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The Expressive Dimension of Free Exercise

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 April 2024

David Golemboski Open the ORCID record for David Golemboski [Opens in a new window]
David Golemboski*
Affiliation:
Associate Professor of Government and International Affairs, Augustana University, USA
*
david.golemboski@augie.edu
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Abstract

Expressivist theories of law focus not only on what legal arrangements do but also what they communicate. The expressivist view has gained special currency in the context of religious establishment. Even when governmental involvement with religion is not coercive or does not materially violate anyone’s rights, it may nevertheless be undesirable by virtue of expressing a preference for a certain religion or a privileged status for certain religious groups over others. The existing literature, however, lacks an equivalent expressivist analysis of the related but distinct domain of free exercise of religion. What is expressed when a religious individual or group is granted special relief from the legal requirements that would otherwise apply to them? I argue that just like religious establishments, religious exemptions not only implicate rights and material interests but also have important expressive dimensions that both help account for their value and impose limits on their desirability.

Keywords

religionfree exerciseexemptionsexpressionsocial meaning

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Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Law and Religion , Volume 39 , Issue 2 , May 2024 , pp. 192 - 211
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Center for the Study of Law and Religion at Emory University

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References

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