Impact statement

This article highlights the disagreement at the Global Plastics Treaty negotiations, underscoring how geopolitical divisions, industry lobbyists and consensus-based procedures hinder international cooperation to address plastic pollution. By examining the reasons behind the deadlock and outlining pathways forward, the article provides critical insights for policymakers, negotiators and civil society actors striving to advance global environmental governance. The analysis contributes to shaping future treaty processes, supports evidence-based policy design and reinforces the urgency of embedding equity and just transition principles. Its impact extends beyond academia by informing international organisations, regional initiatives and grassroots movements working towards ambitious, science-driven solutions to the plastics crisis.

Context

Plastic pollution represents one of the most significant challenges of the century, with undeniable impacts spanning across virtually all environmental compartments, organisms and human health (Cox et al., Reference Cox, Covernton, Davies, Dower, Juanes and Dudas2019; Prata et al., Reference Prata, da Costa, Lopes, Duarte and Rocha-Santos2020; Walker and Fequet, Reference Walker and Fequet2023; Landrigan et al., Reference Landrigan, Dunlop, Treskova, Raps, Symeonides, Muncke, Spring, Stegeman, Carney Almroth, Chiles, Cropper, Deeney, Fuller, Geyer, Karasik, Mafira, Mangwiro, Margaret Matias, Mulders, Park, Velis, Vermeulen, Wagner, Wang, Whitman, Woodruff and Rocklöv2025). In February 2022, at the resumed fifth session of the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA-5.2) in Nairobi, members from 175 countries agreed to adopt a draft resolution (5/14) to develop an international legally binding instrument to end plastic pollution (“the plastics treaty”), including in the marine environment, with the ambition to complete the negotiations by the end of 2024 (Ammendolia and Walker, Reference Ammendolia and Walker2022; United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2022a, 2022b, 2022c, 2022d). UNEA resolutions 1/6, 2/11, 3/7, 4/6, 4/7 and 4/9 underpin this. An Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) was also established to develop the framework of this international, legally binding agreement (United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2022a, 2022b). Aiming to tackle plastic pollution throughout the entire life cycle, the resolution is regarded as one of the most ambitious environmental initiatives since the Paris Agreement (Simon et al., Reference Simon, Raubenheimer, Urho, Unger, Azoulay, Farrelly, Sousa, van Asselt, Carlini, Sekomo, Schulte, Busch, Wienrich and Weiand2021). Talks to develop the international legally binding instrument started in 2022 through the INC.

Since 2022, UNEP has hosted six negotiations towards a new Global Plastics Treaty, but it was originally planned for five (Kiessling et al., Reference Kiessling, Rech and Reus Kand Walker2025). However, a reoccurring major obstacle during all six of these INC negotiations was that a small handful of countries sought to derail the process by exploiting gaps in the rules of procedure and violating the spirit of consensus that is supposed to underpin these consensus-driven negotiations. A minority of countries, called the “Like-Minded group” (a coalition of countries, primarily fossil fuel producers fuelled by lobbyists from petrostates and industry), have consistently sought to obstruct, delay and derail the INC process, especially over specific definitions used in various iterations of the Chair’s draft Treaty Texts (Dauvergne et al., Reference Dauvergne, Allan, Beaudoin, Almroth, Clapp, Cowan, de Groot, Farrelly, de Miranda Grili, Mah, Mendenhall, Paik, Ralston, Stoett, Stöfen-O’Brien, Taggat, Tiller, Villarubia-Gómez and Vince2025a, Reference Dauvergne, Ralston, Clapp and Taggart2025b). These deadlocks occurred despite there now being over 100 countries (members of the “High-Ambition Coalition”) (High Ambition Coalition to End Plastic Pollution, 2024) that have coalesced around key elements for a highly ambitious new Global Plastics Treaty but have been unable to reach consensus due to lobbying and pushback by obstructionist petrostates (Tangri, Reference Tangri2025). The latest (INC-5.2) took place from 5–15 August 2025 in Geneva, Switzerland, ending without consensus and creating a sense of uncertainty and frustration over the future of international cooperation to address plastic pollution (Kiessling et al., Reference Kiessling, Rech and Reus Kand Walker2025; United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2025a).

Although a growing body of literature discusses the emerging Global Plastics Treaty, few analyses focus specifically on the dynamics that shaped INC-5.2 or critically integrate structural geopolitical divisions, industry lobbying and procedural constraints in a single framework. This perspective aims to analyse the factors that contributed to the deadlock at INC-5.2 and to assess the implications for the future of the Global Plastics Treaty process. Specifically, we examine (1) the geopolitical and economic divisions shaping Member States’ positions, (2) the influence of petrochemical interests on negotiating dynamics, (3) the procedural limitations of consensus-based decision-making and (4) the opportunities and constraints for advancing negotiations in the intersessional period and forthcoming sessions. By situating these issues within ongoing scholarly and policy debates, we highlight key pathways for sustaining ambition and restoring momentum in the treaty process. The insights presented here are not only relevant to delegates engaged in the INC process but also to national policymakers shaping domestic plastics legislation, regional organisations working towards harmonised standards and civil society coalitions advocating for ambitious outcomes. By unpacking the interconnected political, economic and procedural dimensions of the negotiations, this analysis provides a broader foundation for understanding and navigating future governance challenges associated with plastic pollution.

The underlying reasons for the deadlock

With all this context, why did the Global Plastic Treaty negotiations not reach an agreement after six INC sessions? There are many possible reasons related to structural division, petrochemical interests and lobbyist groups (Kiessling et al., Reference Kiessling, Rech and Reus Kand Walker2025). The structural divisions shaping negotiating positions are more complex than a simple Global North-Global South distinction. While many lower-income and small island states face disproportionate impacts, such as high rates of ocean plastic influx, transboundary waste shipments and limited waste management infrastructure, these vulnerabilities display significant regional variation. The central fault line in the negotiations lay in divergent visions of the treaty’s scope. The High-Ambition Coalition, comprising over 70 members as of September 2025, advocated for legally binding caps on plastic production, restrictions on virgin plastic and phase-outs of hazardous additives (Landrigan et al., Reference Landrigan, Dunlop, Treskova, Raps, Symeonides, Muncke, Spring, Stegeman, Carney Almroth, Chiles, Cropper, Deeney, Fuller, Geyer, Karasik, Mafira, Mangwiro, Margaret Matias, Mulders, Park, Velis, Vermeulen, Wagner, Wang, Whitman, Woodruff and Rocklöv2025; Olsen et al., Reference Olsen, Tangri, Almroth, Ghiglione, Ter Halle, Fieber, Syberg, Baztan and Wang2025). This approach was informed by scientific consensus that addressing the plastics crisis requires upstream interventions at the point of production and the phasing out of harmful chemicals used throughout the plastics life cycle (Bergmann et al., Reference Bergmann, Almroth, Brander, Dey, Green, Gundogdu, Krieger, Wagner and Walker2022; Dey et al., Reference Dey, Trasande, Altman, Wang, Krieger, Bergmann, Allen, Allen, Walker, Wagner and Syberg2022; Baztan et al., Reference Baztan, Jorgensen, Almroth, Bergmann, Farrelly, Muncke, Syberg, Thompson, Boucher, Olsen and Álava2024; Landrigan et al., Reference Landrigan, Dunlop, Treskova, Raps, Symeonides, Muncke, Spring, Stegeman, Carney Almroth, Chiles, Cropper, Deeney, Fuller, Geyer, Karasik, Mafira, Mangwiro, Margaret Matias, Mulders, Park, Velis, Vermeulen, Wagner, Wang, Whitman, Woodruff and Rocklöv2025; Olsen et al., Reference Olsen, Tangri, Almroth, Ghiglione, Ter Halle, Fieber, Syberg, Baztan and Wang2025). This political momentum was further reinforced by initiatives outside the INC process, including the “Nice Wake-Up Call” launched at the 2025 UN Ocean Conference (France and Costa Rica, 2025) and the “Bridge to Busan” declaration (High Ambition Coalition (HAC), 2024), both of which reaffirmed Member State commitment to upstream measures, life cycle regulation and legally binding obligations as essential components of an effective Global Plastics Treaty. However, oil-producing states, such as Saudi Arabia, Russia and Kuwait, insisted that the treaty should focus on downstream waste management and recycling; thus, rejecting measures that would impact petrochemical markets (Kiessling et al., Reference Kiessling, Rech and Reus Kand Walker2025). This clash shows fundamental differences in economic dependency: for some states, plastics are not just an environmental issue, but also a pillar of their national economy and geopolitical strategy (Dauvergne et al., Reference Dauvergne, Allan, Beaudoin, Almroth, Clapp, Cowan, de Groot, Farrelly, de Miranda Grili, Mah, Mendenhall, Paik, Ralston, Stoett, Stöfen-O’Brien, Taggat, Tiller, Villarubia-Gómez and Vince2025a, Reference Dauvergne, Ralston, Clapp and Taggart2025b).

To this end, the United States aligned with oil-producing states by opposing production restrictions and favouring voluntary, non-binding approaches. This position showed the influence of domestic petrochemical and plastics industries, as well as political resistance to binding international commitments. Given the country’s political and economic weight, the US alignment with petrochemical exporters represented a decisive setback for momentum towards an ambitious outcome (Ammendolia and Walker, Reference Ammendolia and Walker2022). Beyond negotiating positions expressed in Geneva, several petro-aligned states deployed targeted diplomatic tactics during the intersessional period. Notably, media investigations revealed that the United States circulated letters to multiple countries ahead of INC-5.2, urging them to reject plastic production caps (Le Poidevin and Volcovici, Reference Le Poidevin and Volcovici2025). Such interventions contributed to observable shifts in some delegations’ positions between INC-4 and INC-5.2 and amplified the influence of petrochemical interests on the negotiating landscape.

The second part of the last INC session at Geneva (INC-5.2) saw unprecedented attendance of at least petrochemical and fossil fuel industry lobbyists, including major companies, such as ExxonMobil and Dow (CIEL, 2025). Their presence intensified the opposition to stronger measures and added doubt about whether the process could truly deliver an independent, science-driven outcome (Dauvergne and Allan, Reference Dauvergne and Allan2025; Kiessling et al., Reference Kiessling, Rech and Reus Kand Walker2025). This strong lobbying presence reflects trends seen in climate negotiations, where fossil fuel interests have often worked to limit ambition (Dauvergne et al., Reference Dauvergne, Allan, Beaudoin, Almroth, Clapp, Cowan, de Groot, Farrelly, de Miranda Grili, Mah, Mendenhall, Paik, Ralston, Stoett, Stöfen-O’Brien, Taggat, Tiller, Villarubia-Gómez and Vince2025a, Reference Dauvergne, Ralston, Clapp and Taggart2025b).

Furthermore, significant power asymmetries persist across the negotiations, though these do not align neatly with a Global North-Global South divide. While many developing countries face disproportionate exposure to transboundary waste flows and limited waste management capacity, vulnerable and marginalised communities within Global North countries, including Indigenous peoples (Dauvergne, Reference Dauvergne2023; Walker, Reference Walker2024), migrant and informal workers and frontline and fenceline communities near petrochemical facilities, also bear disproportionate health and environmental burdens from plastic pollution. Equitable accessibility to financial, technical and capacity-building resources, therefore, remains critical across all regions. Although financing mechanisms are referenced in the draft treaty text, concerns remain regarding their accessibility, adequacy and long-term sustainability (Ambrose, Reference Ambrose2024).

Finally, and in our opinion, most importantly, consensus-based decision-making, used widely across the UN environment, requires that no Member State formally objects to an agreement to progress. While designed to promote inclusivity and legitimacy, consensus can empower a small number of states to stall negotiations, particularly when economic or strategic interests are at stake (Dauvergne et al., Reference Dauvergne, Allan, Beaudoin, Almroth, Clapp, Cowan, de Groot, Farrelly, de Miranda Grili, Mah, Mendenhall, Paik, Ralston, Stoett, Stöfen-O’Brien, Taggat, Tiller, Villarubia-Gómez and Vince2025a, Reference Dauvergne, Ralston, Clapp and Taggart2025b). More than 100 countries supported strong, legally binding measures on plastic production, but the opposition of a few petrochemical economies blocked the progress (High Ambition Coalition to End Plastic Pollution, 2024). This procedural flaw highlights the vulnerability of multilateral negotiations to obstructionism (Dauvergne and Allan, Reference Dauvergne and Allan2025; Kiessling et al., Reference Kiessling, Rech and Reus Kand Walker2025). Similar dynamics have compromised past environmental negotiations, including early climate talks under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), where consensus requirements slowed progress for decades (Tangri, Reference Tangri2025). In contrast, negotiations leading to the 2023 Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement) succeeded under a consensus framework, partly because delegations were willing to compromise on contentious issues and partly because the treaty permits reservations in certain circumstances, enabling states to join without fully endorsing all provisions. Issues of sovereignty, access to marine genetic resources and national interests were addressed through creative diplomatic solutions that have not yet emerged in the Global Plastics Treaty negotiations. This comparison illustrates why procedural design, political will, and the nature of underlying economic interests all shape the viability of consensus-based approaches.

Critical attention must also be given to the structural dysfunction within the INC Bureau and Secretariat. Critical attention must also be given to reported institutional challenges within the INC Bureau and Secretariat. Several delegations and observers raised concerns during plenary interventions and post-session interviews regarding procedural inconsistencies, communication gaps and unclear decision-making authority. Media reporting and observer accounts of the events of 15 August 2025 further highlighted tensions surrounding transparency and procedural control, contributing to mistrust among delegations and complicating efforts to consolidate a negotiating text (Løvold, Reference Løvold2025). Such institutional dynamics contributed to mistrust among Member States and complicated efforts to maintain momentum towards a consolidated negotiating text.

It is important to emphasise that the term “deadlock” reflects the perception of many high-ambition countries and observers who publicly expressed disappointment at the lack of progress, rather than a formal conclusion that the process had failed. Statements from Rwanda (Ministry of Environment, 2025), Norway, several small island developing states and European Union (EU) member states (United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2025a,b) underscored frustration with the limited movement on core issues such as production caps and chemical controls. Nonetheless, observers also noted positive developments, including the consolidation of a strengthened High-Ambition Coalition and renewed alignment among several delegations during the final days of INC-5.2. The revised Chair’s text, released on 15 August 2025, which was substantially improved from the earlier draft, was widely viewed as a constructive basis for intersessional work, offering a clearer structure for future negotiations. The lack of agreement for a Global Plastic Treaty carries profound environmental and governance implications. Projected to triple by 2060, plastic production represents a significant environmental challenge (OECD, 2022), driving increases in marine litter, micro- and nanoplastic (MNP) contamination and greenhouse gas emissions from petrochemical expansion (Nguyen et al., Reference Nguyen, Rakib, Lin, Hung, Le, Nguyen, Malafaia and Idris2023). The accumulation of plastic debris in marine ecosystems not only threatens biodiversity through entanglement and ingestion but also alters habitat structure and food web dynamics. MNPs further exacerbate these impacts by infiltrating aquatic and terrestrial environments at every trophic level. Their capacity to adsorb and transport hazardous chemicals also amplifies risks to ecological and human health (Li et al., Reference Li, Tao, Wang, Wang, Li and Song2023), underscoring the urgency of addressing plastic pollution at its source (Ammendolia et al., Reference Ammendolia, Castle, Richardson and Walker2025).

From a governance perspective, the absence of a treaty may accelerate a patchwork of regional and national measures, leading to regulatory inconsistencies and limited global impact. Such fragmentation risks undermining economies of scale in solutions. On the other hand, the lack of agreement undermines the sense of faith or trust in the capacity of international institutions to address shared ecological and public health threats, potentially weakening cooperation on other global challenges, such as climate change. It should also be noted that the success of the petrochemical lobbyists risks institutionalising corporate influence over global environmental governance, further impacting public trust in international institutions’ capabilities.

Moving forward

Although INC-5.2 ended without consensus, the treaty process remains active, with further negotiations anticipated in early 2026. Several procedural and institutional pathways have been proposed by Member States and observers. These include reforms to INC decision-making procedures, the elevation of negotiations to the UN General Assembly, the use of existing multilateral environmental agreements (e.g., the Basel Convention) to advance specific elements or the pursuit of an Ottawa-style agreement among high-ambition states. Each pathway faces distinct barriers: reforming consensus rules requires broad political agreement; UN General Assembly routes risk dilution of ambition and plurilateral agreements may generate fragmentation but could also establish de facto global standards through market and trade effects. These options reflect not an abandonment of the treaty process, but a strategic reassessment in response to procedural stagnation.

In parallel with global negotiations, countries may continue to establish or strengthen national plastics action plans and domestic regulatory frameworks as interim measures. While such initiatives can drive innovation and reduce local pollution, their effectiveness remains limited in addressing transboundary plastic flows and global production dynamics. This mirrors the experience of climate governance under the Paris Agreement, which relies primarily on voluntary nationally determined contributions, underscoring both the potential and the limitations of decentralised approaches in addressing global environmental crises.

A deeper understanding of negotiating dynamics also requires attention to procedural issues. Since INC-1, disagreements over the rules of procedure, particularly consensus-based decision-making, have shaped the pace and direction of negotiations. The roles of co-chairs in contact groups and informal discussions, the structuring of drafting processes and the distribution and timing of the Chair’s texts all materially influenced the Geneva outcomes. These procedural dimensions warrant careful consideration in designing future sessions. The pathways forward are still relatively obscure as the frustration from the deadlock of the Global Plastics Treaty negotiations remains in the air. It is, however, essential to reflect on the aspects that proved effective, those that fell short, and the pathways for moving forward.

• • Reforming negotiation procedures: Future rounds of negotiations must reconsider the consensus rule. Alternative decision-making procedures, such as qualified majority voting, could prevent obstruction by a small minority. Lessons from the Montreal Protocol, where strong provisions were eventually adopted despite early resistance, suggest that flexibility in procedure can unlock ambition.

• • Strengthening science-policy interfaces: Independent scientific assessments should play a stronger role in shaping negotiations, ensuring evidence-based policy remains central to decision-making. A formal “plastics science panel” like the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change for climate change could serve this purpose by providing authoritative, consensus-based knowledge.

• • Leveraging regional and national leadership: In the absence of a treaty, ambitious nations and blocs (e.g., the EU) should advance binding regional frameworks and trade-related measures to restrict plastic flows. Such measures can create de facto global standards by influencing supply chains and markets.

• • Mobilising public and civil society pressure: Maintaining advocacy is key to counterbalance industry lobbying and hold governments accountable. Civil society movements have historically led breakthroughs in global governance, as seen in the Montreal Protocol and the Paris Agreement, as well as played a decisive role in shaping and securing UNEA Resolution 5/14, demonstrating their capacity to influence agenda-setting and ambition. To strengthen Civil Society Organisation (CSO) participation in future treaty negotiations, several measures are critical: ensuring equitable access for Global South CSOs through sustained funding and visa support; increasing transparency in contact group and informal sessions; institutionalising observer participation mechanisms and supporting independent monitoring and accountability initiatives. Similar structural and procedural reforms are required to strengthen the role of independent scientific expertise, including formal channels for science-based submissions and clearer interfaces between scientific assessments and negotiating text development. Furthermore, coordinated regional networks and youth-led movements also offer powerful mechanisms for sustaining political momentum. The public demand for tackling plastic pollution remains strong, offering an opportunity for mobilisation.

• • Equity and just transition principles: A durable treaty must integrate financial and technical assistance for developing countries. Embedding equity and just transition mechanisms could alleviate concerns of unfair burden-sharing and ensure broad participation.

Final remarks

A binding global agreement is urgently required due to the inherently transboundary nature of plastic pollution, including marine litter transport, international trade in plastic products and cross-border waste movements. Plastic production is highly concentrated among a relatively small number of multinational petrochemical companies, limiting the effectiveness of uncoordinated national responses. Evidence from existing regional and national measures demonstrates that fragmented approaches are insufficient to curb global plastic flows or reduce production at scale, reinforcing the necessity of coordinated global regulation. The deadlock at the Global Plastics Treaty negotiations has been both poignant and frustrating for the scientific community, the public and anyone who is aware or has experienced the impacts of the plastic pollution crisis. This event has allowed us to reflect on how entrenched the political economy of fossil fuels and plastics is, the limitations of consensus-based governance, and the influence of industry lobbies. Yet, history shows that international environmental agreements often emerge from early failures, with the Montreal Protocol and the Paris Agreement as precedents. While negotiations reached a significant deadlock at INC-5.2, the process remains ongoing, and substantial intersessional efforts continue among Member States, observers and the INC Secretariat. The persistence of high-ambition states, civil society and scientific communities will be critical to overcoming this deadlock.