 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1990)Google Scholar
, “A Student Group Concedes It Took Funds from C.I.A.,” New York Times, February 14, 1967
. “A Short Account of International Student Politics & the Cold War with Particular Reference to the NSA, CIA, Etc.” Ramparts 5 (March 1967): 29–39Google Scholar
, “The 1967 Central Intelligence Agency Scandal: Catalyst in a Transforming Relationship Between State and People,” Journal of American History 98 (March 2012): 1075–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, Killing Détente: The Right Attacks the CIA (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 71–72Google Scholar
, Killing Détente, 76–78, “A Review of the Intelligence Community,” March 10, 1971
, Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U. S. Intelligence Community, 1946–2005 (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007), 65–75Google Scholar
, The Family Jewels: The CIA, Secrecy, and Presidential Power (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2013)Google Scholar
America in the Seventies, ed. and (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004)
, “Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U. S. against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years,” New York Times, December 22, 1974
, “C.I.A. Chief Tells House of $8 Million Campaign against Allende in ’70–’73,” New York Times, September 8, 1974
, Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate Investigations of the CIA and FBI (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 48–58Google Scholar
, A Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence Investigation (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky), 1985Google Scholar
and , Fighting the Odds: The Life of Senator Frank Church (Pullman: Washington State University Press, 1994), 472Google Scholar
, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (NY: HarperCollins, 1995), 413–20Google Scholar
, “Looking for a Rogue Elephant: The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA,” CSI (Winter 1998–99): 81–92Google Scholar
, The Threat on the Horizon: An Inside Account of America’s Search for Security After the Cold War (NY: Oxford University Press, 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
, “Failures on Terrorism Are Seen Shaping Tenet’s Legacy,” New York Times, June 4, 2004
, The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict Between American and al-Qaeda (NY: Free Press, 2011), 3–85Google Scholar
, , and , “How the White House Embraced Disputed Arms Intelligence,” New York Times, October 3, 2004
, “Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Promising Start Despite Ambiguity, Ambivalence, and Animosity,” in and , The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 140–41Google Scholar
, Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 89–108Google Scholar
“9/11 Families Plead for Intelligence Form,” CNN Politics, August 17, 2004
The 9/11 Commission Report: The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (NY: Norton, 2004)
, Congressional Record, July 17, 2003 (Senate), Page S9580-S9581
Report on the U. S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, retrieved from , accessed on October 13, 2011
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, December 17, 2004
, “Transforming Analysis: The Intelligence Community’s Best Kept Secret,” Intelligence and National Security 26 (April–June 2011): 159–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Accessibility standard: Unknown
Why this information is here
This section outlines the accessibility features of this content - including support for screen readers, full keyboard navigation and high-contrast display options. This may not be relevant for you.Accessibility Information
Accessibility compliance for the PDF of this chapter is currently unknown
and may be updated in the future.
- 1
- Cited by