Initial Conception: The First Sino–Japanese War, 1894–1895

The outbreak of war between China and Japan in July 1894 was a culmination of long-standing Sino-Japanese rivalry over influence in Korea which had intensified following the Tonghak Rebellion in April that year. The leadership's main concerns in this war were to fully assert Japanese influence over the peninsula—“the dagger pointed at the heart of Japan”—thereby dismantling the traditional tributary system and ensuring a more favorable balance of power in the region which was understood to be essential for national defense.Footnote ¹² As Japan's first modern conflict, it was also viewed as an opportunity to improve the nation's international standing. In a war against an ostensibly “uncivilized” enemy, the IJA, as the international face of Japan, could demonstrate the progress that had been made following years of reform and modernization under the Meiji slogan, “rich country, strong army” (fukoku kyōhei). More importantly, by demonstrating compliance with international law, Japan could assert its “civilized” status and gain admittance into the “family of nations.”Footnote ¹³ Aside from impressing with striking military victories then, Japanese soldiers were instructed that their conduct be above reproach and in conformity with the laws and customs of warfare.Footnote ¹⁴ The exercise of legislative and judicial authority over civilians in occupied areas was a central element of this. It would serve as a further test of Japan's proficiency in navigating the complexities, ambiguities, and lacunae of the emerging law of belligerent occupation.

Against this backdrop, Japanese martial law developed along the same lines as that of other powers as a set of informal rules originating from the necessities of wartime occupation.Footnote ¹⁵ With no pre-existing legislation for, or precedents regarding, procedure for the administration of justice in occupied territories, senior commanders drafted “emergency laws” (kinkyū hōshō) in the field on an ad hoc basis as they considered necessary. In establishing these improvised rules, commanders drew on Japanese laws and customs, but were also counseled by legal advisors like Ariga Nagao who, as experts in international law, were well-versed in the nascent and ongoing debates regarding the application of the rules of warfare. To ensure conformity with contemporary standards, commanders enacted disciplinary measures solely for the protection of the IJA and the populace. Violators were tried in impromptu military courts rather than summarily and, in the Second Army, permission had to be sought from the commander-in-chief prior to the enforcement of a death sentence.Footnote ¹⁶

This patchwork of informal provisions and procedures remained in place until February 23, 1895 when Imperial General Headquarters issued the Ordinance for the Punishment of People in Occupied Areas (Senryōchi jinmin shobun-rei), hereafter Ordinance.Footnote ¹⁷ Military authorities in Tokyo, under Prince Komatsu Akihito, began drafting regulations, with input from legal experts and government ministers, to formalize military authority in occupied territories following the invasion of the Liaodong Peninsula in late 1894. Earlier iterations concurred that respective army commanders should have the power to issue any appropriate orders as necessary for the preservation of public safety and social order, as well as the realization of wartime objectives. However, in line with obligations under international law, these drafts also stipulated that existing Qing laws continue to be enforced, modified, or suspended only when unavoidable, and that trials involving civil cases or criminal offences which did not have an impact on the military be adjudicated in local courts.Footnote ¹⁸ Draft provisions detailing responsibilities ascribed to officials assigned to civil administrations (minsei-chō), organized in late 1894 to assist in duties relating to the maintenance of peace in occupied areas which included overseeing the administration of justice, advised a similar approach.Footnote ¹⁹ These early drafts were not formally enacted, however.

The final version of what became the Ordinance outlined both substantive and procedural elements to create a uniform, but flexible system for the adjudication of offences committed by civilians which placed military needs at the center.Footnote ²⁰ According to a set of explanatory notes appended to the text, this mechanism was to be based as far as possible on the recently established modern Japanese legal system since it was thought that this framework would sufficiently cover the vast majority of offences and would provide a useful point of reference for military judges involved in the exercise of judicial power. It was recognized, however, that peacetime laws and procedures were not always appropriate during wartime.Footnote ²¹ Thus, while Article 1 of the Ordinance comprehensively stated that any acts of harm toward Japanese forces would be punished according to Japanese laws, the remaining articles were designed to accommodate a more fluid, practical approach commensurate with the perceived necessities and demands of war. In respect to the substantive components of the Ordinance, this was achieved primarily by removing some of the restrictive legal requirements found in the existing penal codes and through adopting simple, straightforward language to reduce the need for complex legal deliberation.Footnote ²² It also involved permitting harsher punishments than normally allowed in Japanese legislation and making punishable acts which could be harmful in the wartime context, but which were not otherwise illegal. Article 2 thus enumerated a range of acts of obvious detriment to an occupying force, like war treason, espionage, damage to military equipment, and poisoning of the water supply, but also sanctioned non-criminal acts like the spreading of rumors and the careless making of noise. These were subject to the death penalty which was considered a valuable intimidation tactic, particularly in the case of “defiant” or “dishonest” elements of the populace. By prescribing the death penalty even for more minor offences, the leadership hoped to inspire awe for the authority of the IJA among Chinese people which would deter further obstructions to military activities.Footnote ²³

It was considered important, however, that those enforcing the Ordinance be free to determine whether it was necessary to take such strict disciplinary action based on their own individual assessment of the circumstances of the crime, as well as on contemplation of whether the harm to Japanese forces had been significant and on evaluation of the apparent sentiments of the local populace. If no real harm had been done and local conditions did not warrant harsh punishment as an example to others, according to Article 3, judges could pronounce alternative sentences at their own discretion.Footnote ²⁴ It was believed that to rigidly impose the death penalty with no consideration of mitigating circumstances would have been unjust. At the same time, it was understood that disciplining those who had been involved in the crime, even if they played a minor role, was essential if martial law was to fulfill the preventive function envisioned for it. Since Japanese legislation placed strict limitations and legal requirements on the reduction of sentences and on the punishment of accessories, conspirators, and others, the spirit of this article, as explained in the notes, was to widen the scope of existing laws by giving judges latitude to adapt punishments to local circumstances and the perceived needs of the military at that specific time.Footnote ²⁵ Reductions in punishment were not only possible for those who attempted, aided and abetted, instigated, or conspired to commit an offence. If it was deemed advantageous, judges might also commute sentences for principal offenders. When doing so, they were generally expected to use Japanese laws as a baseline; however, as stipulated in Article 4, punishments might be selected from those in practice in that locality, if deemed appropriate or advantageous. Judges could decide on the best course of action based on their evaluation of the customs of the area and the requirements of the present military situation. The explanatory notes did warn, however, that the freedom to impose alternative sentences was not meant to be utilized simply for the judges’ own convenience. Traditional customs (especially those involving corporal punishment) were not be used as a way of teaching cruel lessons; they were to be employed only when absolutely necessary.Footnote ²⁶

Indeed, the prolific and unjustified use of customary corporal punishments would contradict the reasoning behind Article 5 which skirted the boundaries of international law somewhat by stipulating that any person who disturbed the peace or who inflicted injury on the body or property of another would be punished upon consultation with local customs and in reference to the laws of Japan. In the explanatory notes it was recognized that in the maintenance of public order, the occupier was meant to respect existing laws, amending or replacing them only as needed from a military standpoint.Footnote ²⁷ However, it was argued that because there was a tendency for brutal laws and customs to be practiced in “inferior, uncivilized countries” (rettō mikai no kuni), while consulting local laws, judges should nevertheless mainly be guided by the principles enshrined in Japanese penal codes. This was not a matter of military necessity per se, but was thought essential in upholding civilized standards by avoiding barbaric practices like that of lingchi, a slow method of execution popularized in recent times as “death by a thousand cuts.”Footnote ²⁸ As highlighted here then, the substantive features of martial law strongly accentuated the civilization–barbarism dichotomy in the framing of this war and, consequently, tended to stress reliance on Japanese laws as a guide to ensuring the “civilized” exercise of judicial authority.

While the Army General Staff similarly encouraged reference to Japanese codes of criminal procedure in respect to the procedural components of martial law, they were aware that the administrative and judicial mechanisms established by the military in occupied territory could not be as they were in peacetime Japan. As such, Article 6 necessitated the establishment of military courts (gunji hōin) in all occupied areas. An earlier proposal had suggested a similar approach to the aforementioned drafts in that criminal cases directly affecting the military be tried by courts-martial (gunpō kaigi), while those that affected civilians be tried by civil administrations. It was thought, however, that differentiating in such a way would not be so clear-cut in practice and would consequently add an unnecessary complication to a process that was supposed to be convenient and swift. Furthermore, since courts-martial moved frequently with the headquarters of each army, it was argued that it would have been logistically cumbersome to send offenders to wherever the court-martial happened to be located.Footnote ²⁹ Military courts, which could be convened at any location under the jurisdiction of the army or a civil administration, would try all criminal cases as a matter of practicality and, according to Article 7, would also have the authority to accept or reject civil cases as required in the absence of local judicial organs.Footnote ³⁰

These courts, as outlined in Article 8, would be composed of judges assigned from among the officers or senior officials of whichever court-martial or civil administration had jurisdiction to try the offence. While a military court was essentially a court-martial, as per the explanatory notes, its composition would not need to fully conform to the regulations established in the Army/Navy Code of Criminal Procedure (Riku/Kaigun chizai-hō), while the disposition of cases need not be compliant with the provisions set forth in the civilian Code of Criminal Procedure (Chizai-hō).Footnote ³¹ As such, under Article 9, army commanders were permitted to establish more detailed regulations regarding trial procedure and sentencing, in addition to issuing instructions on any other matters regarding the implementation of the Ordinance and methods for communicating its provisions to the populace. The explanatory notes reiterated here that any acts not covered by the Ordinance would be punished according to Japanese penal codes and advised that commanders publicly announce the relevant articles so as to ensure that the populace were aware of acts which they should avoid. Overall, however, it was acknowledged that the Ordinance was very general in nature and that commanders must have the authority to enact more detailed regulations as necessary to fully implement its provisions in wartime.Footnote ³² In other words, the center recognized that, while the Ordinance could offer guidance, the implementation of its provisions had to be determined on-the-ground if it were to truly serve military objectives.

The use of martial law-esque regulations in the form of the Ordinance during Japan's first modern conflict emerged organically in the field during the opening months of battle. After the expansion of fighting into enemy territory, however, there was an effort on the part of the leadership to standardize and centralize the administration of law and justice in occupied areas and ensure it largely conformed with established international practice. Interestingly, given the aims for this war, early draft regulations which emphasized close adherence to the laws of war regarding respect for local laws and customs appear to have been rejected in favor of an Ordinance which, at its heart, gave precedence to military needs and wartime convenience. The Ordinance was designed to offer a flexible framework which afforded a high degree of latitude to those on-the-ground in regard its enforcement. Of course, the underlying political aim of demonstrating Japan's “civilized” status to the world through observance of international law was prevalent and its influence is observed throughout the document. But, it was first and foremost an instrument of power designed to protect the IJA and ensure its interests by permitting extended military control over aspects of life in occupied areas, restricting certain undesirable behaviors regardless of their inherent illegality, simplifying and accelerating the judicial process and, ultimately, deterring unrest through threats of severe punishment. The different circumstances prevailing in the Russo-Japanese War, as outlined in the section which follows, saw ideas about the jurisdiction, content, and scope of martial law evolve in diverse ways. However, as will be shown, this initial conception of martial law remained true of its character throughout.

Conflicting Ideas: The Russo–Japanese War, 1904–1905

In February 1904, years of imperial rivalry with Russia, which had emerged as the biggest threat to Japan after 1895, erupted in war. Following a series of failed attempts to persuade Russia to accept Japanese dominance in Korea in exchange for recognition of Russian dominance in Manchuria, the Japanese leadership viewed victory in this war as the only means to assert control over the peninsula and realize growing imperial ambitions for the region.Footnote ³³ In prosecuting this war, Japanese leaders were cautious to avoid this conflict leading to international isolation. The Tripartite Intervention of 1895, in which France, Germany, and Russia had interceded to force Japan to return control of the Liaodong Peninsula to China, had provided an important lesson.Footnote ³⁴ Aware also of the obligations that befell Japan as a member of the “family of nations,” it was important that military conduct continue to be in line with accepted rules and customs of warfare. Thus, Japanese leaders again adopted a “law-abiding attitude” and promised to comply with international law to maintain favorable relations with neutral powers.Footnote ³⁵

For the most part, both military authorities, and the international law advisors who counseled them, sought conformity with the new Hague Conventions as well as accepted customs of the time. On the specific issue of (what would now be formally and hereafter referred to as) martial law, however, there were tensions and a divergence of opinions. Japanese forces were mainly operating in China and Korea during this war and, since these were technically neutral territories, military leaders believed it inappropriate to impose laws which would infringe on the liberties of impartial civilians.Footnote ³⁶ The general staff of the Manchurian Army, the senior command authority in the field, was also opposed to establishing a uniform set of regulations as in the previous war. It was believed that to do so would mean commanders would be bound by inflexible, legal stipulations which, in view of the diverse local circumstances in these occupied areas, could act as a hindrance by requiring that punishment be strictly enforced, even if not commensurate with the crime.Footnote ³⁷ Thus, while refusing a formal declaration of martial law, they simultaneously advised subordinate commanders to refrain from drafting and publicly announcing their own regulations.Footnote ³⁸

International law advisors were opposed to the approach advocated in the Manchurian Army because they viewed martial law as the primary means of defense for any force operating in occupied territory, regardless of whether it was neutral.Footnote ³⁹ They disagreed with the suggestion that any uniform regulations would have produced a rigid and restrictive system since, in the words of Ariga who acted again as legal advisor in this war, “nothing is more elastic than the application of a rule of martial law.”Footnote ⁴⁰ In their view, the enactment of uniform regulations would have merely acted as a point of reference, standardizing procedure and, in doing so, guarding against any inconsistent, impartial, and illegal practices which would have negatively damaged the prestige of the IJA.Footnote ⁴¹ Of most concern was the advice not to publicly announce martial law for this was understood to be essential in realizing its chief deterrent function. Martial law's purpose, according to Ariga, was not to punish every act, but to threaten punishment as a preventive measure.Footnote ⁴² Shinoda Jisaku, international law advisor in the Third Army, also pointed out that it was an accepted and necessary custom of warfare that disciplinary measures in occupied areas could be taken only after a formal announcement of the prohibited acts.Footnote ⁴³ In the view of these advisors, a full declaration of martial law must precede any imposition of punishment upon civilians if Japan were to adhere fully to the practices established and accepted by other belligerents.

Despite the position of the Manchurian Army on this issue, there was no official ban on the enactment of martial law or the public announcement of its main provisions. As such, in view of the circumstances in occupied areas and on the advice of international law advisors, most commanders of subordinate armies opted to draft and publish, at least partially if not completely, some regulations. The result was a return to the ad hoc, informal system which had characterized the opening months of the First Sino-Japanese War. Due to overlapping jurisdictions, the existence of this myriad of different provisions and procedures added confusion and complexity.Footnote ⁴⁴ Driven by those on-the-ground, rather than military authorities at the center, these regulations reflected the different approaches taken, as well as evolving ideas and practices due to the specific opinions, priorities of, and challenges faced by, commanders operating in quite diverse locales.

Occupying armies and garrison units, for instance, had different thoughts about the applicability of martial law over Imperial subjects. Within occupying armies, it was generally thought, and international law advisors agreed, that Imperial subjects should be exempted from martial law because, according to Articles 23 and 24 of the Meiji Constitution, Japanese nationals could not be punished without recourse to law.Footnote ⁴⁵ Since martial law did not derive from ordinary legislation, but from the "right of supreme command" in Article 11, they argued that commanders did not have special dispensation to impose disciplinary measures on Japanese nationals. Furthermore, any offences that might occur would be suitably covered by Japanese penal codes and could be handled appropriately in consular courts which were still in operation. Within garrison units usually based in rear areas which tended to come more into contact with Imperial subjects, it was argued that Articles 23 and 24 were only applicable inside Japanese borders and that, in any case, the stipulations in Article 31 regarding the Emperor's powers meant that nothing should impede any prerogative that commanders thought necessary in the field. Thus, in this view, martial law could apply to Japanese nationals, although some garrison units resolved to punish only those acts not accounted for in existing legislation.Footnote ⁴⁶

There was no question that all other inhabitants of occupied territory, regardless of whether they were local residents or foreign nationals, would be subject to martial law. Nevertheless, some armies put additional safeguards in place in respect to the handling of non-Asians. When violations of martial law were committed by foreign nationals residing in Korea, for example, Korea Garrison Army regulations required that a summary of the case be submitted immediately with a request for instructions from the responsible commander before further actions were taken.Footnote ⁴⁷ In the Third Army, the commander-in-chief was also expected to supervise the adjudication of cases involving any inhabitants who were neither Korean nor Chinese.Footnote ⁴⁸ The development of this discriminatory approach to the treatment of civilians embedded in the legal framework represented, among other things, concern that foreign residents be treated judiciously, especially in neutral territory, to assure other powers that Japan was compliant with the rules and customs of war.

Against the backdrop of debates about the (im)propriety of imposing martial law in neutral territories, the content of regulations was also more clearly oriented toward the protection of the IJA and its activities. The list of enumerated acts punishable by death was greatly expanded with some armies specifying twenty separate offences which featured a host of additional crimes such as looting dead soldiers, betraying military secrets, deliberately misguiding army units, possessing weapons and surveying, photographing, or making copies of the landscape without permission.Footnote ⁴⁹ In contrast to the previous war, only two armies referred to acts which disturbed the peace in these regulations. Third Army martial law contained a separate article explaining that those who disrupted public order or inflicted harm on the body or property of other people would be punished in accordance with local laws and the laws of Japan. However, such acts would be tried separately by members of the military administration rather than military courts.Footnote ⁵⁰ In its supplementary provisions, the First Army stated that persons who committed illegal acts which harmed public security or the body or property of other people would be punished by local officials in accordance with local laws.Footnote ⁵¹ Martial law regulations, then, reflected a marked reluctance on the part of commanders to become involved in the maintenance of peace and order in neutral occupied territory in this war.

Furthermore, since perceived military necessity was prominent in driving the enactment of regulations, there was a shift away from any overt obligation to use Japanese legislation as the baseline for the administration of military justice in occupied areas. This was particularly evident in procedural provisions which contained a pronounced emphasis on ensuring that the exercise of judicial powers in occupied areas served the military and met the demands of wartime. A number of armies established their own trial regulations on the basis of the Army Code of Criminal Procedure which followed a more simplified format than the civilian equivalent. In the interest of expediency, guilt was assumed and it was incumbent upon the defendant to refute accusations and prove their own innocence.Footnote ⁵² Some armies also invested the Kenpeitai with judicial powers allowing them, as in the First Army, to act as judges and, if necessary, legal officers or, as in the Korea Garrison Army, to impose sentences of imprisonment for no more than one year, fines of no more than fifty yen, and flogging of no more than 100 strikes for minor crimes as a form of summary punishment.Footnote ⁵³ In the face of logistical difficulties, military administrations composed of civil officials could also hold trials rather than forward defendants to the nearest military unit and, in some cases, as in the Fourth Army, the enforcement of sentences might be entrusted to local authorities.Footnote ⁵⁴ If cases arose while on the march, in combat, or any other emergency situation, according to the Third Army regulations, the duties of a military court could be carried out impromptu through consultation of three officers in the field.Footnote ⁵⁵

Some key elements of the Ordinance from the First Sino-Japanese War were retained in this conflict and the identical wording of some regulations, like those of the Third Army, are indicative of its influence in the drafting of martial law provisions on this occasion. However, in the absence of a uniform set of rules for the administration of justice, commanders had more freedom to adapt martial law to the specific demands and challenges they encountered in the field. This resulted in a marked shift away from using Japanese legislation as a point of reference in these regulations, an expansion of the list of punishable acts, albeit with a noticeable inclination to eschew too much involvement in the general maintenance of peace in occupied areas, and an extension of martial law to Imperial subjects in some units. It also saw a broader sanctioning of streamlined procedures when confronted by logistical challenges and a widening of judicial powers for kenpei officers. Without specific instructions from authorities in Tokyo then, the regulations drafted by commanders were shaped by, and therefore reflected, perceived necessities in this war. Consequently, martial law evolved even more as an instrument of power wielded in service of the military and its interests.

The regulations established by the Eighteenth Division upon occupation of Qingdao during World War I in September 1914 largely replicated these provisions and, for this reason, will not be discussed at length in this article.Footnote ⁵⁶ One development of note is that martial law in this conflict was supplemented by a range of additional rules and stipulations regarding the administration of occupied areas by the Qingdao Garrison Army, mobilized in November that year to enforce military government.Footnote ⁵⁷ The enactment of these regulations, as discussed in more detail in Ono's work, marked the beginning of a shift toward using martial law, not just to safeguard the Army, but as a crucial element in support of wider goals and strategies for the region.Footnote ⁵⁸ Key developments during the Asia-Pacific War, the focus of the final part of this article, saw the continued evolution of martial law as a tool of both short-term military occupation policy and longer-term political visions for Asia. However, these developments also exposed the gradual subordination of political goals to military necessity, a process which accelerated sharply commensurate with developments in the wartime situation in 1945.

Key Developments and Radicalization: The Asia-Pacific War, 1937–1945

When a local skirmish broke out between Chinese and Japanese soldiers garrisoned at Lugouqiao (Marco Polo Bridge) on the outskirts of Beijing on July 7, 1937, it was viewed by some within the leadership as an opportunity to further extend Japanese influence in the region. A series of other “incidents” instigated by troops in the field following the Manchurian Incident in 1931 had all ended with favorable concessions from Chiang Kai-Shek's nationalist government and expansion of Japanese control over areas in northern China. Others were more cautious. They warned that Japan was not ready for war with China and that any protracted engagement would disrupt long-term national defense preparations. All agreed, however, that fighting must be contained to the north and be resolved swiftly. With the majority anticipating a short, decisive victory for Japan and keen to maintain amicable relations with trade partners as a crucial pre-condition for the nation's defense plans, the leadership eschewed a formal declaration of war.Footnote ⁵⁹

This decision not to declare war initially complicated matters in respect to martial law. Although commanders in the field saw the necessity of establishing restrictions to control civilians in territories coming under army control, the leadership in Tokyo were concerned about the appropriateness of doing so. Diplomatic relations with China had yet to be completely severed and any premature installation of military government might damage Japan's international relations, possibly resulting inwider geopolitical consequences.Footnote ⁶⁰ It was advised, then, that the maintenance of public order be left to local authorities, assisted by dedicated Public Order Maintenance Associations (Chian iji kai) established in northern China.Footnote ⁶¹ But, with the continued expansion of military operations, those on-the-ground argued for the increasing importance of implementing some measures to control foreign residents and Chinese civilians. Accordingly, plans for the establishment of “necessary measures” (hitsuyōnaru sochi) to suppress crime were submitted for approval in September 1937. These plans involved issuing cautionary proclamations detailing prohibited acts, permitting extrajudicial practices for those caught in the act, and the referral of foreigners subsequently arrested to Chinese or consular courts for trial.Footnote ⁶² The Army Ministry, in consultation with the Foreign Ministry, agreed to the proposed measures with no reservations regarding the summary punishment of Chinese civilians. It did warn, though, that until a policy for occupied territories had been officially decided, field units were to exercise extreme caution in dealing with third country nationals.Footnote ⁶³ The lack of army judicial organs soon became untenable, however, and toward the end of that month, the military leadership in Tokyo conceded regarding the formal imposition of martial law with some caveats. Namely, that the content be restricted to just those items which were directly necessary for the protection of the IJA and that special attention be paid to its application over members of third countries.Footnote ⁶⁴ Martial law regulations covering offences, punishments, and procedure to be followed in trial were promulgated in northern China on October 5, followed by central China on December 1, 1937.

Provisions in these regulations were much less detailed than they had been in earlier conflicts, reflecting the distinctive concerns and circumstances of this undeclared war. Martial law, for example, applied to all civilians (though not Imperial subjects), but only in the IJA's operational and base areas. Punishable acts were limited to war treason, espionage, and “other acts” which either harmed the Army or benefitted the activities of its enemies. Examples, as communicated in proclamations to the populace, comprised damage to transportation and communication links, inflicting injury on persons attached to the IJA, stealing military equipment, and spreading poisons or bacteria for the purpose of harming military units. Unlike in previous wars, there was no mention of acts which disturbed public order. Aiding and abetting, conspiring to commit, or attempting such acts was also punishable, although in these cases sentences could be commuted or pardoned depending on the circumstances. Those who turned themselves in prior to the commission of acts, might also have their sentences reduced or may be even be exempted from punishment. Penalties, as enumerated in the accompanying military punishment ordinances, comprised, in order of severity, death, confinement (with labor), exile, fines and, as a supplementary punishment, confiscation. Corporal punishments, like flogging, were no longer permitted in this conflict. Although regulations did outline some parameters for the enforcement of sentences, the terms of confinement and exile, as well as the value of fines, could still be determined at the discretion of judges who, as in other wars, had latitude to punish severely (to coerce or strike fear in the hearts of the population) or leniently (to appease or impress with the magnanimity of the IJA) as the situation demanded.Footnote ⁶⁵

This discretion, also much like in earlier conflicts, was not to be exercised arbitrarily. Military commissions were established in the headquarters of all occupying armies, as well as supply bases, and were overseen by their respective commanders as the official head of said commissions. The commanders’ main tasks in this role were to determine, based on recommendations from the legal department, whether to proceed with prosecution in each case, as well as to appoint court judges—two army officers and one legal officer—who were also supported in their work by prosecutors, clerks and guards. When a death sentence was pronounced in court, approval had to be sought from these commanders, except in cases of urgency, and enforcement of all military punishments would be carried out by the members of the Kenpeitai under the direction of legal officers. Addressing the concerns of the military leadership regarding the application of martial law to nationals of third countries, and retaining the difference in treatment between Asians and non-Asians which emerged during the Russo-Japanese War, permission had to be obtained from the relevant army or base commander when foreign nationals were to be referred to trial. All other procedural matters not specifically established in the regulations were to be in accordance with provisions relating to the special courts-martial (tokusetsu gunpō kaigi) in the Army Courts Martial Law (Rikugun gunpō kaigi-hō), introduced in 1921 to replace the Army Code of Criminal Procedure.Footnote ⁶⁶ Utilized as a simplified version of the regular courts-martial to try soldiers in the field, many of the judicial safeguards (e.g., provisions for defense or appeal) prescribed in the aforementioned law did not apply in these special courts.Footnote ⁶⁷ This was, however, not all that different from the judicial practices established in earlier wars where simplification of procedure had been prioritized.

Still, even with the undeclared nature of this war and Japan's so-called “break with the West” in the 1930s, military leaders remained conscious that any overt deviations from the established rules and customs of warfare would damage the nation's international relations.Footnote ⁶⁸ In fact, while the leadership had initially been reluctant to impose martial law during this “incident,” as fighting intensified and occupied areas expanded, it came to be viewed as the most legitimate means of asserting military control and safeguarding interests in occupied territory. As such, it became central to military occupation policy, utilized chiefly in the protection of Japanese forces, but also in an effort to sanitize military conduct and avert criticism of military activities in China. Shortly after martial law was declared in October 1937, for instance, summary executions were officially prohibited in northern China by order of North China Area Army (NCAA) Chief of Staff Okabe Naozaburō.Footnote ⁶⁹ Indeed, such “battlefield measures,” as observed by the Head of the Tenth Army Legal Department, Ogawa Sekijirō, were considered inappropriate once combat had ceased; the protection of military interests was to be ensured, henceforth, through martial law.Footnote ⁷⁰ Though military authorities in Tokyo recommended a restricted role for martial law, in the field its function as an integral component in the maintenance of public order became apparent early on. Matters of enforcement, for example, became the main theme of an all-day meeting, featuring lectures on pacification and public order work, hosted at the headquarters of the Central China Area Army in Shanghai on December 5, 1937, underscoring the important complementary role which martial law would play in efforts to pacify the occupied population.Footnote ⁷¹ After 1940, its role as a tool of occupation was strengthened further following a shift in approach brought about by the increasingly adverse situation prevailing in rear areas.

The martial law regulations drafted during the opening months of war were shaped considerably by the expectation that fighting would be over quickly and there would be no need for extensive involvement in the administration of occupied territory. However, fighting continued well beyond 1937 and, with a stalemate having been reached with Chinese forces after the Battle of Wuhan in October 1938, military authorities shifted their focus to the consolidation of the rear areas.Footnote ⁷² In spite of their efforts, by 1940 these areas had become veritable “war zones” rife with guerrilla activity and Japanese forces were under “immense pressure” to restore order.Footnote ⁷³ Mounting criticism of Japanese policy in China and perceived deficiencies with the existing military justice system precipitated a re-evaluation of martial law to facilitate this.Footnote ⁷⁴ In June 1940, the scope of the law was expanded to cover any offences which disturbed the peace or impeded military activities. Examples of such acts included, but were not limited to, criticism of Japan's policy in China, slandering the IJA, unjust profiteering, activities which impeded pacification and propaganda work, as well as any act which would have a negative influence on economic, financial, and ideological polices in occupied areas.Footnote ⁷⁵

This expansion of punishable offences, including non-criminal acts, coincided with the institution of a new ordinance to strengthen existing methods of control and “sweep away” the negative elements of the past system by permitting summary punishments for minor violations of martial law.Footnote ⁷⁶ Kenpei officers with command jurisdiction were empowered to make on-the-spot judgments for minor offences committed by Chinese people after reviewing evidence collected by investigators and the statement of the accused. In doing so, they would aid the overburdened military commissions by expediting the handling of trivial cases which had caused no real harm but might, if left unchecked, have a negative influence on military activities. They would also address accusations that sentences pronounced in military courts were overly harsh and often disproportionate which had apparently been fueling hostility toward the IJA. Accordingly, punishments which could be meted out were limited to ninety days detention, fines up to 100 yen and, in central China, the closure of businesses for up to ten days. This new judicial authority was not to be exercised arbitrarily. Commanders were to extensively document the sentences they pronounced, were required to forward all serious cases to military commissions, and were advised to take care that they applied a consistent standard in their judgments; severity and leniency must be balanced to cultivate a better relationship with the populace and ensure confidence in the Kenpeitai.Footnote ⁷⁷

Appeasement was also at the heart of additional regulations introduced in view of the influx of Japanese nationals into China, and the tensions which the growing problem of “delinquent Japanese residents” (furyō hōjin) caused in occupied areas. Under these regulations, Imperial subjects could be punished in military commissions for certain acts which disturbed the peace or disrupted economic stability.Footnote ⁷⁸ Such acts were not criminal under existing legislation (which Japanese nationals remained subject to in occupied territory), but were “in opposition to public order” and were thought to be hindering the construction of a “New Order in East Asia” (Tōa shin-chitsujo) based on principles of friendship.Footnote ⁷⁹ Accordingly, martial law would now allow for stricter control of Imperial subjects, a matter of significance in respect to the leadership's longer-term plans in China. Although proclamations emphasized this new policy of non-discrimination, punishments of Imperial subjects were nonetheless different, limited to confinement, fines, and confiscation.Footnote ⁸⁰ That being said, Japanese residents in occupied China were publicly cautioned that, alongside Chinese and foreign nationals, those who committed acts which obstructed the execution of the “Holy War” (seisen) would be subject to strict military punishment.Footnote ⁸¹

Those involved in enforcing martial law—legal officers and judges—were similarly reminded in June 1940 of the value of the principle of “severe punishment” (genbatsu shugi) in wartime which underpinned the character of regulations enacted in occupied China. Explaining the pivotal role which martial law played in defending the Army from “despicable acts” and “external threats” in a speech delivered in the same month, for instance, NCAA Chief of Staff Kasahara Yukio stressed the importance of considering the wider wartime context and the needs of the armed forces since offences incidental to war could not be judged in accordance with the norms of peacetime.Footnote ⁸² Following this re-evaluation and reassertion of martial law in 1940, it was used more decidedly in support of the Army's occupation policies and the leadership's new transformative plans for Asia. While rooted in earlier conflicts, this emphasis on utilizing legislative power to facilitate both political and military goals, rather than just to protect Japanese forces, became more pronounced at this time and was a guiding principle which influenced the character of martial law after the outbreak of war in the Pacific in December 1941.

The invasion of Southeast Asia was framed originally as a “benevolent, liberating mission” embarked upon for the benefit of all Asians.Footnote ⁸³ Such rhetoric was mobilized by the leadership in view of plans for the creation of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Daitōa kyōeiken).Footnote ⁸⁴ It was also a method of pacification. Japanese forces faced inherent difficulties in fighting an expansive multi-front war while also administering culturally diverse populations in vast, logistically challenging territories. Military strategists, therefore, recognized the value of cooperation with occupied populations and stressed pan-Asian overtures in an effort to co-opt local elites.Footnote ⁸⁵

The so-called “advance south,” however, had been undertaken chiefly as a means of securing access to crucial resources after successive restrictions and embargoes on trade by the United States and its allies had cut off access to the nation's supply of war material.Footnote ⁸⁶ Acquisition of resources became of prime importance and formed the impetus behind risking confrontation with colonial powers in Southeast Asia.Footnote ⁸⁷ Successfully exploiting the region, however, hinged upon the effective consolidation of military power and the strict maintenance of public order. Military authorities understood that wartime occupation would cause hardships for local communities. But, while a conciliatory approach to civilians in Southeast Asia was generally urged, pacification efforts were, out of necessity, limited and policy documents made it clear that any specific requests regarding civilian welfare could not be entertained.Footnote ⁸⁸ Thus, martial law and related regulations came to play a central role in support of occupation policy by encouraging, persuading, and when necessary forcing, civilians to accept the burdens placed upon them by the military. While regulations were heavily based upon those established in China in 1940, slight differences in provisions reflect the specific military priorities and different framing of the IJA's presence in the area.

In view of professed claims of “brotherhood” and “co-prosperity” and in an effort to position Japanese rule in opposition to the discriminatory policies of former colonial powers, for example, martial law applied to all civilians in areas in which a military administration was established from the outset. Provisions requiring greater caution or supervision in the adjudication of cases involving non-Asians were removed.Footnote ⁸⁹ Imperial subjects became punishable under the same regulations as other civilians, although only for acts not already covered by existing Japanese legislation. Occupying forces also enacted various supplementary regulations as part of a more concerted effort to constrain the behavior of Japanese nationals arriving into Southeast Asia. These regulations largely focused on non-criminal acts and customs which were a cause of friction with local peoples, but were not serious enough to warrant formal punishment in military courts. An ordinance that allowed kenpei commanders to summarily punish Japanese nationals in the Philippines, for instance, targeted face-slapping, public nudity, and disorderly conduct, like urinating in streets.Footnote ⁹⁰ Under these new laws, the military had greater freedom to punish Imperial subjects for acts which undermined attempts to construct an image of Japan as liberator and natural leader of a united “Asia for the Asiatics.” If necessary, authorities could even deport convicted offenders, habitual criminals, or those deemed thoroughly irredeemable back to Japan.Footnote ⁹¹

The extent of military authority over local civilians was also greatly expanded. In this “war for resources,” punishable offences were far more extensive, encompassing a diverse range of acts which might frustrate or otherwise impede economic objectives. Examples, as detailed in declarations to the local populace, include obstructing the production and circulation of goods, disrupting public sentiment, throwing the financial and economic markets into disarray, making abnormal profits, destroying or concealing clothing, provisions, livestock, fuel, and other items of military importance to avoid commandeering by military authorities, and any other acts in opposition to the policies of Japanese forces.Footnote ⁹² Violating any further prohibitions established as necessary by commanders was also subject to military punishment.Footnote ⁹³ These prohibitions imposed predictable constraints in the form of curfews, restrictions on movement, and bans on the possession of weapons and radios. However, severe military punishment was also threatened to minimize non-compliance with policies directly affecting everyday life. Under martial law, the sale and consumption of goods was regulated, wages, prices, and rations were fixed, and every household was obliged to register and report their property, including quantities of important supplies such as fuel or rice. Civilians were also required to keep their houses tidy, to receive compulsory inoculations, and to follow strict guidelines regarding other daily matters, like waste disposal.Footnote ⁹⁴ Essentially, martial law in this conflict was mobilized in ways which allowed the military to encroach even more upon the day-to-day lives of civilians, especially in comparison to earlier conflicts.

The greater reach of martial law, particularly its more expansive list of punishable offences, meant in theory handling more cases which increased the pressure on under-staffed legal departments and kenpei units. To address these issues, and perhaps also to demonstrate the professed cooperative spirit of “Greater East Asia,” regulations now permitted local judicial organs to adjudicate violations of martial law, alongside civil cases and criminal acts contravening local laws when expedient or necessary.Footnote ⁹⁵ An amendment in January 1943 also saw the addition of an article which sanctioned army commanders within the Southern Army to enact special administrative orders to assert limits on the adjudication of violations of martial law by local judicial organs according to the circumstances in specific areas.Footnote ⁹⁶ After the Twenty-Fifth Army permitted the high courts in Singapore, Malaysia, and Sumatra to try various seditious acts, for example, the Peace Preservation Law (Chian iji-hō) was enacted to clarify more precisely the types of offences (like gambling, possessing radios, and other seditious acts) that might be tried and the scope of punishments (including introducing provisions for the death penalty) that might be imposed in said courts.Footnote ⁹⁷ Giving army commanders the power to enact such supplementary regulations was considered important due to the wide scope of, and discretion afforded judges under, martial law and concern that this might give rise to abuse if left unsupervised and unchecked by the military.Footnote ⁹⁸ Typically, then, there was a high degree of military oversight to ensure propriety in the administration of justice. Although, the principles espoused by the military in local courts continued to accentuate military necessity through the “speedy resolution” of cases, emphasis on the greater “culpability” of wartime crime and the deterrent function of punishment.Footnote ⁹⁹

To further reduce the burden on military authorities, civilians were also encouraged to self-police each other through the establishment of neighborhood associations (tonarigumi) and self-defense organizations (jikei‐dan) which, among other things, made civilians collectively responsible for each other's conduct.Footnote ¹⁰⁰ While it was acknowledged that international law technically prohibited collective punishments (renza-batsu), they had long been viewed as an effective method for preserving the peace.Footnote ¹⁰¹ Thus, martial law sanctioned the imposition of fines upon juridical persons (inc. associations and organizations), in addition to the joint punishment of their representatives, when an employee or member committed an offence in connection with their business.Footnote ¹⁰² Such practices were overseen by the Kenpeitai who continued to wield extensive powers and held considerable discretion with regard to the enforcement of martial law in occupied territory.Footnote ¹⁰³ As in China, with permission from the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Army, commanders of occupying forces could enact additional ordinances authorizing kenpei officers to punish minor crimes on-the-spot if necessary.Footnote ¹⁰⁴ Regulations that were identical in substance to those implemented in China were enforced in the Philippines after outbreaks of unrest throughout the islands in late 1942, for example.Footnote ¹⁰⁵ For the most part, however, unless a kenpei officer decided to co-opt and subsequently release those who had committed minor offences but were otherwise harmless, military commissions were to retain primary responsibility for passing judgments in Southeast Asia, especially in the most serious violations.Footnote ¹⁰⁶

Punishments meted out in courts, as detailed in regulations, remained the same as those in China—death, confinement, exile, and fines, with confiscation applied as a supplementary penalty. However, a new stipulation allowed subordinate commanders to request permission from the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Army to apply other punishments as they considered necessary.Footnote ¹⁰⁷ Judges also continued to be granted latitude to impose punishments, commute sentences, or waive them altogether depending on the circumstances. Initially, the composition and procedure followed in military courts likewise conformed to regulations established in China.Footnote ¹⁰⁸ This changed in May 1945. With war having entered a “decisive phase” (kessen dankai) and in view of the serious circumstances prevailing at that time, provisions for military commissions were modified. Revisions involved removing provisions permitting local courts to try violations of martial law (though they would continue to try crimes under local laws, in addition to contraventions of military administration decrees); allowing for more simplification of the trial process to ensure cases were dealt with and sentences enforced promptly; and enlarging the scope of recruitment of court personnel in view of mounting difficulties in transportation, a reduction in the number of trained legal officers and an anticipated increase in the incidence of violations of martial law.Footnote ¹⁰⁹ Accordingly, legal officers could henceforth be replaced with regular officers, trials could be held in absentia (though not if the punishment was expected to be death), legal officers could enact punishments without convening a court in cases where the sentence was expected to be equal to or lower than ten years confinement and the procedures for detailing evidence, notifying defendants of sentences or transmitting enforcement orders were substantially abridged.Footnote ¹¹⁰ Explanatory notes on these amendments reveal that such changes were viewed as crucial to achieving military goals at this stage in the war. These new, simplified trial regulations were expected to facilitate the swift handling of numerous cases emerging (and anticipated) in 1945, help suppress and eliminate acts which obstructed operations, and contribute overall to the mopping-up of public order in occupied areas.Footnote ¹¹¹ The notes contained no consideration for the impact that a further streamlining of judicial procedures might have on local inhabitants and little concern for professed political ideals or goals beyond winning the war. The revisions, and the evolving use of legislative powers under the rubric of martial law in sSoutheast Asia more generally, underscore that while mobilized initially in support of longer-term political ambitions, ultimately, this law was an instrument of military power and, as such, when confronted with challenging and deteriorating circumstances, military necessities, short-term interests, and convenience came first.